



NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT 2014

NATIONAL PROGRESS REPORT

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

AS OF 20 FEBRUARY, 2014

Introductory remark: Germany, like many other long-term users of peaceful nuclear energy applications, had already achieved a high level of nuclear security well before the Washington Nuclear Security Summit 2010. This national progress report therefore only describes the additional achievements since then.

1. (CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL /CPPNM)

Germany ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM on 21 October 2010 and supported international efforts to reach the quorum for its entry into force. In 2012 Germany financed IAEA regional workshops in Europe, South America and Africa to facilitate interested states' ratification process and in order to increase the chances of an earlier entry into force of the 2005 Amendment.

2. (UNSCR 1540)

Germany remains fully committed to implementing nationally the obligations deriving from UNSCR 1540. It continues to encourage, and, where appropriate and feasible, to assist, other states in implementing UNSCR 1540. In order to improve cooperation between government and industry in UNSCR 1540 implementation, Germany initiated the "Wiesbaden Process" through hosting industry outreach conferences in 2012 and 2013 respectively. While the 2012 Wiesbaden Conference aimed at strengthening the partnership between government and industry in general, the 2013 Wiesbaden Conference focused on aspects of UNSCR 1540 implementation in the area of biosecurity. The potential for cooperation with industry is to be enhanced further; therefore, Germany is prepared to continue this process and host or co-host further conferences. These could take place abroad and in cooperation with other states and could have a thematic or regional focus.

3. (CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS THE IAEA NUCLEAR SECURITY-RELATED ACTIVITIES)

From 2010 to 2013 Germany allocated 10 m euros to the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund in agreements partly on securing orphan and disused radioactive sources, on setting up a global inventory of radioactive sources, on monitoring the import and export of radioactive materials into and from Libya and on establishing a postgraduate curriculum in nuclear security, partly on equipment and technical infrastructure for the IAEA's Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria.

Germany continues to actively support the drafting of IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents and the work of the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee.

4. (SUPPORT NUCLEAR SECURITY-RELATED INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES)

Germany actively supports GICNT and attended GICNT Plenary Meetings in Daejeon, ROK in June 2011 and in Mexico City in May 2013. In cooperation with the EU Commission Germany in May 2011 organized a GICNT workshop on core capabilities in Nuclear Forensics at the Institute for Transuranium Elements in Karlsruhe, Germany. Germany continued to make large-scale contributions to its G-8 Global Partnership projects in Russia. Especially by dismantling decommissioned nuclear submarines of Russia's Northern fleet and by securing sensitive nuclear installations and materials nuclear security was widely improved there.



5. (NUCLEAR SECURITY-RELATED BILATERAL SUPPORT)

Since 2013 Germany provides bilateral assistance to facility and reactor security efforts in Libya by improving the physical protection of the Nuclear Research Centre Tadjoura and through staff training measures for the Libyan Nuclear Authority. German contribution amounts to 1 m euros so far. Continuation of the project and further financial contributions are envisaged.

6. (CONTRIBUTION TO MINIMISATION OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR MATERIALS)

In close cooperation with international partners Germany continues its efforts to develop high-density LEU fuel with high flux properties as part of its endeavours to minimize the use of HEU in research reactors where technically and economically feasible.

Germany continues to explore ways and means of a timely return of all spent nuclear fuel of foreign origin from German research reactors based on HEU to be accepted to the country of origin.

7. (IMPROVE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY REGULATORY FRAMEWORK)

The evaluation of the national nuclear security regulatory framework is a living process involving all relevant authorities. Since 2010 a lot of regulations have been adjusted or rewritten. An evaluated DBT concerning nuclear facilities, a new guideline concerning intermediate storages and a new regulatory framework concerning cyber security including an own DBT entered into force. The regulatory framework concerning nuclear transports including an own DBT is drafted and expected to be implemented in 2014.

8. (ENHANCE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE)

With regard to the human dimension Germany has recently also focused its updating of nuclear safety regulations to include the interfaces man – technology – organization. The regulatory framework for the professional training of technical personnel in nuclear power plants has been adapted accordingly. In addition, it has been adjusted to nuclear power plants in post-operational phase. At the same time training and education for personnel in nuclear facilities increasingly follow an integrated approach to assure nuclear safety and security equally.

9. (ENHANCE EFFORTS IN COMBATING ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS)

Germany has taken part in international information sharing on the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials through the participation in the IAEA ITDB, IAEA NUSEC, and GICNT IAG. The German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) closely cooperates in the framework of Interpol's CBRNE Programme, the common Interpol/Europol project "Rutherford" and the CBRN Working Group of the European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network, all relating to illicit trafficking in nuclear or other radioactive materials. Since 2011 the Federal Customs Administration has more than doubled the number of mobile radiation measurement devices. The new highly sensitive radiation gauges enable customs authorities to conduct customs controls more efficiently. Furthermore a special CBRN incident reporting scheme for police and customs was implemented in July 2012.

10. (STRENGTHEN NATIONAL NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL MATERIAL SECURITY SYSTEM)

Germany attaches great importance to minimizing the risks related to the legitimate use of radiological and other radioactive materials. It applies nuclear security measures, including transport security measures, in accordance with the 2005 CPPNM Amendment and INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. In order to implement EU Council Directive 2003/122/Euratom, which demands strict control of each "High Activity Sealed Source" from manufacturing to the final disposal, a central register was established in Germany. It ensures comprehensive traceability of these sources, thus making it possible to ascertain their whereabouts at any time.

Strengthening the security regime for other radioactive material is a topical task in Germany. Therefore, a comprehensive guideline to provide appropriate security is currently being developed under consideration of the IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 11 (Implementing Guide – "Security of radioactive Sources" and further



recommendations). The guideline includes a graded approach based on the potential risk of other radioactive material and defines requirements and measures for each security level. It is expected to have a first draft version at the end of 2014.