Why Nations Fail

Based on

Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty
by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson

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September 23, 2011
The Lay of the Land
Figure: The evolution of average GDP per capita in Western Offshoots, Western Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa, 1000-2000.
Juan Díaz de Solís colonizes Río de la Plata in 1516, ‘River of Silver’ and Pedro de Mendoza founds Buenos Aires in 1534.

But Solís and de Mendoza unable to enslave and put to work the hunter gatherer Indians of the area, Charrúas and the Querandí. Starving Spaniards soon left the area.

In 1537, Juan de Ayolas found the sedentary and more densely settled Guaraní up the Paraná river, in Paraguay. The Spaniards could successfully take over the Guaraní hierarchy, enslave them and put them to work to produce food for them.

A very similar pattern to the colonization of the Aztecs and the Incas.
The Beginning—Spanish Colonial Map
The Beginning—United States

- Colonization attempts of Virginia Company in Jamestown in early 17th century, attempting to re-create an authoritarian, “extractive” regime:

  “No man or woman shall run away from the colony to the Indians, upon pain of death.
  Anyone who robs a garden, public or private, or a vineyard, or who steals ears of corn shall be punished with death.
  No member of the colony will sell or give any commodity of this country to a captain, mariner, master or sailor to transport out of the colony, for his own private uses, upon pain of death.” [from the laws passed by Sir Thomas Gates and Sir Thomas Dale].

- But the Company was unsuccessful—it could not force the English settlers into gang labor and low wages.
The Company switched to the ‘headright system’ giving all settlers 50 acres of land and then shortly thereafter also political rights, in the form of it General Assembly.

Similar events unfolded in Chesapeake Bay, Maryland and Carolina.

The chain of events that ultimately leading to the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution.
The Beginning—The Americas in General
Making Sense of the Divergence

- While both culture (religion, attitudes, values) and geography (climate, topography, disease environments etc.) are important for the ability of humans to form well functioning societies, they are not the “main” source of this divergence.
  - Much of Latin America likely richer than North America as late as mid-18th century.
  - Divergence due to the ability of the United States, just like Britain, to take advantage of new economic opportunities.

- The “ignorance hypothesis” also unable to explain the logic of social arrangements leading to relative poverty—Cortes, Pizarro and Ayolas did not set up forced labor and repressive regimes because they were “ignorant” about their implications.

- Instead, central role of “institutions” broadly defined.

- **Key questions:** historical roots of institutional differences and the logic of institutions that do not unleash growth.
Towards a Theory of Institutions

- **Extractive economic institutions**: Lack of law and order. Insecure property rights; entry barriers and regulations preventing functioning of markets and creating a nonlevel playing field.

- **Extractive political institutions**—in the limit “absolutism”: Political institutions concentrating power in the hands of a few, without constraints, checks and balances or “rule of law”.

- **Inclusive economic institutions**: Secure property rights, law and order, markets and state support (public services and regulation) for markets; open to relatively free entry of new businesses; uphold contracts; access to education and opportunity for the great majority of citizens.

- **Inclusive political institutions**: Political institutions allowing broad participation—*pluralism*—and placing constraints and checks on politicians; rule of law (closely related to pluralism).
  - But also some degree of *political centralization* for the states to be able to effectively enforce law and order.
## Synergies

<table>
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<th>Political Institutions</th>
<th>Inclusive Economic Institutions</th>
<th>Extractive Economic Institutions</th>
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<td><img src="images/cycle.png" alt="Cycle" /></td>
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</table>
Growth under Inclusive Institutions

- Inclusive economic and political institutions (or inclusive institutions for short) create powerful forces towards economic growth by:
  - encouraging investment (because of well-enforced property rights)
  - harnessing the power of markets (better allocation of resources, entry of more efficient firms, ability to finance for starting businesses etc.)
  - generating broad-based participation (education, again free entry, and broad-based property rights).

- Key aspect of growth under inclusive institutions: investment in new technology and **creative destruction**.

- **Central question:** why are extractive institutions so prevalent throughout history and even today?
Main thesis is that growth is much more likely under inclusive institutions than extractive institutions.

Growth, and inclusive institutions that will support it, will create both winners and losers. Thus there is a logic supporting extractive institutions and stagnation:

- **Economic losers**: those who will lose their incomes, for example their monopolies, because of changes in institutions or introduction of new technologies
- **Political losers**: those who will lose their politically privileged position, their unconstrained monopoly of power, because of growth and its supporting institutions—fear of creative destruction.
- Both are important in practice, but particularly political losers are a major barrier against the emergence of inclusive institutions and economic growth.
Towards a Theory of Institutional Change

- **Conflict** pervasive in society.
- Leading to **differential institutional drift** → small but notable differences in institutions across nations
- **Small differences that matter.**

\[
\text{institutions}_t \quad \xrightarrow{\text{drift}} \quad \text{institutions}_{t+1} \quad \xrightarrow{\uparrow} \quad \text{institutional divergence} \\
\uparrow \quad \downarrow \\
\text{critical juncture}
\]

- But outcomes during these critical junctures not historically determined, partly **contingent** (≈ stochastic).
- Naturally, the changes that happen as a result of this interaction then become the background—small or not so small—institutional differences upon which new critical junctures act.
Transition to Inclusive Institutions

- Extractive institutions have been the norm in world history.
- Where do inclusive institutions come from?
  - Earlier moves towards inclusive institutions resulting from conflict and institutional drift—Roman Republic, Venice, but ultimately reversed.
- Crucial turning point: the **Glorious Revolution** in England in 1688.
  - The Glorious Revolution brought much more inclusive, pluralistic political institutions which then led to a transition towards much more inclusive economic institutions.
- This created the conditions which led to the **Industrial Revolution**.
- Growth in the 19th century and dissemination of industry were conditioned by interactions between initial institutional differences and the critical junctures created by political events and the Industrial Revolution itself.
The Emergence of Inclusive Institutions in Europe

- Driven by the interaction of initial institutions and critical junctures:
  
  - **Initial institutional drift:** Britain was the beneficiary of a long history of gradual institutional change from the Magna Carta of 1215 onwards, through the creation of a monopoly of violence by Henry VII after 1485, nascent state under Henry VIII, Civil War of the 1640s.
  
  - **Critical juncture:** Development of the Atlantic economy after 1492 led to the emergence of a broad and powerful coalition in society in favor of reforming political institutions and removing absolutism (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) “The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change and Economic Growth”).

- Owing to the context created by the initial institutional drift, this coalition triumphed in 1688.

- **Small difference:** Initial institutions in Spain somewhat different, especially in allowing the crown to monopolize colonization and Atlantic trade → critical junctures leading to greater wealth and political power of the monarchy.
Institutional Divergence at Critical Junctures: Black Death and Feudalism

- The divergence of Western and Eastern Europe after the Black Death—in the West the power of landlords declines and feudalism withers away, in the East the power of landlords intensifies leading to the Second Serfdom in the 16th century.

- This institutional divergence driven by a large demographic shock interacting with initial institutional differences (organization of peasant communities, distribution of landholdings).

- Key mechanism: increases in wages following population decline (e.g., Phelps Brown and Hopkins, 1956).
Meanwhile in Mexico: Implications of Coercion

- The effects of lower population very different when there is coercion. Another instance of institutional divergence.

Population and Average Real Daily Wages for Unskilled Repartimiento (Labor Draft) Workers

Source: Own Calculations based on Borah and Cook (1958) and Gibbons (1964).
Meanwhile in Mexico (continued)

Population and Average Real Daily Wages for Unskilled Textile Obraje Workers

Source: Own Calculations based on Borah and Cook (1958), Gibson (1964) and Viqueira and Urquiola (1990)
Institutional Persistence

- Why do extractive institutions persist? **Vicious circles**

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{political inst's}_t & \implies \text{de jure political power}_t \\
\text{dist. of resources}_t & \implies \text{de facto political power}_t \\
\text{collective action}_t & \implies \text{econ. inst's}_t \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{econ. perf}_t & \implies \text{dist. of resources}_{t+1} \\
\end{align*}
\]

- But also possibility for change.
Revisiting Early Latin American Experience

- Early Latin American institutions example of *extractive economic and political institutions*.
- In line with the logic of these extractive institutions, early on productivity in Latin America and the Caribbean is high, though unequal it is committed.
- The break comes with another critical juncture: **Industrial Revolution**.
- Different responses in the North and the South.
  - Why? New opportunities, particularly conducive to fear of creative destruction.
  - In the United States and Britain, industrialization spearheaded by new individuals and groups—not the existing elites. This type of creative destruction difficult or impossible under extractive political institutions.
Divergence in Europe

- The Latin American response to the Industrial Revolution not so different from those of other extractive political institutions, such as Austria-Hungary, Russia, China or the Ottoman Empire.
- Industrialization and railways blocked in Austria-Hungary and Russia, because emperors and elites afraid of political change.
- Francis I and Metternich’s approach:

  “We do not desire at all that the great masses shall become well off and independent ... How could we otherwise rule over them?”

- Nicholas I and Kankrin’s approach in Russia:

  “Railways do not always result from natural necessity, but are more an object of artificial need or luxury. They encourage unnecessary travel from place to place, which is entirely typical of our time.”
Railways in Europe
Why Didn’t the Ottoman Empire Catch-Up?

- In 1445 in the German city of Mainz, Johannes Gutenberg invented the printing press based on movable type. Spread rapidly throughout Western Europe.

- In 1485, the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II issued an edict to the effect that Muslims were expressly forbidden from printing in Arabic.

- Sultan Selim I in 1515 strengthened this edict.

- Only in 1727, the first printing press is allowed in the Ottoman lands. Then Sultan Ahmed III issued a decree granting İbrahim Müteferrika permission to set up a press, but under close supervision and censorship. Müteferrika printed few books in the end, only seventeen between 1729, when the press began to operate, and 1743 when he stopped.
Divergence in Asia

- Critical juncture from European and American intervention in Asia both for China and Japan.
- Another case of small differences leading to significant divergence at a critical juncture.
- Absolutism continued in China in the face of British threat during the opium wars.
- A political revolution leading to the end of absolutism in Japan in the face of American threat.
- Small difference: Tokugawa rulers had much less control over entire society than Chinese emperor and imperial elite.
Persistence of Power and Elites: the US South

- Why and how do extractive institutions persist?
- In the antebellum period, the South run by plantation owners, and the system of slavery and labor-intensive cotton production.
- Relatively poor (about 70% of the national level of GDP per-capita). Little manufacturing industry, much lower urbanization and density of canals and railroads than the North.
- Civil War: major change in economic and political institutions; the abolition of slavery and the enfranchisement of the freed slaves.
- One might have anticipated a dramatic change in economic institutions.
- But what emerged was a labor-intensive, low wage, low education and repressive economy—just like the antebellum South.
Persistence of the Southern Equilibrium

- Despite losing the Civil War, traditional landed elites could sustain their political control of the South, particularly after Reconstruction ended in 1877 and the Union army was withdrawn.
- Blocking of economic reforms that might have undermined their power, such as the distribution of 50 acres and a mule to each freed slave.
- Were able to use their local political power to disenfranchise blacks and re-exert control over the labor force.
- Use of Black Codes, Vagrancy Laws, Ku Klux Klan and Jim Crow.
- What persists? Specific economic and political institutions changed, but the underlying distribution of political power did not and neither did the interests of the elite. They were able to use different institutions to achieve the same goal. The incentive environment for the mass of the population did persist.
## Persistence of the Southern Equilibrium (continued)

The persistence of the landed elite in three “Black Belt” counties of Alabama

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Name</th>
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</table>

**Number of planters** 25 18 16
**Percent present in 1870** 72% 64%

*Rounded off to the nearest thousand; as reported in the U.S. Census of Population, manuscript schedules. To convert to constant gold prices, see p. 14, note 13.

*Wealth of father or husband

Source: Weiner (1978, Table 2, p. 12)
Persistence of Power and Elites: Theory


  “The domination of an organized minority... over the unorganized majority is inevitable. The power of any minority is irresistible as against each single individual in the majority, who stands alone before the totality of the organized minority. At the same time, the minority is organized for the very reason that it is a minority.” Mosca

- Once again, related to the distinction between de jure and de facto power, but now de facto power is the agent for persistence rather than change.
Legacy of Colonial Times Today

- Regression discontinuity effects of *Mita* from *Dell (2010) “Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining Mita”:*

![Graph showing the relationship between distance to mita boundary and log equivalent consumption.](image-url)
Labor Coercion in Uzbekistan

On September 6 2006, schools in Uzbekistan were emptied of 2.7 million children. A mother of two explains:

“At the beginning of each school year, approximately at the beginning of September, the classes in school are suspended, and instead of classes children are sent to the cotton harvest. Nobody asks for the consent of parents. They don’t have weekend holidays [during the harvesting season]. If a child is for any reason left at home, his teacher or class curator comes over and denounces the parents. They assign a plan to each child, from 20 to 60 kg per day depending on the child’s age.

Why? Uzbekistan under the corrupt regime of Ismail Karimov.

Cotton farmers are forced to sell at very low prices. Lack of incentives and running down of machinery. Use of forced labor as a substitute for incentives for farmers.
Why is Africa Poor?

- The legacy of pre-colonial institutions:
  - Lack of state centralization in parts of Africa up to the 17th century; e.g., parts of the Congo.
  - Absolutist regimes remaining unchallenged in other parts; e.g., Ethiopia.
  - Pre-colonial slavery and labor coercion institutions.
The Effects of the Slave Trade

- European intervention led to a highly distorted path of institutions in much of Africa.
  - Slave trade having a big demographic effect.
  - Warmaking and raiding to capture slaves:

  “The great quantity of guns and powder which the Europeans have brought have caused terrible wars between the Kings and Princes and Caboceers of these lands, who made their prisoners of war slaves; these slaves were immediately bought up by Europeans at steadily increasing prices, which in its turn, animates again and agin these people to renew their hostilities, and their hope of big and easy profits makes them forget all labour, using all sorts of pretexts to attack each other or reviving old disputes.” (From the Dutch Colonial Director).

- Collapse of state institutions in many parts due to erosion of the authority of the state and persistent infighting.
Post-Slave Trade Equilibrium

- European colonialism creating a different range of distorted incentives after the end of the slave trade.
  - “Legitimate trade” based on domestic slavery are placing the slave trade.
  - Making of a dual economy in South Africa to create a reservoir of cheap labor.

- For example, agricultural boom in the second part of the 19th century in South Africa clamped down by
  - European settlers wishing to avoid the competition of African farmers and attempting to create a cheap labor force for the gold and diamond mines;
The Slave Trade in Africa
Land Allocation in South Africa
Verwoerd, the architect of the Apartheid, explaining this in 1954:

“The Bantu must be guided to serve his own community in all respects. There is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour ... For that reason it is to no avail to him to receive a training which has as its aim absorption in the European community while he cannot and will not be absorbed there.”

Traditional chiefs who were seeing their power weaken as a result of these economic changes.
Post-Independence Persistence

- The system created by Europeans, and the one to some degree persisting from pre-colonial times, has been maintained and re-created, but in a further distorted manner in post-independence Africa.

- Best illustrated through the history of Sierra Leone before and after independence.
Sierra Leone Before Independence

- Sierra Leone, in the 18th century originally set up as a home for repatriated and freed slaves.
- In 1806, it becomes a British colony, but the interior still made up of many small African kingdoms.
- The interior becomes a British Protectorate in 1896 on the basis of treaties with these African Kings. The Kings are given the new title of ‘Paramount Chief’.
- The British rule the interior ‘indirectly’ through the Paramount Chiefs. In practice, the Chiefs are given fairly unlimited powers and freed from the need to obtain popular support and legitimacy. Moreover, chieftaincy becomes a form of hereditary aristocracy, only members of original ‘ruling houses’ allowed to become chiefs.
  - In other parts of Africa, the British create such chieftaincies and ruling houses even when none existed before.
Sierra Leone Before Independence (continued)

- The British also set up the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board, similar to other marketing boards in Africa.
  - in theory to smooth the incomes of rural producers; in practice to expropriate them by paying much less than the market price.

- When diamonds are discovered in Kono, the British grant a monopoly, together with the right to set up a private army, to the De Beers company.
  - This contrasts to how access to newly discovered gold in Australia in the 19th century was given to anybody willing to pay a license fee to search and dig for gold. (The same strategy would have been feasible in Sierra Leone since diamonds were ‘alluvial’).
Sierra Leone After Independence

- After independence, Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) comes to power, with support from the South and the East, particularly Mendeland.
- Narrowly defeated by Siaka Stevens’s All Peoples Congress (APC) in 1967, which had most of its support in the North.
- Stevens’s rule becomes much more corrupt than that of SLPP.
- Stevens declared himself president in 1971, and set up a repressive, often violent one-party rule, or in essence his dictatorship.
Sierra Leone After Independence (continued)

- Remarkably, Stevens uses essentially all of the same colonial economic and political institutions.
- He relied on Paramount Chiefs to rule the interior; he nationalized the diamond monopoly; he used the marketing board, even more intensively than before, expropriate farmers.
- Stevens also pulled up the railway line to Mendeland even though this had become major source of export revenues, as the primary transportation from the South bringing coffee, cocoa and diamonds.
- Stevens thought that he had to impoverish and weaken the support base of the SLPP in order to consolidate his power.
Breaking the Mold

- History is not destiny.
- Effective reforms towards inclusive institutions possible.
- But it often necessitates a minor or major political revolution.
- Two examples:
  1. End of Southern equilibrium in the United States
  2. Botswana
“Political Revolution” in the South

Figure 3: Incidence of Different Types of Collective Action, 1955-62

Figure 2. Movement-Initiated Actions, September 1955 through December 1962


Source: McAdam (1983)
An Unlikely Success Story

- Upon independence in 1966, Botswana was one of the poorest countries in the world; it had a total of 12 kilometers of paved roads, 22 citizens who had graduated from university and 100 from secondary school.

- It was also almost completely surrounded by the white and hostile regimes in South African, Namibia and Rhodesia.

- In the subsequent 45 years, Botswana would become a stable democracy (Africa’s only), achieve one of the fastest growth rates in the world and reach the highest income level in sub-Saharan Africa on a par with places such as as Estonia, Hungary, or Costa Rica.
An Unlikely Success Story (continued)

- **How?**
  - Proximate answer: inclusive economic institutions (secure property rights, stable macroeconomic policies, investment in education and infrastructure) supported by inclusive political institutions (democracy with checks and balances).
  - But the real question is: why did these get adopted in Botswana?
  - Good leadership by Seretse Khama and Quett Masire. But also historical factors making such leadership possible and meaningful.
Three African Chiefs

- On September 6 1895, Chiefs Khama of the Ngwato, Bathoen of the Ngwaketse and Sebele of the Kwenla arrived in Britain on a mission—to save their and five other Tswana states, making up Bechuanaland (Botswana), from Cecil Rhodes.

- In 1885, Britain had declared Bechuanaland a Protectorate to block further expansions by the Boers and possible expansions by Germans who had annexed Southwest Africa, but had no interest in actively colonizing it.

- When Cecil Rhodes’s British South Africa Company started expanding north out of South Africa, the Chiefs decided to ask for greater British control and protection from Rhodes.

- They met colonial secretary Joseph Chamberlain and went on a speaking tour to shore up support. With the background of the disastrous Jameson Raid, Chamberlain agreed.

- Since the British still had no interest in the area, they did not set up the usual indirect rule.
Contingency during a Critical Juncture

- Botswana would avoid both the establishment of white rule as in South Africa or Rhodesia, and British indirect rule transforming indigenous institutions.
- This was particularly fortunate since the indigenous political institutions of the Tswana were more participatory than most—certainly more so than what would emerge under Rhodes or British indirect rule.
- The ‘kgotla,’ a formal great assembly, was used both for dispute resolution by broad participation and as a check on Chiefs’ actions.
- Chieftaincy, in great contrast to the institution of Paramount Chiefs set up by the British in other African nations, was not hereditary, but in practice open to those demonstrating talent, ability and leadership.
- These institutions persisted until independence.
- Clearly these institutions were far from inclusive. But just like Magna Carta and elected Parliaments in England, they created the basis for a possible further development of inclusive institutions.