What is a Global Field?

Rethinking Bourdieu’s Field Theory beyond the Nation-State*

Larissa Buchholz

Abstract

While scholarship on global and transnational fields has been emerging, hitherto contributions have rarely or not explicitly discussed how Bourdieu’s field theory has to be altered when its use expands from a national to a global scale. Starting from the premise that a global field is not a national field writ large, this paper discusses strategies and elements for revising field theory for use beyond national borders. Specifically, the article first proposes analogical theorizing as a systematic approach for extending and modifying the tools of field theory at a global level. Analogical theorizing offers a method for constructing the object in a global context in a way that goes beyond rescaling and minimizes the risk of deductive reification. Against this background and drawing from research on the global visual art field, the article offers criteria for delineating a global field and distinguishes relative functional and vertical autonomy. Finally, it discusses how the concept of ‘relative vertical autonomy’ contributes in three ways to the development of global field analysis: for theorizing emergence; examining global-national interdependencies; and denationalizing Bourdieu’s concept of ‘national capital.’

Introduction

One of the most important challenges of current sociological theorizing is to reassess the conceptual resources that originated in the imaginary frame of the western nation-state in light of the often qualitatively different problems associated with transnational or global research. On one hand, we cannot simply go ahead and scale up our concepts of “society” or “power” from particular Western societies “straight to the level of the global.” (Connell 2007, p. 373). Such a rescaling approach runs the danger to produce a reifying picture of the nature of global society from the one-sided perspective of the global north (Connell 2007, p. 373; cf. also Brenner 1999, pp. 53-60; Reed 2013; Abbott 2015). At the same time, we can also not afford to go to the other extreme and completely discard the resources of the sociological tradition. Many of today’s global structures (e.g. nation-state system, capitalist economy, modern science, arts, sports, etc.) indeed often originated, or at least have roots in, European modernity (e.g. Giddens 1990; Meyer et al. 1997). Theories derived from North-Western experiences, whatever their shortcomings, may still offer useful toolboxes for transnational and global sociology. Hence, beyond mere upscaling or downright dismissal, a more promising route is likely to be that of theoretical reform: to re-examine and re-conceptualize the resources of the sociological tradition in the reflexive confrontation with the transnational and global problems of research.

The challenge to reassess sociological theories beyond the nation-state also pertains to burgeoning scholarship on transnational or global fields: a growing body of work builds upon and expands Bourdieu’s field theory to engage with transnational or global social orders (e.g Dezalay and Barth 1996; Heilbron 1999; Casanova 2004; Fourcade 2006; Steinmetz 2008a, 2008b; Go 2008; Buchholz 2008, 2013; Krause 2014). These studies demonstrate that Bourdieu’s influential field theory has much to offer for transnational and global sociology when it

* Forthcoming lead article The Sociological Review, Spring 2016, special peer-reviewed issue on transnational and global fields. I would like to thank Gil Eyal, Ulf Wuggenig, Diane Vaughan, George Steinmetz, Mark Gould, Phil Gorski, Chris Muller, Monika Krause, Maggie Frye, Ya-wen Lei, Nick Wilson, John Lie, Carol Lindquist, Sarah Sandelbaum, and the four anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback and suggestions. I would also like to thank Julian Go for engaging and insightful conversations on the topic. Special thanks are due to Steffen Rudolph for his assistance in the production of the graphs.
is extended beyond national boundaries: for one, in contrast to the two dominant theoretical paradigms of global sociology field analysis offers a mode of examination that can move beyond monolithic models of one overarching economic or cultural global system (e.g. Wallerstein 1974, 2004; Meyer 2000). It provides an approach that is able to map the plurality and specificity of social spheres in global context, each revolving around semi-autonomous logics and histories.\(^1\) Indeed, by making use of field theory, scholars have engaged with such diverse cases as, e.g., world literature (Casanova 2004), the global profession of economics (Fourcade 2006), the colonial state (Steinmetz 2008a, 2008b), empires (Go 2008), or humanitarian intervention (Krause 2014). And whereas the two main established paradigms in global sociology—world-systems and world polity analysis—are either materialist or culturalist, field theory permits one to take into account both the material and cultural dimensions of global arenas (Go 2008, pp. 206-10).\(^2\) Yet field theory is not just multi-dimensional but also multi-leveled. It equips one to examine transnational or global processes from three levels of analysis: the micro level of agents’ habitus and strategies, meso-level social and cultural relations, and the macro level of larger structures or environments (Buchholz 2008, 2013).

Nevertheless, while a multifaceted body of research on transnational and global fields has emerged and demonstrated the unique advantages of the approach, scholars have rarely or at least not explicitly discussed how field theory has to be altered when its use goes beyond national borders. Perhaps even more important, there has been little discussion about what kinds of analytical principles and strategies are useful to extend an entire model such as field theory from the national to the global scale in systematic and reflexive ways. The problem is not only that by not engaging in such a discussion one might end up in rescaling and thus run the danger of Northern reification. It is also true that if we do not confront this problematic explicitly, we are likely to miss an important, broader question of transnational and global sociology: how are social configurations at the transnational or global level different? What is distinctive or indeed unprecedented about them?

Given this background, the purpose of this article is twofold: first, to propose analogical theorizing as one systematic approach for extending and modifying tools of field theory at a transnational or global level in reflexive and non-reifying ways. Against this background and drawing mainly from empirical research on the global art field, the article secondly offers basic criteria for delineating a field in a global context. It thereby introduces the concept of vertical autonomy to account for one characteristic in which certain transnational or global fields differ significantly from the way fields were structured in Bourdieu’s original theory, namely their multi-scalar architecture.

Specifically, my discussion unfolds in four parts. The first opens with an introduction to analogical theorizing, as developed by Diane Vaughan, and sketches how this method can be used to move and revise concepts and models across different scales. The second section argues that ‘relative autonomy’ is a defining criterion in Bourdieu’s field theory and, on this basis, develops elementary criteria for identifying a social sphere as a field. The third section shows how this elementary conception of a field can be extended and revised at the global level, based on principles of analogical theorizing. Drawing from my research on the global field of the contemporary visual arts—which represents a case that has reached a particularly highly globalized state—I thereby develop a distinction between relative functional and verti-

---

\(^1\) As I have argued elsewhere (Buchholz 2006, 2008), global field analysis thus offers one theoretical way to resuscitate a ‘functional or institutional differentiation perspective’ (Gorski 2013, p. 329) for the field of global studies, which has so far remained underdeveloped—apart from other frameworks, such as the model of transnational scapes by the anthropologist Arjun Appadurai (1990) or Luhmann’s world society theory (e.g. Luhmann 1997).

\(^2\) This is not to say that world-systems analysis and world polity theory can’t be thought of as complementary. Indeed, the latter also evolved as a response to world-systems analysis, seeking to counter-balance its materialist emphasis (conversation with George Steinmetz). Yet, as Go rightly pointed out, field theory offers a way to synthesize their insights, and thus to arrive at a multidimensional approach (Go 2008).
cal autonomy and suggest criteria for delineating a field in a global context. The final part fleshes out how the concept of relative vertical autonomy may contribute to the development of a global field analysis in three ways.

**Analytical Theorizing for Constructing the Object in a Global Context**

Bourdieu originally developed his conception of fields in the frame of the nation-state unit, particularly France and Algeria. As I argued in previous work, this national origin does not mean that the idea of the field automatically falls prey to (implicit) methodological nationalism for at least two analytical reasons (Buchholz 2006, 2008). First, Bourdieu's model of socially differentiated fields is, in contrast to functionalist variants of social differentiation, not tied to the idea of a functionally integrated society. In fact, Bourdieu dismissed the concept of society itself (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 37, 134). Second and perhaps more importantly, Bourdieu advocates a pragmatic use of his theory (cf. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 31). He considers concepts first and foremost to be ‘temporary construct(s)’ or ‘tools kits’ (Wittgenstein) (Wacquant in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 31) for organizing empirical research, which can and ought to be modified in light of different cases and problems of research (Bourdieu 1985, p. 11; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 95f.). This pragmatic approach also applies to field theory. Indeed, as Bourdieu emphasized:

‘[T]he notion of field does not provide ready-made answers to all possible queries in the manner of the grand concepts of “theoreticist theory” which claims to explain everything and in the right order. Rather its major virtue […] is that it promotes a mode of construction that has to be rethought anew every time. It forces us to raise questions: about the limits of the universe under investigation, how it is “articulated,” to what and to what degree, etc. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 110).’

Thus, Bourdieu’s field theory represents not a static model with a priori determined confines. Instead, it offers a mode of analysis for constructing an ‘object’ of knowledge, beyond what is visible to common sense (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 128, 131; Gorski 2013, pp. 327–366). The specific boundaries and characteristics of a field have to be determined in the course of research, and they may transgress, principally, those of nation-states (Buchholz 2006, 2008).

---

3 For reasons of exposition, I will henceforth not explicitly distinguish between transnational or global fields, which define a more-extended, that is, global geographic scope. Global refers to a scale that is multi-continental; it covers several continents. For this territorial qualification of the concept ‘global,’ see Held et al. 2003.

4 The contours of Bourdieu’s distinctively pragmatic theoretical stance can be delineated by considering two alternative positions against which it is directed, namely so-called ‘theoreticist theory’ and positivism. Regarding the former, Bourdieu sharply objected to the idea that theoretical concepts can be developed for their own sake independent of engagement with empirical research, by the mere ‘dissection or by amalgamation of other theories’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 161). At the same time, Bourdieu’s stance rejects positivistic approaches. Informed by French historical epistemology (particularly the work of Bachelard and Canguilhem, cf. Wacquant 1992, p. 5, 61), he opposes positivism in maintaining that theory should be accorded epistemological primacy in constructing a research problem (eg Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 35).

5 Bourdieu’s approach has been criticised for being confined to the national space of France. I will bypass the complex debate about determining boundaries of fields, as it has been discussed in Swartz (1997) and Eyal (2013), but I do want to point out that one should generally distinguish between two different questions: on one hand, whether Bourdieu’s models of the social space or field are also applicable to other countries or scales. Here, one has to see that Bourdieu conceives of theories as models for the construction of sociological objects, which can be modified according to the specific area or object of research. In this specific regard, it would not be a decisive objection whether ‘high culture’ is an equally important criterion for distinction in the U.S. as it is in France, cf. Michele Lamont (1992). It would be more important to ask whether Bourdieu’s epistemological and theoretical principles allow us to validly construct and explain the heterogeneity of practices, for example. A sounder problem, however, consists in Bourdieu’s strong empirical orientation toward a nation-state or subnational frame of analysis, beginning with his studies of Algeria. He thereby privileges an endogenous perspective. With respect to the field concept, such criticism, however, can be put into perspective, as is demonstrated.
In fact, Bourdieu referred to world or global fields in his later work,\(^6\) and, as outlined in the introduction, by now a growing body of scholarship extends field theory to engage with transnational or global problems of research. The crucial question is no longer if his model can be expanded to transnational or global scales, but how this can be accomplished in systematic and reflexive ways. For this question, however, Bourdieu’s writings offer us few systematic clues. For one, Bourdieu only addressed how to transpose concepts from one nation-state to the other (eg from France to the U.S. or Japan, Bourdieu 1984, pp. xi–xiv; 1998, pp. 1–3), not how to move them across different scales.\(^7\) Furthermore, in his discussion of how models can be adjusted to varying (national) contexts, Bourdieu refers to changes in the content of concepts, but not to modifications in the analytical architecture. For example, in the English preface of Distinction he suggests that his theory of inequality represents ‘universal propositions’ that are ‘valid for every stratified society’ (Bourdieu 1984, p. xif.). Thus, in order to transpose it to a different context, the main task would be to search for ‘structural equivalents,’\(^8\) that is, substantive alternatives of principally the ‘same structures’ (Bourdieu 1984, p. xii, cf. also Bourdieu 1998, pp. 1–3).

For transposing field theory to a global level, such principles of theory extension are too narrow. They imply that we would have to rescale the national field model and substantiate it with new empirical content without critically interrogating or altering its architecture. Yet if—as Bourdieu states—the ‘major virtue’ of the notion of field ‘is that it promotes a mode of construction that has to be rethought anew every time’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 110), then extending it to the transnational or global scale could and should be more than up-scaling.

Given these limitations, I suggest that Diane Vaughan’s method of analogical theorizing (AT) for cross-case comparison\(^9\) offers a productive alternative (Vaughan 1992, 2014). As Bourdieu remarked, ‘analogical reasoning […] is a powerful instrument of construction of the object’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 233). And Vaughan’s approach to extending theory is principally akin to Bourdieu’s suggestion to search for structural equivalents, since analogy is understood as a ‘cognitive process’ of identifying structural equivalencies ‘between separate, distinctive domains and their parts’ (Vaughan 2014, p. 61). Yet, AT is an alternative to Bourdieu in two crucial ways: first, it is explicit about—and geared toward—extending models across different levels of analysis. For example, deploying principles of AT, Vaughan

\(^6\) Bourdieu did not elaborate a global field analysis in the context of systematic empirical research, but he referred to international or global fields in his later writings, eg in a discussion of the ‘field of world sociology,’ (Bourdieu 1991), the ‘international legal field’ (Bourdieu 1996) as a foreword to Dezalay’s and Garth’s (1996) pioneering field analysis of international commercial arbitrage; the ‘world media field’ (Bourdieu 1999), or the ‘global economic field’ (Bourdieu 2003).

\(^7\) As noted, Bourdieu did write conceptually about transnational and global fields. Yet he did not discuss how to extend his concepts in systematic ways in the course of research across scales, which stands very much in contrast to his otherwise strong emphasis on epistemological-methodological reflexivity (eg Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).

\(^8\) His usage of the concept of structural equivalence should be distinguished from the meaning of the term in the context of network theory, cf. Lorrain and White (1971), whose definition is mathematical, suggesting that two actors have structural equivalence if they have identical ties to and from all the g-2 other actors in a diagram or nondirected graph.

\(^9\) Cross-case comparison is to be distinguished from same-case comparison. The former engages with cases that may vary in their size, function, or complexity (Vaughan 2014, p. 63). A classic example is Goffman’s concept of the ‘total institution.’ It originated from field work at a mental hospital (Goffman 1961). Then, he elaborated it further through cross-case comparison with such diverse cases as prisons, army training camps, naval vessels, boarding schools, and monasteries (Goffman 1961, p. 62). Same-case comparison, by contrast, refers to similar cases, such as social revolutions in different nation-states. Stinchcombe, for example, envisioned historical case comparison essentially as a search for relations of structural equivalence (Stinchcombe 2013 [1978], cf. in Vaughan 2014, p. 62).
moved Merton's theory of deviance from the level of individuals to organizations and, in the process, significantly innovated upon his original model (Merton 1968 [1938]; Vaughan 1983). Second, while Vaughan's method is based on the identification of structural similarities between cases, it does not stop at that. For AT, establishing structural similarities between cases represents only a first step. It serves to create the analytical background against which it then becomes possible to decipher differences in a systematic, controlled way. It is such differences that are critical in AT, because they are the basis for theoretical innovation (Vaughan 2014, p. 66). The central principle of theory extension for AT is thus not analogical similarity (or in Bourdieu's vocabulary structural equivalents), but analogical difference: the use of analogy as a heuristic tool and cognitive process to systematically identify differences against the background of equivalencies. Hence, AT is not just relevant for adjustments in the content of concepts. Importantly, it may extend to modifications of a model's analytical architecture as well.

Deploying AT for theory extension across scales involves three main analytical moves. I only briefly summarize them here. Their application to extending field theory will be exemplified in the second and third sections of the article. The first move consists of the analytical reduction of theory. This does not just mean to formalize the model into a scheme that identifies the core concepts and their relations, which constitutes a common procedure not specific to the method of analogical theorizing. The task is, more particularly, to reconstruct the model in such a way that: a) form is subtracted from content, and b) properties are disentangled from scale. These two principles of analytic reduction are based on the assumption that all forms of social organization—withstanding variation in their size, level, complexity and function—have certain features in common: they share basic characteristics of structure (which Bourdieu terms ‘structural homologies’), such as ‘hierarchy, division of labor, goals or normative standards’ (Vaughan 2014, p. 64). In addition, they display similar processes, eg ‘socialization, conflict, competition, cooperation, power, culture’ (Vaughan 2014, p. 64). Thus, to reconstruct a model with AT means, literally, to reduce elements of the theory to scale-invariant properties.

For example, with regard to field theory: in a scale-invariant way, one can generally posit that a field refers to a social sphere that is relatively autonomous from its environment. How to conceptualize this environment, in turn, would be scale-specific. Bourdieu’s original theory tied the environment of fields like those of cultural production closely to the nation-state and the field of power more generally (eg Bourdieu 1993a, pp. 37-40). Yet, to move the concept beyond national borders, we need to abstract specification from this national level in a move of analytical reduction in order to construct a preliminary formal model. We know that fields need to be theorized in relation to their environment, yet how to conceptualize this environment, in particular, is scale-dependent and thus has to be determined in the course of research.

A second move consists of analogical extension. It means to identify to what extent and how there are structural equivalencies between the model and the characteristics of the empirical case in order to justify the transposition. The more equivalencies there are, the deeper the analogy and thus the better, principally, the fit of the theory will be for the case. At this stage it is best to work with theoretical alternatives, in order to identify comparatively the concept/model with the best fit, so that one avoids mere ‘relabeling.’ Indeed, analogical theorizing should not be mistaken for a method that leads simply to ‘the ever more extensive expansion of some theoretical system in a way that effectively closes it off from rebuttal or disconfirmation’ (Healy 2015, p. 3).

---

Finally, against this background, one arrives at the critical step of adjusting and substantiating the selected model that provided the best fit by identifying relevant empirical differences. Of course, there can be an infinite number of differences. What matters are those that are relevant for the specific research question. Thus, the identification of what needs to be adjusted or rearranged must be fundamentally problem-driven and seen against the background of the established analogies. Principally, there can be two kinds of differences: first, the specification of terms that became abstracted from the original model (eg the above example of ‘environment’). Second and more profound is the identification of necessary changes in the analytical architecture of the model, eg by introducing new concepts, by re-formulating or subtracting core concepts, or by changing the logic of their relationships. For example, I will discuss in the article’s third section how I identified one significant difference in comparison to Bourdieu’s national approach by engaging in research on the problem of the emergence of the global art field. And, thereby, how I introduced a new concept into the field model, namely ‘relative vertical autonomy.’ But before we get there, I would like to illustrate briefly the first two analytical moves. Thus, the next section begins by developing a basic, scale-invariant definition of a social field that is centered on the concept of ‘relative autonomy.’ Then, I proceed to discuss how this basic conception of a social field has been transposed to a global scale, in line with the move of analogical extension.

Relative Autonomy as a Defining Criterion of Bourdieusian Fields

*The Autonomy Criterion*

Bourdieu’s field theory builds upon and expands Max Weber’s notion of social differentiation (Weber [1915] 1946; Martin Levi 2003, p. 29, Gorski 2013, p. 329). Standing on Weber’s shoulders, he develops a framework to account for a variety of (modern) social spheres, which follow their own ‘inherent lawfulness’ (Weber [1915] 1946)—such as science, the arts, the bureaucratic state, or the economy (eg Bourdieu 1996, 1999, 2004, 2005). Each social field embodies a uniquely structured, differentiated social space of specialized practice that revolves around distinctive beliefs and interests (cf. Swartz 1997, pp. 117–149). In Bourdieu’s take on social differentiation, the concept of ‘relative autonomy’ is fundamental, because it designates how a social field is to be distinguished from others. In this way, it represents the central entry point from which to delineate the analytical boundary conditions that define a social sphere as a distinctive social field. To reconstruct an elementary, that is, scale-invariant field definition, this section looks more closely at how Bourdieu introduced and used the concept—dissecting the twin components of ‘autonomy’ and ‘relative.’ This analysis will establish analytical criteria for the third part, which discusses how to extend the field model to a global level by drawing upon principles of analogical theorizing.

Bourdieu oriented his usage of ‘autonomy’ closely to its original meaning as a composite of the Greek words *nomos* (law) and *autós* (self). He deploys the term to account for social spheres that are governed by their own ‘specific law’ (Bourdieu 2000, p. 15) or, as he alternatively writes, their own ‘specific logic’ of competition (Bourdieu 2000, p. 126). But what specifically does Bourdieu mean by ‘law’ or ‘logic’? The *Rules of Art* offers specification,

12 It should be noted that the concept of relative autonomy was originally introduced by Louis Althusser (1971), ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,’ in Sharma, A., & Gupta, A. (Eds.). (2009). *The anthropology of the state: a reader*. John Wiley & Sons: 86–111. Standing in the Marxian tradition, he sought to formulate a relationship between the base and the superstructure that is less deterministic, and acknowledges the possibility of reciprocal effects. Bourdieu develops this idea in the context of field theory further, as a central angle of his version of social differentiated theory.
13 We might want to keep in mind that the latter notion, a specific ‘logic,’ has been deemed as ‘broad and too amorphous’ to have analytical leverage in field theory (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, p. 10).
for here he associates the notion of a field’s *nomos* with fundamental ‘principles of vision and division’ (Bourdieu 1996, p. 223ff, 230). In this sense, the idea of a field-specific law should not be mistaken for codified legal regulations. More deeply, it refers to elementary ways in which agents perceive a particular world and through which they devise—accordingly—social categories and hierarchies that give order to that world.

At this point, we should pause and note a crucial implication of Bourdieu’s use of autonomy as a differentiating concept, namely that a social field refers not just to a sphere of specialized practice—which visual art, for example, had been for centuries. Already in the Renaissance, for instance, painters underwent long and arduous periods of specialized training; and creators (and competitors) like Leonardo da Vinci and Michelangelo clearly achieved highly specific artistic mastery. Still, a social field emerges not only on the grounds of a kind of ‘division of labor’ or specialization. In Bourdieu’s approach, this would constitute only a necessary, but not sufficient condition. What matters analytically is what I call the autonomy criterion: a stage when a social sphere of specialized practice institutionalizes categories of ‘vision and division’ that construe its law (or logic) of competition as relatively independent from the logics of other social spheres or the broader environment. This subtle but important distinction is crucial to keep in mind throughout the sections in which I discuss how to define and delineate a field at a transnational or global scale.

**Three Dimensions of Autonomy**

For the purposes of research, it is useful to specify the autonomy criterion along three dimensions. They can be analytically extracted from The Rules of Art (1996). The first dimension refers to an autonomous ideology, which, at the level of agents, becomes embodied in a ‘particular form of belief’ (Bourdieu 1983, p. 317). An autonomous ideology construes a specific sphere of practice as distinctive, independent, and ‘ultimately more valuable’ than other practices (Gorski 2013, p. 334). For example, the emergence of the modern art field hinged on the rise and legitimization of a new belief in the principle of *l’art pour l’art*. This ideology redefined art as a practice that demanded to be seen and appreciated for its own intrinsic aesthetic sake (Bourdieu 1996, p. 297, 81)—independent from the worldly demands and influences of patronage, the state, or the market. In the visual arts in France, this new ‘vision’ was spearheaded by Édouard Manet (Bourdieu 2013). His aesthetic strategies claimed the importance of form over content, the aesthetic ‘mode of representation over the object of representation’ (Bourdieu 1996, p. 299f). By moving the emphasis from the subject of a painting to the pure play of colors or the formal manner of brushwork, Manet sought to free visual art from its traditional duty of representing the external world, thereby bringing about what Bourdieu called a ‘symbolic revolution’—the erection of an autonomous vision of artistic production (Bourdieu 2013).

A second dimension consists of the establishment of autonomous principles of constructing hierarchy, manifested in what Bourdieu would term a distinctive type of specific symbolic capital, which, at the subjective level, becomes associated with specific interests.

---

14 Which Philip Gorski considers as Bourdieu’s ‘most sophisticated piece of historical analysis and arguably his most methodologically sophisticated work *tout court*’ (Gorski 2013, p. 328).

15 Bourdieu distinguishes between four main sorts of capital: apart from ‘economic capital,’ which denotes material wealth in the form of money, stocks and shares, etc., he introduces ‘cultural capital,’ ‘social capital,’ and ‘symbolic capital.’ ‘Cultural capital’ refers to the possession of cultural goods (eg books, paintings), institutional academic titles or formal credentials, and the degree to which one has incorporated cultural competencies or maintains familiarity with certain cultural practices. His rather vague notion of social capital signifies the kind and amount of social relationships that can be mobilized for certain strategies in specific fields (for the idea of negative social capital, cf. Wacquant 1998, p. 27f). The concept of symbolic capital indicates a degree of social recognition or prestige as an effect of possessing some of the aforementioned sorts of capital, such as cultural capital in cultural fields, etc. (eg Bourdieu 2001). Regarding the latter, Bourdieu frequently speaks of *specific*
For example, in the art field, the ideology of l’art pour l’art entailed new notions of artistic legitimacy. Its attribution became anchored in aesthetically specific peer criteria and opposed to external evaluative principles, such as those imposed by state institutions or the commercial market. In other words, artistic legitimacy (ie symbolic capital) turned into something autonomous to the extent that it became defined in opposition to external worldly forms of economic or public artistic success, leading to a new mandate of ‘interest in disinterestedness’ (Bourdieu 1996, pp. 124-127; Bourdieu 1993a, p. 39).16

A third, and often underappreciated, dimension of an autonomous field consists of the formation of a ‘set of specific institutions’ (Bourdieu 1996, p. 292)17 through which autonomous principles of vision and division become ingrained in a distinctive institutional infrastructure. In the case of the modern art field, this third dimension became manifest in what Bourdieu termed a market for ‘restricted production.’ It encompassed, for example, autonomously oriented ‘places of exhibition (galleries, museums, etc.), institutions of consecration (academies, salons, etc.), institutions for the reproduction of producers (art schools, etc.), and specialized agents (dealers, critics, art historians, collectors, etc.)’ (Bourdieu 1996, p. 292).

Thus, abstracted from the substantive case of the modern art field, one can derive three principal and scale-invariant dimensions that specify when a social sphere qualifies as an autonomous field: 1) an autonomous ideology and related beliefs about a particular realm of practice (what Bourdieu also referred to as ‘vision,’ cf. Gorski 2013, p. 329); 2) autonomous principles of hierarchy formation as the foundation for a specific type of ‘symbolic capital’ and associated interests (corresponding also to his notion of ‘division’); and 3) a distinctive set of ‘institutions’ through which autonomous principles of vision and division become objectified and perpetuated.

**The Historical Relativity of Autonomy**

Bourdieu does not go as far as Weber (Alexander 1995, p. 160) or classical field theorists in physics to assume the possibility of complete closure. As he recognizes, social fields are themselves embedded, and, as such, they are not immune to external influences. Larger societal processes, events, or crises may all impact upon field dynamics (cf. also DiMaggio 1991, Fligstein and McAdam 2012, pp. 59–64). To highlight this critical point, Bourdieu adds the qualifier ‘relative’ to his conception of autonomy. It suggests that environments may affect fields, but in a modus that is relative to their specific ‘laws’ and particular historical configurations: external influences have an impact only to the extent that they become ‘refracted’ like a prism through the internal principles, structures and meanings of a historically given state of the field. In addition, ‘relative’ also means that a field’s autonomy is empirically variable, and so it may range in a linear fashion from absolute autonomy to nearly complete heteronomy (Gorski 2013, p. 329f): the higher the degree of autonomy, the higher in turn is the field’s ‘refraction effect,’ that is, its power to absorb and transform external influences or constraints into internal ones (Bourdieu 1992, p. 137).

symbolic capital, because it refers to a form of recognition that functions only with particular forms of capital whose value depends on the field itself; symbolic capital in ‘rigorous terms’ thus designates ‘symbolic effects of capital’ (Bourdieu 2000, p. 242). Wacquant remarks that the notion of symbolic capital is one of the most complex in Bourdieu’s approach (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 119.)

16 Bourdieu summarized this argument in the *Field of Cultural Production* succinctly, as follows: ‘Thus, at least in the most perfectly autonomous sector of the field of cultural production, where the only audience aimed at is other producers (as with Symbolist poetry), the economy of practices is based, as in a generalized game of ‘loser wins,’ on a systematic inversion of the fundamental principles of all ordinary economies: that of business (it excludes the pursuit of profit and does not guarantee any sort of correspondence between investments and monetary gains), that of power (it condemns honours and temporal greatness), and even that of institutionalized cultural authority (the absence of any academic training or consecration may be considered a virtu.’ (Bourdieu 1993a, p. 39).

17 Which, properly translated, refers to a set of specific organizations.
Thus, the composite of ‘relative autonomy’ offers a way to delineate what differentiates a field from others, while, at the same time, it also formulates a varying modus of how a field is related to other spheres or a broader environment. Taken together and concluding the move of analytical reduction that motivated this second section, a social field can be defined—in an elementary and scale-invariant sense—as a sphere of specialized practice with a relatively autonomous logic of competition in the three dimensions of a distinctive ideology, a particular type of specific symbolic capital, and a distinctive set of organizations.

I agree with Steinmetz that it is useful to distinguish the concept of an autonomous field clearly from a settled field (Steinmetz 2002, cf. especially p. 151, 193, 2008, p. 539)—also in view of the notion of ‘field settlement’ in the theory of strategic action fields (eg Armstrong 2005; Fligstein and McAdam 2012). In a settled field, participants concur not only about the distinctive value of a specialized practice and the particular type of symbolic capital that is dominant. Far more, they also agree about the specific criteria of evaluation that underlie the distribution of symbolic capital (Steinmetz 2002, p. 151, 2008, p. 595). They have, in other words, arrived at a ‘field settlement,’ manifested in a ‘stable consensus regarding rules of conduct and membership criteria’ (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, pp. 88–90). In short, a settled field has reached a higher degree of consolidation, being characterized by a ‘robust social order’ and established ‘rules of the game’ (Fligstein and Adam 2012, p. 92).

While one might object that the concept of a relatively autonomous field refers to a rather loose meso-level order by comparison, I posit that this feature has unique advantages for transnational or global analysis. Insofar as transnational relations tend to be more ephemeral (Buchholz 2013) and their meanings in flux—being marked by greater ‘indeterminacy’ (Madsen 2006, p. 24, 33) and ‘ontological openness’ (Marginson 2008, p. 313)—the model of an autonomous field is principally well suited for their analysis. One can capture relatively distinct and interdependent transnational orders as orders without having to exaggerate the degree of consolidation and integration. In other words, the concept has a unique analytical purchase to enable one to grasp social spheres with ‘institutionalized anomic’ (Bourdieu 1993b, pp. 238–253), which seem to be profuse at the transnational or global level.

Extending the Field Concept to a Global Level: From Functional to Vertical Autonomy

**Analogue Extension: Relative Autonomy and Global Fields**

As outlined above, in an elementary sense, Bourdieu defines fields by considering relative autonomy to be a necessary condition. Fields refer not just to social spheres of specialized practice. They also designate spheres of specialized practice that have established a (relatively) autonomous logic. An intriguing body of empirical-theoretical work has transposed the concept of autonomy beyond national borders to examine fields in a global context, proceeding akin to the strategy of extension via structural equivalencies (eg Dezalay and Barthes 1996; Heilbron 1999; Steinmetz 2008a, 2008b; Go 2008; Krause 2014). These works demonstrate that at the transnational or global level, too, certain social spheres are best grasped as differentiated through relatively autonomous logics of competition.

For example, positioning himself against political economy models, Johan Heilbron reveals that the global field for book translations functions in its cross-border exchanges relatively independently from the ‘constraints’ of the broader ‘world market’ (Heilbron 1999, p. 432). He shows that the share of a language group like Dutch or French in the total number of translated books worldwide is not a derivative of ‘global economic structures,’ ie inequalities of the world economic system. Instead, the position of a language group is influenced by the particular history and principles of hierarchy that are specific to the field of book translations.

---

18 It should be mentioned that in doing so, these studies did not refer to principles of analogical theorizing.
as a relatively autonomous sphere of cultural exchange (Heilbron 1999). As another example, Monika Krause (2014, pp. 112–114) has insightfully demonstrated how a global field of humanitarian relief emerged by defining its (relative) independence from state politics, social movements and religious organizations. It is the vision of neutrality toward these institutions that provided the foundational ideology for a specific type of humanitarian symbolic capital, which, the study reveals, figures as the dominant resource and stake of competition among agents and organizations in this realm of global humanitarian practice.

By synthesizing these and other contributions, one can arrive at a preliminary, basic definition of a global field that centers, analogous to Bourdieu’s national fields, on the criterion of relative autonomy. What changes in such a move of analogical extension is, first and foremost, the geographic scale, expanding from the national to the global level. Correspondingly, based on analogical equivalencies, a global field can be delineated along three basic analytical characteristics: 1) as a sphere of specialized practice; 2) with a relatively autonomous logic of competition, and 3) on a multi-continental scale of geographic expansion.

Analogous Difference: Distinguishing Functional and Vertical Autonomy

For my work on the contemporary visual arts, however, simply extending Bourdieu’s relative-autonomy criterion proved to be insufficient. While investigating the emergence of the global art field, I had to revise Bourdieu’s argument that a field emerges through increasing autonomy in relation to other fields. Extending his conception analogically—from the making of a national field to the making of a global one—it became evident that I had to supplement it with a second axis of differentiation: the global field of contemporary visual art emerged not so much by constituting its independence from other fields of practice, such as the economic, the political or even the religious field (Bourdieu 1996). The main axis of differentiation was that it became relatively autonomous from the logics of various national art fields (Buchholz 2008, 2013). In this case, however, the autonomy criterion assumed a new direction and meaning: rather than applying to functionally different spheres of practice, it relates to the different levels on which fields operate. In short, in examining the emergence of a global field in the contemporary visual arts, I was confronted with a second set of processes of differentiation across different levels of social organization—and thus, I concluded, a second kind of autonomy.

To delineate the latter for global field analysis, I suggest that it is necessary to distinguish between two types of autonomy: first, what I term functional autonomy, which designates how social spheres are differentiated by functionally different types of interests, practices and their logics, corresponding to Bourdieu’s original conceptualization (Bourdieu 1996, 2013). Second, vertical autonomy, which accounts for differentiation in relation to other field-levels of social organization in the same realm of specific interest and practice.

---

19 For this territorial qualification of the concept ‘global,’ see Held, et al. 2003.
20 In this context, I presume a clear distinction between functional and functionalist, the latter referring to an older variant of systemic social differentiation theory, as formulated, for example, by Parsons. For an insightful critique of functionalist reasoning in historical sociology, cf. Roy 1990.
Diagram 1. Relative Functional and Vertical Autonomy

Diagram 1 represents the distinction between these two kinds of autonomy in highly schematic terms with regard to the case of the global art field and respective forms of capitals (+ signifying positive volume): as illustrated, functional autonomy captures how the (global) art field is (relatively) distinct in its logics from the economic field (or political or religious etc.), while vertical autonomy refers to how the global art field is (relatively) differentiated in its logic from national fields of art (eg French, U.S., Japanese). Thus, it depicts differentiation between field levels of social organization, rather than the type of specialized practice. Instead of functional differentiation (broadly understood, cf. Gorski 2013, p. 329), it accounts for a form of vertical differentiation.

Correspondingly, by integrating ‘vertical autonomy’ as a feature of analogous difference—in the case of a field with different scales of social organization—the preliminary definition of a global field from the previous section has to be specified by four rather than three analytical characteristics: 1) as a sphere of specialized practice; 2) on a transcontinental scale; 3) functional autonomy in relation to other fields of practice; and 4) vertical autonomy from ‘lower’ field levels of organization within the relevant practice sphere. In short, a multi-scalar global field can be defined as a globally extended sphere of specialized practice that displays a relatively autonomous logic of competition vis-à-vis other types of fields as well as other field levels within the same realm of practice.

I will detail in the following paragraphs how the idea of vertical autonomy can contribute to advancement of the development of a global field analysis more generally. But, before doing so, I would like to add three important qualifications of my conceptual distinction: first, the term vertical is not meant to designate a certain kind of hierarchical relationship between fields. In my usage, it denotes an analytically different meaning and direction of autonomy, in contrast to functional autonomy (cf. Diagram 1). Second, while I develop the concept of vertical autonomy in this article with primary reference to the relations of global to national fields, it is, in principle, not limited to these field levels. It could be also used, for example, to conceptualize global fields in relation to regional fields (Heilbronn 2013), or to global fields
vis-à-vis local fields—depending on the particular research problem. In this sense, the concept is not attached to inherent methodological nationalism. Third, this analytical flexibility also pertains to the directionality of the relationship among field levels. For example, while I focus my discussion in the following section on the emergence of a global art field as a process that involves vertical autonomy from national art fields, one could also invert the vector of analysis. In regard to a different field and historical period, one could study, for instance, how the emergence of national fields of state governance also involved the vertical differentiation from pre-existing global fields of empire (Wimmer 2010) or the modern capitalist economy. In short, vertical autonomy should not be associated with a pre-defined directionality.

**Contributions of Relative Vertical Autonomy to the Development of Global Field Analysis**

If one reads carefully, one could argue that the idea of vertical autonomy has been implicit in important contributions that define global cultural fields (eg Casanova 2004 p. xii, p. 11f; Kuipers 2011, p. 541, 554). However, as it has not been explicitly distinguished as a different kind of autonomy, the vertically autonomous dimension has remained under-theorized in the actual empirical study of global fields. Pushing our analytical attention more into the direction of vertical autonomy offers, I argue, at least three contributions to the study of fields in a global context: first, it brings into sharp focus how the emergence of certain global fields involves a dynamic of vertical differentiation across field levels. As such, it provides an entry from which to theorize mechanisms of the emergence of higher-order fields out of lower-order fields—something that Bourdieu himself was not clear about. Second, it offers a lens through which we can examine how global fields remain (at least partially) articulated and interdependent with national fields (or urban or regional fields, etc.). Third, as I will detail, it also advances the conceptualization and measurement of the macro-structure of a global field.

**Theorizing the Emergence of Multi-Scalar Global Fields**

As indicated, relative vertical autonomy was originated and developed during research on the emergence of the global art field. Taking the visual arts as an example, I would like to suggest that the concept may offer analytical purchase for examining the emergence of global fields that are multi-scalar more generally, and that it thereby extends the existing literature in important ways.

For example, one of the most elaborated and convincing studies on global field emergence so far is Pascale Casanova’s pioneering work on avant-garde world literature (Casanova 2004). Her approach is breathtaking in historical scope, yet it relies mainly on the vantage-point of functional autonomy. In The World Republic of Letters, she showed how one fundamental precondition that enabled a world literary field to arise after the 19th century was that literary production gained increasing independence from the nation-state and national politics within different national fields, first in Europe, then spreading around the world, also to various post-colonial states. With looser ties to national agendas and the production of propaganda, writers became able to envision an alternative, non-national conception of literature—and thus to develop a more international vision of their work (cf. also Moretti 2000; Santano 2014). Yet, while Casanova's historical argument is insightful, it is incomplete. Insufficiently addressed is how, out of various national, yet autonomous literary fields, a genuinely global literary field can emerge that is not just a sum of these independent entities.

This is exactly where the concept of vertical autonomy can be productive: it offers a lens through which to theorize more explicitly a second axis of differentiation that is crucial.

---

21 That is, those that are already institutionalized at ‘lower,’ eg national levels, etc.
22 Global in the generic sense introduced in footnote 3.
for multi-scalar fields—to bring into clear relief how a global arena becomes relatively different in its logic and structures from national fields. Vertical autonomy thereby also implies that the making of a global field is not necessarily just a question of the spatial extension of boundaries—e.g., when specialized agents and institutions from different autonomous fields expand their competitive exchanges across national borders (Buchholz 2006, 2008; Kuipers 2011, p. 542f). It also comprises another set of processes, which can be grasped, I argue, as a dynamic of vertical social differentiation.

To explain the vertical differentiation of a global field, the historical processes are seen to be multifaceted and complex, resonant with Bourdieu’s intricate approach to historical sociology (Steinmetz 2011; Gorski 2013). Yet, by transposing Bourdieu’s three-dimensional model of differentiation from functional to vertical autonomy and using it as a heuristic frame, my research identified three mechanisms that have come into play in the vertical differentiation of the global art field since the 1980s. These mechanisms might be transposable for examining the historical emergence of other (multi-scalar) global fields. They encompass a) the formation of global institutions for cross-border exchange; b) the rise and institutionalization of a field-specific global discourse; c) the rise of genuinely global evaluation mechanisms, which I conceptualize as institutional transnational or global forms of capital.

Figure 1.

The Emergence of the Global Art Field:
Three Mechanisms

3. Global Rankings, since 2000

2. Field Specific Global Discourse, since 1990s
From Critique of Western Doxa to the Construction of a Global Gaze

1. Global Institutional Circuits, since 1980s
Formation of Global Biennial Circuit/Global Auction Market

Transnational Contemporary Art Field, since 1960s

Stages of Institutionalization

Cross-Border Flows

As schematically summarized in Figure 1, it is through the interaction of these three mechanisms that the vertical differentiation of the global art field could be situated and historically explained—that is, as an interdependent global space for cultural cross-border flows and competition in which the ultimate stakes and values of contemporary art have become redefined in global terms. In the following paragraphs, I describe each mechanism separately

23 Which also needs to be conceptualized as more than the ‘opening up of national fields,’ since we are dealing with a process of veritable emergence. (cf. Kuipers 2011).

24 As section 1 outlined, in a scale-invariant sense, field autonomy encompasses, at minimum, three dimensions: 1) specific ideologies/beliefs; 2) a specific type of symbolic capital/interests; and 3) a specific set of organizations.
with illustrations from my research. By considering findings of empirical studies on other cases, I seek to indicate how these mechanisms might be relevant for theorizing global field emergence beyond the visual arts.

The first mechanism consists of what I term **global institutions for cross-border exchange**, referring to the establishment of an institutional infrastructure for the worldwide circulation of ideas, persons, and goods across borders (Buchholz 2008, 2013). In the visual arts, the two most influential global institutions for the emergence of a global field were the global art biennial circuit at the cultural pole, and the global auction market at the economic pole. While both institutions (ie art biennials and auction houses) had been international for a longer period, over the past three decades they increasingly diffused across several continents. More importantly, they began to form interconnected circuits for the worldwide flow and valorization of contemporary art. For example, Sotheby’s and Christie’s underwent tremendous (and competitive) expansion since the 1980s, which entailed the formation of a partially integrated global auction market (Moulin 2003; van den Bosch 2005; Horowitz 2010, p. 13f.; Buchholz 2013). By the first decade of the new millennium, both houses had established sales locations in nine cities (including New York, London, Toronto, Zurich, Milan, Amsterdam, Hong Kong, Paris, Doha or Dubai). In addition, while Sotheby’s could further rely on offices in 23 countries on five continents, Christie’s sales offices spread across 29 countries, plus Africa.

The formation of such global institutions for cross-border exchange constituted an important mechanism for the vertical emergence of a global art field because they helped to connect individual and organizational players from various national art fields around the world on a more frequent and, above all, sustained basis. Thus, they created an institutional infrastructure that made regular cultural exchange and competition with a worldwide scope possible in the first place. Beyond the visual arts, the relevance of transnational or global institutions for cross-border exchange in the formation of a global field is indicated, for example, in the literary realm, where international book fairs figure as significant institutions for enabling the cross-border circulation of cultural goods and connecting brokers from different national fields on a more frequent basis (Sapiro 2010, p. 243). Also, in global TV, the proliferation of trade conventions or fairs has come to play a similarly connecting and integrative role (Bielby and Harrington 2008, especially pp. 2–8). Recent work on the social sciences, too, highlights the early importance of international social scientific associations for an emerging global field in this realm (Heilbron 2013, p. 689f.).

However, we should not assume that a global field arises quasi-mechanically out of the formation of a global institutional infrastructure. In the case of the contemporary visual arts, its emergence also hinged upon the rise of new meanings that rendered such institutional

---

25 Art biennials refer to periodic group exhibitions that aspire to represent the state of international contemporary art (Boecker 2002, p. 422). As several scholars have noted (e.g. Quemin 2002; Stallabrass 2004), since the 1980s, contemporary art biennials have proliferated all over the world, with new biennials in places in Asia, Latin America, or Africa. Yet beyond diffusion, they have also come to form a partially integrated global institutional circuit that heightens transcontinental flows of intermediaries, artists, and artifacts (Bydler 2004, p. 85-169; Buchholz 2013). Other examples of border-crossing integrated circuits, which do not necessarily reach a global scope, however, are the more ephemeral travelling exhibitions among art museums (Crane 2002); and certainly the Guggenheim’s spectacular expansions, which have partly faltered and partly been revived, with a new, major Abu Dhabi satellite in the making.

26 My institutional analysis of globalization in the contemporary visual arts focused only on institutions that are particularly important for the global valuation of art. Other institutional phenomena that also matter for increasing artistic flows and exchange across borders are artist-in-residence programs (Bydler 2004; Glaser 2009), or art fairs, which, however, with few exceptions, tend to operate more regionally (Quemin 2012, pp. 53-82; Baia Currioni 2012, pp. 115-51).

27 This analysis did not take into account consultancies, which represent a far less institutionalized, volatile form of the foreign representation of auction houses.

28 It should be added that the authors did not refer to Bourdieu’s field approach.
transformations intelligible and redefined the ‘vision’ and cultural boundaries of contemporary art in global terms (Buchholz 2013). In this regard, a second mechanism that I identified in my research is field-specific global discourse. In view of the art field, field-specific global discourse defines the body of writings that engage with global issues and globalization in specific view of contemporary art, that is, its institutions, its artistic practices, its meanings, and its history. As Ferguson (1998) has insightfully shown at the national level, discourse is a fundamental mechanism for field autonomization. It provides tangible schemes of reference that may cohere and harden into cultural logics and beliefs that are constitutive for a particular social field (cf. also Gorski 2013, p. 334f.). Regarding a global perspective, Bourdieu himself ironically stressed the performative, constructionist nature of discourse in a vehemently critical discussion of the concept of globalization, which he denounced (with focus on its neoliberal sources) as a ‘power discourse’ in the ‘strongest sense of the word’ (Bourdieu 2003, p. 84). However, in the context of global field analysis, so far, few works have fully attended to the systematic study of discourse in order to account for the constitutive role of meanings and beliefs in cross-border transformations (for an exception, cf. Steinmetz 2008a).

In my work, I traced the dynamics of global art discourse by examining internationally influential art journals over a period of three decades. This tracking showed how field-specific global discourse rose since the 1980s, and how it entailed, over time, the emergence of new global imaginations and meanings, which, eventually, led to the gradual construction and legitimation of a ‘global gaze.’ This dynamic was far from straightforward. The construction of a global gaze unfolded in three stages that were each associated with different connotations of global categories and themes: first, toward the end of the 1980s, debates on multiculturalism and post-colonialism introduced global concepts and topics into the contemporary art field primarily as a normative topos from which to criticize (at times vehemently) Eurocentric perspectives in Western contemporary art and its institutions. Second, in the late 1990s, the global became additionally associated with discourses and debates on globalization in the art field. The institutional transformations mentioned above found their cultural echo. Global art discourse came to both express and contribute to growing awareness of a globally expanding institutional context, such as the art biennial circuit—a context that, it was noted, afforded new kinds of artistic exchanges and hybridizations beyond the dominant Western hemisphere. Finally, at the beginning of the new millennium, the global assumed greater taken-for-granted status. More and more agents began to believe in the global as an actually existing (immanent) condition for contemporary art and its institutional landscape. At the same time, global art discourse became entrenched in new modes of institutional and artistic classification, manifested, for example, in the proliferation of new, unifying categories, such as ‘global art world,’ ‘global art,’ ‘global styles’ or ‘global artist.’ Taken together, these transformations in fundamental classifications and beliefs about the scope of contemporary art and its institutions demonstrate how field-specific global discourse can figure both as a crucial indicator and cultural mechanism for the vertical differentiation of a global field.

A third mechanism for the vertical differentiation of the global art field rested in the rise of new institutional practices of classifying and assessing artistic recognition and value in global terms, notably in the advent of worldwide artists’ rankings in the new millennium (Buchholz 2013). Newly created rankings of the most successful artists in the global exhibition space and global auction market figured as important mechanisms, because they contributed to the construction of new principles of hierarchy and, thus, new types of ‘global capital’—as both stakes and objects-of-competition among cultural agents from virtually all corners of the world.29 For one, they globalized the parameters within which the highest stakes of

---

29 It was in this period, thus, when I observed an interaction effect between mechanisms one and two, which in tandem contributed to the emergence of a global field.

30 The two most relevant rankings that played into the vertical differentiation of the global art field were, on one hand, the Artfacts ranking, which assesses the global symbolic recognition of artists by drawing upon infor-
artistic recognition could be represented, thought of, and referenced. In addition, such rankings had important effects on the cultural construction of a common space of global competition. Their logic of evaluation suggests that artistic production around the world—which is nested in very different local histories, contexts, and biographies—can be attributed with enough sameness so as to be comparable in the first place. By creating unifying representations, global rankings both presuppose and indirectly assert the very notion that there is a common global competitive game.

The relevance of institutions for global evaluation or rankings as mechanisms for the institutionalization of vertically autonomous principles of hierarchy could be generalized. Existing studies indicate their importance for the international field of literature, eg regarding the Nobel Prize (Casanova 2004 [1999]: 126–163), or for the global field of higher education (Marginson 2007). Extending Bourdieu’s terminology, I suggest the conceptualization of such mechanisms as *institutional forms of transnational or global capital*. Because they operate as formal institutions of evaluation, they solidify stakes and types of transnational or global capital in principally more-ephemeral, vertically differentiated value struggles—thus establishing tangible objects of competition in an emerging global game.

In sum, it was the historical convergence and, in part, the interaction of these three mechanisms at the beginning of the new millennium—the establishment of a global art infrastructure, the cultural construction of a global gaze, and the institutionalization of new global institutional practices of evaluation in the form of rankings—that laid the institutional foundation for the vertical emergence of a global field in the contemporary visual arts as an interdependent and minimally integrated cultural space of exchange and competition that reaches across six continents. This nascent global art field, which is still in the process of consolidation, does not obliterate the relevance of national or regional art fields, nor does it vanquish their diversity. Thinking in terms of vertical autonomy allows one to appreciate it as an additional, relatively differentiated dimension that runs through the smaller fields and connects them with a historically unmatched worldwide scope. As I have sought to indicate throughout this section, the three identified mechanisms of vertical differentiation might be fruitful for examining the emergence of other global fields. Yet, in line with a pragmatist and analogical approach to theory, they should not be considered as exhaustive.

*National-Global Interdependencies: Degrees and Modalities*

Second, the idea of relative vertical autonomy offers a conceptual basis from which it is possible to theorize relations between global and national levels in ways that avoid simple dualisms, an issue that has been long and rightly problematized in the globalization literature (eg Brenner 1999; Sassen 2007; Major 2013). As the ‘relativity’ of field autonomy suggests that national and global field levels may be seen to be only partially independent, we must approach them, by the same token, as still relatively interdependent. Thus, the concept permits us to grasp global and national field levels as simultaneously distinct and entangled, as independent and interdependent—beyond any dualistic or even zero-sum terms.

To be sure, there are already important terms in global and transnational sociology that account for how the global and the national (or local) relate, such as ‘glocalization’ (Robert-
embracing contemporary art as an alternative mode of investment. Ink faced mounting problems with forgeries and skyrocketing prices, so that investment-oriented Chinese art buyers became predisposed to look for alternatives. Although these buyers had long exhibited a cultural disdain for the Chinese contemporary art genre, under such circumstances, it became desirable for them to go beyond cultural prejudices in order to embrace contemporary art as an alternative mode of investment. In short, the rise of Chinese

31 Cf. section two, on the historical relativity of autonomy.
contemporary artists in the global auction market improved their national standing, but, as I showed, only indirectly, by refraction through the particular (dis)tastes, investment cultures and market junctures in the Chinese auction sub-field.

Lastly and importantly, the ideas of vertical autonomy and refraction can be illuminating when one inverts the analytical perspective, as well: to examine how the national becomes refracted in the global. For instance, in my work on global art, I found that since the 1990s, certain artistic styles emerged in art exhibitions and criticism that were interpreted as ‘global styles,’ such as global conceptualism or global pop art (Buchholz 2013). Yet, upon closer inspection, it became clear that these global art styles were far from anything unitary or homogeneous. Rather, they represented a kind of artistic idiom through which various nationally rooted forms of aesthetic expression were brought into dialogue. Global pop art, for example, is a style that encompasses artistic variations from the U.S. and Great Britain, as well as Japan, Italy or Germany. A similar dynamic can be observed in the case of the ‘rock aesthetic’ as a global idiom in popular music (Regev 2003, p. 224). Rather than being homogeneous, this global musical style is constituted through numerous refracted national variations around the world, such as Russian, Chinese, Beninese or Argentine rock, thus representing ‘diversity within sameness’ (Regev 2003, p. 223).

In general, thinking about such cases with the concept of vertical autonomy provides a way to understand and explain why global culture in its expressive forms does not need to be reduced to something homogeneous; and why, and in which modalities, it is not necessarily devoid of national influences. In some strands of global sociology, the notion is prevalent that the global as a particular socio-spatial configuration makes it unnecessary to think in national terms, but in the cases of contemporary art or rock music this move would be reductionist. To grasp global cultural manifestations in these realms adequately, it is indispensable to keep an eye on persistent and complex entanglements of the global with the national. And this is why, I posit, vertical autonomy provides a fertile vantage point: we can examine and theorize global culture as an (unequal) mélange of refractions of various national and local modes of cultural production; a mélange that emerged, nevertheless, through trans-border exchanges and competition. Consequently, the symbolic space of a global field can be conceived as constituted through diversity within commonality—emerging out of multiple, vertically drawn-upon cultural traditions, sources, and entanglements; that is, global refractions of national cultural varieties (or local or urban or regional ones, etc.).

**Macro-Structure: Identifying and Denationalizing Bourdieu’s National Capital**

Finally, I argue that relative vertical autonomy offers a useful refinement of our understanding and measurement of a global field’s macro-structure. As Bourdieu points out (Bourdieu 2003), it is important to incorporate a macro-structure into the analysis of certain global fields in order to illuminate in what ways the dimensions and results of power contests go beyond the meso-level properties and relations of individual or organizational participants. They are also influenced by macro-level asymmetries, that is, inequalities between eg national fields. For instance, in view of global economic competition, Bourdieu argued that a firm’s position in the imbalanced macro-structure between national fields has a ‘positive or negative multiplier’ effect on its chances of success (Bourdieu 2003, p. 91). Although he did not make it explicit, it must be recognized that an agent’s position in a macro-structure is thus thought to have contextual effects that function independently from how her agent-level forms of capital are wielded. To extend the above example, two corporate entities with comparable resources will, nonetheless, have quite different odds of succeeding in global competition depending on their relative location, if one is situated in an economically advantaged area and the other in a disadvantaged one. So, a global macro-structure can hone our comprehension of power dy-

---

32 As one of the reviewers rightly noted.
namics in transnational or global fields, as it affects them at the meso-level but cannot be reduced to that point. And this, I emphasize, is the key implication.

Both Bourdieu (2003, p. 91) and Casanova (2004, p. 94) have made pioneering suggestions for conceptualizing the macro-structure of global fields, which, however, suffer partly from methodological nationalism. They posited that a global field’s macro-structure is to be conceptualized by the distribution of stocks of various forms of ‘national capital,’ that is, eg economic, political, cultural or linguistic resources associated with particular national fields as a whole. Yet, in general terms, I believe that it is neither necessary nor advisable to posit ‘national capital’ a priori as the main structuring category. The weight of ‘national’—in contrast to urban or regional macro inequalities—may be subject to change; when considering cultural spaces, their relative significance may also differ between different cultural forms and genres.33 Also, if we look beyond cultural arenas to global finance, for instance, Saskia Sassen has insightfully demonstrated that global cities rather than nation-states define the macro power structure of this economic realm most accurately (Sassen 1991). Thus, in order not to be blinded by presuppositions of methodological nationalism, I have argued that one should treat the relevance of ‘national’ capital not as an axiomatic assumption but as a factor, whose empirical and analytical weight has to be determined and justified in the course of research (Buchholz 2006, 2008).

Yet, apart from the general importance of maintaining the flexibility of various forms of what I term ‘macro capital’ (Buchholz 2013), the concept of relative vertical autonomy can advance our approach to a global field’s macro-structure in two ways. For one, it allows us to distinguish in which cases such a macro-structure is relevant for global fields at all, namely, only when they are differentiated along the vertical axis and thus partly remain interdependent with lower field levels and, therefore, the latter’s forms of capitals (eg national, regional or urban fields in the same practice realm, etc.). This contrasts with global fields that constitute themselves completely independently from any entanglements with, eg, the national level, as Krause has shown, for example, for the global field of humanitarian intervention (Krause 2014).

Moreover, even if countries (rather than cities or regions) are often the most relevant sub-units in many cases, vertical autonomy suggests that what matters in a global field are only those macro-level characteristics of national fields that constitute structural asymmetries at a global level of rivalry and competition, that is, at a vertically relatively autonomous field level. This apparently fine distinction has important implications for how one measures the macro-inequalities of a global field. For example, for reconstructing asymmetries in the distribution of institutional resources across 149 countries in the contemporary art field, it led me to consider only those art institutions within a national field that were also oriented toward a transnational or global level in their operations, instead of a national or regional level (eg among biennials, museums, or auction houses). In other words, I made sure that my sampling was precise by including only entities of the institutional macro-structure of a national field that entailed inequalities at the level of transnational culture exchange and valuations. Consequently, taking into account the idea of relative vertical autonomy, I argue, alerts us to the need to distinguish clearly between nationally and transnationally relevant ‘national stocks of capital.’ By implication, the concept serves to denationalize Bourdieu’s and Casanova’s original formulation of ‘national capital.’ Macro-level global hierarchies are not a simple reflection of national macro-hierarchies.

33 Casanova (2004, p. 35f.), for example, pointed out that literature has tended to be strongly tied to the construction of national spaces, being bound up with corresponding languages. Regarding the artistic media and visual ‘languages’ of the fine arts, this is not the case to the same extent (Buchholz 2006). Also, for certain research questions, it might be more appropriate to take, for example, cities or regions and not countries as the main macro-level entities. Hence, I argue for a more flexible approach to reconstructing the macro-structure of a global field.
Conclusion

We finally return to the question that opened this paper: what is a global field? By now, it should be clear that this question is ill-posed. Instead of seeking a quasi-universal theoretical definition, it seems more fruitful to ask which are the most fertile analytical principles to examine and use in theorizing the distinctive characteristics of global fields during the course of research? In other words, what are useful methods and ‘thinking tools’ for advancing an empirically grounded global field analysis, and which also avoid the traps of deductive reductionism or Northern-Western theory reification?

I have offered some suggestions for this complex problem. First, I argue that Vaughan’s analogical theorizing opens one possible path for further developing Bourdieu’s nation-state-centered field analysis toward a transnational or global level. Analogical theorizing provides both the means to generate an empirically differentiated as well as theoretically cumulative global field analysis. Second, drawing upon analogical theorizing and taking the visual arts as an empirical example, I argue that one characteristic in which certain transnational or global fields differ from the way fields were conceived in Bourdieu’s original theory is their multiscalar architecture. To account for this distinctive feature, I propose the concept of relative vertical autonomy and outline how it contributes to the analysis of fields in a global context in three ways: 1) for theorizing their emergence, 2) examining their relations or interdependencies on global and national levels, and 3) their macro-structure. This concept was elaborated in research on the global visual art field. It should not be interpreted as a world-spanning generalization (Connell 2007). Instead, and in line with principles of analogical theorizing, it should be treated as a preliminary construct that might be revised or confirmed—in the perpetual confrontation with different objects of global research.

Finally, I believe that there are three further directions in which the idea of vertical autonomy may inform research on global fields and be elaborated further: the first involves the theorizing of the strategies of agents, which, in vertically differentiated fields, are more complex to grasp. They can be simultaneously oriented at a national as well as a transnational or global field level, in relation to which they can have quite different meanings (cf. also Madsen 2006, p. 28, 30; Regev 2007, p. 127f). In other words, players may pursue double or multiple games in their various national or transnational positions (cf. Dezalay 2006). Thus, it is important to account for and further theorize the multi-positionality of agents in a vertically nested structure. Multiple-correspondence analysis, for example, is not suitable for use in analyzing such a multi-scalar situation. Second, it would be fruitful to develop further Bourdieu’s conception of social capital to detail in more refined ways how cross-border networks affect the dynamics of a global field across vertically autonomous levels. Third, as indicated in the fourth section, vertical autonomy requires one to revise one’s understanding of a field’s symbolic space in a global context, so that it avoids overly cohesive or structuralist presuppositions as in Bourdieu’s original formulation. For, if we can grasp global symbolic space as an assembly of vertically refracted national or local cultural forms, we need to account for local diversity within global similarity (or global similarity within local diversity), neither of which are easily mapped onto a dualist, structuralist grid. In other words, the idea of vertical autonomy demands further understanding of a seemingly paradoxical cultural constellation: how multiple, vertically drawn-upon sources, refractions, and entanglements make up the common diversity in the culture of global fields.


