Proportional Presidentialism:
Formal Rules and Informal Powersharing in Indonesia

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I. Are Rules Institutions? Indonesian Democracy as an Ideal Test-Case

Comparative politics largely revolves around the study of political rules and their expected effects. While other social science disciplines focus on the workings of global forces such as nationalism, capitalism, and neoliberalism, political scientists seem at times to be more captivated by what non-specialists must consider a more mundane set of “isms”: e.g. federalism, presidentialism, and bicameralism. Following Douglass North, political scientists have increasingly adopted the notion that a society’s key institutions are its political “rules of the game.”\(^1\) By *defining* rules as institutions, we tend effectively to *assume* that they channel politics in very real, even predictable ways over time.\(^2\)

This paper commences with the assertion that the status of rules as institutions must be investigated, not assumed. To what extent can we understand political patterns in a society by understanding its political rules? When political rules change, to what extent do they channel politics in new directions? *How much* rules matter (and not just *how* rules matter) should be a fundamental concern in the study of comparative politics.

Recent rule changes in Indonesia’s decade-old democracy provide an ideal test-case for the hypothesis that new rules make new politics. Most importantly, direct presidential elections were held for the first time in 2004, and again in 2009, replacing the previous system under which presidents were selected indirectly by a proportionally elected parliament.\(^3\) This has created powerful new formal pressures against what I have

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\(^1\) North 1990.
\(^2\) Definitions of institutions typically include informal norms as well as formal rules. But the key point is that formal rules are almost always considered to be institutions *by definition*, whether or not informal norms are as well.
\(^3\) Indonesia has also moved gradually since 2004 from its pure PR, closed-list electoral rules toward more of an open-list PR system. The implications of this shift in rules, if any, are less clear than those surrounding the introduction of direct presidential elections, but are certainly worthy of further examination.
described elsewhere as *party cartelization*, a defining feature of Indonesian politics from 1999-2004.\(^4\) This period saw parties in parliament enjoying the power to appoint and remove Indonesia’s president, leading to what one local observer referred to as “a dictatorship of the parliament.”\(^5\) By bringing literally every significant party into the ruling coalition, the governments of Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) and Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-04) effectively extinguished organized party opposition, with deeply troubling implications for “vertical accountability” between voters and incumbents and for government performance more broadly.\(^6\)

Indonesian voters have now secured and twice exercised the right to select their president themselves, and parliament’s powers of impeachment have been greatly curtailed. It should thus be much harder for parliament to force the president to share executive power with the “party cartel” by carving up the cabinet among all significant political parties. Formal rule changes should encourage a more presidential pattern of politics, in which the president exercises his authority to exclude certain parties from the executive, thereby producing an effective (even if involuntary) political opposition – something Indonesia lacked between the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 and the inaugural direct presidential elections of 2004, due to the party cartel’s collective stranglehold on political power. New electoral rules point definitively toward the majoritarian power-hoarding of presidentialism, and away from the proportional powersharing of parliamentarism.

\(^4\) Slater 2004.
\(^5\) Interview with Kusnanto Anggoro, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, 7/23/04.
\(^6\) On the distinction between horizontal and vertical accountability, see O’Donnell (1994). On the importance of “robust competition” among parties to reducing incumbent authorities’ exploitation of state resources, see Grzymala-Busse (2007).
As it happens, the 2004 and 2009 presidential election results provide an especially strong test of the hypothesis that rule change produces real change, because they produced an especially strong president. In a word, the elections were both landslides, providing retired General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) with a resounding popular mandate. SBY crushed incumbent President Megawati in the 2004 election, gathering over 60% of the popular vote. He repeated the favor in the 2009 rematch, winning over 60% of the vote against Megawati and his own vice-president, Jusuf Kalla, in a tri-cornered contest. These crushing victories have given SBY ample formal room to govern in a more presidentialist style, most notably by appointing a cabinet of allies beholden to himself rather than to parliament. Especially since he is ineligible to run for a third term, and faces no pressure to line up support from other parties for another reelection campaign, 7 SBY is about as unconstrained by formal institutions promoting powersharing as a chief executive can be.

But not all politics is formal. For SBY to replace the cartelized cabinets of old with a more presidential cabinet, he would need to impose political defeat on his former partners from the first Abdurrahman Wahid cabinet (1999-2000) and the Megawati cabinet (2001-04), in both of which he had served in a leading role. As both a veteran of cabinet collusion and a president with a powerful popular mandate, would SBY be unleashed by more permissive rules, or bound by lingering informal constraints? Or something in between? How, theoretically, might we expect this kind of direct clash between formal and informal logics to play out?

7 It is likely that SBY’s effort to preserve cartelization in 2004 was partly motivated by a desire to secure wide-ranging support for his 2009 reelection campaign, or even to position himself to run for reelection unopposed. If so, this would appear to have been a miscalculation. Either way, such reelection considerations cannot explain SBY’s coalition-building behavior after 2009.
My main empirical argument is that the old, informal pattern of party collusion is exhibiting remarkable resilience, given the formal difficulties of sustaining a party cartel, and the formally guaranteed temptations for a directly elected president not to do so, under a pure presidential system. Political opposition (and thus improved political accountability) has emerged more by default than by design, and could easily die out again (literally even as I type these very words), despite the new political rules. By the same token, the rule changes can hardly be ignored. They have clearly disrupted Indonesia’s party cartel – which was, I argue, a stable equilibrium in the near term in the absence of dramatic rule changes – even if they have not exactly destroyed it. Whereas the 1999-2004 period witnessed the inclusion of every single significant party into the cabinet, cabinets from 2004 until the present have excluded several significant parties, despite President SBY’s apparent preference to reconstitute the cartel in full. The full-blown party cartel of 1999-2004 has thus yielded to a slightly less collusive form of coalitional government from 2004 to the present: what I have elsewhere called “promiscuous powersharing.”

Yet it would be deeply dissatisfying to assess the ongoing battle between formal and informal institutions in Indonesian democracy by simply saying: “The game is currently tied.” Instead, we need new theoretical and conceptual armature to help us understand how exactly formal rules and informal powersharing practices are interacting.

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8 Slater and Simmons 2011. We define “promiscuous powersharing” as “an especially flexible type of coalitional inclusion, in which parties express or reveal a willingness to share executive power with any and all other significant parties after an election takes place, even across a country’s most important political cleavages.” Our definition of a party cartel draws on Katz and Mair (1995) but is more restrictive, encompassing only those postelectoral coalitions in which “every single significant party gains a share of executive power through appointments to the cabinet.”
in the Indonesian context, and what this says about the relative and combined weight of the formal and informal in “ruling politics” more generally.

Toward this end, my primary theoretical claim is that, when informal institutions are multiple and conflictual, *formal rule changes can produce real political change by shifting political actors’ relative reliance on those different informal institutions,*\(^9\) rather than superseding them entirely. More specifically, I proceed both deductively and inductively to identify ten different informal institutions\(^10\) for powersharing that could allow a president to engage in promiscuous powersharing at a minimum, and to build a fully cartelized coalition in the extreme scenario. Literally all of them plausibly played some supporting role in shaping the origins of party cartelization in Indonesia in 1999, and in reasserting the cartel’s triumph through the impeachment and toppling of President Wahid in 2001.\(^11\) The introduction of direct presidential elections in 2004 did not

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\(^9\) This is somewhat different from Hale’s (2011) claim that divergent formal constitutions shaped variation in informal behavior in post-color-revolutionary Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. For Hale there is only one informal institution in question – i.e., clientilism – and the variation that arises is in its formal channeling through a single or divided executive. My analysis draws attention to multiple informal practices that jointly uphold a broader informal institution – i.e., promiscuous powersharing – and how actors shift among them with tangible consequences for both formal and informal outcomes.

\(^10\) I am yet to draw a definitive judgment on what *type* of informal institutions these are, particularly in terms of their status as powersharing *norms* as opposed to strategic powersharing *logics.* I thus try to avoid the use of the term “norm” below, though I do not mean to reject the idea that collusion has some normative basis. In general I will refer to these informal institutions in terms that do not presume their normative or strategic character, such as practices, arrangements, and approaches.

\(^11\) To date I have found this “degrees-of-freedom” problem too insuperable to overcome, so I do not yet attempt a systematic and parsimonious explanation for the origins of Indonesia’s party cartel per se. Compounding this difficulty is the fact that cartelization was almost certainly facilitated by formal rules – especially the indirect parliamentary selection of the president and the lack of transparent roll-call voting in the parliament – as well as informal institutions. My intention is to tackle this problem in the longer version of this project with additional comparative cases as well as much deeper process-tracing evidence to mediate among the many plausible alternative explanations.
eliminate any of these informal approaches to powersharing, but it did prompt actors to proceed increasingly according to some informal institutions more than others.

Two informal approaches to powersharing are especially interesting for our purposes: what I call (1) Proportionality, and (2) Victory. The Proportionality approach to coalition formation is effectively Gamson’s Law: parties receive seats in the cabinet in proportion to their seats in parliament. While Proportionality is generally expected to prevail under parliamentarism, the Victory approach is better suited to presidentialism. Under this informal institution, power is shared only among those parties that endorsed the winning presidential candidate, and hence contributed to his or her electoral victory. In the analysis below, I argue and attempt to demonstrate that informal powersharing arrangements have always navigated the friction between these two conflicting institutions, but that recent rule changes have made this friction more acute. Although we can identify a definite drift toward “Victory cabinets” since 2004, as the introduction of direct presidential elections would lead formal institutionalists to expect, the continued relevance of Proportionality in cabinet formation suggests important limits to any account stressing the centrality of formal rules in ruling politics.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides a quick and dirty overview of how formal electoral competition has been followed by surprising levels of informal postelectoral collusion in Indonesia from 1999-2009. Section III constructs a conceptual apparatus for analyzing that messy empirical reality, briefly elaborating the ten informal approaches to powersharing that appear potentially relevant for explaining “promiscuous powersharing” in the Indonesian context (and potentially

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12 I will consistently refer to all ten informal institutions in capital letters, for clarity.
elsewhere, given their deductive grounding and utterly non-exotic character). Section IV reduces this theoretical complexity by applying the informal institutions of Proportionality and Victory to Indonesia’s multiple experiences with cabinet formation. It argues that the growing significance of the Victory approach exemplifies the combined importance of formal institutional change and preexisting informal institutions in shaping real politics, while the lingering relevance of Proportionality indicates the impressive relative power of informal institutions over their formal counterparts.14

II. Competitive Elections and Noncompetitive Elites in Indonesia

Competitive elections do not always produce competitive elites. As Richard Katz and Peter Mair noted over fifteen years ago in Western Europe, political parties might collude to share power more than they compete to win it outright.15 This is especially true in parliamentary systems, in which the chief executive is a direct agent of parliament and only an indirect agent of the people. Minority parties can extract major concessions from prime ministers, including plum cabinet postings, in exchange for their support. Presidential systems should be far less amenable to party cartelization. Once popularly elected, presidents have little incentive to share executive power with other parties. Presidential systems should thus produce opposition parties virtually by definition, as parties excluded from the cabinet assume an oppositional stance in preparation to challenge the next presidential election.

14 In other words, Proportionality is a competing informal institution under pure presidentialism, while Victory is a congruent (or complementary) informal institution (Helmke and Levitsky 2006; Levitsky and Slater, this workshop).
15 Katz and Mair 1995. To be more precise, parties in a cartel may contest elections themselves quite vigorously, yet bury the hatchet and share power across the board after the competitive electoral dust has settled.
Indonesia witnessed the emergence and ascendance of a party cartel between 1999-2004, in the wake of the collapse of the long-ruling Suharto regime (1966-1998).\(^\text{16}\) The parliamentary elections of June 1999 produced no majority party, but did deliver nearly 87% of the votes and just over 90% of the total parliamentary seats to five major parties. (See the first numerical column in Table 1.\(^\text{17}\)) The opposition party PDIP under Megawati Sukarnoputri gained approximately 33% of all seats, outperforming the old authoritarian vehicle, Golkar, which gained 26% thanks in part to lingering malapportionment in its favor. Three Islam-oriented parties (the PPP, PKB, and PAN) secured roughly 10% each. Meanwhile, the Indonesian military, or TNI, retained nearly 8% of all parliamentary seats to protect its interests during the country’s highly tumultuous, economic-crisis-wracked democratic transition.

Under semipresidential rules, Indonesia would see its president selected indirectly by the parliament, at a special session in October 1999. Despite her advantage in seats, Megawati failed to build the coalition necessary to secure the presidency. Instead, Amien Rais of the PAN took the lead in forging an Islam-oriented coalition dubbed the “Central Axis,” which threw its support behind PKB leader Abdurrahman Wahid. Despite the fact that the PKB only held 11% of all parliamentary seats, Golkar and the military supported Wahid over Megawati and delivered him the presidency. After pro-Megawati riots broke out in outrage at her defeat, Megawati was offered the vice-presidency as a consolation prize of sorts. In the coalition formation process that followed, new President Wahid had

\(^\text{16}\) For a much more detailed discussion of party cartelization from 1999-2004, see Slater (2004).

\(^\text{17}\) For consistency, Tables 1-3 are derived from the same source (Suryadinata 2002: 261-266), and exclude all ministers listed as uncertain (i.e. “PKB?”). Tables 4 and 5 are from my own calculations, based on multiple Indonesian newspapers as well as the highly useful website TokohIndonesia.
little choice but to yield to the interests of the parties that had anointed him. He duly constructed a “National Unity Cabinet” that distributed portfolios to every significant party and then some, including even the tiny PK – a member of the PAN-led Islamic “Central Axis” – despite holding only 1.5% of all parliamentary seats.

This arrangement quickly began to fray. Chafing under a parliamentary cabinet and tempted by his formal presidential powers, Wahid began in 2000 to expel from his cabinet representatives of PDIP and Golkar – Indonesia’s two largest parties – and to bulk up his PKB’s position in the executive. (See Table 2.) Even while taking care to preserve at least some portfolios for all members of the party cartel, Wahid set off a firestorm with what seemed to his initial parliamentary backers to be a wanton power grab. By 2001, every party except Wahid’s own PKB had come together to impeach and remove Wahid from the presidency. This meant the promotion of Megawati to the presidency and of her PDIP to the coalition-building catbird seat.

Like Wahid in 1999, Megawati honored her party backers in her 2001 cabinet, spreading portfolios in relatively proportional fashion across the full party cartel as her backers demanded. (See Table 3.) Even the PKB, the party of ousted President Wahid, retained a seat. To foreshadow our analysis slightly, this Megawati-run cabinet from 2001-04 represented the ultimate proportional coalition of Indonesia’s young democratic era. Gamson’s Law very much appeared to be in effect, but with a collusive twist: coalition-building did not stop once a Riker-style “minimum-winning coalition”\textsuperscript{18} was in place, but proceeded to encompass every significant player in party politics. Hence from 2001-04, Gamson conquered Riker in Indonesia.

\textsuperscript{18} Riker 1962.
A dramatic change in political rules threatened, but by no means promised, to upend this cozy elite arrangement. Demands from civil society groups for the introduction of direct elections for political executives from the national to the local level proved surprisingly fruitful with the electoral reforms of 2002.\(^\text{19}\) This formal shift would not necessarily trump the informal institution of proportional powersharing, however. The two largest parties in parliament, PDIP and Golkar, had developed an extremely close working relationship during the Megawati years, anchored in the emerging political alliance between the president herself and Golkar chairman Akbar Tandjung. The most likely outcome of direct presidential elections in 2004 appeared to be a PDIP candidate (obviously Megawati) facing off against a Golkar candidate (not obviously the uncharismatic Akbar). Whoever prevailed in such a contest would be almost certain to preserve the party cartel by crafting another “rainbow cabinet,” perpetuating a situation in which no significant party opposition existed to check incumbent abuse – formal rule changes notwithstanding.

What disrupted the party cartel was not the introduction of direct presidential elections per se. Rather, it was disrupted by what would at first appear to be a highly contingent personality conflict that this rule shift had allowed to bubble to the surface. Long denied any hope for the presidency by his lack of party roots, the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, popular retired general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), rightly saw direct elections as his ticket to the top. When Megawati’s husband publicly referred to him as “childish” in March 2004, SBY seized the opportunity to bolt Megawati’s cabinet and commence his personal quest for the presidency. It bears emphasis, however, that the introduction of direct presidential elections had facilitated \(^\text{19}\) King 2004.
but not predestined the critical Megawati-SBY split. If Megawati had shown the foresight to make SBY her running-mate in advance of the 2004 elections, before her meddling spouse showed the bad judgment to insult him, SBY almost certainly would have accepted.  

\[20\] This would have made the complete restoration of the party cartel after the 2004 presidential elections practically a foregone conclusion.

Instead, SBY made great political hay out of his “victimization” by his former boss, and adopted the barely-breathing Partai Demokrat (PD) as the vehicle for his presidential ambitions. After the PD made a respectable showing in the April 2004 parliamentary elections (placing fifth in votes and third in seats), SBY teamed up with one of the other coordinating ministers in the Megawati cabinet – Golkar’s Jusuf Kalla – as a presidential and vice-presidential ticket in the subsequent presidential vote. The charismatic former general easily surpassed his erstwhile coalition partners,  

\[21\] even though Golkar formally backed the PDIP’s Megawati in an effort to salvage the party cartel in the face of the SBY challenge. While Megawati’s reelection would have almost surely meant pure coalitional continuity, SBY’s big win left elite politics in a state of uncertainty. Such disruption of the party cartel would have been virtually unthinkable had Indonesia not shifted to direct presidential elections.

Nevertheless, the politics to follow was characterized by political continuity more than political change. In forming his cabinet, SBY bent over backwards to bring every party on board. (See Table 4.) Even after taking a healthy chunk of portfolios for his own party, and distributing similarly healthy chunks to smaller parties that had backed him

\[20\] See John McBeth, “PDI-P Cannot be Megawati Fan Club,” The Straits Times, 3/2/05.

\[21\] All five presidential candidates in the first round of voting – SBY, Megawati, Amien Rais, former TNI leader Wiranto, and PPP head Hamzah Haz – had played leading roles in shaping elite collusion since the fall of Suharto.
against Megawati such as the PAN, PKS, and PBB, new President SBY dangled cabinet portfolios before all three of the parties that had opposed him: Golkar, the PDIP, and PPP. The PPP took its bite first, claiming three portfolios in exchange for abandoning its oppositional position. Then Golkar toppled its Chairman, Megawati ally Akbar Tandjung, who was insisting that Golkar would stick it out with Megawati’s PDIP in opposition, and replaced him with SBY’s new Vice President, Jusuf Kalla. The old authoritarian ruling party was duly rewarded with four cabinet seats.

That left Megawati, her PDIP, and their 20% of all parliamentary seats. Although SBY made overtures to Megawati as well, the former president remained furious with her ex-deputy for bolting her cabinet and challenging her – and then trouncing her – in the inaugural direct presidential elections of 2004. Effectively cutting off her nose to spite her face, Megawati refused to bring her PDIP into the cabinet. A revolt thus erupted in PDIP as in Golkar, as figures with experience in Indonesia’s cartelized cabinets attempted to topple Megawati (as Golkar had done to Akbar) and take over control of the party to bring it back into the cabinet. Unlike Akbar, Megawati had ample popularity and inherited familial charisma\textsuperscript{22} to survive the internal party revolt, and PDIP remained outside the SBY government.

The 2009 presidential elections largely proved to be a replay of 2004, with SBY surpassing 60% of the popular vote in a tri-cornered contest with Megawati and his own incumbent vice-president, Golkar’s Jusuf Kalla. Once again Megawati ignored internal party pressure and presidential entreaties to join SBY’s cabinet; once again Golkar’s leader was toppled for his folly of opposing the SBY steamroller; and once again a new leader was toppled for his folly of opposing the SBY steamroller; and once again a new leader was toppled for his folly of opposing the SBY steamroller;

\textsuperscript{22} Megawati is a daughter of Indonesia’s founding father, Sukarno, who continues to attract an intense following among the country’s secular-nationalist working class, especially.
Golkar leader brought the party into the ruling coalition. The bigger shift was in the parliamentary elections, when the president’s PD party more than doubled its seat share to surpass all five of the major parties that originally crafted the party cartel. (See Table 5.) Nevertheless, SBY’s second cabinet appears only mildly more “presidential” than his first, with several more small parties besides PDIP standing outside the ruling coalition, but with an overall distribution of portfolios that Gamson would find agreeably familiar.

III. Informal Institutions and Promiscuous Powersharing: Ten Approaches

How might we make theoretical sense of this messy empirical reality? For present purposes, I set aside the questions of how and why promiscuous powersharing came about, as well as broader questions regarding the impact of such informal arrangements on democratic accountability and the likely trajectories of what I have called collusive democracy.23 Here, I focus on the relative and combined weight of formal and informal institutions in generating the powersharing arrangements that we have just seen. To what degree can the disruption of Indonesia’s party cartel be attributed to formal rule changes? And to what extent can its relative continuity be attributed to enduring, informal powersharing practices (i.e. informal institutions)?

My answer will primarily stress the weight of informal over formal institutions. But to see why, we need to do more conceptual work to understand the wide array of informal approaches to powersharing that can potentially produce the kinds of oversized coalitions witnessed in democratic Indonesia. Although all have plausibly played some role in shaping some instances of powersharing promiscuity, I will primarily focus my

23 For my working arguments on these other dimensions of Indonesia’s collusive democracy, see Slater (2004, 2006, 2009) and Slater and Simmons (2011).
attention on two: what I call the Proportionality approach and the Victory approach. It is in the tension between these two practices where one can best assess how formal and informal institutions are combining to produce the coalitional patterns we see.

Why might promiscuous powersharing persist under presidentialist rules? Why might a president with the mandate of the people willingly share power with parties he or she has just vanquished in the voting booth? It is unsatisfying to explain the persistence of cartelized powersharing through the invocation of “habit” or “legacies” alone. Indonesian politicos are not simply hide-bound traditionalists – they are crafty and power-hungry political entrepreneurs, like elite politicians basically anywhere. It is thus worth considering how across-the-board powersharing might be in the self-interest of a president who has been directly elected, not just in Indonesia but in general.

Through a combination of deductive rumination and inductive analysis of the Indonesian case, I have conjured ten distinct informal practices through which a directly elected president might self-interestedly build a promiscuous coalition at a minimum, and a cartelized coalition at a maximum. To aid in portability, I have given each of them an easily transferable moniker. The first three will be called (1) Compatibility, (2) Consociationalism, and (3) Stabilization. These are the most familiar and, from a democratic theory perspective, perhaps the most normatively justifiable logics for promiscuous powersharing. The next two approaches, (4) Proportionality and (5) Victory, will be the primary tools with which I assess Indonesian cabinet politics. Yet these are hardly exhaustive. I also introduce five additional approaches to powersharing which have plausibly helped produce promiscuous and cartelized coalitions in Indonesia: (6) Reciprocity, (7) Loyalty, (8) Armistice, (9) Balancing, and (10) Protection. Only when
we recognize the dizzying range of informal institutions for (potentially promiscuous) powersharing can we appreciate how they might come into friction, allowing formal rule changes to shape real politics by pushing political elites to shift how much they adhere to some informal institutions at the expense of others.

**Logic #1: Compatibility**

**Principle:** “If you are ideologically compatible with me, you get to share power.”

**Intuition:** If any factor is likely to make a president eschew an effort to build a Rikerian “minimum winning coalition,” it is an unwillingness to exclude those parties with whom the president feels ideologically compatible. In countries where parties exhibit stark ideological differences, of course, Compatibility cannot generate cartelization on its own. Yet it might help do so in combination with other informal approaches detailed below. In a country with relatively weak ideological divides such as Indonesia, the overall “non-programmatic” quality of politics may certainly have facilitated promiscuous powersharing. In at least one case, the PDIP-led government’s exclusion of the tiny PK from the cabinet in 2001, a non-instance of promiscuous powersharing has been attributed to the two parties’ stark ideological *incompatibility* over issues of Islam and religious pluralism.

**Logic #2: Consociationalism**

**Principle:** “If you are a minority group requiring representation, you get to share power.”

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24 Given the importance of ideological cleavages around issues of regime type and religion in the founding elections of 1999, however, it makes more sense to see non-programmatic politics as endogenous to party behavior (Slater 2011).

25 Interview with Pramono Anung, PDIP Secretary-General, 22 July 2009.
Intuition: In deeply divided societies, a chief executive may unleash civil strife by excluding key parties from a rival ethnic or religious group from a share of governmental power. Social peace may thus require promiscuous powersharing. A major limitation this approach encounters in Indonesia is that “secular-nationalist” presidents such as Megawati and SBY have not only shared power with one or two Islamic parties, but with every significant Islamic party (with the slight exception of Megawati’s 2001 exclusion of the PK). Something besides a desire to ensure that all relevant groups have “a seat of the table” is clearly operative here. Yet as with Compatibility, Consociationalism may well serve as a partial explanation for promiscuous powersharing in Indonesia. A likely example would be the offering of the vice-presidency to Megawati in 1999, after pro-PDIP riots signaled the dangers of forming a government that was too heavily “Islamic” and ignored Indonesia’s powerful “nationalist” community.

Logic #3: Stabilization

Principle: “If crisis conditions require national unity, you get to share power.”

Intuition: Times of national peril have recurrently ushered in “grand coalitions” to ensure that partisanship does not derail national economic recovery (as in contemporary Greece) or even national survival (as in wartime Britain). One can certainly view Indonesia in 1999 through this theoretical lens, as democratization occurred amid a calamitous economic crash and the outbreak of communal violence in various parts of the fractious archipelago at a time when the military had barely returned to their barracks. Yet

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26 This limitation highlights the point that consociationalism is ultimately a theory about cleavages, not parties. Yet cleavages do not share power – parties do.

27 For a more thorough rejection of the idea that consociationalism helps explain party cartelization in Indonesia, see Ambardi (2008).
Stabilization does not appear to explain promiscuous powersharing in 2001, 2004, and 2009, when the multiple crises of transition had all seemingly abated. It seems more likely that Stabilization played a supportive role during the “critical juncture” when the cartel initially formed, but that other informal institutions have served as “mechanisms of reproduction” beyond the cartel’s origins. 28

Logic #4: Proportionality

Principle: “Your share in parliament equals your share in the executive.”

Intuition: There can be no easier way to build a coalition than by divvying up cabinet seats in equal proportion to parliamentary seats. As noted above, Gamson’s Law is as close to a law-like regularity as there is in comparative politics. 29 Yet if Proportionality is practically universal, cartelization is incredibly rare. This is curious, since Proportionality can lead quite easily to cartelization. If a party that only gets 3% of the votes can stake a claim to 3% of the cabinet seats, significant opposition will vanish. It is at least plausible, then, that Proportionality is a sufficient condition not just for promiscuous powersharing, but for full-blown cartelization. Among the cabinets we reviewed above, Megawati’s from 2001-04 most tightly fits the Proportionality model, as I discuss further below.

Logic #5: Victory

Principle: “If you helped me win, you get to share power.”

Intuition: Victory is less conducive to cartelization than Proportionality. Under this principle, only parties that supported the president before the election have a claim to a

28 See Slater and Simmons (2011) for more on these arguments. On methods of reproduction, see Thelen (1999).
29 Carroll and Cox 2007.
share of the executive. But Victory can also play a role in cartelization, either by serving as one of multiple powersharing logics operative at the same time, or by being implemented in positive-sum rather than zero-sum fashion (i.e. supportive parties get “bonus” cabinet seats, and non-supportive parties are forced to take a “discount” without being excluded entirely). Again, this will be discussed at more length after the remaining five informal institutions for powersharing have been introduced.

**Logic #6: Reciprocity**

**Principle:** “If you promise to support my leadership, you get to share power.”

**Intuition:** Where Reciprocity is the key norm or principle underlying powersharing agreements, it becomes quite simple for presidentialist rules to yield cartelized powersharing (as with Proportionality). Every party agrees to support the president after the elections take place, and every party gets invited into the executive. One sees the clear friction between Reciprocity and Victory since the introduction of direct presidential elections. Golkar leaders publicly claim their right to a proportional share of cabinet seats on the basis that they will support the president, even though the party did not endorse his campaign and in fact directly opposed him in both 2004 and 2009. Contrarily, parties such as PKS and PAN make the case for greater cabinet representation than Golkar, even though they have fewer parliamentary seats, on the basis that they have consistently been supportive members of the president’s coalition.

**Logic #7: Loyalty**

**Principle:** “If you have been a long-time associate, you get to share power.”
**Intuition:** Under Loyalty, competing in elections does not imply irreconcilable differences among competing candidates. After the election is over, old collusive relationships might still carry the day, as the electoral hatchet gets buried. Under conditions of low turnover of political leadership and limited rotation among the political elite, Loyalty can prove quite conducive to cartelization. Indeed, it is almost certainly the case that cross-party relationships forged under Suharto’s unusually absorptive authoritarian regime facilitated the initial crafting of a party cartel. Over time, these informal networks might also help sustain promiscuous powersharing by giving a president trusted allies in a range of parties with whom s/he feels comfortable working. The carryover in specific personnel from cabinet to cabinet attests to the supportive role this informal institution plays in furthering promiscuous powersharing, though there has also been enough turnover to suggest that Loyalty is far from sufficient for explaining cartelization on the whole.

**Logic #8: Armistice**

**Principle:** “If you can hurt me politically when excluded, you get to share power.”

**Intuition:** Former President Lyndon Johnson would immediately recognize this as the principle that it is better to have an especially dangerous potential opponent inside your tent pissing out, than outside your tent pissing in. If all parties are perceived as potentially dangerous when in opposition, Armistice can logically lead to cartelization as well. This danger might manifest itself through concerted opposition to a president’s agenda, the threat of disruptive street politics, or the specter of investigations and even the impeachment of the directly elected president. To the extent that Indonesian political
elites were reared in an authoritarian era of highly bridled competition, and perceive that any organized opposition is by definition destabilizing, Armistice may be the most compelling overall rationale for promiscuous powersharing. With his personal background in the internally hierarchical and non-consultative, non-adversarial setting of the military, President SBY seems especially sensitive to the idea that opposition is threatening by definition: a notion bordering at times on paranoia, given his powerful electoral mandate and the strong formal position of the presidency under Indonesia’s post-2002 electoral rules.

Logic #9: Balancing

**Principle:** “If you help me discipline my least trusted partners, you get to share power.”

**Intuition:** It would seem to be a default assumption of the “minimum winning coalition” framework that the first party a president would invite to share power would be the one with which the president feels most comfortable: i.e. on the basis of Compatibility. Yet this is not necessarily the case. A major party might have a claim to powersharing through an alternative logic such as Proportionality, Victory, or Armistice. If so, the president might invite additional parties in to dilute the power of his most influential, but not most trusted, coalition partner. In the extreme, Balancing can wind up producing cartelization as well. An example could perhaps be seen in SBY’s initial dependence on Islam-oriented parties such as PKS and PAN in his campaign’s coalition, despite SBY’s

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30 It is also the one that tends to make Indonesian colleagues nod their heads most feverishly in recognition and agreement, for what little that anecdote is worth. A drawback of Armistice as an explanation, however, is that Indonesian parties claim to retain the right to act as “critical partners” when in government, criticizing the president’s policies even while sharing his power. In LBJ’s terms, being in the tent does not preclude pissing in it.
secular-nationalist background. To avoid excessive dependence on these small Islamic parties, inviting Golkar to share power as a fellow non-Islamic party makes good sense under Balancing – though SBY’s recurrent efforts to recruit PDIP as well seem excessive under this informal approach.

**Logic #10: Protection**

**Principle:** “If you can help me suppress an enemy, you get to share power.”

**Intuition:** At first blush, Protection seems to be a more likely source of elite collective action under authoritarian than democratic conditions, as I argue elsewhere. The existence of a shared enemy implies that not all groups are sharing power, which implies the existence of a robust political opposition, in turn. Yet if this opposition is a powerful “anti-system” force, it might incite wide-ranging elite collective action for purposes of Protection in a procedural democracy as well, but without presenting a meaningful threat of electoral replacement. It is also conceivable that political elites might be so detached from the grassroots that they collectively see the public as a threat to their interests that they must keep in check. In other words, politics might be more effectively studied as an oligarchy than a democracy, as some scholars have argued in the Indonesian context.

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31 Slater 2010a.
32 One wishes there would have been more promiscuous powersharing in Weimar Germany to prevent the Nazis from coming to power, for example.
33 Winters 2011, Robison and Hadiz 2004. On the instability of such oligarchic cartels in settings where appealing to the masses is a temptation, and amounts to “defection,” see the analysis of Meiji Japan in Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1998). For an argument that party cartelization is generally stymied by defection and electoral volatility in contemporary Eastern European democracies, see Grzymala-Busse (2007: 187).
What is most striking about these informal institutions of powersharing, at least to this author, is that none of them is remotely exotic. There would appear to be a surprising number of routes to promiscuous powersharing and even cartelization, given the apparent relative rarity of such an outcome in real-world politics. One possibility is that democracy contains formal rules that tend to militate against and “outweigh” these informal arrangements, thus ensuring that some sort of meaningful opposition will exist wherever there are democratic elections. In what follows I embrace this notion in part, showing how, under presidentialism, the formal institution of direct presidential elections has led the incumbent Indonesian president to build a cabinet based more on Victory, and less on Proportionality, than did his predecessor. Yet since Victory is an informal institution in its own right which preceded the formal rule change, its growing relevance is not simply a sign of formal rules “ruling politics” at the expense of informal practices, but of formal and informal institutions doing so in combination.

IV. Explaining Informal Institutional Change:

The Friction between Proportionality and Victory

To what degree do Proportionality and Victory – as just two of the ten informal institutions of powersharing just detailed – provide a sufficient yet relatively parsimonious explanation for the dynamics of promiscuous powersharing since its onset in Indonesia in 1999? One must take a more fine-grained look at the data in Tables 1-5 to make any headway toward this difficult determination.

Both Proportionality and Victory can be seen, for starters, in the founding cartelized coalition formed in 1999 under the PKB’s Abdurrahman Wahid (or perhaps
over would be a better term). (See Table 1.) In terms of Proportionality, there is an obvious if imperfect “eyeball” correlation between parliamentary strength and cabinet strength when examining the first and fourth numerical columns. More specifically, Golkar’s seven portfolios and the PBB’s one portfolio are the most proportional possible allocation, given their seat shares. Although the PPP’s haul would be more proportional if it had gained three seats instead of two, the fact that one of its seats was a prized coordinating minister post suggests the rough proportionality of this outcome as well.

More striking, perhaps, is the apparent importance of the Victory pattern, considering that President Wahid was in such a weak and dependent position vis-à-vis parliament. The results of interest here are PDIP, which was underrepresented in the executive, and PKB, PAN, and PK, which were all overrepresented. To be sure, the PDIP’s position was not radically non-proportional, considering its plum positions in the vice-presidency and in one of the cabinet’s three coordinating minister roles. Yet the fact that the PDIP received no more portfolios than PKB – despite having fully three times as many parliamentary seats – should make it readily apparent that Proportionality was not the only name of the informal game.

Considering that the PKB’s leader had just defeated the PDIP’s leader in the indirect parliamentary selection of the president, Victory provides an efficient explanation for this stark imbalance. Victory also makes sense of the PAN’s striking overrepresentation, with twice as many cabinet portfolios (four) as its parliamentary seats proportionally warranted (two). Recall here that the PAN’s leader, Amien Rais, had played the pivotal formateur-style role in forging the Central Axis alliance of Islam-oriented parties, which tipped the scales at the special parliamentary session toward the
PKB’s Wahid and away from the PDIP’s Megawati. Besides garnering a supersized share of portfolios for itself, the PAN’s “coattails” appear to have helped the tiny PK secure a portfolio, even though its vote and seat share warranted no cabinet posts at all under a pure Proportionality scenario.

The obvious outlier in the 1999 cabinet is the military. Neither Proportionality nor Victory can explain why the TNI secured six cabinet posts, or 20% of all portfolios not held by nonparty and nonmilitary professionals, when only holding 7.6% of the parliamentary seats. Although virtually all of the informal institutions detailed above can plausibly help explain this result, given the tight entanglements between party elites and military elites during Suharto’s New Order, Stabilization probably provides the strongest option. In the wake of the military’s crisis-ridden retreat from direct political hegemony, keeping it in the barracks seemed to warrant not just guaranteed appointed seats in the parliament, but a large “bonus” in terms of cabinet posts. Further evidence for this argument stems from the declining role of the military in democratic cabinets (as well as its total removal from the parliament) over time, as the transition crisis waned.

One might expect that Wahid’s cabinet reshuffle of 2000, driven as it was by an urge to assert presidential prerogative, would see Victory clearly trumping Proportionality. Yet Proportionality remained surprisingly relevant, foreshadowing the “proportional presidentialism” that would persist even after the introduction of direct presidential elections in 2004 (see Table 2). Golkar, for instance, actually gained ground proportionally speaking, even while losing one portfolio in absolute terms, due to

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34 This double negative is awkward, but necessary. Every cabinet discussed here included some number of professionals, often from an academic and “technocratic” background, with ties to neither the military nor any particular party. Hence the TNI did not have 20% of all cabinet seats, but 20% of those seats held neither by party nor military appointees.
Wahid’s increased reliance on nonparty over party personnel in his “All the President’s Men” cabinet. PKB also gained proportional ground, but only through other parties’ losses, not any absolute gain in portfolios. In short, all parties were allowed to remain in the cabinet, in rough if imperfect proportion to their parliamentary positions of strength. The biggest exceptions, both readily attributable to the Victory approach, were the overrepresentation of President Wahid’s PKB, and the underrepresentation of the party looming as Wahid’s biggest rival in the shadow of potential impeachment – Vice-President Megawati’s PDIP.

Wahid’s impeachment and replacement by Megawati in 2001 ushered in the heyday of proportional presidentialism. As Table 3 indicates, the rank-ordering in parliamentary and executive strength is identical, from PDIP at #1 to the PBB at #7. Of particular interest here is the almost perfect fit between the portfolio distribution being demanded of Megawati by party leaders in the final weeks of the impeachment process, as reported by the reputable Jakarta weekly Gatra, and the finally cabinet tally. The fact that PDIP grabbed one extra portfolio beyond the “quota” being demanded by parliament was not a source of controversy, perhaps in part because such a move was grounded in an existing informal institution as practiced by Wahid before her: namely, Victory. On the flip side, Megawati’s extraction of a pound of cabinet flesh from the PAN further suggests the relevance of Victory, given that party’s leading role in her earlier 1999 defeat. Although some analysts might see the importance of Compatibility in the secular-nationalist PDIP’s demotion of the PAN and ousting of the PK (which was only ever included on the PAN’s coattails), Megawati’s coziness with the equally Islamic PPP suggests otherwise. Note also that, although Wahid himself was thrown out of office, his
PKB was not entirely removed from the cabinet. Its continued presence suggests the importance of Proportionality, even as its underrepresentation suggests Victory.

The Megawati cabinet thus underscores that Proportionality could serve as the overriding basis for informal powersharing, even in a *semi*presidential system. With the introduction of direct presidential elections in 2004, we would see whether Proportionality could remain so central to coalitional politics under *full-blown* presidentialism. Looking now at Table 4, what do the data suggest?

Yet again, Proportionality and Victory are both visible in tandem, and in friction. In terms of Proportionality, Golkar and PAN are the tightest fits. As for Victory, we immediately see the (by now familiar) bonus accruing to the presidential party, in this case SBY’s PD, as well as for two small Islamic parties that supported SBY’s candidacy from its earliest days: the PKS (formerly the PK, which Wahid had included but Megawati had excluded with its 1.5% seat share) and the PBB. The PKB’s slight underrepresentation was due more to the party’s factional implosion and lack of resulting bargaining power in the wake of Wahid’s impeachment than any “punishment” under the Victory scenario.

To appreciate the growing importance of Victory under presidentialism, however, one must look more closely at the three parties that backed Megawati against SBY in the 2004 presidential election: Golkar, the PPP, and of course the PDIP itself. As noted earlier, SBY began working immediately after his landslide to lure all three of these major parties into his coalition. The PPP came on board first, and got the biggest Victory payoff for doing so: three portfolios when its parliamentary strength alone only warranted two. Golkar was also duly rewarded for its abandonment of opposition, securing a
proportional number of portfolios, including a coordinating ministry, in addition to the vice-presidency through its new leader, Jusuf Kalla. One thus sees a kind of twist in the Victory logic: rather than rewarding supportive parties for their consistent backing (a la the PKS and PBB), SBY evidently felt pressured to give slightly super-proportional allocations to Golkar and PPP to turn these detractors into supporters. To put it another way, SBY incorporated both Golkar and the PPP under a third approach that has been unnecessary to our discussion of Indonesia thus far: Reciprocity, under which any party willing to support a president receives cabinet seats, regardless of whether it endorsed the president during his campaign or not.

One might fruitfully keep both Victory and Reciprocity in mind when interpreting the most striking result of the 2004 post-electoral fallout: the withdrawal of the PDIP from the cabinet, with its nearly 20% of all parliamentary seats. It seems fair to say that, in general, it is the strength of the Victory norm and the weakness of the Reciprocity norm that explains why promiscuous powersharing under presidentialist conditions is so rare. President SBY’s use of Reciprocity with Golkar and the PPP (i.e. inviting them to share power after trouncing them) is the outlier approach, while PDIP’s insistent refusal to offer Reciprocity after losing a presidential election (i.e. refusing to support the president in exchange for cabinet posts) is what political scientists have come to expect. In so doing, the PDIP effectively played by the logic of Victory: only parties that backed the president should join him in coalition, leaving the PDIP outside the cabinet lineup. The formal introduction of direct presidential elections thus had a major political effect, not in overriding informal institutions entirely, but in prompting the PDIP to stop playing Proportionality and start playing Victory.
Yet SBY remains wedded to his vision of being a Proportionality president, not just a Victory president. This can be seen in the cabinet SBY formed after his landslide 2009 reelection, in Table 5. Literally all six parties in SBY’s second cabinet received a portfolio share that **combined the Proportionality approach with the Victory approach**.

The logic was concisely expressed to me in an interview with SBY’s official spokesman, PD member Andi Mallarangeng, on the eve of cabinet formation in July 2009. When asked what the basis would be for divvying up cabinet seats, Andi answered, without any prompting, “Proportional.”

When pressed on whether PKS and PAN would receive any bonus for backing SBY in the election, he insisted – either incorrectly or insincerely – that they would not. Proportionality rather than Victory, he was effectively insisting, would be the formula. Yet when asked whether Golkar would get its full complement of portfolios, even after its leader had run against SBY while concurrently serving as his vice-president, Andi hesitated. “We do need to punish them a little bit,” he said with a smile. And then, with a wink: “Just a little discount.”

What Andi revealed in his smiling, winking account of how Golkar would be treated in the cabinet lineup in fact revealed how all parties would be treated: with a mixture of Proportionality and Victory, or a game of “bonuses” and “discounts.” As shown in Table 5, the overall distribution of portfolios hewed quite closely to Proportionality on the whole. It was Victory that would explain imperfections in Proportionality. The five parties that comprised SBY’s electoral coalition, the PD, PKS, PAN, PPP, and PKB, all received their fair share of portfolios, and then some. In fact some small bonuses were almost mathematically inevitable, considering that more than

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35 It was indeed this interview that spurred me to begin trying to interpret Indonesian coalitional politics through the Proportionality more than the Reciprocity lens.
20% of parliamentary seats remained in the hands of parties that refused to join the cabinet at all. (More on which in a moment.) Even so, the bonuses accruing to the PAN and PKS in particular cannot be accounted for without noticing the sizable Victory bonus on top of any rounding error. While SBY’s backers all got bonuses, its only electoral opponent that joined his cabinet, Golkar, got exactly the “little discount” that his presidential spokesman had foreseen. Even here, what is most striking is how little Golkar’s discount is, and hence how closely to Proportionality the president remained in his cabinet distribution.

The incrementally rising relevance of Victory vis-à-vis Proportionality under full-blown presidentialism is most readily seen in the parties – now plural for the first time – that voluntarily remained outside SBY’s second cabinet. Like the PDIP did on its own in 2004, the PDIP was joined in its wholesale rejection of any Reciprocity or Proportionality arrangement by two upstart parties formed by prominent retired generals: Hanura under former TNI head Wiranto, and Gerindra under Suharto’s “black sheep” son-in-law, Prabowo Subianto. The ranks of parties following the Victory approach continue to grow, while those pursuing Proportionality continue to decline under formal presidentialist rules. If the Megawati cabinet of 2001-04 had looked like almost pure Proportionality, the SBY cabinet of 2009-14 looks like an almost perfect combination of Proportionality and Victory.36

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36 In a cabinet reshuffle in October 2011, SBY wound up giving one more net portfolio to his own PD party at Golkar’s expense, hence taking one more slight step away from Proportionality, and toward Victory.
V. Conclusion

What does this all mean for “ruling politics”? To what degree is real political practice shaped by formal rules as opposed to informal practices? And to the extent that informal and formal institutions shape political life in tandem, how might we begin to make more systematic sense of that formal-informal interaction?

Indonesia’s decade of democracy provides an ideal test-case for considering such questions. The evidence presented here suggests that new formal rules can indeed have a pronounced impact, even in the face of contradictory informal institutions. Yet it also seems to be the case that these new formal rules’ capacity to increase the strength and salience of some informal institutions, while reducing that of others, is what actually translates rule change into real change. This implies a much greater need to theorize the various ways in which institutions not only constrain and shape actor behavior, but interact with other institutions. This holds true not only for formal-informal interactions, but informal-informal interactions.

Much like their dictatorial predecessor, Suharto, Indonesia’s democratic presidents have navigated a polity of tremendous institutional complexity. And also like Suharto, these presidents have been able to leverage this complexity in their favor – or at least in ways that they perceived would be in their favor. When institutions contradict each other, they do not (indeed cannot) simply constrain and channel elite action; they

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37 As noted in the introduction, however, this paper does not assess the relative weight of preexisting formal rules in shaping the origins and course of democratic powersharing in Indonesia: most importantly the indirect parliamentary selection of the president and the Indonesian parliament’s operation by “consensus” rather than majority voting. On the whole, then, the relative weight of the formal is certainly somewhat greater than this analysis has captured.

38 On institutional complexity and autocratic agency in Suharto’s Indonesia, see Slater (2010b).
also provide opportunities for creative leadership agency and political entrepreneurship.\textsuperscript{39} By expanding the purview of political choice, however, institutional complexity also raises the potential for enormous missteps and miscalculations by leaders who can shift from one informal practice to another as conditions change, yet without controversially appearing to be ignoring existing institutions at all.

Analyzing Indonesian democracy as a scene of complex and conflicting institutions helps explain why powersharing outcomes have seemingly been so strongly shaped by presidential personalities. When Wahid assumed the presidency in 1999, he presided over a cabinet that exhibited signs of Victory as well as Proportionality. His assertion of stronger control over his cabinet was not a wholesale rejection of informal practices, but an assertion of Victory a la presidentialism over Proportionality a la parliamentarism. Wahid’s gambit failed, but if it had been attempted more competently, it could well have succeeded. Similarly, Megawati paid heed to considerations of Proportionality and Victory after assuming the presidency in 2001, making both informal approaches readily appropriable by SBY after his landslide victory of 2004.

This leaves us with the puzzle of SBY’s presidential restraint. Why not ditch Proportionality in favor of Victory entirely? The clearest answer here would appear to be SBY’s own deep political experience as a leading figure in Indonesia’s party cartel. This experience may have led him to believe that promiscuous powersharing was the proper way to do business through a habitual commitment to Proportionality, or a strategic belief in Armistice, or a more venal reliance on Loyalty, or some combination of these factors. The key point is that SBY ascended to the presidency from within, not outside the prevailing universe of informal powersharing institutions. As suggested in the

\textsuperscript{39} Sheingate 2010.
introductory paper for this workshop, formal rules are more likely to make new politics when accompanied by an outsider’s political victory. In the final analysis, politics is ruled by rulers, not just rules – especially when the institutional terrain is so complex that a president can justify virtually any form of powersharing as consistent with one preexisting practice or another.
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Slater, Dan. 2010b. “Altering Authoritarianism: Institutional Complexity and Autocratic Agency in Indonesia.” In Mahoney and Thelen (eds.).


TABLE 1: Powersharing in President Wahid’s “National Unity Cabinet,” 1999-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Parl. Seat Share</th>
<th>Coordinating Ministers#</th>
<th>Cabinet Ministers</th>
<th>% of Party Posts in Executive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
<td>1 [+VP]</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>0 [+Pres.]</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNI/Polri</td>
<td>7.6*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
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<td>PBB</td>
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<td>PK(S)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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# Coordinating Ministers are included in “Cabinet Ministers” count
* Appointed seats in parliament
TABLE 2: Powersharing in President Wahid’s “All the President’s Men” Cabinet, 2000-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Parl. Seat Share</th>
<th>Coordinating Ministers#</th>
<th>Cabinet Ministers</th>
<th>% of Party Posts in Executive</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
<td>1 [+VP]</td>
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<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>0 [+Pres]</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNI/Polri</td>
<td>7.6*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>PBB</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>PK(S)</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
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# Coordinating Ministers are included in “Cabinet Ministers” count
* Appointed seats in parliament
### TABLE 3: Parties’ Projected (and Actual) Cabinet Positions Under Megawati, 2001-04


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Parl. Vote Share</th>
<th>Coordinating Ministers#</th>
<th>Cabinet Ministers</th>
<th>% of Party Posts in Executive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
<td>1 (1) [+Pres.]</td>
<td>4 (5)</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>6 (5)</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>0 (0) [+VP]</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNI/Polri</td>
<td>7.6*</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PK(S)</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
<td>0%</td>
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# Coordinating Ministers are included in “Cabinet Ministers” count

* Appointed seats in parliament
### TABLE 4: Powersharing in SBY’s First ‘Promiscuous Powersharing’ Cabinet, 2004-05

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Parl. Seat Share</th>
<th>Coordinating Ministers</th>
<th>Cabinet Ministers</th>
<th>% of Party Posts in Executive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Golkar*</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>1 (+VP)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP*</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>PD (SBY)</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>0 (+Pres.)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>9.6</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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<td>9.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDI-P*</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Parties that directly opposed SBY in the 2004 presidential election
# Coordinating Ministers are included in “Cabinet Ministers” count
**TABLE 5: Powersharing in SBY’s Second ‘Promiscuous Powersharing’ Cabinet, 2009-**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Parl. Seat Share</th>
<th>Coordinating Ministers#</th>
<th>Cabinet Ministers</th>
<th>% of Party Posts in Executive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PD (SBY)</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>0 (+Pres.)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Golkar*</td>
<td>18.9</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>PAN</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P*</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerindra*</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanura*</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Parties that directly opposed SBY in the 2009 presidential election
# Coordinating Ministers are included in “Cabinet Ministers” count