Education, Party Polarization and the Origins of the Partisan Gender Gap*

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Abstract

The tendency of men to identify more with the Republican Party and less with the Democratic Party than women is a fixture of modern American politics. In contrast to much of the previous literature, we argue that this partisan gender gap emerged because of long-standing ideological differences between men and women, which became more relevant to party choices when the parties ideologically polarized. Those with more political knowledge are more likely to have noticed this polarization and adjusted their partisanship accordingly. In support, we use a large new dataset of pooled individual-level Gallup polling data to find that the partisan gender gap emerged earlier, and is consistently larger, among the highly educated. We also use American National Election Studies data to show that, while ideological differences between men and women are roughly consistent across education levels, the highly educated detected party ideological polarization earlier and more strongly.

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1 Introduction

On November 6, 2012, incumbent Democratic President Barack Obama received 126 more electoral votes, and nearly five million more popular votes, than Republican Mitt Romney. Yet, Romney may have been elected president were it not for the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which guaranteed women the right to vote. Exit polls show that Romney defeated Obama by seven percentage points among male voters, making this the fourth time in the last five elections that a plurality of men supported the Republican presidential nominee, while a plurality of women supported the Democrat (Center for American Women and Politics, 2012).

It is a relatively recent phenomenon that men favor Republicans and women favor Democrats. Women disproportionately identified themselves as Republicans and supported Republican presidential candidates from the dawn of modern polling in the 1930s through the 1950s (Ladd, 1997, 120-121).[1] While neither the press nor the academic literature paid much attention to gender differences in partisan preferences in the 1960s or 1970s, the disproportionate male support for Ronald Reagan in the 1980s thrust the modern partisan gender gap into the spotlight, where it has remained (see Mansbridge, 1986; Wirls, 1986; Mueller, 1988; Wolbrecht, 2000; Norris, 2003; Kaufmann, 2006). Many conservative parties in other industrialized democracies similarly transitioned from being disproportionately supported by women in the early and mid-twentieth century to being supported mainly by men by the turn of the century (Duverger, 1955; Studlar, McAllister and Hayes, 1998; Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006).

Most explanations of the partisan gender gap's emergence attribute it to growing cleavages between men and women in various political preferences, which they often blame on economic and social trends (Deitch, 1988; Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Edlund and Pande, 2002; Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef and Lin, 2004; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006). For example, Edlund

[1] This reverse gender gap was often substantial, peaking at 15 percentage points in 1936 Gallup exit polls (Ladd, 1997, 121), yet party elites and political strategists did not take much notice of it until the early 1950s (Harvey, 1998, 211).

and Pande argue that changes in relative economic vulnerability caused women to prefer a larger welfare state than men. Conversely, some argue that women's increased labor market experience and greater economic and psychological independence from men caused them to move to the left politically (Carrol, 1988; Manza and Brooks, 1998; Inglehart and Norris, 2000). Others argue that the partisan gender gap was caused by a conservative shift in men's preferences, rather than a liberal shift among women (Wirls, 1986; Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999).

The literature pays less attention to the role of national party polarization in the emergence of the gender gap. While a number of feminist activists argued in the immediate aftermath of the 1980 election that party polarization on gender-related issues during the late 1970s created the partisan gender gap, these claims were quickly challenged, often because there was little difference in the mass-level social policy preferences of men and women (Mansbridge, 1986; Cook, Jelen and Wilcox, 1992; Seltzer, Newman and Leighton, 1997; Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999). Other work finds that men are consistently more conservative than women on many other issues, particularly national defense and criminal justice. However, because these preference differences predate the partisan gender gap's emergence and remain relatively constant over time (e.g., Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986), they have not received much attention from scholars looking for preference changes to explain the gap's emergence.

This paper argues that national-level party polarization, rather than changing mass-level preferences, is the main source of the partisan gender gap's emergence. In the 1960s and 1970s, Democratic and Republican elites began taking more consistently liberal and conservative stances across a range of prominent issues, a trend that would continue in later decades. This elite polarization made it easier for citizens to identify with parties that matched their preferences (Levendusky, 2009). Because men held more conservative issue positions than women, such sorting had the potential to create a partisan gender gap. However, citizens must be aware of polarization in order to respond to it. Thus, our argument predicts that the partisan gender gap first formed among the politically knowledgeable and later spread to the less politically knowledgeable as awareness of polarization grew.

To test this prediction, we assembled the largest dataset ever used to study the partisan gender gap by pooling individual-level responses to 1822 Gallup polls that included questions about gender and party identification from 1953 through 2012. While most previous work on this topic mainly uses American National Election Study (ANES) or the General Social Survey (GSS) data, such surveys do not occur frequently enough or have sufficient sample sizes to determine precisely when the gender gap emerged or whether it was consistently larger among certain groups. Using our larger dataset, we show that the aggregate-level modern partisan gender gap emerged in the late 1970s, gradually, but steadily, increased until the mid 1990s, and since has plateaued. The smooth growth of the gap in our data contrasts with the large fluctuations observed in the ANES and GSS, which we argue likely reflects random sampling error. Yet this aggregate pattern hides important differences between those who tend to be more and less knowledgeable about politics. The modern partisan gender gap emerged in the 1960s and grew through the 1970s among college graduates, but a similar smaller gap did not emerge until the 1980s among non-college graduates. The difference in the size of the partisan gender gap between college and non-college graduates remains significant today, and holds even after controlling for a host of demographic, socioeconomic, and geographic variables.

We then use ANES data, which contains more questions about policy preferences and perceptions of the parties' issue positions, to explore the mechanisms that drive these patterns in the Gallup data. We observe that men's preferences are more conservative than women's in most major issue domains, regardless of education. Exceptions are views on abortion, on which we see few gender differences, and on gender roles, on which men are more conservative among college graduates, but women are more conservative among non-college graduates. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, college graduates of both genders perceived more ideological differences between the two parties than non-college graduates. Perceptions of ideological polarization increased among both college graduates and non-college graduates between the 1970s and 1980s, while cleavages between men and women in policy preferences remained constant.

Together, our results from the Gallup and ANES data are consistent with the hypothesis that the gender gap emerged first among college graduates because they were more aware

of the growing ideological divergence between the Democratic and Republican parties, and thus better able to sort according to their policy preferences. This explanation contrasts with much of the existing literature, which focuses on changes in mass-level preferences. To our knowledge, we are the first authors to show heterogeneity in educational level in the emergence of the partisan gender gap and to connect it to differential perceptions of ideological party polarization.[2]

2 What Drives the Partisan Gender Gap?

Males' disproportionate support of Ronald Reagan in 1980 catalyzed scholarly interest in the partisan gender gap. Prior to 1980, most research on gender differences in political behavior focused on participation (e.g., Andersen, 1975; Welch, 1977). Because gender differences in partisanship were not consistently present in pre-1980 scholarly surveys, such as the ANES or GSS, or in exit polls in 1976, work immediately following the 1980 election tended to focus on what changed between 1976 and 1980 to create a partisan gender gap (e.g., Wirls, 1986).

Most explanations offered for the development of the partisan gender gap involve changes in the policy preferences of men or women, or both. Perhaps the most prominent explanation is that women came to prefer a larger welfare state because they became relatively more economically vulnerable. Deitch (1988) argues that the expanding welfare state in the 1960s and 1970s increased women's dependence on government programs more than men's, which caused women to prefer more government spending. Also consistent with the economic vulnerability explanation are findings that women report more negative assessments of the national economy than men (Miller, 1988; Ladd, 1997; Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler, 1998) and that male's and female's support for social welfare spending diverged more in the 1980s than in previous decades (Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999).

The most prominent versions of the economic vulnerability argument cite declining marriage rates and increasing divorce rates as the main sources of women's increased relative

[2]Ladd (1997) observes that the gender gap is larger among the more educated in the 1980s and 1990s, but does not look at earlier time periods or changes over time.

economic insecurity. Edlund and Pande (2002) show that the gender gap is larger in states where divorce is more prevalent and that, in panel data, marriage and divorce make women more Republican and Democratic, respectively. Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef and Lin (2004) find that the aggregate partisan gender gap increases when economic performance wanes and the number of economically vulnerable single women increases. Iversen and Rosenbluth (2006) find that, among wealthy European countries, the partisan gender gap is larger when more women are unmarried and their country has a high overall divorce rate.

In contrast to the economic vulnerability explanation, some scholars propose that the gap emerged because women became more psychologically and financially independent from men. The Developmental Theory of Gender Realignment is the most prominent form of this argument, which claims that women move to the left in "post-industrial" democracies because of their greater economic independence and embrace of "egalitarian attitudes associated with postmaterialism and feminism" (Inglehart and Norris, 2000, 454). In support, Inglehart and Norris show that the partisan gender gap grew more in post-industrial democracies, particularly among age cohorts that were socialized into politics later.

Some other findings in the literature are consistent with The Developmental Theory of Gender Realignment. In contrast to Edlund and Pande (2002), Carrol (1988) and Inglehart and Norris (2000) observe little variation in the partisan gender gap across income levels. Carrol (1988) and Manza and Brooks (1998) find that women who work outside the home and in more economically independent professions vote more Democratically.[3] Finally, Conover (1988) and Manza and Brooks (1998) establish that women with a feminist consciousness have more liberal policy attitudes and are more likely to identify as Democrats.[4]

Several scholars reject the premise that the partisan gender gap emerged because of changes in women's partisanship, instead arguing that it resulted from changes among men (Wirls, 1986; Norrander, 1999; Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999). This claim is supported by ANES

[3]Labor force participation may also reflect economic vulnerability because it is negatively related to marriage and positively related to divorce.

[4]Although Cook and Wilcox (1991) show that males with a feminist consciousness and females without a feminist consciousness also have more liberal policy attitudes than males without a feminist consciousness.

data that show men became more Republican between the 1950s and late twentieth century. while women's partisanship remained fairly stable.[5] This literature does not always specify the mechanism that caused men to become more Republican, although Kaufmann and Petrocik's (1999) claim that it was caused by men's increasingly conservative views on social welfare spending is consistent with the economic vulnerability argument.

Considered together, some of the most prominent scholarly explanations of the partisan gender gap are oddly disconnected from the dominant general theories of public opinion and party identification. The contention that partisan preferences respond directly to people's personal economic situations contradicts the main branch of political science public opinion scholarship, which places a much greater emphasis on political socialization, group attachments, and long-term changes in citizens' assessments of parties' ideology and macroeconomic performance (Campbell et al., 1980; Stokes, 1966; Jennings and Niemi, 1981; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, 1998; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002). The partisan gender gap literature also largely neglects differences in political knowledge, which the public opinion literature considers one of the primary influences on how ordinary people interact with politics (Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992; Bartels, 1996; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). Finally, existing explanations of the partisan gender gap are often divorced from the broader U.S. political environment during these decades, in which arguably the biggest change was the ideological polarization of party elites and the subsequent sorting of the mass public into parties that better represented their preferences (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2006; Levendusky, 2009).

In the aftermath of the 1980 election, party polarization on social issues was discussed as a possible cause of the partisan gender gap . Early in the century, national Republican politicians were at least as liberal as national Democrats on women's rights issues (see Mansbridge, 1986; Adams, 1997; Wolbrecht, 2000). That changed in the late 1970s and culminate in 198,0 when the Republican platform contained a conservative position on abortion and the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) for the first time, while the Democratic platform reaffirmed liberal

[5]It is less clear which gender is more responsible for the voting preference gender gap in the ANES (Norris, 2003).

positions on both. While feminist activists in the 1980s publicized this as an explanation for the partisan gender gap (Bonk, 1988; Costain, 1988; Wolbrecht, 2000), scholars objected on several bases. Some pointed out that the partisan gender gap predated partisan position change on these social issues (Kaufmann, 2006; Norris, 2003; Wolbrecht, 2012). Others noted that mass-level gender differences in social issue preferences are usually negligible (Mansbridge, 1986; Cook, Jelen and Wilcox, 1992; Seltzer, Newman and Leighton, 1997; Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999) and that priming people with campaign appeals about traditional women's issues does not increase the gender gap (Hutchings et al., 2004).[6]

Party polarization on non-social issues has received less attention in partisan gender gap scholarship.[7] Previous work demonstrates a number of long-standing differences in the issue positions of men and women. For instance, Shapiro and Mahajan's (1986) meta-analysis of gender differences on 962 issue questions asked between 1964 and 1983 shows that men were significantly more conservative than women, particularly on issues related to the use of force, such as national defense and criminal justice.[8] With a few exceptions (e.g., Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999), these gender differences on policy attitudes not directly connected to reproduction and gender equality receive little attention in most scholarly work on the emergence of the partisan gender gap, perhaps because these preference differences predate its emergence and do not change much over time (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986).

What was changing while the partisan gender gap emerged, however, were the parties' positions on these issues, as Democratic and Republican elites more consistently took liberal and conservative positions respectively (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2006; Noel, 2013).

[6]However, Kaufmann (2002) finds that the correlation between social preferences and partisanship is larger among women than men, which suggests that social preferences could cause a partisan gender gap absent large gender differences in social preferences.

[7]For convenience, we use labels like "gender issues" versus "non-gender issues" and "social issues" versus "non-social issues" interchangeably to divide abortion, the ERA and other controversies explicitly concerned with women's rights from all other issues. Yet we acknowledge that issues labeled "non-gender" or "non-social" in his typology still have important implications for women's rights.

[8]Many other studies have also found gender differences on issues related to the use of force (Smith, 1984; Gilens, 1988; Miller, 1988; Clark and Clark, 1993; Kaufmann, 2006). The mass-level gender gap on use of force-related attitudes goes back at least to the 1940s (Ladd, 1997, 116). Other studies find gender differences in other realms, such as racial policy preferences (Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Hutchings et al., 2004) and ideological self-placement (Norrander and Wilcox, 2008).

We contend that this elite polarization made it easier for men and women to sort into parties that represented their ideological preferences, and thus contributed to the development of the partisan gender gap (Levendusky, 2009). Moreover, we argue that the gender gap emerged first, and remains larger, among the most educated because they were politically knowledgeable enough to notice this polarization first and continue to be the most aware of it.

3 Data

Our understanding of when, and among whom, the partisan gender gap formed is limited by the relative infrequency and modest sample sizes of the surveys, such as the ANES and GSS, used in most previous research. As we discuss in detail in the next section, a better understanding of these facts is important for testing theories of why the partisan gender gap developed. To overcome the statistical power issues that limit existing work, we assembled the largest dataset ever used to study the partisan gender gap. It includes individual-level responses from every poll conducted by the Gallup Organization from 1953 through 2012 that (1) asked about either party identification, presidential approval, or ideology and (2) is contained in the Roper Center iPOLL database.[9] This data collection effort yielded 1,143,091 and 1,103,278 unique observations of the partisan affiliation of females and males, respectively, from 1,822 different surveys of representative samples of the voting-age population. These data are described in detail in the Data Appendix.[10]

The Gallup data have several advantages over the ANES, which is the most common data source used in the literatures described in the previous section (e.g., Wirls, 1986; Manza and Brooks, 1998; Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler, 1998; Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Norrander, 1999; Edlund and Pande, 2002; Kaufmann, 2002; Norris, 2003; Kaufmann, 2006). Because at

[9] In 1950, Gallup transitioned from using quota-controlled sampling to modern probability sampling (Berinsky, 2006). Thus, Dwight Eisenhower's was the first presidency during which Gallup used probability sampling.

[10] Gallup data are widely used in political science, primarily in the study of presidential approval. (e.g., Mueller, 1973; Edwards, 1990; Baum and Groeling, 2008), but also in the study of partisanship (MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson, 1989; Box-Steffensmeier and Smith, 1996; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002). While a small but prominent literature uses commercial survey data to separately model the dynamics of men's and women's presidential approval (Winder, 1992; Clarke et al., 2005) and partisanship (Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef and Lin, 2004), we are aware of no previous paper that has used individual-level data to do so.

least 13, and often substantially more, Gallup polls are available in every year since 1953, we observe the party identification of tens of thousands of respondents each year. In contrast, the ANES has been administered to between 1,000 and 3,000 respondents every two years since 1952. This gives us greater statistical power to learn about differences in the trajectory of the partisan identification of men and women over time.[11] It also allows us to analyze subgroups separately (e.g., college graduates or high-income people) while maintaining adequate sample sizes. We have a similar advantage over studies that use the GSS, which has been conducted periodically (usually every two years) since 1972 (e.g., Wirls, 1986; Deitch, 1988). Finally, the Gallup series begins well before the emergence of the modern gender gap, unlike the aggregate time series of CBS/*New York Times* polls used by Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef and Lin (2004), which starts in 1979.

Gallup asks about party identification in a slightly different manner than the ANES, GSS, and CBS/*New York Times* polls. Those three ask, "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" Gallup asks "In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat or Independent?"[12] Abramson and Ostrom Jr (1991) argue that the Gallup question introduces more short-term political and economic considerations than the more standard partisanship question.[13] Thus, our study lies somewhere between a study of the voting and ANES-style party identification. While important, these differences should not be overstated. All three of these variables—presidential voting, ANES-style party identification, and Gallup party identification—are substantially

[11]Power tests show that even relatively large shifts in a partisan gender gap in the population between time period t and $t+1$ will not always produce statistically significant changes in the partisan gender gap in samples of size 3,000. For example, suppose that 50% of men and women affiliate as Republicans at time period one and that 55% of men and 50% of women affiliate as Republicans at time period two. A Monte Carlo simulation suggests that we will observe a statistically significant difference-in-difference increase in the percentage of Republicans about 50 percent of the time when we sample 1,500 males and 1,500 females in each period.

[12]Gallup also occasionally asks "In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Independent?"

[13]When Angus Campus designed the ANES question, Philip E. Converse (2006, 608) recalls that "he wanted it differentiated as clearly as possible from the Gallup one...he wanted a party term as distinct as possible from current vote plans...Thus, his item was decked out with phrases like 'Generally speaking' and 'usually' to broaden the time frame." In Converse's (2006, 608) view, the Gallup question is "in effect a vote intention question, were there an election 'today,' but cast in party terms simply because the other terms—candidates and issues—lack generic names."

correlated both within individuals and with aggregate movements over time (MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson, 1992; Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999, 668-870).

A related complication is that Gallup's standard party identification question offers three responses (Republican, Democrat, or Independent). In contrast, the ANES consistently asks a follow-up question to those who identify as Independent asking whether they lean towards the Democrats or Republicans, while the GSS asks people to self-place on a 7-point party identification scale.[14] Gallup followed up by asking Independents about their leanings sporadically, including the question occasionally in the 1950s, almost never in the 1960s and 1970s, sometimes in the 1980s, and then regularly from the 1990s on. Previous studies find that men are more likely than women to label themselves as Independent leaners rather than partisans. As a consequence, grouping leaners with Independents in some years reduces the size of the gender gap in the ANES among white northerners by making some northern white Republicans appear to be Independents (Norrander, 1999, 571). Because we cannot consistently observe leaners over time, we code the partisanship of respondent i on survey s, $Prtnshp_{s,i}$, in our baseline specification as:

$$Prtnshp_{s,i} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if Respondent identifies as Republican} \\ 1/2 & \text{if Respondent identifies as neither Republican nor Democrat} \\ 0 & \text{if Respondent identifies as Democrat} \end{cases} \cdot$$

However, we replicate our analyses including leaners as partisans on the subset of surveys that asks about leanings to test the robustness of our findings to the inclusion of leaners as partisans.

Finally, Gallup does not consistently ask about as many other political attitudes as the ANES or GSS do. Because our dataset only includes demographic and attitudinal measures that were asked consistently by Gallup over time, the only attitudinal measures we observe are presidential approval, party identification, and, since 1992, ideological self-placement. This limits our ability to determine the role of other political attitudes in the formation of the

[14] CBS/*New York Times* polls do not contain a follow-up question about leaning either.

partisan gender gap using Gallup data. Thus, we also test how the patterns of timing and heterogeneity observed in the Gallup data map back onto the attitudes and perceptions of party positions observed in the ANES. Combining the more detailed policy questions in the ANES with the larger sample size in Gallup data allows us to shed new light on how and why the partisan gender gap formed.

4 Empirical Tests with the Gallup Data

Our first set of empirical tests use the Gallup data to determine when the partisan gender gap first emerged. Linking precisely when the gap first appeared to the changing political environment can help us better understand its sources. In the mid-1960s, elite Democrats and Republicans began taking more polarized positions on the issue of the welfare state. While substantial elite polarization would continue in subsequent decades (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2006), enough had already occurred by the mid-1970s that Democrats and Republicans were almost as polarized on social welfare preferences at the mass-level in 1972 as in 2000 (Layman and Carsey, 2002).The passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 Voting Rights Act also highlighted evolving divisions between Democrat and Republican positions on racial issues in the mid-1960s (Carmines and Stimson, 1989). Conversely, social issues - such as abortion, the ERA, and gay rights - divided national party politicians in the late-1970s and 1980s (e.g., Adams, 1997; Wolbrecht, 2000; Karol, 2009). Thus, social welfare and racial issues are more likely than social issues to have caused a partisan gender gap in the 1960s and early 1970s.

We use a non-parametric approach to estimate the gender gap in partisanship over time. First, we construct the average of $Prtnshp_{s,i}$ for men, $\overline{Prtnshp_{s,men}}$, and women, $\overline{Prtnshp_{s,women}}$, within each survey.[15] A measure of each gender's partisanship at time t is constructed by taking a weighted average of these survey averages using an Epanechnikov kernel function. A key parameter when constructing these weighted averages is the bandwidth of this kernel, as it

[15]In all of our analyses, responses are weighted by their Gallup sample weight.

determines the weight that each survey is given at time t based on the proximity of the date of survey s, t_s, to time t.[16] Based on the results of a leave-one-out cross-validation procedure, we use a bandwidth of 100 days throughout our analysis.[17]

Some have suggested that certain important political events, such as Barry Goldwater's nomination in 1964, the 1973 Row v. Wade Supreme Court decision, or the 1980 presidential campaign and its accompanying party platform changes, were important drivers of the partisan gender gap (see Bonk, 1988; Silver, 2012; Wolbrecht, 2012). Without ruling out the possibility that these events had long-term effects, we examine whether the gender gap grew noticeably right after them. We test for any periods of rapid change in the partisan gender gap using Equation 1, which is a standard parametric specification that tests for discontinuous changes in an outcome before and after time t, with θ capturing the discontinuous change in gender gap among those survey after time t (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). The change in the gender gap from an additional year passing prior to time t and after time t is captured by δ and $\delta + \gamma$, respectively. Thus, $\delta + \gamma + \theta$ capture the total change in the gender gap between year t and year $t + 1$. To increase the plausibility of the assumption that the effect of time on partisanship is locally linear, the sample is restricted to only include surveys such that t_s is within five years of t when estimating Equation 1.

$$\overline{Prtnshp_{s,men}} - \overline{Prtnshp_{s,women}} = \alpha + \delta(t_s - t) + \gamma(t_s - t)\mathbb{1}(t_s > t) + \theta\mathbb{1}(t_s > t) + \epsilon_s \quad (1)$$

Next, we are interested in identifying variation in the size of the gender gap across types of individuals. Because people must be aware of party polarization before they can sort on

[16] We define t_s as the midpoint of when survey s was in the field.

[17] The cross-validation procedure is based on minimizing the mean squared difference between the actual and predicted values of four different quantities in the 232 surveys conducted between 1975 and 1984. We construct the average partisanship level of males who graduated from college, females who graduated from college, males who did not graduate from college, and females who did not graduate from college. For each of the 232 surveys, we construct a predicted value for each of these four quantities at time t_s using data from all of the applicable surveys weighted with an Epanechnikov kernel function with a variety of bandwidths. A bandwidth of 100 days minimizes the average mean squared difference between the actual and predicted values of the four quantities.

the basis of it, our expectation is that the partisan gender gap first developed among the most politically knowledgeable individuals. While the best way to measure this would be to use a short quiz of basic political facts (Price and Zaller, 1993), we use education as a proxy because the Gallup data do not contain such questions. Because education is one of the strongest predictors of political knowledge (Price and Zaller, 1993; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996), it is often used as a proxy for political knowledge in public opinion research (e.g., Zaller, 1994; Berinsky, 2007). We expect that people who are more educated will be more aware of party polarization and thus more likely to sort, causing a gender gap to emerge earlier and be consistently larger among the highly educated.

We are also interested in how the partisan gender gap varies with respect to age. The Development Theory of Realignment predicts that a larger partisan gender gap will develop among younger generations because women who were socialized after the transformation of sex roles would be more left leaning (Inglehart and Norris, 2000). Beyond that, the general durability of partisan identification leads us to expect that the gender gap would be smaller among older generations that formed their partisan attachments earlier, regardless of the source of the growing gap (Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002).

We use Equation 2 to test for heterogeneity in the gender gap with respect to some characteristics $Z_{s,i}$ (e.g., college graduate, age). Let $Female_{s,i}$ be an indicator for whether respondent i on survey s is female and $X_{s,i}$ be a vector of other characteristics that may influence the partisanship of respondent i on survey s. We include survey fixed effects, γ_s, when estimating Equation 2 to account for features of the political environment that affect the overall partisanship of the population at time t_s. Our primary parameter of interest in Equation 2 is θ, which captures the interaction between $Female_{s,i}$ and characteristics $Z_{s,i}$.

$$Prtnshp_{s,i} = \gamma_s + (\beta + \delta X_{s,i})Female_{s,i} + (\lambda + \kappa X_{s,i})Z_{s,i} + \theta Z_{s,i}Female_{s,i} + \epsilon_{s,i} \qquad (2)$$

A limitation of using education as a proxy for political knowledge is that education also

relates to a number of other characteristics that could affect partisanship. It is possible that differences in the partisan gender gap across education levels reflect a relationship between some of these other variables and the gender gap. For example, Edlund and Pande (2002) argue that structural changes in the economy increased demand for the welfare state among those with less human capital, particularly if they were married to someone with more human capital. Thus, the interaction between gender and education could be capturing the interaction between gender and human capital rather than gender and political knowledge. In attempts to account for this, we include household income, employment status, and marital status in $X_{s,i}$ to control for socioeconomic status differences between individuals with more and less education. The robustness of our results to the inclusion of these controls reduces concerns that the interaction between gender and education is driven by economic vulnerability rather than political knowledge.

5 Gallup Data Analysis

5.1 Aggregate Analysis

Figure 1 presents the evolution of the partisan gender gap in Gallup polls from 1953 through 2012. Each dot shows a gender's average partisanship in an individual poll, while the lines show the smoothed averages constructed using the method described in the previous section.[18] As with all of the analysis throughout the paper, higher values indicate a more conservative outcome. Several trends stand out from this broad overview. Much like in many other wealthy countries in the 1950s, women were slightly more likely to identify with the more conservative party. While the lines representing men's and women's partisanship cross each other in the mid-1960s, the trend is quite gradual, suggesting that no single incident caused the change. The gender gap continued to grow slowly through the 1970s, accelerated a bit in the early 1980s, and contracted in 1984 as both genders became more Republican. The

[18] Figure A.1 in the Supplemental Appendix shows the relationship separately for Republicans and Independents.

slow, steady growth pattern that the gender gap followed from the mid-1950s to 1980 resumed in the mid-1980s until the mid-1990s, when it stabilized to approximately its current size.

It is useful to directly compare our findings in Figure 1 with those previously observed in the ANES and GSS. Figure 2 presents the size of the gender gap in our Gallup data compared to the ANES (in the top panel) and the GSS (in the bottom panel). The main difference between the Gallup data and these benchmark surveys is that the latter have much larger confidence intervals and more variation around the general trend. Yet when viewed together, all these surveys appear to be following the same trend. In 27 out of 28 ANES and 27 out of 29 GSS surveys, the point estimate of the gender gap using the Gallup data is within the benchmark survey's 95% confidence interval. This is roughly the proportion that one would expect to fall outside a 95% confidence interval due to sampling error. This reassuringly suggests that, despite the differences in question wording, the ANES, Gallup, and GSS data capture a similar construct.

An implication of Figure 2 is that the development of the partisan gender gap is a smoother process than one might conclude from observing the patterns in the ANES or GSS. Although the findings is only occasionally statistically significant, men tend to be slightly more Republican than women throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Since 1977, the gender gap has remained statistically distinguishable from zero at the 95% level, two-tailed, with few dramatic shifts. Several surges and swoons in the gap's size in the ANES or GSS, which we might imbue with political importance if we considered these surveys alone, now appear to be mere sampling variation around the gradual trend.[19] Developing post-hoc reasons for these fluctuations in the ANES and GSS seems misguided.

As a further test of our claim of a gradual emergence, we estimate Equation 1 for a variety of values of t to see if we can identify any break-points in the trajectory of the partisan

[19]It appears in the ANES that, after disappearing in 1958 and 1960, the old reverse gender gap re-emerged for the last time in 1962. Years such as 1968 and 1974 stand out as points when the modern gap first emerged at notable sizes (and marginal statistical significance). More recently, 1982, 1994, and 1996 would stand out for particularly large gender gaps, and 2002 for an unusually small one. It appears in the GSS that the modern gender gap first emerged in 1976 (in contrast to the ANES), and then dissipated until emerging again in the mid-1980s, temporarily shrank in 1993-1994 and from 2002 through 2006, and vanished almost entirely in 2008 before re-emerging at its previous size in 2010 and 2012.

Figure 1: Partisanship Level by Gender in Gallup Polls



Notes: Lines represent a weighted average of a gender's partisanship level calculated using an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 100 days.

Figure 2: Partisanship Level by Gender in Gallup, ANES, and GSS



Notes: Solid line represents a weighted average of the difference in female's and male's partisanship level in Gallup polls using an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 100 days.

gender gap. Figure 3 focuses on two examples, 1964 and 1980, that are possibly consequential political break-points. In 1964, the Republicans nominated conservative Barry Goldwater to run against President Lyndon Johnson, marking a significant jump in party polarization on social welfare issues. In the top panel of Figure 3, we estimate separate linear time trends in the gender gap before and after 1964. There is no gap between the lines, and they have indistinguishable slopes. In the lower panel of Figure 3, we look for a break-point in 1980, when the Republican Party took more conservative stances on gender-related issues as well as on social-welfare and defense policy. Again, we find neither a significant gap between the lines nor a significant difference in slope. To solidify our claims of gradual emergence, we run a similar analysis for every year in our dataset. The largest estimated yearly increases in the partisan gender gap are only 1.6 points, which occur between January 1, 1979 and January 1, 1980 and January 1, 1986 and January 1, 1987.[20]

Summarizing the results from this subsection, the partisan gender gap grew steadily from when it was first statistically significant in 1977 until the mid 1990s. The 1980 campaign, in which the parties polarized on women's rights-related issues, did little to change its trajectory. Observing that the partisan gender gap evolved slowly is contrary to what we would expect to see if it developed because of an individual event. It also means that we cannot get much leverage on what caused the emergence of the aggregate partisan gender gap by chronologically connecting surges in its growth to specific political events.

5.2 Individual-Level Analysis

Figure 4 compares gender differences in the partisanship of college graduates (top panel) to non-college graduates (lower panel). It shows that the slow and steady growth in the gender gap in aggregate partisanship displayed in Figure 1 masks important differences across education levels. The gender gap emerged much earlier, and is consistently larger, among college graduates.

The partisan gender gap among college graduates largely results from female college grad-

[20]The estimated yearly increase is $\hat{\delta} + \hat{\gamma} + \hat{\theta}$.

Figure 3: Gender Gap in Partisanship Level near 1964 and 1980 Elections



Notes: Lines represent the best linear fit of the difference in men's and women's partisanship level in polls from 1959-1963 and 1964-1968 (top figure) and 1975-1979 and 1980-1984 (bottom figure) .

Figure 4: Partisanship Level by Gender and Education in Gallup Polls



Notes: Lines represents a weighted average of a group's partisanship level using an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 100 days.

uates becoming more Democratic over the last 50 years. During the 1950s, there was little difference in the partisanship of male and female college graduates. While college graduates of both genders became more Democratic between 1960 and 1980, the movement was greater among females. College-educated males then became more Republican in the 1980s, so that by 1990 they were almost 10 points more Republican than female college graduates. This gap has remained roughly constant over the last 20 years.

The story is different for those with less than a college degree. Here there is no sign of gender differences before 1980. During the 1980s, both sexes become more Republican, but the change is larger among men, creating a gender gap. Further male movement towards the Republicans from the early 1990s to 2012 has slightly increased the gap.[21]

Because individuals with and without college degrees differ on many dimensions, including in their race, age or age cohort, region, economic circumstance, political sophistication and knowledge, and exposure to feminism, it is difficult to know why the gender gap in partisanship is larger among college graduates. In the remainder of this section we use Equation 2 to examine the robustness of this interaction to the inclusion of controls that are associated with college education to try to better understand what causes this relationship. [22] Table 1 shows that controlling for race, decade of birth, and region has little effect on the educational differences in the partisan gender gap. These are our baseline controls because they are both associated with having a college degree and observable across almost every survey. Columns 1 and 2 summarize the gender gap in four-year intervals from 1953 through 2012 among those who have and who have not graduated college, respectively, with column 3 presenting the college/non-college difference without the baseline controls.[23] The fourth column shows

[21]Figure A.2 in the Supplemental Appendix compares the size of the gender gap of college graduates and non-college graduates in the Gallup data with the ANES and GSS and illustrates that the sample sizes of the ANES and GSS are insufficient to rule out most plausible differences. Yet our point estimate is within the 95% confidence interval of every ANES and GSS survey, except the 2004 GSS. Because our estimate should be outside of this confidence interval slightly more than one out of 20 times by chance, this is again consistent with all these surveys measuring the same trend.

[22]Tables A.10-A.13 in the Supplemental Appendix show the bivariate relationship between the size of the partisan gender gap and all of these variables.

[23]Table A.14 in the Supplemental Appendix shows that including leaners as partisans slightly increases the difference in partisanship between college and non-college graduates in the Gallup data.

the same comparison while controlling for our baseline controls and these baseline controls interacted with both gender and education. The similarity of the results in the third and fourth columns suggests that differences in race, age, or region are unlikely to explain the larger partisan gender gap among college graduates.

Controlling for household income also has little effect on the educational differences in the gender gap. The left half of Table 2 shows how the interaction between gender and education is affected by the inclusion of controls for whether a respondent is in the upper 20th or upper 50th percentile of household income in the survey. While limiting ourselves only to surveys that include information about household income reduces the number of observations, particularly in the earlier years, a comparison of Columns 1, 2, and 3 shows that greater household income explains only a small portion of the larger gender gap in partisanship among college graduates.

Because marriage and labor market experience are central to some prominent theories of the gender gap, we want to control for marital and employment status whenever possible. The right half of Table 1 shows the difference in the size of the partisan gender gap among individuals who have and do not have a college degree when controlling for whether an individual is married, works full time, and works part time, in addition to the baseline and income controls. While our full set of controls often reduces the size of the interaction between being a female and being a college graduate, it never makes it disappear. The biggest reduction in its size is between 1985 and 1988, when the full controls reduce the difference by 33%, from 7.1 to 5.1 points. Yet in this case the relationship without controls was unusually large, and the remaining difference with the controls is still fairly large historically. Unfortunately, these variables are only observable since 1977, and even then were often not included on surveys. However, the fact that controlling for marital and employment status in the later periods has little effect on the results provides some evidence that college graduation is not just a proxy for marital and employment status in the earlier periods.

An additional concern is that interaction between gender and education may reflect changes over time in the types of people who graduate from college.[24] However, Table 3 shows little

[24]Figure A.3 in the Supplemental Appendix shows how the percentage of the population that is a college

Table 1: Education and the Partisanship Gender Gap

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		No Controls		**Baseline Controls**
	College Graduates	Not College Graduates	Difference	Difference
1953-1956	0.013	0.012	0.001	0.008
N = 106,871	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.009)
1957-1960	0.012	0.027	-0.015	-0.013
N = 107,234	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.010)
1961-1964	-0.007	0.007	-0.014	-0.015
N = 148,857	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.009)
1965-1968	-0.040	-0.002	-0.037	-0.037
N = 141,313	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.008)
1969-1972	-0.019	-0.002	-0.017	-0.012
N = 122,727	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.008)
1973-1976	-0.036	0.009	-0.045	-0.036
N = 142,913	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)
1977-1980	-0.046	-0.003	-0.043	-0.036
N = 156,030	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.006)
1981-1984	-0.069	-0.018	-0.051	-0.044
N = 126,975	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)
1985-1988	-0.079	-0.022	-0.057	-0.050
N = 96,641	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)
1989-1992	-0.084	-0.035	-0.049	-0.048
N = 167,135	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
1993-1996	-0.090	-0.047	-0.042	-0.040
N = 196,180	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)
1997-2000	-0.101	-0.052	-0.049	-0.047
N = 192,459	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
2001-2004	-0.103	-0.056	-0.047	-0.045
N = 117,341	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
2005-2008	-0.096	-0.049	-0.048	-0.041
N = 133,341	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
2009-2012	-0.087	-0.048	-0.040	-0.036
N = 275,783	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)

Notes: Baseline controls are an African-American indicator, decade of birth indicators, region of residence indicators, and the interaction of these variables with both the gender and education indicators. All regressions also include survey fixed effects.

Table 2: Effect of Controls on the Education and the Partisanship Gender Gap

	(1) **No Controls**	(2) **Baseline Controls**	(3) **& Income**	(4) **No Controls**	(5) **Baseline Controls**	(6) **Full Controls**
1957-1960	0.060	0.016	0.024			
	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.053)			
		N = 5,045				
1961-1964	-0.016	-0.016	-0.014			
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)			
		N = 135,678				
1965-1968	-0.039	-0.039	-0.036			
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)			
		N = 132,319				
1969-1972	-0.016	-0.011	-0.011			
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)			
		N = 119,595				
1973-1976	-0.044	-0.035	-0.033			
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)			
		N = 133,960				
1977-1980	-0.043	-0.036	-0.035	-0.045	-0.040	-0.042
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
		N = 151,558			N = 70,881	
1981-1984	-0.053	-0.045	-0.047	-0.055	-0.046	-0.046
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
		N = 120,583			N = 110,915	
1985-1988	-0.066	-0.056	-0.054	-0.071	-0.058	-0.051
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)
		N = 60,317			N = 47,510	
1989-1992	-0.053	-0.052	-0.050	-0.053	-0.052	-0.049
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
		N = 127,919			N = 74,159	
1993-1996	-0.043	-0.040	-0.037	-0.047	-0.044	-0.035
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)
		N = 174,588			N = 60,014	
1997-2000	-0.052	-0.049	-0.047	-0.052	-0.045	-0.036
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)
		N = 152,906			N = 30,023	
2001-2004	-0.046	-0.045	-0.047	-0.032	-0.035	-0.055
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.028)
		N = 100,436			N = 4,724	
2005-2008	-0.048	-0.041	-0.044	-0.035	-0.038	-0.033
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
		N = 113,336			N = 19,407	
2009-2012	-0.037	-0.034	-0.032	-0.040	-0.037	-0.029
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
		N = 222,510			N = 172,218	

Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient and standard error on the interaction of gender and education from a regression of partisanship level on the gender and education indicators, the specified controls, the listed controls interacted with the gender and education indicators, and survey fixed effects. Baseline controls are an African-American indicator, decade of birth indicators, and region of residence indicators. Income controls include indicators for being in the top 20th and 50th percentiles of household income in a survey's sample. Full controls also include indicators for being married, employed full time, and employed part time. All regressions also include female and college indicators, all of the controls

evidence of age heterogeneity in the partisan gender gap among college graduates. Rather, the partisan gender gap develops within cohorts over time. For example, female college graduates aged 18 to 39 were 1.5 (s.e. 2.5) points more Republican than their male counterparts between 1957 and 1960. Twenty years later, female college graduates aged 40 to 59 were 4.3 (s.e. 1.2) points less Republican than their male counterparts between 1977 and 1980. Twenty more years later, female college graduates over the age of 60 were 10.7 (s.e. 0.8) points less Republican than their male counterparts between 1997 and 2000. Conversion, rather than socialization, appears to cause the partisan gender gap to develop among college graduates.

In contrast, the partisan gender gap is larger among younger non-college graduates. During the late 1960s and 1970s, males under the age of 40 were slightly more Republican than their female counterparts, while males over the age of 40 were slightly more Democratic than their female counterparts. Throughout the 1980s, a sizable gender gap was present only among the youngest cohort of non-college graduates. While a partisan gender gap eventually did develop among the older individuals who did not graduate from college, the gap was still nearly twice as large among those 18 to 39 as among those over 60 during the first Obama administration. Thus, the pattern Inglehart and Norris (2000) detected in the general population in Europe—that the modern gender gap emerged first among younger voters—is evident in the United States only among those without college degrees.

Summarizing our regression results, race, age, region, household income, or employment or marital status cannot explain much of why the partisan gender gap develops first, and remains larger, among college graduates. This gender gap even emerged among age cohorts that displayed no gender differences when young. These findings are consistent with, although not conclusive of, politically knowledgeable men and women sorting themselves into parties that matched their preferences as the parties' platforms polarized during the 1960s and 1970s. To test this claim more directly, we are interested in looking at how the policy preferences and perceptions of party issue positions of females and college graduates differed in the 1960s and 1970s. Our ability to do so using our Gallup dataset is limited, because it lacks questions

graduate varies by gender over time.

Table 3: Age Heterogeneity in the Partisanship Gender Gap

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	College Graduates			**Not College Graduates**		
	Age 18-39	Age 40-59	Age 60+	Age 18-39	Age 40-59	Age 60+
1953-1956	0.006	0.016	0.044	0.016	0.025	0.025
	(0.026)	(0.016)	(0.026)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
1957-1960	0.015	0.004	0.019	0.026	0.038	0.044
	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
1961-1964	0.005	-0.029	-0.026	-0.002	0.017	0.021
	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
1965-1968	-0.050	-0.040	-0.036	-0.011	0.009	0.005
	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
1969-1972	-0.019	-0.024	-0.015	-0.017	0.011	0.009
	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
1973-1976	-0.043	-0.034	-0.018	-0.012	0.020	0.035
	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
1977-1980	-0.049	-0.043	-0.036	-0.010	0.007	0.002
	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)
1981-1984	-0.071	-0.063	-0.074	-0.034	0.002	-0.007
	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
1985-1988	-0.084	-0.070	-0.080	-0.033	-0.013	0.006
	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
1989-1992	-0.092	-0.077	-0.077	-0.050	-0.016	-0.010
	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
1993-1996	-0.096	-0.091	-0.067	-0.059	-0.034	-0.031
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
1997-2000	-0.095	-0.104	-0.107	-0.058	-0.044	-0.039
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
2001-2004	-0.110	-0.101	-0.090	-0.064	-0.054	-0.035
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
2005-2008	-0.099	-0.096	-0.091	-0.053	-0.047	-0.041
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
2009-2012	-0.085	-0.080	-0.103	-0.065	-0.046	-0.033
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)

Notes: Each cell presents the coefficient and standard error on the interaction between gender and the age cohort from a regression in the specified time period for the specified educational level. All regressions also include decade of birth indicators and survey fixed effects.

on personal policy preferences and perceptions of party issue positions. In contrast, the ANES has a large number of questions on both of these areas. Thus, in the next section we analyze these data so that we can more directly test our theory.

6 ANES Analysis

Tables 1 and 2 show that a partisan gender gap was not present among either education level in the 1950s. What changed in the 1960s and 1970s to produce a gap among the most educated, but not among the less highly educated? And when a gap finally did emerge among the less educated, why was the gap among college graduates still consistently larger?

Perhaps the simplest explanation is that there are greater gender differences in policy attitudes among the highly educated. We look for evidence of this by analyzing respondents' policy attitudes in the ANES in the 1960s and 1970s, when the gender gap was present among college graduates but not among non-college graduates.[25] We examine policy questions on four different specific issue areas (domestic welfare spending, law and order, military policy, and racial policy), three gender-related issues (abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment, and views on traditional gender roles), as well as assessments of general ideology (i.e., a combined measure of whether they consider themselves liberal or conservative and how they evaluate those two ideological groups), pooling data from all ANES surveys from the 1960s and 1970s in which these questions were asked. Policy preferences are regressed on a female indicator, a college graduate indicator, the interaction between the two, and survey fixed effects. If policy attitudes explain why men were more Republican than women only among college graduates, we expect to observe a negative interaction between the female and college indicators.

Table 4 shows that gender differences in policy attitudes did not generally vary with education level. Men held more conservative preferences than women among both college and non-college graduates in the four areas not traditionally labeled as gender issues: domestic welfare spending, law and order, military, and race. However, the direction of the gender

[25] We would also like to look at earlier time periods, but unfortunately these types of questions were not asked on the ANES until the mid 1960s.

gap on gender issue preferences did vary by education level. On the ERA and gender roles, women were more conservative than men among the less educated, while men were more conservative than women among the more educated. Men and women did not significantly differ at either education level in their abortion preferences. Finally, a gender gap in general ideological orientation was only observed among college graduates.

Why did differences in policy preferences only translate into differences in partisanship among the most educated in the 1960s and 1970s? We hypothesize that as the parties ideologically polarized, the most politically aware noticed first and sorted themselves into parties accordingly. Because the highly educated are more politically aware, they sorted more during the 1960s and 1970s. We test this by examining whether college graduates report larger differences in their assessments of the parties' positions on a number of issues. We regress these differences on a gender indicator, an education indicator, the interaction between the two, and survey fixed effects. Table 5 shows that more educated respondents, regardless of gender, perceived larger differences between the parties' positions on welfare spending, law and order issues, race issues, traditional gender roles, and general ideology during the 1970s.[26]

Our theory is that college graduates perceive greater differences between the parties because they are better informed about politics. Thus, our expectation is that including a measure of political information will attenuate the relationship between perceived ideological differences and college graduation. To test this, we also include an interviewer's assessment of a respondent's level of political information and the interaction between this assessment and respondent's gender in the regressions reported in the even-numbered columns. Consistent with our expectation, including these proxies for political information reduces the college graduate coefficient by about 40%.

Combining the findings in Tables 4 and 5 supports our explanation of why the gender gap emerged earlier among college graduates. While men and women of all education levels differ in their non-social policy preferences, the better educated were different in that they 1) put

[26]Our argument also implies that these differences should not be as large in the 1950s, as parties were not as polarized. Unfortunately, this cannot be tested because assessments of party positions were first surveyed in the 1970s.

Table 4: Personal Ideological Assessments in ANES from 1964 - 1978

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dependent Variable	**Issue Specific Ideology**				**Gender Issues**			
	Domestic Welfare Spending	Law & Order	Military	Race	Abortion	ERA	Gender Roles	**General Ideology**
Years in Sample	66-78	68-78	64-72,76	64-78	72, 76-78	76-78	72-78	64-78
Female	-0.038	-0.039	-0.065	-0.024	0.015	0.049	0.038	0.000
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.003)
College	0.059	-0.071	-0.057	-0.098	-0.142	0.107	-0.116	0.017
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.029)	(0.015)	(0.007)
Female X College	-0.004	0.020	-0.009	-0.006	-0.008	-0.123	-0.081	-0.047
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.013)	(0.023)	(0.041)	(0.020)	(0.010)

Notes: Assessments of own ideological positions are standardized so that the most liberal response is coded as 0 and the most conservative response is coded as 1.The exception is economic situation where the most negative response is 0 and the most positive response is 1. If multiple measure of the dependent variable are available, they are averaged. All regressions also include year fixed effects.

Table 5: Differences in Party Ideological Assessments in ANES from 1970 - 1978

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Dependent Variable	**Issue Specific Ideology**									
	Domestic Welfare Spending		Law & Order		Race		Gender Roles		**General Ideology**	
Years in Sample	70-78		70-78		70-78		72, 76-78		72-78	
Female	-0.019	-0.014	0.005	0.020	-0.015	0.004	-0.004	-0.013	0.005	0.023
	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.028)
College	0.179	0.115	0.112	0.077	0.164	0.110	0.069	0.048	0.126	0.078
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Female X College	-0.019	-0.026	-0.007	-0.002	0.012	0.014	-0.015	-0.018	-0.008	0.001
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Pol. Info		0.238		0.142		0.199		0.089		0.231
		(0.023)		(0.022)		(0.019)		(0.023)		(0.032)
Female X Pol. Info		0.032		-0.012		-0.006		0.029		-0.012
		(0.030)		(0.031)		(0.026)		(0.033)		(0.043)
Avg. Year Fixed Effect	0.180	0.053	0.115	0.035	0.124	0.018	0.079	0.028	0.257	0.120
	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.024)	(0.008)	(0.022)

Notes: Assessments of parties' ideological positions are standardized so that the most liberal response is 0 and the most conservative response is 1. The dependent variable is the difference in the respondent's assessment of the Republican and Democratic parties' ideological positions. If multiple measure of the dependent variable are available, they are averaged. Assessments of political information are standardized so that the least informed assessment is coded as 0 and the most informed assessment is coded as 1.

together their specific policy views to form a self-identification, 2) held policy views on gender issues that matched this self-identification, and 3) perceived meaningful differences between the parties in general ideology, non-social issues, and social-issues. Together, these distinctions led more-educated women to become more Democratic during the 1960s and 1970s, creating the modern partisan gender gap.

To better understand what caused the partisan gender gap to grow across all education levels in the 1980s, we conclude this section by comparing how gender and education relate to assessments of policy preferences, economic well-being, and party polarization in the 1970s and 1980s. Columns 1 through 4 suggest that there was little change between the 1970s and 1980s in the differences in the policy preferences of men and women. Columns 5 and 6 also suggest that women were just as negative in their economic assessment in the 1970s as they were in the 1980s. However, the difference in the constant terms in Columns 7 and 8 and Columns 9 and 10 show that the mass public saw greater policy differences between the parties in the 1980s, regardless of education and gender. This means that, even though the less educated were still less likely than the more educated to notice partisan differences in the 1980s, the growing realization of important policy differences was occurring even among this group. While certainly not conclusive, these results are consistent with the theory that this awareness drove more men than women to the Republican party, because less-educated men held more conservative issue positions than less-educated women.

7 Conclusion

The gender gap in party preferences is a fixture of American politics. Women disproportionately favor Democrats, while men favor Republicans. For instance, at the conclusion of the 2012 presidential campaign, Democratic pollster Margie Omero confidently predicted, "There will be a gender gap on Election Day, Obama has, and will continue to have, an advantage with women" (Siddiqui and Blumenthal, 2012). The partisan gender gap has attracted lots of scholarly attention. However, there are many contradictory assertions in the literature about

Table 6: Comparing ANES Assessments from the 1970s and 1980s

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Dependent Variable	**Own Assessments**						**Assessments of the Parties' Issue Positions**					
	Issue Positions		General Ideology		Economic Assessments		Important Differences Between Parties		Rep. - Dem. Ideological Assessments			
									Issue Positions		General Ideology	
Coding	(Most Lib. = 0, Most Con. = 1)				(Much Worse = 0, Much Better = 1)		(No = 0, Yes = 1)		(None = 0, Max = 1)			
Years in Sample	70-78	80-88	70-78	80-88	70-78	80-88	70-78	80-88	70-78	80-88	72-78	80-88
Female	-0.026	-0.022	0.005	-0.011	-0.040	-0.030	-0.013	-0.034	-0.016	-0.027	0.003	-0.020
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.012)
College	-0.056	-0.056	0.016	-0.003	0.041	0.089	0.189	0.201	0.148	0.150	0.125	0.189
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.034)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Female X College	-0.006	0.007	-0.053	-0.037	0.018	-0.021	-0.094	-0.019	-0.014	-0.010	-0.005	0.000
	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.049)	(0.031)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Constant	0.556	0.539	0.526	0.560	0.523	0.554	0.506	0.599	0.127	0.214	0.260	0.236
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.009)

Notes: Assessments of both own and party ideological positions are standardized so that the most liberal response is coded as 0 and the most conservative response is coded as 1. Retrospective and prospective economic assessment are standardized so that the most negative response is coded as 0 and the most positive response is coded as 1. If multiple measure of the dependent variable are available, they are averaged.

when and why the gap developed, a situation we attribute to datasets lacking sufficient sample size to avoid random noise in the time trends or to pin down distinct patterns among demographic groups.

Our newly assembled dataset containing every individual-level response to Gallup polls asking about gender and party identification from 1953-2012 allows us, with the help of ANES data, to get a much clearer picture of the development of the partisan gender gap than previous work. The creation of the gender gap consisted of separate processes among the more and less educated. Among the college educated, women moved towards the Democratic Party more than men in the 1970s and, unlike men, did not move at all towards Republicans in the 1980s. Among the non-college educated, men moved more towards the Republicans in the 1980s than women did, creating a consistent yet smaller gender gap.

We argue that political knowledge explains this interaction between the gender gap and education. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, women had consistently more liberal policy views than men regardless of their education level. But those with more education noticed that the parties were becoming more ideologically distinct and that their policy views could be translated into a more liberal self-identification and more Democratic partisanship. Less-educated men did not translate their more conservative policy views into a more Republican orientation until the 1980s.

How does this pattern fit with the literature's dominant explanations of the partisan gender gap's emergence? Much of the evidence that we uncover is inconsistent with the economic vulnerability explanation. The partisan gender gap first emerged because women with the most human capital became more Democratic. These women are, on average, at less financial risk from microeconomic downturns, divorce, or other hardships. The size of the gender gap in social welfare spending attitudes and personal economic assessments among college graduates was indistinguishable from the same gap among non-college graduates. Moreover, gender differences in attitudes towards social welfare spending were comparable to gender differences in attitudes on law and order issues and smaller than gender differences in attitudes on military issues. Finally, gender differences in assessments of own economic well-being remained con-

stant between the 1970s and 1980s. None of these patterns suggests that women's economic vulnerability caused the gender gap to develop.

Our evidence is at best only partially consistent with the Development Theory of Gender Realignment. While the gender gap developed earlier—and is consistently larger—among those with more education, it largely is not because more-educated women have adopted more liberal post-materialist views on social issues. The only evidence consistent with this is that more-educated women had more liberal views on gender roles and the ERA relative to educated men. But among the less educated, this pattern reversed. And on abortion, women were similar to men at all educational levels. Moreover, while there was some generational replacement among non-college graduates, it appears to be the product of conversation among college-gradates, and not socialization and generational replacement

The contention in the literature that the gap emerged as much because of the conservatism of men as the liberalism of women has some truth to it. Among those with less education, the main story is men's movement towards the Republicans. However, this occurred 15 years after the gender gap first emerged among the highly educated, largely because of educated women becoming more Democratic.

The contention by feminist activists in the early 1980s that the right turn in the policy positions of the national Republican party created the gender gap has substantial truth to it. However, it ignores the fact that this right turn was a continuation of a gradual ideological polarization of the two parties that began in the 1960s and 1970s. As the polarization went on longer and got larger, more people noticed and the gender gap became larger and somewhat more widespread.

We believe our analysis helps to remedy the disconnect between the literature on the partisan gender gap and the most prominent general theories of public opinion and party identification. One of the most prominent scholarly claims about American public opinion is that people with different levels of political awareness comprehend politics and respond to new political information differently (Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992). Another major claim is that, because party identification is a social identity, it will very rarely change quickly, even when

new information is received (Campbell et al., 1980; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002). The fact that party identification responded to party polarization only gradually, and did so differently depending on political awareness, is consistent with these two seminal arguments. New theories of mass political behavior are not required to explain the patterns we observe in the development of the partisan gender gap. Rather, the gender gap's formation is an understandable consequence of women and men's divergent policy preferences, the polarization of the party system, and the differences in the awareness of this polarization among those who are more and less politically knowledgeable.

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8 Supplemental Appendix

8.1 Data Coding Appendix

We attempted to collect and code a consistent set of political attitudes and demographic variables for all polls conducted by the Gallup Organization between 1953 and 2012 that have individual-level data posted on the Roper Center iPoll Databank. One challenge in this effort was that Gallup frequently changed both the constructs they were trying to measure and the questions used to measure these constructs over time. Because there were many more questions asked than we could feasibly code, we limited ourselves to coding only responses to questions that were asked frequently over time, and in a consistent enough manner that responses over time were comparable.

Table A.1 presents the political attitudes that are included in our dataset. We coded responses to questions about presidential approval, partisan identification, and ideology. The standard presidential approval question is "Do you approve or disapprove of the way that <Name of President> is handling his job as president?" Because there is variation across surveys in how Gallup coded responses like "Don't Know" or "Neither Approve or Disapprove" in the raw data, we code any response other than "Approve" or "Disapprove" as "Other." Gallup also occasionally asks domain-specific presidential approval after the standard presidential approval question. When asked, we also used a similar scheme to code responses to questions about the president's handling of the economy and foreign affairs.

Table A.2 displays the number of observations and surveys that contains responses to the standard presidential approval question by quarter. The table shows that we observe approximately 20,000 responses from about 15 surveys in a modal year, with the number of responses and surveys observed in a year increasing somewhat over time. There are a few quarters in which we do not observe any surveys. This happens because Gallup stopped asking presidential approval immediately prior to some presidential elections. To assess the coverage of these Gallup polls, we examined whether there were polls that had aggregate totals listed at `http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/data/presidential_approval.html` in July

2013 but did not have usable individual-level data in the Roper Center iPoll Databank. Table A.3 lists the 135 polls that fit this description. Given that we observe over 1,400 series with presidential approval, this suggests that we are observing a high percentage of the possible surveys.

We report a similar breakdown of the number of observations and surveys that contain responses to partisan identification by quarter in Table A.4. Unlike with presidential approval, Gallup asks about partisan identification in just about every survey we coded. The exact wording of the partisan identification question varies slightly across surveys. The two most common forms of the question are: "in politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Independent" and "in politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Independent?" There are also a few times in the early 1950s when instead the question was worded: "Normally, do you consider yourself a Democrat, Republican, or Independent." While respondents sometimes provide alternative answers (e.g., support a third party, don't know, refused to answer), these responses cannot always be differentiated from "Independent" in the raw data. Thus, we again jointly code all responses other than Democratic or Republican into an omnibus "Other" category. In some surveys, Gallup also asks a follow-up question to individuals who do not initially identify as a Democratic or Republican about whether they lean towards either party. The exact question wording is "As of today do you lean more to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party?" This question was asked somewhat frequently in the 1950s, quite rarely in the 1960s or 1970s, and then frequently again beginning in the 1980s. Responses to this questions are coded when available.

Gallup has asked about ideology for less time than either presidential approval or partisan identification. While questions about ideology were occasionally asked in the 1980s and the early 1990s, Gallup only began regularly asking about ideology using a consistent question wording in 1992: "How would you describe your political views - very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, or very liberal?" Table A.5 shows the number of observations and surveys that contains responses to this question by quarter. We cannot always differentiate in the raw data between people who respond that they are moderate and those who give

another answer (e.g., don't know, refuse to respond), so all responses that are not liberal or conservative are placed into an omnibus "Other" category.

Tables A.6 and A.7 present the demographic variables we collected about respondents. We collected information about a respondent's gender, race and ethnicity, age, marital status, employment status, religion, and education. We also collected information about household income, what industry the household's chief wage earner works in, and whether someone in the household belongs to a union. Finally, we collected information about the state of residence and the community in which the respondent resides. Unfortunately, not all of these variables are contained in every survey we coded. To provide a general sense of when we observe different variables, Table A.8 presents the percentage of responses in which we observe a given variable by presidential term.

Finally, Table A.9 presents the variables we collected about the survey design. Most Gallup polls are designed to be a nationally representative sample of the voting-age population in the United States. To deal with the fact that some types of individuals within this population are more likely to respond than others, Gallup has used weights since it abandoned quota sampling in the aftermath of incorrectly predicting the 1948 presidential election. How these weights are represented in the raw data has varied over time. In earlier years, observations were duplicated in the raw data in proportion to their weight (e.g., an observation with a weight of three would be placed in the dataset three times). In later years, sample weights were provided with each observations. We construct a common weighting variable, final_weight, to use across all of the surveys ; it has an average value of one within each survey. Occasionally Gallup purposely oversampled a particular group (e.g., African-Americans, State of the Union viewers). In such cases, we note whether our weighting variable is able to reconstruct a representative sample. Finally, we code information about the survey mode and the sponsor of the survey.

8.2 Additional Tables and Figures

Table A.1: Description of Political Variable Codings

Variable	Variable Name	Coding		
Presidential Approval:				
Job as President	pres_approve	Approve	=	1
		Disapprove	=	-1
		Other	=	0
Handling of Economy	pres_approve_economy	Approve	=	1
		Disapprove	=	-1
		Other	=	0
Handling of Foreign Affairs	pres_approve_foreign	Approve	=	1
		Disapprove	=	-1
		Other	=	0
Partisan Identification:				
Consider Yourself	party	Republican	=	1
		Democrat	=	-1
		Other	=	0
Lean More to	party2	Republican	=	1
		Democrat	=	-1
		Other	=	0
Ideology	ideo	Very Conservative	=	2
		Conservative	=	1
		Liberal	=	-1
		Very Liberal	=	-2
		Other	=	0

Notes: -9 indicates missing value, -99 indicates variable not included in series.

Table A.2: No. of Obs. (Surveys) with Presidential Approval by Quarter

Quarter	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
1	4,720	6,131	7,443	8,918	6,154	7,710	4,592	5,049	4,300	7,736
	(3)	(4)	(5)	(5)	(4)	(5)	(3)	(3)	(2)	(3)
2	3,075	5,747	6,084	7,975	7,761	4,547	6,292	7,351	12,591	9,215
	(2)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(5)	(3)	(4)	(4)	(5)	(4)
3	5,938	7,727	5,848	4,276	6,131	7,616	7,005	14,752	6,763	6,875
	(4)	(5)	(4)	(2)	(4)	(5)	(3)	(7)	(3)	(3)
4	5,987	4,468	2,977	3,043	2,991	4,514	6,834	6,497	6,128	8,014
	(4)	(3)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(3)	(3)	(3)
	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
1	6,889	15,263	7,832	12,977	8,913	4,503	7,675	9,281	4,634	6,046
	(3)	(6)	(4)	(5)	(4)	(3)	(5)	(6)	(3)	(4)
2	10,626	15,555	11,204	10,144	12,200	7,653	7,701	6,062	7,945	6,134
	(5)	(6)	(5)	(4)	(5)	(5)	(5)	(4)	(5)	(4)
3	5,605	0	10,566	8,925	9,932	4,552	7,810	7,544	3,108	0
	(3)	(0)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(3)	(5)	(5)	(2)	(0)
4	8,566	2,498	9,586	9,760	6,365	3,027	6,222	4,662	4,588	2,966
	(4)	(1)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(2)	(4)	(3)	(3)	(2)
	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
1	6,145	11,015	7,747	7,786	7,757	9,233	10,721	9,527	4,799	6,121
	(4)	(7)	(5)	(5)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(6)	(3)	(4)
2	9,281	10,196	7,912	4,607	10,671	10,712	9,158	9,409	9,193	9,282
	(6)	(8)	(5)	(3)	(7)	(7)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)
3	7,609	7,816	4,635	0	7,564	13,969	10,903	4,750	7,699	7,580
	(5)	(5)	(3)	(0)	(5)	(8)	(7)	(3)	(5)	(5)
4	7,795	7,823	9,213	1,559	10,609	4,658	9,226	3,100	7,666	6,123
	(5)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(7)	(3)	(6)	(2)	(5)	(4)
	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
1	7,742	6,231	7,944	3,711	5,368	4,480	6,907	5,918	18,885	7,276
	(5)	(4)	(6)	(4)	(6)	(4)	(6)	(5)	(20)	(7)
2	9,161	7,340	6,999	5,626	8,247	4,032	11,116	5,695	10,967	9,343
	(6)	(6)	(6)	(5)	(5)	(2)	(11)	(5)	(11)	(8)
3	10,774	10,848	7,023	4,657	5,523	2,001	6,753	16,483	11,759	4,442
	(7)	(7)	(6)	(5)	(6)	(2)	(6)	(16)	(11)	(4)
4	6,066	6,052	3,136	5,638	7,170	1,025	7,527	15,294	2,008	4,046
	(4)	(4)	(3)	(5)	(8)	(1)	(7)	(16)	(2)	(4)
	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
1	11,069	10,070	7,021	6,076	8,167	9,970	12,328	11,300	5,089	6,705
	(12)	(10)	(7)	(6)	(8)	(11)	(13)	(10)	(5)	(7)
2	8,124	7,793	8,822	10,164	3,970	4,697	10,302	4,114	5,055	8,869
	(8)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(4)	(5)	(9)
3	10,954	8,996	12,233	9,097	7,974	13,756	8,954	7,225	5,883	8,442
	(11)	(9)	(12)	(9)	(8)	(17)	(8)	(7)	(6)	(9)
4	10,251	10,117	7,127	4,850	4,907	12,600	5,060	5,121	4,881	7,779
	(10)	(9)	(7)	(6)	(5)	(12)	(5)	(5)	(5)	(7)
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
1	12,063	7,053	6,946	5,030	5,030	11,134	16,910	14,239	15,324	14,843
	(12)	(7)	(7)	(5)	(5)	(8)	(20)	(17)	(18)	(14)
2	7,086	5,013	8,959	6,032	6,042	7,532	13,695	13,921	9,194	15,967
	(7)	(5)	(9)	(6)	(6)	(7)	(17)	(15)	(11)	(15)
3	4,021	5,551	7,864	4,016	6,084	7,095	12,874	10,396	9,953	15,641
	(4)	(5)	(8)	(4)	(6)	(7)	(14)	(11)	(11)	(15)
4	5,018	8,613	7,666	4,534	7,101	10,376	10,215	7,345	10,630	19,071
	(5)	(7)	(8)	(4)	(7)	(8)	(10)	(6)	(12)	(19)

Table A.3: Missing Presidential Approval Data Series

Year (# Missing)	Date(s) of Missing Series
1961 (1)	4/28-5/3
1964 (1)	12/11-12/16
1965 (1)	3/11-3/16
1968 (1)	3/10-3/15
1978 (1)	11/10-11/13
1984 (2)	5/3-5/5,6/6-6/8
1985 (4)	8/16-8/19,9/13-9/16,11/1-11/4,12/6-12/9
1986 (5)	5/16-5/19,6/6-6/9,8/8-8/11,9/12-9/15,12/5-12/8
1987 (4)	3/6-3/9,6/5-6/8,8/7-8/10,12/4-12/7
1988 (10)	1/22-1/25,3/4-3/7,4/8-4/11,6/10-6/13,6/24-6/27 7/15-7/18,8/19-8/22,9/25-10/1,10/21-10/24,12/27-12/29
1990 (6)	3/15-3/18,3/16-3/29,4/19-4/22,5/17-5/20,6/7-6/10,8/3-8/4
1991 (10)	7/11-7/14,8/19,9/5-9/8,9/13-9/15,10/3-10/6 10/31-11/3,11/7-11/10,11/14-11/17,12/5-12/8,12/12-12/15
1992 (1)	3/20/92-4/22/92
1994 (2)	9/20-9/21,10/18-10/19
1996 (3)	3/1-4/14, 4/23-4/25,8/16-8/18
1997 (2)	1/10-1/13,4/18-4/20
1998 (3)	8/7-8/8,8/21-8/22,9/10
1999 (4)	1/8-1/10,3/19-3/21,9/29-10/3,11/18-11/21
2000 (3)	5/18-5/21,8/29-9/5,9/29-10/5
2001 (9)	2/1-2/4,3/5-3/7,4/6-4/8,6/11-6/17,7/19-7/22 8/16-8/19,10/11-10/14,11/8-11/11,12/6-12/9
2002 (11)	2/4-2/6,3/4-3/7,4/8-4/11,6/3-6/6,6/17-6/19,7/9-7/11 7/22-7/24,8/5-8/8,9/5-9/8,10/14-10/17,10/21-10/22
2003 (8)	2/3-2/6,3/20-3/24,4/7-4/9,5/5-5/7,7/7-7/9,10/6-10/8,11/3-11/5,12/11-12/14
2004 (10)	1/12-1/15,2/9-2/12,3/8-3/11,5/2-5/4,7/8-7/11 8/9-8/11,9/13-9/15,10/11-10/14,11/7-11/10,12/5-12/8
2005 (11)	1/3-1/5,2/7-2/10,3/7-3/10,4/2-4/5,4/4-4/7,7/7-7/10 8/8-8/11,9/12-9/15,10/13-10/16,11/7-11/10,12/5-12/8
2006 (11)	1/9-1/12,2/6-2/9,3/13-3/16,4/10-4/13,5/8-5/11,7/6-7/9 8/7-8/10,9/7-9/10,10/9-10/12,11/9-11/12,12/11-12/14
2007 (3)	1/15-1/18,2/1-2/4,3/11-3/14
2009 (8)	1/21-1/23,2/9-2/12,2/19-2/21,2/21-2/23,2/24-2/26,3/13-3/15,6/5-6/7,6/16-6/19

Gallup polls listed at `http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/data/presidential_approval.html` in July 2013 that do not have usable micro data in the Roper Center archive.

Table A.4: No. of Obs. (Surveys) with Party Identification by Quarter

Quarter	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
1	6,276	6,131	7,443	8,918	6,154	7,710	4,592	5,049	6,502	7,736
	(4)	(4)	(5)	(5)	(4)	(5)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)
2	4,623	5,747	6,084	7,975	7,761	4,547	6,292	7,351	12,591	9,215
	(3)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(5)	(3)	(4)	(4)	(5)	(4)
3	6,225	6,262	5,848	10,714	6,131	7,616	7,005	14,752	6,763	6,875
	(4)	(4)	(4)	(5)	(4)	(5)	(3)	(7)	(3)	(3)
4	5,987	4,468	6,051	8,944	4,532	4,514	7,422	6,497	6,128	8,014
	(4)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(3)	(3)	(4)	(3)	(3)	(3)
	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
1	6,889	15,263	9,452	12,977	6,205	4,503	7,675	9,281	4,634	6,046
	(3)	(6)	(5)	(5)	(3)	(3)	(5)	(6)	(3)	(4)
2	10,626	15,555	11,204	10,144	12,200	7,653	7,701	10,730	9,570	12,892
	(5)	(6)	(5)	(4)	(5)	(5)	(5)	(7)	(6)	(10)
3	5,605	10,842	10,566	8,925	9,932	7,563	10,329	7,544	4,613	6,029
	(3)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(5)	(3)	(4)
4	11,162	9,482	9,586	9,760	6,365	4,632	9,318	6,194	6,156	4,482
	(5)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(3)	(6)	(4)	(4)	(3)
	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
1	6,145	11,015	9,307	12,404	10,770	9,233	10,721	9,527	6,339	6,121
	(4)	(7)	(6)	(8)	(7)	(6)	(7)	(6)	(4)	(4)
2	9,281	11,739	9,777	10,286	13,726	10,712	10,669	10,939	9,193	10,838
	(6)	(9)	(8)	(7)	(9)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(6)	(7)
3	7,609	7,816	7,755	6,198	7,564	13,969	10,903	6,288	7,699	7,580
	(5)	(5)	(5)	(4)	(5)	(8)	(7)	(4)	(5)	(5)
4	9,383	7,823	9,213	7,715	10,609	6,193	9,226	6,249	7,666	6,123
	(6)	(5)	(6)	(5)	(7)	(4)	(6)	(4)	(5)	(4)
	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
1	7,742	6,231	8,964	3,711	5,974	5,687	6,907	7,591	21,124	9,210
	(5)	(4)	(7)	(4)	(7)	(6)	(6)	(7)	(23)	(9)
2	10,701	7,340	10,055	5,626	9,818	4,032	14,214	7,972	11,735	11,303
	(7)	(6)	(8)	(5)	(6)	(2)	(15)	(9)	(12)	(10)
3	10,774	10,848	7,023	4,657	5,523	3,031	9,178	17,293	10,894	6,622
	(7)	(7)	(6)	(5)	(6)	(3)	(9)	(17)	(10)	(6)
4	6,066	6,052	3,136	7,907	7,170	5,110	8,027	16,956	2,786	6,427
	(4)	(4)	(3)	(7)	(8)	(5)	(8)	(17)	(3)	(8)
	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
1	14,693	12,385	7,021	6,076	8,794	10,620	12,990	12,331	7,606	6,705
	(17)	(13)	(7)	(6)	(9)	(12)	(14)	(11)	(8)	(7)
2	11,268	10,132	11,631	11,493	5,000	4,697	12,493	8,396	5,696	8,869
	(12)	(10)	(11)	(11)	(5)	(5)	(12)	(9)	(6)	(9)
3	12,917	8,996	12,873	19,433	7,974	14,205	8,954	19,193	6,464	8,442
	(14)	(9)	(13)	(31)	(8)	(17)	(8)	(35)	(7)	(9)
4	10,776	10,742	8,514	29,047	6,510	17,912	5,721	38,223	4,881	7,779
	(11)	(10)	(9)	(39)	(7)	(19)	(6)	(48)	(5)	(7)
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
1	14,779	7,053	8,190	5,030	5,030	11,134	33,682	19,218	20,749	16,377
	(16)	(7)	(9)	(5)	(5)	(8)	(28)	(17)	(18)	(14)
2	8,767	5,013	8,959	6,841	6,042	7,532	23,239	16,393	11,871	19,332
	(10)	(5)	(9)	(7)	(6)	(7)	(21)	(16)	(12)	(15)
3	4,021	6,220	9,722	4,016	6,084	16,256	17,809	13,909	11,447	16,103
	(4)	(6)	(11)	(4)	(6)	(15)	(14)	(12)	(11)	(15)
4	6,686	9,053	10,194	4,534	7,101	17,470	11,202	12,426	16,142	19,535
	(7)	(8)	(12)	(4)	(7)	(15)	(10)	(9)	(14)	(19)

Table A.5: No. of Obs. (Surveys) with Ideology by Quarter

Quarter	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,859
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(4)
2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,320
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(4)
3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,180
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(3)
4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
1	3,011	6,098	4,030	5,028	4,106	7,973	9,790	12,331	6,945	6,705
	(3)	(6)	(4)	(5)	(4)	(8)	(10)	(11)	(7)	(7)
2	6,280	3,008	4,830	6,039	3,970	4,031	11,313	7,172	5,696	8,869
	(7)	(3)	(5)	(6)	(4)	(4)	(10)	(7)	(6)	(9)
3	5,885	3,034	6,063	16,364	2,837	7,839	8,946	19,193	5,069	8,442
	(6)	(3)	(6)	(28)	(3)	(8)	(8)	(35)	(5)	(9)
4	6,289	8,078	3,160	27,050	5,911	10,650	5,060	35,104	4,881	7,779
	(6)	(7)	(3)	(37)	(6)	(12)	(5)	(44)	(5)	(7)
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
1	12,063	7,053	5,943	5,030	5,030	11,134	33,682	14,239	15,489	16,377
	(12)	(7)	(6)	(5)	(5)	(8)	(28)	(17)	(18)	(14)
2	7,750	5,013	8,959	6,032	6,042	7,532	23,239	14,424	8,992	17,395
	(8)	(5)	(9)	(6)	(6)	(7)	(21)	(16)	(11)	(15)
3	4,021	5,551	8,489	4,016	6,084	16,256	15,826	12,937	10,188	15,147
	(4)	(5)	(9)	(4)	(6)	(15)	(14)	(12)	(11)	(15)
4	6,022	8,613	10,194	4,534	7,101	17,470	10,215	12,426	13,356	19,071
	(6)	(7)	(12)	(4)	(7)	(15)	(10)	(9)	(14)	(19)

Table A.6: Description of Respondents' Characteristics and Locality Variable Codings

Variable	Variable Name	Coding
Gender:		
Male	male	Yes = 1, No = 0
Female	female	Yes = 1, No = 0
Race and Ethnicity:		
White	white	Yes = 1, No = 0
Black	black	Yes = 1, No = 0
Hispanic	hispanic	Yes = 1, No = 0
Age	age	18 to 99
Married	married	Yes = 1, No = 0
Household Income:		
Minimum Value	lower_bound_income	Dollars
Maximum Value	upper_bound_income	Dollars
		(Top Coded = -1)
No Response	missing_income	Yes = 1, No = 0
Union Household	unionHH	Yes = 1, No = 0
State of Residence	state	Gallup State Code
Place of Residence:		
Minimum City Size	lower_bound_citysize	Population
Maximum City Size	upper_bound_citysize	Population
Lives on Farm	farm	Yes = 1, No = 0
Near City of Pop. 100,000+	near100k	Yes = 1, No = 0
Suburbs in City Size	andsub	Yes = 1, No = 0
Area Code	area	201 to 999
Congressional District	cd	1 to 53

Notes: -9 indicates missing value, -99 indicates variable not included in series.

Table A.7: Description of Labor Market, Religion, and Education Variable Codings

Variable	Variable Name	Coding		
Employed	employment	Full Time	=	1
		Part Time	=	2
		Not Employed	=	3
Industry of Chief Wage Earner	industry	Farmer	=	1
		Business	=	2
		Clerical	=	3
		Sales	=	4
		Skilled	=	5
		Unskilled	=	6
		Service	=	7
		Professional	=	8
		Farm Laborer	=	9
		Non-Farm Laborer	=	10
		Non-Labor Force	=	11
		Other	=	12
Religion	religion	Protestant	=	1
		Catholic	=	2
		Jewish	=	3
		Other	=	4
Education	education	Not High School Graduate	=	1
		High School Graduate	=	2
		Technical College	=	3
		Some College	=	4
		College Graduate	=	5

Notes: -9 indicates missing value, -99 indicates variable not included in series.

Table A.8: Variables Observed by Presidency

	IKE	JFK & LBJ	Nixon & Ford	Carter	Ronald Reagan	G.H.W. Bush	Bill Clinton	G.W. Bush	Barack Obama
Presidential Approval:									
Job as President	90%	90%	76%	89%	91%	83%	69%	87%	75%
Handling of Economy	0%	0%	0%	1%	28%	0%	15%	23%	8%
Handling of Foreign Affairs	0%	0%	0%	4%	26%	1%	15%	18%	6%
Partisan Identification:									
Consider Yourself	99%	99%	100%	99%	100%	97%	100%	100%	100%
Lean More to	19%	1%	6%	5%	36%	52%	95%	97%	100%
Ideology	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	7%	69%	95%	91%
Gender	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Race	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Hispanic	0%	0%	0%	0%	44%	34%	90%	100%	100%
Age	96%	99%	98%	99%	99%	99%	99%	99%	98%
Education	99%	100%	100%	99%	100%	99%	99%	99%	99%
Married	1%	4%	21%	51%	80%	58%	32%	49%	98%
Religion	76%	97%	98%	94%	82%	67%	18%	48%	94%
Union Household	63%	38%	83%	50%	75%	23%	8%	8%	10%
Employment	0%	0%	1%	47%	73%	54%	28%	12%	78%
Industry of Chief Wage Earner	96%	99%	99%	98%	74%	23%	13%	0%	0%
Income	2%	96%	97%	98%	82%	76%	85%	86%	80%
State of Residence	98%	97%	100%	100%	98%	99%	99%	100%	100%
Area Code	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	20%	89%	35%
Congressional District	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	78%	0%
City Size	85%	97%	100%	96%	90%	23%	12%	0%	0%

Table A.9: Description of Survey Variable Codings

Variable	Variable Name	Coding		
Weighting:				
Final Weight	final_weight	Average Value	=	1
Sample Weight	weight	0 to 999		
Times at Home	times	0 to 9		
Duplicate Obs. in Raw Data	duplicates	0 to 26		
Survey Contains Oversample	over	Yes = 1, No = 0		
Oversample Unrepresentative:				
Presidential Approval	unrep_approval	Yes = 1, No = 0		
Partisan Identification	unrep_partyid	Yes = 1, No = 0		
Ideology	unrep_ideology	Yes = 1, No = 0		
Survey Info:				
Survey Code	series	Name of Series		
Observation Number	obs_num	Order in Raw Data		
Start Date	start_date	First Date in Field		
End Date	end_date	Last Date in Field		
Survey Sponsor	survey	Gallup (In-Person)	=	1
		Gallup (Telephone)	=	2
		Newsweek	=	3
		CNN/*USA Today*	=	4
		Times Mirror	=	5
		UBS	=	6
		Other	=	7

Notes: -9 indicates missing value, -99 indicates variable not included in series.

Table A.10: Partisanship Gender Gap by Education, Age, and Race

	Education				Age			Race	
	No HS Degree	HS Degree	Some College	College Degree	18-39	40-59	60+	White	Black
1953-1956	0.000	0.020	0.025	0.010	0.010	0.021	0.022	0.013	-0.028
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.009)
	[58,104]	[30,763]	[9,538]	[8,466]	[44,967]	[39,818]	[19,550]	[95,851]	[8,579]
1957-1960	0.019	0.021	0.051	0.013	0.013	0.033	0.039	0.023	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.009)
	[55,702]	[32,985]	[9,515]	[9,032]	[40,413]	[39,518]	[22,243]	[96,692]	[10,052]
1961-1964	0.002	0.010	0.014	-0.005	-0.011	0.009	0.020	0.003	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.007)
	[72,881]	[47,955]	[14,007]	[14,014]	[55,782]	[56,919]	[34,609]	[132,543]	[15,543]
1965-1968	-0.019	0.004	0.030	-0.043	-0.026	0.000	0.000	-0.012	-0.018
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.007)
	[61,132]	[49,749]	[15,604]	[14,828]	[52,584]	[53,505]	[33,212]	[128,608]	[11,686]
1969-1972	-0.007	0.001	0.006	-0.020	-0.024	0.000	0.007	-0.007	-0.011
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.007)
	[45,049]	[45,182]	[16,772]	[15,724]	[49,477]	[43,560]	[28,461]	[111,782]	[9,845]
1973-1976	0.011	0.011	0.001	-0.036	-0.020	0.003	0.028	0.001	-0.014
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)
	[45,109]	[53,826]	[23,449]	[20,529]	[63,067]	[45,257]	[31,605]	[125,863]	[15,086]
1977-1980	-0.005	0.000	-0.003	-0.045	-0.020	-0.011	-0.006	-0.013	-0.010
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.005)
	[44,373]	[60,435]	[26,981]	[24,241]	[70,560]	[46,233]	[37,632]	[138,107]	[16,832]
1981-1984	-0.008	-0.017	-0.030	-0.070	-0.043	-0.020	-0.018	-0.032	-0.021
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)
	[30,830]	[49,321]	[22,968]	[23,856]	[57,060]	[36,215]	[33,137]	[110,334]	[13,889]
1985-1988	-0.018	-0.012	-0.045	-0.079	-0.046	-0.036	-0.010	-0.034	-0.047
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.008)
	[16,780]	[37,320]	[19,188]	[23,353]	[45,071]	[27,769]	[23,362]	[84,849]	[9,220]
1989-1992	-0.030	-0.031	-0.047	-0.083	-0.061	-0.039	-0.028	-0.044	-0.049
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.006)
	[22,448]	[63,256]	[36,497]	[44,934]	[75,065]	[51,452]	[39,493]	[145,013]	[14,588]
1993-1996	-0.040	-0.039	-0.065	-0.090	-0.067	-0.054	-0.047	-0.056	-0.052
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.005)
	[22,305]	[70,398]	[45,595]	[57,882]	[82,386]	[65,698]	[46,816]	[165,434]	[19,957]
1997-2000	-0.061	-0.039	-0.065	-0.100	-0.066	-0.065	-0.061	-0.062	-0.054
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.005)
	[16,388]	[63,307]	[46,283]	[66,481]	[74,168]	[71,457]	[45,302]	[160,699]	[17,747]
2001-2004	-0.053	-0.050	-0.065	-0.102	-0.076	-0.070	-0.056	-0.063	-0.060
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.007)
	[7,940]	[36,043]	[27,370]	[45,988]	[38,334]	[46,519]	[30,681]	[99,741]	[9,092]
2005-2008	-0.053	-0.044	-0.055	-0.097	-0.066	-0.064	-0.059	-0.059	-0.048
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.007)
	[7,645]	[38,736]	[30,121]	[56,839]	[31,248]	[54,032]	[46,894]	[112,569]	[10,095]
2009-2012	-0.038	-0.042	-0.060	-0.087	-0.071	-0.057	-0.053	-0.056	-0.065
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.005)
	[15,675]	[75,261]	[66,517]	[118,330]	[58,157]	[98,146]	[115,516]	[232,874]	[23,285]

Notes: Each cell present the coefficient, standard error, and sample size of a regression of partisan identification on a gender indicator for the specified demographic group and time period. All regressions also include survey fixed effects.

Table A.11: Partisanship Gender Gap by Income and Labor Market Status

	Median HH Income		Avg. HH Income in Chief Wage Earner's Industry				Employment		
	Above	Below	High	Mid	Low	No Job	Full	Part	None
	N/A	N/A	0.011	0.009	-0.003	0.028	N/A	N/A	N/A
1953-1956	N/A	N/A	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.017)	N/A	N/A	N/A
	[0]	[0]	[20,221]	[44,858]	[26,557]	[2,750]	[0]	[0]	[0]
	0.002	0.041	0.010	0.030	0.011	0.017	N/A	N/A	N/A
1957-1960	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.008)	N/A	N/A	N/A
	[3,231]	[2,156]	[21,129]	[46,506]	[22,359]	[12,899]	[0]	[0]	[0]
	-0.001	0.013	-0.010	0.007	0.006	0.000	N/A	N/A	N/A
1961-1964	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)	N/A	N/A	N/A
	[81,857]	[62,821]	[31,973]	[63,757]	[27,693]	[23,343]	[0]	[0]	[0]
	-0.010	-0.003	-0.017	-0.009	-0.009	-0.013	N/A	N/A	N/A
1965-1968	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.006)	N/A	N/A	N/A
	[80,548]	[53,643]	[32,743]	[59,420]	[21,737]	[23,973]	[0]	[0]	[0]
	-0.005	-0.003	-0.018	-0.004	-0.015	-0.007	N/A	N/A	N/A
1969-1972	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.006)	N/A	N/A	N/A
	[71,468]	[49,280]	[30,406]	[49,436]	[16,987]	[21,894]	[0]	[0]	[0]
	-0.002	0.014	-0.012	0.003	-0.007	0.015	-0.035	0.165	0.032
1973-1976	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.037)	(0.082)	(0.036)
	[76,050]	[60,737]	[33,917]	[57,004]	[17,513]	[28,176]	[699]	[142]	[682]
	-0.011	-0.002	-0.028	-0.002	-0.002	-0.012	-0.038	-0.010	0.006
1977-1980	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.005)
	[84,819]	[68,264]	[42,977]	[54,573]	[19,545]	[33,568]	[34,729]	[7,152]	[32,211]
	-0.029	-0.013	-0.050	-0.018	-0.024	-0.029	-0.062	0.005	0.010
1981-1984	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.004)
	[70,940]	[51,713]	[33,453]	[38,663]	[14,448]	[25,953]	[51,349]	[12,154]	[52,306]
	-0.037	-0.020	-0.058	-0.019	-0.023	-0.021	-0.058	-0.025	0.016
1985-1988	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.007)
	[34,191]	[26,273]	[13,861]	[14,948]	[5,694]	[9,792]	[22,931]	[5,280]	[20,236]
	-0.043	-0.039	-0.051	-0.029	-0.036	-0.029	-0.073	-0.019	0.000
1989-1992	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.005)
	[72,169]	[56,323]	[11,163]	[12,761]	[4,332]	[8,145]	[47,918]	[10,292]	[33,386]
	-0.060	-0.042	-0.060	-0.013	-0.016	-0.052	-0.078	-0.009	-0.005
1993-1996	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.006)
	[101,253]	[74,091]	[11,921]	[13,584]	[4,959]	[9,159]	[35,773]	[7,767]	[26,843]
	-0.064	-0.048	-0.051	-0.031	-0.020	0.004	-0.103	-0.002	-0.014
1997-2000	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.009)
	[102,971]	[52,760]	[1,939]	[1,781]	[793]	[1,244]	[20,412]	[3,282]	[12,584]
	-0.069	-0.049	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	-0.098	0.009	-0.019
2001-2004	(0.004)	(0.005)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	(0.014)	(0.042)	(0.018)
	[64,619]	[37,075]	[0]	[0]	[0]	[0]	[4,468]	[620]	[2,927]
	-0.067	-0.049	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	-0.093	0.023	-0.009
2005-2008	(0.004)	(0.004)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	(0.009)	(0.024)	(0.010)
	[63,273]	[50,567]	[0]	[0]	[0]	[0]	[10,622]	[1,649]	[9,089]
	-0.073	-0.049	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	-0.096	-0.015	-0.020
2009-2012	(0.003)	(0.003)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)
	[121,549]	[102,726]	[0]	[0]	[0]	[0]	[93797]	[21,386]	[99,197]

Notes: Each cell presents the coefficient, standard error, and sample size of a regression of partisan identification on a gender indicator for the specified demographic group and time period. All regressions also include survey fixed effects.

Table A.12: Partisanship Gender Gap by Religious, Marriage, and Union Status

	Religion			Married		Union HH	
	Prst.	Cath.	Jwsh.	Yes	No	Yes	No
1953-1956	0.019	-0.005	-0.058	N/A	N/A	0.017	0.007
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.015)	N/A	N/A	(0.006)	(0.004)
	[51,082]	[16,958]	[2,386]	[0]	[0]	[20,087]	[52,053]
1957-1960	0.028	0.007	-0.079	0.075	0.022	0.026	0.013
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.055)	(0.007)	(0.004)
	[61,843]	[22,047]	[2,923]	[1,277]	[318]	[16,672]	[45,866]
1961-1964	0.015	-0.030	-0.080	N/A	N/A	-0.014	-0.009
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.012)	N/A	N/A	(0.008)	(0.005)
	[100,763]	[33,814]	[4,271]	[0]	[0]	[11,837]	[34,903]
1965-1968	-0.002	-0.031	-0.069	0.013	0.039	0.002	-0.020
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.021)	(0.007)	(0.004)
	[92,252]	[33,559]	[4,042]	[8,559]	[2,233]	[15,482]	[47,557]
1969-1972	-0.001	-0.020	-0.071	-0.012	0.001	0.002	-0.022
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.004)
	[76,212]	[31,606]	[3,364]	[36,030]	[11,464]	[20,535]	[61,456]
1973-1976	0.009	-0.015	-0.072	0.001	-0.007	0.008	-0.010
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.005)	(0.003)
	[85,173]	[38,196]	[3,493]	[5,610]	[2,070]	[33,914]	[105,133]
1977-1980	-0.004	-0.028	-0.074	-0.014	-0.027	0.002	-0.032
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)
	[88,573]	[41,793]	[3,485]	[54,546]	[25,144]	[18,037]	[59,068]
1981-1984	-0.021	-0.053	-0.061	-0.012	-0.060	0.000	-0.043
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)
	[69,753]	[33,796]	[2,927]	[83,978]	[41,739]	[25,192]	[93,240]
1985-1988	-0.032	-0.041	-0.093	-0.016	-0.065	-0.014	-0.043
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.005)
	[36,960]	[16,788]	[1,453]	[35,951]	[17,550]	[9,951]	[40,785]
1989-1992	-0.043	-0.068	-0.103	-0.027	-0.070	0.004	-0.050
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.017)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.005)
	[63,086]	[30,104]	[2,583]	[60,170]	[36,911]	[6,947]	[33,211]
1993-1996	-0.068	-0.082	-0.169	-0.033	-0.062	-0.121	-0.063
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.032)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.042)	(0.021)
	[12,803]	[6,520]	[646]	[42,293]	[30,736]	[347]	[1,653]
1997-2000	-0.068	-0.073	-0.135	-0.043	-0.074	-0.070	-0.073
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.026)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.006)
	[19,853]	[10,358]	[986]	[29,408]	[23,588]	[4,603]	[24,409]
2001-2004	-0.072	-0.074	-0.103	-0.050	-0.053	-0.054	-0.064
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.027)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.009)
	[19,456]	[9,582]	[960]	[18,306]	[14,480]	[1,876]	[10,568]
2005-2008	-0.065	-0.081	-0.050	-0.046	-0.061	-0.103	-0.062
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.025)	(0.011)
	[38,429]	[19,075]	[1,920]	[51,050]	[38,403]	[1,176]	[6,795]
2009-2012	-0.062	-0.071	-0.100	-0.042	-0.065	-0.087	-0.080
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.015)	(0.006)
	[99,892]	[59,393]	[5,962]	[150,448]	[120,442]	[3,675]	[23,512]

Notes: Each cell presents the coefficient, standard error, and sample size of a regression of partisan identification on a gender indicator for the specified demographic group and time period. All regressions also include survey fixed effects.

Table A.13: Partisanship Gender Gap by Region and City Size

	Region						Size of City of Residence		
	New Engl.	Mid Atlc.	Cntrl.	South	Rocky Mtn.	West	Under 10k	10k to 100k	Over 100k
1953-1956	-0.006	0.001	0.014	0.018	0.002	0.000	0.010	0.009	0.005
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)
	[7,237]	[25,151]	[32,165]	[26,755]	[3,700]	[11,543]	[39,422]	[15,273]	[40,140]
1957-1960	0.033	0.006	0.020	0.031	0.006	0.035	0.024	0.045	0.014
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)
	[6,625]	[25,099]	[32,363]	[23,994]	[6,080]	[9,668]	[37,028]	[11,011]	[39,131]
1961-1964	-0.002	-0.015	0.006	0.011	-0.038	0.007	0.013	-0.011	-0.005
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)
	[7,598]	[32,392]	[42,760]	[36,423]	[5,153]	[16,871]	[56,585]	[19,767]	[67,405]
1965-1968	-0.010	-0.015	0.006	-0.027	-0.003	-0.015	-0.007	-0.007	-0.016
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)
	[7,462]	[32,474]	[41,080]	[37,916]	[5,159]	[17,211]	[52,247]	[19,455]	[67,065]
1969-1972	-0.012	-0.002	-0.012	-0.015	0.001	0.001	-0.005	-0.002	-0.013
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)
	[6,737]	[29,037]	[35,193]	[31,993]	[4,420]	[15,303]	[42,743]	[19,222]	[60,761]
1973-1976	-0.004	-0.007	0.014	-0.011	0.012	-0.003	0.003	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)
	[8,301]	[29,680]	[40,708]	[39,932]	[5,363]	[18,905]	[45,800]	[26,222]	[70,869]
1977-1980	-0.029	-0.013	-0.002	-0.015	-0.003	-0.028	-0.012	-0.007	-0.017
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)
	[9,038]	[34,506]	[44,238]	[42,649]	[5,495]	[20,096]	[44,821]	[28,438]	[76,595]
1981-1984	-0.036	-0.033	-0.028	-0.025	-0.017	-0.041	-0.013	-0.039	-0.039
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)
	[6,879]	[27,085]	[34,210]	[34,483]	[5,077]	[17,661]	[36,966]	[20,018]	[66,913]
1985-1988	-0.021	-0.037	-0.027	-0.040	-0.001	-0.062	-0.030	-0.026	-0.045
	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.004)
	[5,097]	[18,431]	[24,575]	[27,402]	[4,576]	[12,973]	[23,580]	[10,157]	[43,587]
1989-1992	-0.041	-0.058	-0.039	-0.050	-0.034	-0.062	-0.026	-0.042	-0.044
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.006)
	[9,513]	[31,028]	[43,101]	[50,403]	[10,536]	[21,213]	[10,336]	[4,996]	[21,849]
1993-1996	-0.057	-0.063	-0.054	-0.063	-0.044	-0.063	-0.022	-0.036	-0.045
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.006)
	[11,224]	[36,276]	[49,259]	[60,720]	[11,766]	[26,910]	[11,434]	[5,325]	[25,601]
1997-2000	-0.057	-0.074	-0.063	-0.064	-0.048	-0.075	-0.077	-0.026	-0.021
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.023)
	[11,349]	[36,320]	[45,137]	[56,118]	[13,468]	[27,839]	[1,395]	[1973]	[1769]
2001-2004	-0.066	-0.090	-0.064	-0.062	-0.049	-0.077	N/A	N/A	N/A
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.007)	N/A	N/A	N/A
	[7,250]	[21,352]	[27,503]	[35,593]	[8,644]	[16,986]	[0]	[0]	[0]
2005-2008	-0.072	-0.074	-0.058	-0.056	-0.060	-0.077	N/A	N/A	N/A
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.007)	N/A	N/A	N/A
	[7,503]	[22,498]	[30,523]	[42,798]	[10,711]	[19,308]	[0]	[0]	[0]
2009-2012	-0.079	-0.071	-0.062	-0.051	-0.053	-0.057	N/A	N/A	N/A
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	N/A	N/A	N/A
	[14,927]	[45,525]	[62,445]	[89,238]	[23,432]	[40,215]	[0]	[0]	[0]

Notes: Each cell presents the coefficient, standard error, and sample size of a regression of partisan identification on a gender indicator for the specified demographic group and time period. All regressions also include survey fixed effects.

Table A.14: Partisanship Gender Gap Including Versus Excluding Leaners

	w/o Leaners		**w/Leaners**	
	College Graduates	Not College Graduates	College Graduates	Not College Graduates
1953-1956	0.013	0.015	0.001	0.016
N = 104,766	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.003)
1957-1960	-0.015	0.019	-0.041	0.028
N = 10,607	(0.029)	(0.009)	(0.032)	(0.010)
1961-1964	0.045	0.008	0.051	0.008
N = 10,349	(0.027)	(0.009)	(0.029)	(0.009)
1965-1968 N = 0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1969-1972 N = 0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1973-1976	-0.004	0.006	0.002	0.014
N = 15,423	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.019)	(0.008)
1977-1980	-0.061	0.009	-0.102	0.007
N = 7,869	(0.024)	(0.010)	(0.027)	(0.011)
1981-1984	-0.091	-0.032	-0.120	-0.035
N = 13,795	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.009)
1985-1988	-0.088	-0.016	-0.110	-0.026
N = 66,021	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)
1989-1992	-0.077	-0.030	-0.105	-0.039
N = 90,421	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.004)
1993-1996	-0.089	-0.046	-0.117	-0.056
N = 189,785	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)
1997-2000	-0.101	-0.051	-0.131	-0.061
N = 184,129	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)
2001-2004	-0.101	-0.054	-0.128	-0.072
N = 111,753	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)
2005-2008	-0.096	-0.049	-0.119	-0.064
N = 134,134	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
2009-2012	-0.094	-0.046	-0.126	-0.067
N = 279,418	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)

Notes: All regressions also include a gender indicator and survey fixed effects.

Figure A.1: Partisan Affiliation by Gender in Gallup Polls



Notes: Lines represent a weighted average calculated using a Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 100 days.

Figure A.2: Difference in the Partisanship Gender Gap Between College Graduates and Not College Graduates in Gallup, ANES, and GSS



Notes: Solid line represents a weighted average of the difference in female's and male's partisanship levels among respondents who graduated from college minus the difference in female's and male's partisanship levels among respondents who did not graduate from college, calculated using an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 100 days.

Figure A.3: College Graduates by Gender in Gallup Polls



Notes: Lines represent a weighted average calculated using an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 100 days.