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Focusing on Results at the New York City Department of Education

The 2007–2008 academic year would mark a turning point for the New York City Department of Education (DOE). For the first time, the DOE would publicly release progress reports for each of New York City’s 1,456 public schools. The reports would evaluate schools along two dimensions. First, each school would receive a letter grade from “A” to “F” based on its demonstrated ability to improve student achievement. Second, each school would be given one of five ratings ranging from “undeveloped” to “well-developed” to evaluate the school team’s ability to use and manage data to improve student outcomes. Senior managers at the DOE expressed a wide range of predictions about how parents, teachers, and principals would react to the results, but all agreed that transparency of school performance data was a necessary step in dramatically improving student achievement.

Chief Accountability Officer Jim Liebman was the primary architect of the DOE’s new performance management system. He knew Chancellor Joel Klein’s citywide strategy and massive restructuring plan depended on the DOE’s ability to build the capacity of school teams to improve their performance without heavy oversight from a central bureaucracy and to hold principals accountable for their schools’ performance. Liebman and his team in the Office of Accountability were focused on both of these tasks.

As Liebman reflected on the design and initial implementation phases of the performance management system, he knew there was an inherent tension in simultaneously implementing an accountability system with strong consequences and a set of organizational learning processes that encouraged school teams to collaboratively use performance data to improve their own practice. He also believed that achieving the optimum balance between the two tasks could accelerate the shift to the results-oriented culture that was already under way in New York. (See **Exhibits 1a** and **1b** for performance data.)

Background and Context

Serving 1.1 million students in over 1,456 schools with a budget of \$15 billion, the New York City school system was the largest in the United States (**Exhibit 2**). After 32 years of governance by a seven-member appointed Board of Education in conjunction with 32 locally elected boards, the system came under the aegis of the city’s mayor, who established the DOE in 2000 and had the power

Lecturer Stacey Childress and Research Associate Tonika Cheek Clayton prepared this case. PELP cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management.

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to appoint the chancellor and other key personnel. When Mayor Michael Bloomberg began his first term in January 2002, he inherited what many perceived to be a failing school system. In July 2002, Bloomberg appointed Klein as the DOE's new chancellor.

Klein took over the DOE after a successful career in business, law, and politics. His lack of direct experience in education sparked some resistance to his appointment, but others hoped he could offer a fresh perspective on how to improve the troubled system. Following a series of community engagement meetings during his first year, Klein unveiled the Children First reform agenda, named to show his commitment to putting the interests of "children first, not politics or bureaucracy."

Preparing for Empowerment and Accountability

The early years of Children First focused mainly on regaining control of what Klein described as a "chaotic and dysfunctional organizational structure." Klein noted that his administration's "first task was to lock the system down, establish some control, and bring coherence to the system." Klein grouped the 32 community districts into 10 regional offices designed to support schools' operational and instructional needs. Using the regional offices to enforce standards and implement reforms, the DOE instituted a common math and literacy curriculum for grades K-8, ended social promotion, created 150 small schools to replace large failing high schools, and added math and literacy coaches as well as a parent coordinator position to every school (**Exhibit 3**).

Two years after establishing the regional offices, Klein's Children First message began shifting from regional control to school-level empowerment. The refined Children First strategy included three pillars of reform: leadership, empowerment, and accountability. Klein remarked: "Our reform strategy is premised on the core belief that strong school leaders who are empowered to build and support teams and make instructional and managerial decisions and who are prepared to be held accountable for student performance will result in high-functioning schools."

To address the inadequate preparation of principals for NYC schools, Klein created a selective Leadership Academy to train and recruit high-quality principals. Klein believed that if highly competent principals who were closest to the problems were empowered and given the resources needed to make decisions about solving them, this would ultimately be in the best interest of students. In order for empowerment to be effective, Klein also believed that principals needed to be held accountable for student performance. Klein described his theory of change:

If we empower principals and hold them accountable for school results, we'll do two things—shift the locus of power from central office to the schools, and shift the organizational culture to a focus on results. However, I know that autonomy in and of itself is not going to guarantee success. But it will lead to innovation. And I suspect that if we're tight on accountability and instill an intense focus on student outcomes, we can also build into the equation some variability in terms of problem solving at the school level and learn from it.

The Autonomy Zone In 2004, the DOE put Klein's theory into practice by launching a pilot program called the Autonomy Zone (the Zone), which gave a self-selected group of schools autonomy from regional control in exchange for more accountability for specific student performance targets. Twenty-six schools volunteered to join the Zone and signed five-year performance contracts that specified targets for a variety of indicators, including state test scores, attendance figures, and graduation rates. As part of the agreement, principals assumed control over all budgetary and decision-making authority that previously resided with regional offices and the DOE (**Exhibit 4**).

Zone schools that met their performance targets were left alone, while those that missed more than a set number of targets entered into what the DOE called the “ladder of consequences.” The first year a school missed its targets, the school’s leadership was required to develop specific action plans for the following year. If a school missed its performance goals for a second year, the principal could be removed. If things did not improve by the third year, the school could be closed. The principals answered to the DOE’s Zone chief executive officer, who was responsible for overseeing all Zone schools and working directly with those who failed to meet their targets.

After the first year of the pilot, four out of 26 schools failed to meet their targets. After the second year of the pilot, these four schools had met their targets. At the beginning of the second year, 20 additional schools joined the Zone. At the end of the second year, two of the 46 Zone schools failed to meet their performance goals for the first time. After three years, it had not been necessary for the DOE to remove any principals or close any schools participating in the pilot.

Empowerment schools Pleased with the results of the Autonomy Zone, Klein extended the strategic pillars of empowerment and accountability to all NYC public schools. In 2006, every principal in NYC had the opportunity to join Zone schools in a new structure called “empowerment schools.” Becoming an empowerment school was not based on prior performance. As Klein saw it, “Empowerment is a precondition for success, not something that schools should have to earn.”

Despite opposition from people in the regional and central offices and from the principals’ union, 320 principals from schools across all five NYC boroughs volunteered to become empowerment schools. Some opponents of the reorganization argued that empowerment school principals were giving up too much by signing performance contracts, while other critics felt that the empowerment structure discarded the benefits of the regional structures, such as community relationships, feeder school collaborations, and the sharing of solutions to problems common within regions (**Exhibit 5**).

Klein remarked on the success of the initiative in beginning a cultural change:

I think if you don’t change the culture of public education, you’re not going to change the outcomes materially. A culture that doesn’t focus on performance is a culture that won’t work. And now these principals are saying they want to be held accountable for their performance. It’s quite a thing to have 320 principals, over the objection of their union, sign performance agreements saying, “If I don’t hit the ball, they’ll be sending me to the minors.” It’s a big, big deal given the objections from the union and the good relationships many of these principals have with their regions. So that, to me, is a really profound change.

Empowerment schools assumed all instructional and budget authority previously held by the regional and central offices and received additional money to compensate for the support services they would no longer receive from the DOE. The DOE created a market for services by allowing empowerment schools to purchase support they needed from regional offices or external vendors.

Because the Zone CEO did not have the capacity to directly oversee all of the empowerment schools, the DOE created a network structure to support schools’ instructional and operational needs. Each school self-selected into a network of 20 to 25 schools based solely on the principal’s desire to affiliate with other empowerment schools. In practice this meant that there were no geographic patterns, and few schools in any of the networks had similar school-level characteristics. Each network interviewed and selected a network leader from a pool of former principals and regional administrators. The network leader’s role was to coordinate common support services for the group of schools, not to supervise network principals. In fact, the network leader was accountable to the network principals for providing the support they needed. The network leader selected and supervised a staff including two achievement coaches to help schools focus on using data to improve

instruction, a business manager to provide operational support across the network, and a special education specialist. However, these roles were loosely defined, and it was up to the principals and the network leader to design the team to provide differentiated support based on schools' needs.

Empowerment schools faced a ladder of consequences similar to the one that had been developed during the Autonomy Zone pilot. The first year a school missed its targets, it had to develop an action plan for reaching them the following year. The second year, the principal could be removed, and if the school failed to improve after two more years, it could be closed. During SY 07, the 320 empowerment schools formed networks, built network teams, and exercised their autonomy in a variety of ways. Because they represented nearly 25% of all New York schools, they had a dramatic influence on Klein's thinking about changes to the entire system.

Restructuring the entire system In January 2007, Klein announced a fundamental shift away from the regional model he had established at the beginning of his tenure and unveiled a new three-pronged organizational structure that would go into effect in fall 2007. The 10 regional offices would be disbanded, and all schools would choose to participate in one of three structures:

1. The empowerment support organization: Additional schools could become empowerment schools by signing performance contracts and forming self-managed networks.
2. Learning support organizations (four): Most similar to the old regional structure but not organized geographically, learning support organizations would offer schools service, support, and oversight through four centers run by the DOE in locations around New York.
3. Partnership support organizations: Schools that partnered with external nonprofit organizations for support and services would be part of this structure and would sign performance contracts. A number of schools were already partnered with external organizations, and the new structure would formally give those organizations additional support responsibilities, hold them accountable for school results, and open up the option to additional schools and nonprofits.

As with the Autonomy Zone and empowerment schools experiments, all elementary and middle school principals would still have a relationship with one of 32 community superintendents, and high school principals with one of 10 high school superintendents. Both groups of superintendents were responsible for duties specified by law (e.g., hiring, rating, and firing principals) (**Exhibit 6**). The services previously provided by the regions would be supplied, if at all, by the organization with which each school chose to affiliate. Although each of the three organizational structures had distinctive features and benefits, all principals would sign performance contracts and be held accountable for their students' results. With the intentional differentiation of structures and school practices that would result from the dramatic change, Klein knew the DOE needed a common thread to keep the schools linked to one another and the DOE. As he explained: "Schools will not only be allowed to but encouraged to differentiate their approaches for achieving results for their students. But we need to create integrating mechanisms through accountability and organizational learning systems that are inherently flexible enough to allow for this differentiation while knitting all schools together into a system of great schools."

Creating a Learning Organization

Liebman had been a respected scholar and teacher at Columbia Law School when Klein convinced him to join the DOE in 2005 as the chief accountability officer and charged him with leading the design and implementation of a performance management system. Liebman believed that the success

of the performance management system was contingent upon schools developing into organizations in which the professionals in them were constantly learning with one another about how to solve performance problems. He described the link between accountability and organizational learning:

Accountability isn't entirely or even mainly about incentives. It's about capacity building, which to me means adult learning based on self- and team evaluation of what's working and what's not, and knowledge management, meaning spreading what works from one student or school to another. If we want the lever of accountability to be as powerful as possible, we have to provide ways for schools to build their capacity to be relatively self-sufficient in evaluating themselves every day and in solving their unique performance problems and, when necessary, in asking for the specific help they need. This will never work if the central bureaucracy behaves as if it has all the answers. Our role is to help professionals in schools ask better questions so that they can craft customized answers based on their own evaluation of their performance problems.

With this philosophy in mind, Liebman's team in the Office of Accountability worked to develop tools and processes that could enable schools to build their capacity to self-evaluate and learn while holding them accountable for student performance and spreading the knowledge their innovations generated. Key elements of the new system were school-quality reviews, periodic assessments, inquiry teams, senior achievement facilitators, a new technology system, and school progress reports.

Quality Reviews

Beginning in SY 07, every school in New York would participate in an annual quality review (QR). The Office of Accountability partnered with Cambridge Education, a United Kingdom-based school review firm, to develop and implement the QR protocols for three years. Modeled in part after public school inspections in the U.K. and Hong Kong, the rubric developed for NYC QRs focused primarily on a school's use of data to adjust teaching practices in order to improve student outcomes. Liebman and his team created five overarching quality statements with detailed secondary points for reviewers to use as a guide when evaluating schools. Before their review, principals received training that covered the quality statements and the QR process (**Exhibit 7**).

Liebman described why he created a rubric focused on the use of data:

I looked at all of the rubrics that are out there for school reviews and instructional walkthroughs. They all have one section on the use of data to drive strategy and facilitate frequent adjustment, and many other sections on inputs such as specific teaching practices and curricular materials. As I thought about what we are trying to accomplish, I realized that what we needed to change most was the emphasis in our schools from "teaching inputs" to "learning outcomes." Until we instill a culture of data-driven instructional differentiation in our schools, I'm not as interested in the parts of these rubrics about inputs.

Secondly, we are not pushing a particular educational philosophy or professional development strategy. The last thing we want to do is to convey the sense that we have an idea in our heads at the central office about what the "right" answer is for each school. So it all came together for me in formulating our school-quality reviews around this notion of school teams organizing themselves to use what they know objectively or can learn about their students to be good self-evaluators and problem solvers.

In spring 2006, the DOE worked with Cambridge Education to pilot the process in 100 schools. Throughout SY 07, after modestly revising the rubric and the process, Cambridge Education

consultants performed all of the school-quality reviews and began training DOE principals and administrators to conduct the process by having them observe actual QRs. Since most of the consultants were former school principals and administrators who resided in the U.K., each traveled to NYC for five to six weeks at a time to keep a steady flow of QRs in process.

By June 2007, approximately 140 consultants had conducted school-quality reviews across all 1,456 schools. Starting in SY 08, principals would be held accountable for the results of their QRs. The DOE planned to have enough internal reviewers trained so that many QRs could be conducted without outside consultants by 2010.

Real-life QR—a principal’s perspective Principal Karen Reed perused the QR agenda she had created as she waited for the reviewer to arrive (**Exhibit 8**). The reviewer was set to meet privately with a group of parents, teachers, and students as part of the QR protocol. Following established QR procedure, Reed had also asked two teachers to each present a case study of a student to demonstrate how the school differentiated instruction to improve the student’s progress. In addition to the self-evaluation form she had already submitted to demonstrate her school’s own assessment of its success in meeting the quality statements, she had prepared several documents that she hoped would shed light on her team’s efforts to incorporate the ideas in the quality statements into their day-to-day work. As principal of an empowerment school, she understood the consequences of receiving an “undeveloped” rating because they mirrored those she had agreed to in her performance contract (**Exhibit 9**).

Reed had participated in the Children First Intensive, a two-hour training session to prepare principals for QRs. She learned that reviewers signed a code of conduct stating that they did not have any preconceived notions of the school prior to the QR, but she worried about the reviewer’s ability to fairly assess her school during a relatively short visit. Because her school’s student population was under 500, only one reviewer would assess the school over a one-and-a-half-day visit. For schools with student populations between 500 and 1,000, one reviewer would visit for three days and be joined by a second reviewer for a day and a half. Schools with enrollments over 1,000 received two reviewers for three days.

She had heard mixed reactions to QRs from her colleagues. While some found their reviewers to be helpful and constructive, others felt as though they were treated harshly or had difficulty connecting personally with the reviewer. If she felt that her QR was conducted unfairly, she knew she had the option to appeal to the Office of Accountability. Appeals could be as simple as language changes in the report or as complicated as direct challenges to the reviewer’s final ratings.

Real-life QR—a reviewer’s point of view Scott Abbott had not traveled to NYC much before becoming a Cambridge Education consultant, so he enjoyed walking from subway stops to schools to get a sense of the neighborhood before entering the school. Prior to his job at Cambridge Education, Abbott worked as one of Her Majesty’s inspectors, a title given to school inspectors in the U.K., after serving for several years as a U.K. school principal. He was one of the first consultants to administer NYC’s QRs during the 100-school pilot, so he had reviewed many empowerment and regional schools across the ratings spectrum.

In preparation for this QR, Abbott reviewed all available student performance data and the self-evaluation form completed by the principal and her team. During the school visit, he would look for evidence of the quality review statements in action. Although the self-evaluation form provided by the principal gave him some of the evidence he was looking for, he still needed answers to several questions. He had also prepared specific questions for his group meetings with teachers, parents, and students absent the principal. Throughout the visit he would ask the principals and teachers very specific questions in search of evidence to support each quality statement. In some cases, the school

leadership provided the evidence needed early on without much effort. In other cases, Abbott felt as though getting the principal to talk in detail about the school's use of data to inform instruction was "like trying to nail jelly to a wall."

At the end of the visit, Abbott would meet privately with the school principal to offer feedback and to discuss ratings on each of the quality statements and the school's overall rating. Depending on Abbott's evaluation of each quality statement, he would give the school an overall rating of well-developed, proficient, or undeveloped. When assigning a rating to a quality statement, Abbott needed to cite specific evidence in support of his assessment. In the following days, he would write a report for the principal and the Office of Accountability detailing his observations and evidence in support of his ratings. Once completed and reviewed by the principals, and barring any appeal, the report would be published on the DOE's public website.

After Cambridge Education had conducted a few hundred QRs, it worked with the Office of Accountability to pull examples from real reports to clarify for principals and reviewers what a well-developed, proficient, or undeveloped school looked like for each of the quality statements in order to try to build consistency across reviewers. After the first round of QRs, the team realized that a small number of schools were rated well-developed or undeveloped, and most schools were designated proficient. However, the range of observed practices within the proficient category was so wide that the Office of Accountability decided to expand from three to five ratings for SY 08 in order to capture more granularity for schools rated at the high and low ends of the proficient category, at the top of the undeveloped category, and at the bottom of the well-developed category.

Periodic Assessments

The Office of Accountability instituted a "no-stakes" periodic assessment program to gather data on students' strengths and needs in support of quality statement number five. The assessments were intended to be used by teachers as a tool for understanding where students were struggling so that they could align instruction accordingly. By "no stakes," the Office of Accountability meant that the data from periodic assessments was solely for the use of school-level employees to improve their own instructional practice, not for the purpose of any external evaluation of how individual teachers or schools were performing. The results of the periodic assessments would not influence a school's quality review rating; however, the school's ability to demonstrate processes and practices for using the data to improve instruction would be a major factor in the QR ratings.

Beginning in SY 07, empowerment schools were required to deliver periodic assessments in math and reading five times per year. In the following academic year, this requirement would expand to all schools regardless of which of the three organizational structures they joined. Some senior managers at the DOE felt that mandating periodic assessments was contrary to empowering school principals to make instructional decisions, while others believed that the assessments were critical to helping schools adopt a continuous improvement cycle in which they used data to improve student learning. Skeptical of the impact of periodic assessments, Randi Weingarten, president of NYC's United Federation of Teachers, remarked, "Our issue is, how much teaching time is this eating up? You're spending a lot of time doing test prep and paperwork associated with test prep instead of teaching."¹

Acknowledging that schools had different needs with regard to the content and design of the assessments, the Office of Accountability allowed schools to either choose from a menu of DOE-approved assessments or develop assessments of their own. To ensure a certain level of quality,

¹ Julie Bosman, "City Expands Test Program in Schools," *The New York Times*, May 31, 2007.

schools that decided to develop their own periodic assessments had to submit a proposal to the Office of Accountability to demonstrate that their own approach equaled or surpassed the rigor of the options approved by the DOE. The proposal also had to explain in detail the school's capacity to design and implement the assessments given competing demands for the school leadership's time. All self-designed assessments had to meet eight criteria:

1. Align with state standards.
2. Demonstrate mastery of curriculum.
3. Break down activity into component parts and identify student strengths and weaknesses.
4. Reveal student progress to teachers, parents, and students.
5. Rely on objective evaluative standards that can be applied by school faculty consistently for different students.
6. Allow progress of students and groups of students to be compared over time.
7. Identify ways to close the gap between where students are now and the learning objectives they need to achieve.
8. Administer assessments approximately five times a year.

The implementation of the periodic assessment program in empowerment schools resulted in significant feedback on the assessment features, both positive and negative. The DOE used this feedback to draft a highly specific request for proposal (RFP) to provide a more flexible and comprehensive assessment program for the citywide application that aligned with educators' requirements. When all schools adopted periodic assessments in SY 08, the vendor chosen through the RFP would provide multiple testing options for schools that would:

- Predict student's performance on state exams and identify areas of weakness
- Assess progress in those targeted areas of weakness
- Align to the most widely used curricula in city schools
- Pinpoint a student's instructional level regardless of grade level (for students performing well below or above grade level)
- Allow for customization of the assessment by schools

In line with Klein's empowerment philosophy, schools could administer the assessments provided by the vendor that most met their students' needs or elect to design their own tests as long as they met the eight criteria for self-designed assessments.

Inquiry Teams

In an effort to build each school's capacity to use data to improve instruction, the Office of Accountability asked each of the 320 empowerment schools to develop an "inquiry team" during SY 07. Each team included the school's principal and three or four teachers selected by the principal and was charged with identifying a struggling group of students and using data from periodic assessments and school-level observations to develop a targeted instructional approach for each

student. Irma Zardoya, leader of the Children First Intensive professional development program, described the process and expectations for each inquiry team:

Each team selects 15 to 30 students who are outside the school's sphere of success and who share similar academic struggles. Then, the team looks not only at the students' current performance data but also at their histories, looking for patterns. The team conducts low-inference classroom observations to understand how instruction is delivered, how the students respond, and how they are either learning or not learning.

Then, the inquiry team members develop strategies that they feel will help the students learn. These go beyond finding an extra teacher or offering reading recovery. Rather, the team focuses on specific ways that a student's existing teacher could change his or her practice to support the student's progress in developing a particular skill. The team tracks the group of students' progress as a result of these strategies.

We ask the teachers on the inquiry teams to share their findings with their colleagues in the school to lay the groundwork for other teachers to engage in a similar collaborative process of inquiry. We hope the inquiry teams serve to develop a culture of learning, in which the members of each school community continually study what they do and incorporate the learning to make their teaching better and to improve student achievement.

Liebman's team was encouraged that in a survey of inquiry teams, over 85% of respondents felt as though the work was valuable and wanted to continue it in the coming year. In addition to expanding inquiry teams to all 1,456 schools in SY 08, the Office of Accountability planned to extend the range of activities for the existing inquiry teams to include communicating with the school community about the school's results, developing schoolwide protocols for looking at student work, and implementing solutions based on QR findings.

Senior Achievement Facilitator

To provide additional support from the Office of Accountability to each school, Liebman planned to institute a new high-level role called the senior achievement facilitator (SAF). SAFs would support 20–25 schools within the empowerment, learning support, and partner organizations, but they would not supervise principals in the traditional sense. Their chief responsibilities would be to support their schools' efforts to utilize all of the new performance tools and processes to improve student achievement and to provide professional development in support of the inquiry teams. Liebman also expected the SAFs to be a critical part of a feedback loop that would help his team continually refine the tools and processes to best serve schools.

Liebman estimated that the DOE needed 62 individuals in achievement facilitation roles to cover all 1,456 schools. As a key part of their own training to succeed in the new environment, the 32 community and 10 high school superintendents would provide achievement facilitation to a group of 20–25 schools while continuing to oversee a separate group of schools as established by state law. This arrangement was designed to enable the superintendents, during this initial capacity-building period, to separate their support activities from the oversight function. The DOE would fill 20 SAF openings with senior managers such as former regional and deputy superintendents and former principals who had credibility with existing principals. All candidates would be required to demonstrate a solid knowledge of the uses of data to improve instruction.

Achievement Reporting and Innovation System (ARIS)

In order to support the push for schools to use data to solve performance problems, the DOE had to revolutionize its technology infrastructure. To access student achievement data using the existing systems, principals and teachers endured a time-intensive process that required multiple logins to different systems, none of which presented all the relevant data in a single application. Moreover, performance data was not broken down to detail a student's strengths or weaknesses, nor did a student's performance data follow the child from school to school.

As one senior manager described it, the DOE's existing knowledge management system was "based on the old bureaucratic idea that experts would develop knowledge about valuable instructional practices centrally and push it down to schools vertically—often by fiat." She continued:

The new empowerment structure assumes that most knowledge will be developed locally in individual schools in response to problems presented by individual students and groups of students. Distributing this more granular knowledge horizontally from one school to another both on a voluntary "pull" basis [teachers and schools proactively seeking the information] and on a data-driven "push" basis [automatically informing struggling schools about practices at schools performing better with similar student populations] poses a challenge that school systems all over the country are trying to solve.

To integrate the existing disparate student data systems and use the data to help distribute knowledge horizontally, the DOE signed an \$80 million contract with IBM and Wireless Generation to create the Achievement Reporting and Innovation System (ARIS). The goal of ARIS was to provide school professionals with access to all of the district's historical and current student performance data and effective practices through a single Web-based interface. This would require the system to bring together all of the district's past and current student achievement data systems on one application and to provide added functionality for administrators and teachers, including the ability to analyze the new periodic assessment data. The system would also allow teachers, principals, and administrators to publish, retrieve, and receive targeted alerts about effective practices tagged to particular subjects and student populations (**Exhibit 10**).

Office of Accountability Chief of Staff Rajeev Bajaj described the purpose of ARIS:

Over a period of time, we expect ARIS to become an intelligent engine that links data and content in a way that's meaningful for practitioners. So say there's a fourth-grade teacher who has a specific reading problem [e.g., phonemic awareness] with her ELL students. The teacher will be able to go onto ARIS and look up schools with similar populations of ELL fourth graders that are doing well with that specific reading concept and learn about interventions or other pieces of "small knowledge" they've used to improve performance. We are enabling collaboration through Web 2.0 tools so educators can interactively share and refine best practices and describe what worked [or did not] when they tried to solve a similar problem.

In the past, the assumption was that there were only a few big instructional problems and that central experts had the right one-size-fits-all approach. We now know that if you can break down large problems into series of more granular problems, often many of those small problems have already been solved and the best "know-how" is in other schools with the same challenge. This bottom-up approach to harvesting effective practices from educators who are closest to students will allow knowledge flow to be horizontal within and across schools instead of top down from a regional office or the DOE. This has transformed our thinking about one role of the central office as a facilitator and supporter of collaboration.

The first development phase of ARIS would launch to principals and teachers in September 2007. In the fall of 2008, ARIS would be used to distribute school- and student-performance data and quality review reports to parents and periodic assessment reports following the five assessment windows.

Designing and Implementing Progress Reports

In order to achieve a transparent way of evaluating and communicating school performance internally and externally, the Office of Accountability designed a progress report that would give a historical account of a school's overall success in improving student academic outcomes. Progress reports for all schools covered four main components, each with different weights that would contribute to the school's overall letter grade of A, B, C, D, or F: school environment = 15%; student performance = 30%; student progress = 55%; and closing the achievement gap = extra credit (**Exhibits 11a and 11b**).

To account for differences in curriculum and targets by grade level, two versions of the report were created, one for elementary and middle schools and another for high schools. The DOE would eventually expand the range of reports to include separate reports for schools serving only early-childhood students (grades K-3), special-education students taking alternative assessments, and high schools students who were at risk of "aging out" of the school system without graduating.

School environment In both versions of the report, the school environment section scored schools based on attendance figures and survey data from parents, teachers, and students in sixth through 12th grades. The DOE used an outside vendor to administer surveys that Liebman's team had designed. The surveys covered four areas: safety, expectations, student engagement, and communication between stakeholders and schools. The section would count 15% toward the overall progress report score (5% for attendance and 10% for the four areas covered by the surveys). At the end of SY 07, the DOE had conducted the first survey of parents, teachers, and students. Administering almost 2 million surveys posed significant implementation challenges, but the response rates were large enough to allow for reliable data on the four survey areas in a large majority of schools. Overall response rates were close to 25% of the more than 1 million surveyed families, 30% of surveyed teachers, and over 90% of sixth through 12th graders.

Student performance The student-performance section graded the school based on the percentage of students scoring proficient and above on that year's state mathematics and English-language arts exams for elementary and middle school students. Science and social studies would be added over the next two years. On the high school progress report, this section also scored graduation rates and the percentage of 11th and 12th graders taking the PSAT, SAT, or ACT. This section comprised 30% of the overall progress-report score.

Student progress To distinguish the new progress reports from previous "accountability reports" distributed by the city and state, the DOE added a focus on individual student *progress* over time rather than a sole focus on student *performance* at a point in time. The *progress* section measured the longitudinal change in an individual student's performance within one school year. For example, if most students started the school year at a "below-basic" level but ended the year at a "high-basic" level, the school would receive credit for the aggregate gain, even if the students did not reach the "proficient" level. On the flip side, a school could lose points if many students started the year at the "advanced" level and ended the year at the "proficient" level.

In the past, accountability reports only focused on percentages of students at proficient and above at a point in time, not on the gains or losses in a student's performance within and across all of the performance levels. Instead of rewarding schools for the kinds of students they attracted, the DOE hoped this area of the progress report would reward what schools brought to the students—in other words, giving schools credit for “adding value” to their students' performance trajectory. They expected the progress measurement to highlight the schools in which student learning was taking place and to stop giving schools an incentive to screen for higher-performing students in their enrollment processes.

To reflect changes in performance, the elementary and middle school student progress sections measured the average change of student proficiency in mathematics and English-language arts on state exams. For high schools, the student progress section compared schools based on whether students' scores on the New York state high school Regents exams across five subjects were below, at, or above the levels predicted by the same students' eighth-grade scores on state standardized tests in the same subject. The high school version also weighted credit accumulation, the average changes in PSAT scores from 10th to 11th grade, and the average pass rate for Regents exams. To make operational their belief in the importance of a school's ability to add value to its students' learning, Liebman and his team weighted this section as 55% of a school's overall progress-report score.

Closing the achievement gap Lastly, the achievement gap section gave extra credit to elementary and middle schools that raised proficiency levels by half of a proficiency level or more among high proportions of struggling African-American, Hispanic, English-language learner, and special-education students. The comparable section on the high school version gave extra credit to schools based on the number of students in those same populations that attained at least a quarter of the credits needed to graduate in each of their first two years of high school. This was based on DOE data that showed that ninth- and 10th-grade credit accumulation predicted graduation.

Overall grade In each of the three subsections, schools received two scores: one showing how well the school performed in relation to all NYC public schools, and another demonstrating how the school performed relative to “peer” schools with comparable student populations. To determine the overall grade, the city and peer comparisons for each subsection were weighted 33% and 67%, respectively, to derive a total subsection score, and then each subsection score was weighted appropriately (school environment = 15%, student performance = 30%, and student progress = 55%). Then, any extra credit was added for closing the achievement gap. This calculation yielded a numerical score that was converted into a letter grade (**Exhibit 12**). In addition to the letter grades, the rating from the school's QR would be reported on the progress report but would not factor into the progress-report grade.

During SY 07, draft versions of progress-report results were piloted first for empowerment schools and then, after revisions based on the pilot, for all schools. SY 07 results would be publicly released in September 2007 with consequences attached.

Results and Consequences

Although QRs and progress reports were both tools to help the DOE hold schools accountable for results, Liebman viewed the results from each very differently. He described school-quality reviews as leading indicators in predicting the school's future student-performance outcomes. He categorized the letter grades on the various sections of the progress reports as lagging indicators of a school's current and past performance. Because of this difference, it was possible for a school to receive a low grade on its progress report based on current performance indicators but receive a “well-developed”

rating as a result of its QR—the opposite was also possible. One member of Liebman’s team explained his reaction to this potential outcome:

In the early years of the implementation of these systems, I imagine we will see some counterintuitive pairings of quality-review ratings and progress-report grades. But what we have to believe is that if our QR rubric and rating process is valid as a leading indicator, then over a few years a school’s progress-report grades will change for better or worse consistent with the QR ratings.

To clearly communicate the consequences for schools earning low grades and poor QR ratings, Liebman’s team created a matrix that defined a school’s standing depending on its results (**Exhibit 9**).

To assist in the enforcement of consequences, Liebman’s Office of Accountability team was expanded to include a School Improvement Office, which had previously been housed in the DOE’s Division of Teaching and Learning. This office would assist community and high school superintendents in conducting performance conversations and work with school support organizations and senior achievement facilitators to support the structured academic planning required in the first year in which schools failed to meet their goals.

Supported by the chancellor’s office, the community and high school superintendents would implement principal removal and school closures if they became necessary and exercise other statutory supervisory roles. Because the DOE was moving to an organizational structure in which principals had more control over their programs and activities, the new emphasis on accountability and on consequences for school success and failure had important philosophical and practical implications. As one senior manager explained:


When people ask me whom principals will be accountable to, a big part of my answer is that “they are accountable to the data.” But to make this stick, we need to be prepared to remove principals from their schools each year based on their students’ performance. If we can’t effectively enforce that consequence in a disciplined way, we will dilute the power of all the other elements of the system.

Making the Cultural Shift

Chancellor Klein often explained his view of the culture change that had to happen in New York, saying, “If our reforms are to succeed, we’ll need to go through three major cultural shifts. We will have to evolve from a culture of excuses to a culture of accountability, from a culture of compliance to a culture of innovation, and from a culture of uniformity to a culture of differentiation.” As Liebman reflected on the three shifts, it was clear to him that each piece of the performance management system he and his team were implementing had a role to play in creating a culture of accountability, innovation, and differentiation.

As the school teams used the new tools and processes to improve their performance, Liebman and his team would continue to adapt and refine them based on what they learned during the implementation phases. Accomplishing rapid institutionalization of the new systems and structures to create lasting culture change was a key challenge. Mayor Bloomberg would not run for reelection, so 2009 would be his last year in office. Because Klein reported to the mayor, there would likely be a leadership change at the top of the DOE in 2010. Liebman knew that he and his team had less than three years remaining to contribute to the realization of Klein’s vision of cultural transformation.

Exhibit 1a New York City and State of New York English-Language Arts and Mathematics Assessments Results



Sources: New York City Department of Education; State University of the State of New York, State Education Department:

2002 English Language Arts Test Results

http://www.emsc.nysed.gov/irts/ELA4_8_2002/4th8thEnglish2002final.ppt

2002 Math Test Results

www.emsc.nysed.gov/irts/Math4_8_2002/Math_Results4th8th_grade_2002.ppt

2007 English Language Arts Test Results



<http://schools.nyc.gov/daa/2007ela/default.asp> - Summary Report on the 2007 Results of the ELA Assessments (Grades 3-8)

<http://www.emsc.nysed.gov/irts/ela-math/ela-07/Grade3-8ELAResults2007Final.ppt>

2007 Math Test Results

<http://www.emsc.nysed.gov/irts/ela-math/math-07/Grade3-8MathTests2007FINAL.ppt>

Exhibit 1b New York City Mathematics Assessments Results, 1999–2007



Note: New York state exams have four performance categories, with level one being the lowest and roughly comparable to “below-basic” designations in other states, level two comparable to “basic,” level three comparable to “proficient,” and level four comparable to advanced.

Source: New York City Department of Education.

Exhibit 2 New York City Public Schools Facts and Figures

Number of K-12 students (as of 10/31/06)	1,042,078
American Indian	4,520
Asian	142,172
Black	336,191
Hispanic	410,016
White	149,179
English Language Learners	135,573
Budget	\$15 billion
Number of Schools and Programs (as of 12/31/06, excludes charters)	1,456

Source: New York City Department of Education.

Exhibit 3 Summary of Children First Reforms

Children First Reform Highlights 2002–2005

- DOE management structure reorganized with the creation of regional offices
- A uniform literacy and math curriculum instituted for grades K-8
- Select failing secondary schools closed; 150 new small secondary schools opened
- New parent support system established with a parent coordinator in every school
- Leadership Academy created to train new school leaders
- Autonomy Zone piloted

Three Pillars of Children First

- Leadership—Principals as the locus of control
- Empowerment—Value exchange between autonomy and accountability
- Accountability—Use quantitative and qualitative measures to hold principals accountable for the demonstrated progress of every student

Source: New York City Department of Education

Exhibit 4 Autonomy Zone Value Exchange Summary


Value Exchange: Summary Autonomy for Accountability

PRINCIPALS ACCEPT: 5-year Performance Agreements	PRINCIPALS RECEIVE: Control and Support		
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT	AUTONOMY (within legal and contractual requirements)		
5-year standards with a minimum annual gap-closure target: - Average daily attendance: 90% HS; 92% MS/ES - 80% Regents cohort pass rate for ELA and Math Regents Exams - 4-year cohort graduation rate: 70% OR 55% 4-year and 75% 5-year - 2 or 4-year college acceptance: 90% of graduating students - Annual drop-out rate: No more than 4% of HS students enrolled - Annual course pass rate: 75% HS - Meet AYP targets for ELA, Math & Science in all subgroups for grades 3 through 8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Choice of curriculum, instructional models and interim assessments - Membership in school-led networks organized around shared educational philosophies - Choice of professional development - Flexibility in scheduling of school day - Maximum flexibility in staffing decisions within contract - Greater flexibility in school budget - Opportunity to develop new approaches to educate special populations 		
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY	CROSS-FUNCTIONAL SUPPORT		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - All student groups (ELL, SPED and Level 1) make educational gains on test scores and graduation rates - For choice enrollment schools, attract an equitable entering class mix that is close to citywide HS average for ELL, SPED, level 1 (no less than 10% ELL; 10% SPED, no less than 25% Level 1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dedicated team from ROC/Admin, Human Resources, Youth Development, Special Education/ELL - Voice in selecting LIS and setting coaching/support priorities - Reduction in administrative/paperwork burden on principals - Timely, useful data about all aspects of school performance: accountability metrics and other management information - Optional attendance in any professional development or other DOE forum 		
SHARED LEARNING			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Document, share best practices, accept visits 			
FISCAL INTEGRITY			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Expend resources consistent with education plans and within approved budget levels. In addition, spending must comply with contracting and purchasing procedures 			
INCENTIVES & CONSEQUENCES			
<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; vertical-align: top;"> <u>Consequence:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Renewal/non-renewal with or without conditions - School closure </td> <td style="width: 50%; vertical-align: top;"> <u>Incentives:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Visibility of results to peers, public </td> </tr> </table>	<u>Consequence:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Renewal/non-renewal with or without conditions - School closure 	<u>Incentives:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Visibility of results to peers, public 	
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Source: New York City Department of Education.

Exhibit 5 NYC Schools Old and New Organizational Structures


Disbanded NYC Department of Education and Regional Organizational Structure



Source: New York City Department of Education.

Exhibit 5 (continued)

NYC Department of Education Organizational Chart (2007-2008)




(*) There will be 9 certificated high school superintendents, which will have schools assigned to them based partly on geographic factors and partly on the school support organization they have chosen to work with
 (**) School support organizations to be selected by the principal and approved by the appropriate Superintendent

Source: New York City Department of Education.

Exhibit 5 (continued)

NYC Department of Education - Chancellor's Office



Source: New York City Department of Education.

Exhibit 6 New York State Statutory Powers and Duties of Community Superintendents

1. Appoint and assign principals and supervisory personnel in accordance with chancellor's regulations.
2. Evaluate, at least annually, the performance of every principal in the district with respect to educational effectiveness and school performance, including effectiveness of promoting student achievement and parental involvement and maintaining school discipline.
3. Transfer or remove principals for persistent educational failure, conflicts of interest, and ethics violation.
4. Require principals to participate in training and other remedial programs to address identified factors affecting student achievement and school performance.
5. Retain fiscal officer(s), who shall be selected from qualified fiscal personnel employed by the City Department of Education, to monitor and report on schools' expenditures pursuant to school-based budgets. Fiscal officers may be responsible for more than one district. The fiscal officer may be located as determined by the chancellor.
6. Operate the administrative offices and similar facilities, including social centers and recreational and extracurricular programs, under the district's jurisdiction.
7. Administer district minor repair and purchasing funds and provide for minor repairs to all schools buildings and other sites within the district.
8. Provide relevant data to the Community District Education Council to encourage informed and adequate public discussion on student achievement and the state of each school within the district.
9. Submit zoning lines, consistent with regulations of the chancellor, to the Community District Education Council for approval.
10. Recommend to the Community District Education Council for approval and submission to the chancellor a district annual capacity plan, based on data from the chancellor on enrollment/utilization for each school within the district.
11. Have regular communications with all parent associations in the district and meet at least quarterly with elected officers of the parent associations and provide information so that associations have with full factual information concerning matters of pupil achievement, including (but not limited to) annual reading scores, comparison of achievement of pupils in comparable grades and schools, and the record of achievement of such pupils as they progress through schools (in nonidentifiable manner).
12. Take all necessary steps to ensure the integrity of community district operations, consistent with regulations promulgated by the chancellor.
13. Review, modify, and approve school-based budgets proposed by each school in the district.
14. Sign written orders issued by the director of finance of the city for the disbursement of funds credited to a community council.
15. Discontinue teaching and supervisory staff prior to the completion of probation and recommend teaching and supervisory personnel for appointment on tenure.
16. Appoint, define duties of, assign, promote, and discharge all nonsupervisory employees in the district, subject to the terms of any applicable collective bargaining agreements.
17. Initiate charges against teaching and supervisory staff who have completed probation, and where delegated by the chancellor implement any penalties or punishment imposed after a hearing on such charges.
18. Contract for and receive special, federal, state, and private funds, to be transmitted to the city board and disbursed through the chancellor, and use funds and resources obtained to design programs of educational excellence tailored to the needs and peculiar characteristics of the district. Apply to funding agencies as a local educational agency for federal or state funds not allocated to the city on a formula basis and accept such funds. Submit proposals to the chancellor for review as to form only and prompt transmittal to funding agencies for special funds allocated to the city on a formula basis, subject to restrictions on the total amount as determined by citywide formula, and consult with non-public school authorities on a continuing basis with any special funds applicable to non-public school programs and students.

19. Prepare semiannual and end-of-year reports, including an accounting of all funds received and expended by the Community District Education Council to be distributed to the chancellor, the Community District Education Council, and the public.
20. Approve/disapprove matters relating to the instruction of students in all district schools, including school choices with respect to the selection of textbooks and other materials, subject to the chancellor or his designees with authority to, among other things, establish minimum clear educational standards, curriculum requirements and frameworks, and mandatory educational objectives applicable to all schools and programs throughout the city district.
21. Delegate powers and duties to subordinate officers or employees of the district as he/she deems appropriate and modify or rescind such delegation.
22. Attend monthly public meetings of the Community District Education Council and discuss the current state of the schools in the district and progress made toward the implementation of the district's comprehensive education plan required by the chancellor.
23. The community superintendent is the superintendent of schools of the Community School District.
24. Maintain discipline in the educational and other facilities in the district and provide schools with the assistance necessary to maintain discipline. Suspend students from required attendance for specified behaviors and conduct hearings or designate a hearing officer to conduct such hearings for student suspensions that exceed five days.
25. Receive annual School Comprehensive Education Plans aligned with the school-based budget submitted by School Leadership Teams, as required by state education law.
26. Approve plans developed by the principal to enhance teacher and staff development related to increasing student achievement and support extended day programs, school reform programs, and pupil support services.
27. Develop a proposed budget for the administrative and operational expenses of the community superintendent and the Community District Education Council for submission to the chancellor and modify and reallocate monies in the enacted district budget.
28. Consult with the chancellor on the development of objective formulae to be used to allocate funds to the districts for the district's programs and activities, and advise on the educational needs of the community district, so that the formulae may reflect the relative needs of community districts to the maximum extent feasible.
29. With the participation of principals and schools, provide an annual update of the capital plan for the district, addressing health and safety, maintenance, capacity, and technology.
30. Purchase material goods, supplies, and services directly from vendors or suppliers, pursuant to a procurement policy for the city schools established by the chancellor.
31. Develop, in collaboration with administrators, teachers, and parents, a district plan for school-based planning and shared decision making, in accordance with Commissioner's Regulations 100.11.
32. Make an annual report covering all matters relating to schools under the district's jurisdiction including, but not limited to, the evaluation of the educational effectiveness of such schools and programs connected therewith.
33. Employ or retain counsel subject to the powers and duties of the corporation counsel of the city of New York to be the district's attorney and counsel, pursuant to subdivision a of section three hundred ninety-four of the New York city charter.
34. In addition to statutory powers and duties, community superintendents shall follow applicable chancellor's regulations, policies, and procedures, policies of the city boards and regulations on the New York State Commissioner of Education.

Source: New York City Department of Education

Exhibit 7 School-Quality Review Quality Statements

Quality Review Scoring Key	
△	Underdeveloped
➤	Underdeveloped with Proficient Features
✓	Proficient
+	Well Developed
◇	Outstanding

Quality Statement 1 – Gather Data: School leaders and faculty consistently gather and generate data and use it to understand what each student knows and can do, and to monitor the student’s progress over time.					
To what extent do school leaders and faculty gather, generate, and utilize data to provide . . .	△	➤	✓	+	◇
1.1 an objective, constantly updated understanding of the performance and progress of each student, classroom, grade level?					
1.2 an objective, constantly updated understanding of the performance and progress of special education students?					
1.3 an objective, constantly updated understanding of the performance and progress of English language learners?					
1.4 an objective, constantly updated understanding of the performance and progress of ethnic groups, gender groups and all other categories of interest to the school?					
1.5 a measurement of performance and progress based on the school’s own past performance, and among students, classrooms, grades and subject areas?					
1.6 a measurement of performance and progress based on comparisons with similar schools?					
1.7 training, management systems and structures that support teachers in the use of school data to inform planning and instruction and to track the progress of students?					
Overall score for Quality Statement 1					

Quality Statement 2 – Plan and Set Goals: School leaders and faculty consistently use data to understand each student’s next learning steps and to set suitably high goals for accelerating each student’s learning.					
To what extent do school leaders and faculty . . .	△	➤	✓	+	◇
2.1 engage in collaborative processes to set rigorous, objectively measurable goals for improvement, and to develop plans and time frames for reaching those goals?					
2.2 focus on each student, classroom, grade level, academic subject and group of students whose performance or progress has been identified by the school as a particular focus area?					
2.3 identify and improve the performance and progress of those students in greatest need of improvement?					
2.4 share whole school goals with all members of the school community to rigorously improve the performance and progress of students?					
2.5 convey consistently high expectations to students and their parents/caregivers?					
2.6 regularly provide students and their parents/caregivers with information about the goals set for each student, and about each student’s progress and performance, and how they can improve?					
2.7 invite and enable parents/caregivers to provide useful information to teachers and the school about the learning needs and capacities of their children ?					
Overall score for Quality Statement 2					

Source: New York City Department of Education.

Exhibit 7 (continued)

Quality Statement 3 – Align Instructional Strategy to Goals: The school aligns its academic work, strategic decisions and resources, and effectively engages students, around its plans and goals for accelerating student learning.					
To what extent do the school leaders . . .	Δ	▶	✓	+	◇
3.1 select core curricular approaches that facilitate and provide meaningful interim data about progress towards goals and focus on raising the achievement of students?					
3.2 provide a broad and engaging curriculum, including the arts, to enhance learning both within and outside the school day?					
3.3 hold teachers accountable for the progress and learning of the students in their charge, for making instruction interesting and compelling, and for creating a positive, safe and inclusive learning environment?					
3.4 ensure that teachers use school, classroom and student data to plan for and provide differentiated instruction that meets the specific needs of all the students in their charge?					
3.5 make budgeting, staffing and scheduling decisions strategically, based on data, to meet the school's academic goals for all students?					
3.6 ensure that there is an environment of mutual trust and respect between all staff and students to support personal and academic development?					
3.7 ensure that there are effective and consistently applied procedures to encourage and monitor student attendance and tardiness?					
Overall score for Quality Statement 3					

Quality Statement 4 – Align Capacity Building to Goals: The development of leadership, teachers and other staff capacity is aligned to the school's collaboratively established goals for accelerating the learning of each student.					
To what extent do the school leaders. . .	Δ	▶	✓	+	◇
4.1 use frequent observations of classroom teaching by the principal and other available information to develop a differentiated strategy for improving the quality of each teacher's instruction?					
4.2 make professional development decisions strategically, based on data, to help meet the improvement goals of students and teachers?					
4.3 provide frequent opportunities for teachers to observe each other's classroom instruction and to meet together in teams to plan, share effective practices, and evaluate one another's instruction in an open and reflective professional environment?					
4.4 develop effective procedures for the induction and support of teachers who are new to the profession or the school?					
4.5 align youth development, guidance/advising and other student support services around stated academic and personal development goals?					
4.6 consistently implement clear procedures that enable the school to run smoothly, encourage effective student learning, and effectively address discipline related incidents?					
4.7 create effective partnerships with outside entities that support the academic and personal growth of the students?					
Overall score for Quality Statement 4					

Quality Statement 5 – Monitor and Revise: The school has structures for monitoring and evaluating each student's progress throughout the year and for flexibly adapting plans and practices to meet its goals for accelerating learning.					
To what extent do . . .	Δ	▶	✓	+	◇
5.1 the school's plans for improving student outcomes include interim goals that are objectively measurable and have suitable time frames for measuring success and making adjustments?					
5.2 the school's plans for improving teacher outcomes include interim goals that are objectively measurable and have suitable time frames for measuring success and making adjustments?					
5.3 teachers and faculty use periodic assessments and other diagnostic tools to measure the effectiveness of plans and interventions for individual and groups of students in key areas?					
5.4 teachers and faculty use the information generated by periodic assessments and other progress measures and comparisons to revise plans immediately in order to reach stated goals?					
5.5 school leaders track the outcomes of periodic assessments and other diagnostic measures and use the results to make strategic decisions to modify practices to improve student outcomes?					
5.6 school leaders and staff use each plan's interim and final outcomes to drive the next stage of goal setting and improvement planning?					
5.7 the principal and school community have a clear vision for the future development of the school and implement procedures and systems to effect change?					
Overall score for Quality Statement 5					

Source: New York City Department of Education.

Exhibit 8 Sample School Quality Review Agenda**Day 1**

8:00–10:00 a.m.	Arrival and Meeting with Principal
10:00–11:00 a.m.	Classroom Walkthroughs
11:00–12:00 p.m.	Teacher Group Meeting/Lunch
12:00–1:00 p.m.	Student Group Meeting
1:00–2:00 p.m.	Classroom Walkthroughs
2:00–3:00 p.m.	Parent Group Meeting
3:00–4:00 p.m.	Observe Instructional Leadership Team Meeting
4:00–4:30 p.m.	Recap day with Principal

Day 2

8:00–9:00 a.m.	Arrival and Meeting with Principal
9:00–9:45 a.m.	Student Case Studies Presentation
10:00–11:00 a.m.	Classroom Walkthroughs
11:00–12:30 p.m.	Exit Interview with Principal

Exhibit 9 Consequences for Progress-Report Grades Crossed with Quality-Review Ratings

		Quality Review			
		Well-Developed	Proficient	Undeveloped	
Progress Report	A	Eligible to Receive Rewards		No Rewards or Consequences	
	B				
	C	No Rewards or Consequences, unless a school receives a C for 3 consecutive years, in which case it will be treated as a school who receives a D for one year.			
	D	These schools will be subject to structured academic planning and target setting signed off by the Office of Accountability. Additional consequences occur if a school continues in the D or F range for multiple years, especially if it does not reach its target or improve its QR rating.			
	F				Potential Leadership Change or Closure

Source: New York City Department of Education.

Exhibit 10 ARIS Objectives and Scope

Objectives	Scope of the ARIS
<p>Ensure access to the information and tools necessary to enable</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Longitudinal and detailed analysis and reporting of achievement and performance data • Best-in-class assessment design and implementation processes to extract data from multiple sources, including designing own reports and the capability to slice and dice the data • Tools to improve learning of students with a range of identified needs; • Sharing best practices and collaborating across schools to encourage cultures of continuous school improvement and professional learning. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide principals, teachers and parents with online information on student achievement, including periodic assessments • Support development of longitudinal and detailed analysis • Develop an integrated portal, including a dashboard to analyze key environment factors and achievement metrics • Enable real-time prediction of school performance against year-end targets • Generate standard reports for specific end users • Develop scorecards to enable drill-downs by student, assessment, strand and sub-strand analysis • Provide knowledge management tools that capture teaching and assessment content generated at school level with an ability to approve, publish and share with the networks or the broader district. As well as capturing new quality review data

Exhibit 11a Elementary/Middle School Sample Progress Report



New York City Department of Education

Progress Report 2006–07

MIDDLE SCHOOL

This Progress Report is for:

SCHOOL	FREDERICK DOUGLASS ACADEMY V MIDDLE SCHO (212273)
PRINCIPAL	DEBORAH CIMINI
ENROLLMENT	269
SCHOOL TYPE	MIDDLE SCHOOL
PEER INDEX	3.14

Your School's Overall Results

Progress Report Grade


A

What does this grade mean?

Schools are assigned letter grades based on their overall Progress Report score. Schools that get As and Bs are eligible for rewards. Schools that get Ds and Fs, or 3 Cs in a row, face consequences.

How did this school perform?

- This School's overall score for 2006–07 is **66.6**
- This score places the School in the **78.5** percentile of all middle school's citywide (i.e., **78.5** percent of those schools scored lower than this school)
- This School's target score for 2007–08 is **79.1**

Category	Calculated Score	
School Environment	11.1 out of 15	
Student Performance	19.4 out of 30	
Student Progress	31.6 out of 55	
Additional Credit	4.5	
Overall Score	66.6	 <p style="text-align: center; font-size: small;">Next year's target 79.1</p>

How Scores translate to grades:

- Schools receive letter grades based on their overall score
- Schools with an overall score between **65.2** and **93.6** receive a letter grade of **A**
- **25.2%** of schools earned an **A** in 2006–07.

Middle School Table

Grade	Score Range	2006-07 City Summary
A	65.2–93.6	25.2% of schools
B	50.5–65.2	35.5% of schools
C	38.8–50.5	25.5% of schools
D	30.9–38.8	9.7% of schools
F	-0.4–30.9	4.1% of schools

Quality Review Score

This school's 2006–07 Quality Review score is **P**. To see your school's Quality Review Report, locate your school at <http://schools.nyc.gov/>, click 'Statistics', and scroll down to Quality Review Report.

2006–07 State Accountability Status

Based on its 2005–06 performance, this school is **In Good Standing**. This measure, determined by New York State as part of the federal No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, is not a factor in the Progress Report Grade.

Inside This Report:


The NYC Progress Report is a new accountability tool. Each school's Progress Report (1) measures student year-to-year progress, (2) compares the school to peer schools, and (3) rewards success in moving all children forward, especially children with the greatest needs. The Progress Report measures four areas:

- School Environment** uses surveys and other data to evaluate necessary conditions for learning: attendance, safety, academic expectations, engagement, and communication.
- Student Performance** evaluates student skill levels in English Language Arts and Math.
- Student Progress** measures average student improvement in English Language Arts and Math from last year to this year.
- Closing the Achievement Gap** gives schools additional credit for exemplary gains among high-need students.

More information about the Progress Report is on the back page.

Source: New York City Department of Education.

Exhibit 11 (continued)



Source: New York City Department of Education.

Exhibit 11 (continued)

Additional Information

SCHOOL **FREDERICK DOUGLASS ACADEMY V MIDDLE SCHO (212273)**
 PRINCIPAL **DEBORAH CIMINI**

Closing the Achievement Gap

Schools earn additional credit when their high-need students make exemplary gains. These gains are based on the percentage of high-need students who improve by at least one-half of a proficiency level in English Language Arts or Math (e.g., student improves from 2.25 to 2.75 in ELA, or 3.10 to 3.60 in Math). Schools earn this additional credit if the percentage of students, in any of the five high-need categories, who achieve exemplary gains is in the top 40% of all schools citywide.

This component can only improve a school's overall progress report grade. It cannot lower a school's grade.

Credit	Exemplary Proficiency Gains	Student Group
English Language Arts		
<input type="checkbox"/>	-	English Language Learners
<input type="checkbox"/>	16.7%	Special Education Students
<input type="checkbox"/>	23.3%	Hispanic Students Who Are In Lowest Third Citywide
<input type="checkbox"/>	18.2%	Black Students Who Are In Lowest Third Citywide
<input type="checkbox"/>	-	Other Students Who Are In Lowest Third Citywide
Mathematics		
<input type="checkbox"/>	23.8%	English Language Learners
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	25.0%	Special Education Students
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	46.5%	Hispanic Students Who Are In Lowest Third Citywide
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	45.2%	Black Students Who Are In Lowest Third Citywide
<input type="checkbox"/>	-	Other Students Who Are In Lowest Third Citywide

More Information

Each school's Progress Report **(1)** measures student year-to-year progress, **(2)** compares the school to peer schools, and **(3)** rewards success in moving all children forward, especially children with the greatest needs. Each of these steps is a key component of Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg and Chancellor Joel I. Klein's Children First reforms. By taking these steps in a rigorous way that is sensitive to empowered schools' many pathways to success, the Progress Report is designed to assist administrators, principals, and teachers in accelerating the learning of all students. The Progress Report also enables students, parents, and the public to hold the NYC Department of Education and its schools accountable for student achievement and improvement and for ensuring a high quality education for every student in NYC's public schools.

The Office of Accountability (OA) developed the Progress Report in collaboration with parents, teachers, principals, community leaders, and researchers. The report also reflects feedback from a citywide pilot in 2006-07. OA will continue to monitor results, solicit feedback, and refine the report over time.

This Progress Report relies in part on surveys of parents, teachers, and secondary students citywide to evaluate schools' learning environments. Details and analysis of each school's survey results are available at <http://schools.nyc.gov/Surveys>.

Progress Reports will be distributed at the beginning of each school year. Schools are eligible for rewards and consequences based on Progress Report outcomes and scores on annual Quality Reviews. For more information about rewards and consequences, see <http://schools.nyc.gov/Accountability/ProgressReports/Consequences>. Future Progress Reports will compare each school's performance in the current year to the target set for the school in the previous year.

In addition to Progress Reports for Elementary and Middle Schools and general education High Schools, OA is developing Progress Reports for Specialized High Schools, Transfer Schools, Special Education (District 75) School and Early Childhood Schools. Each of these Progress Reports reflects the unique qualities and challenges of the schools it evaluates.

If you have any questions or comments about the Progress Report, please visit <http://schools.nyc.gov/Accountability/ProgressReports> or send us an email at pr_support@schools.nyc.gov.

Source: New York City Department of Education.

Exhibit 12 Progress Report Peer Group and Letter Grade Calculations




ES/MS Progress Report: Each School's Peer Group

Each Elementary and Middle School has a **Peer Group**, which contains the **20 schools immediately higher & the 20 schools immediately lower** than that school in a citywide listing of schools according to the following demographic weights:

- Percentage of Black/Hispanic (40%)
- Percentage of ELL (10%)
- Percentage of SPED (10%)
- Percent of Free & Reduced Lunch (40%)



About Letter Grades & Percentiles



Source: New York City Department of Education.