Property and Power:

MPs' Asset Type and Support for Democratization

in the 1867 UK Reform Act

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Working Paper

Abstract

Influential current theories of democratization (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000, 2006; Boix, 2003) emphasize elites' fear of the redistributive consequences of democratic reform as an important limit on democratization. They also argue that capital-owners are less likely than landowners to fear redistribution, as their assets are more mobile and thus easier to protect from expropriation. This thesis uses the 1867 Reform Act in the UK, which doubled the enfranchised population to include large parts of the urban working class, as a case study. It uses an original dataset on the 1865-8 House of Commons to test the claim that asset type matters for democratization, and finds that in fact, the most substantively important variable for votes on democratization was party, which has been neglected by the distributional conflict literature. While material interests, particularly landowning, matter, they are crucially mediated by partisan electoral interests. Indeed, while landowning Liberals are less democratic than non-landowning Liberals, this effect is not present among Conservatives. Using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, this thesis contends that this effect is due to partisan electoral and material interests reinforcing one another in an anti-democratic direction among Conservatives, while for landowning Liberals pro-democratic electoral incentives and anti-democratic material interests create a cross-pressured situation.
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I Introduction

Theories of democratization are often based on macro-processes that affect the entire country - increases in wealth, industrialization (Robinson, 2006), rising income equality (Muller and Seligson, 1994), rising education (Barro, 1997), or a combination of these factors (Lipset, 1959; Huntington, 1991; Boix and Stokes, 2003) - or processes that are instigated from the outside, such as international intervention or incentivization (Huntington, 1991, p.87; Levitsky and Way, 2010), colonialism (Przeworski et al., 2000, p.83), or diffusion (Weyland, 2010). These causes are seen as affecting collective actors such as ‘the elite’, ‘the bourgeoisie’ or ‘the working class’, who then collectively bring about democracy. This work is most successful when it is combined with causal mechanisms applying to those in power, as the rise of the working class or other opposition forces affects the regime (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992), or, particularly in recent cases, how intra-elite splits between hard- and soft-liners open up an opportunity for transition to democracy (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986) or how international pressure and norms affect elite calculations (Whitehead, 2001; Pevehouse, 2002). While collective actors ought not to be dismissed, in many cases understanding of their contribution to democracy is crucially enhanced by considering the microfoundations of the individuals making them up. And in many 19th and 20th century European cases, the process by which democratization occurred in practice was not revolution or pacted transition, but legislation.

Parliaments, which had existed in Europe since the 13th and 14th centuries as representative institutions (Myers, 1975, p.23), were important as arenas in which their own power was extended, their representativeness increased, and the rights and liberties with which citizens could engage in this political process broadened and deepened (Ziblatt, 2006, p.335). Further, this was by no means a unidirectional process; occasionally, the opposite decisions were made. This meant that the individual MPs who made up these parliaments, not collective actors, were the ones deliberating on and ultimately deciding to actively support such legislation that moved their country back and forth on the sliding scale between absolute authoritarianism and
pure democracy, often knowingly limiting their own power. While these individuals’ views were surely affected by the macro-processes mentioned above, they were also active participants in them, with economic backgrounds that may have affected their outlooks and thus their votes. Indeed, as (largely) wealthy individuals, MPs in 19th and early 20th centuries had much to lose: their careers, but also their assets, especially as democracy paved the way for eventual redistributive policies (Meltzer and Richard, 1978). The 1867 Reform Act in the UK was one such act, almost doubling the franchise to allow household suffrage in the boroughs, largely benefiting urban industrial workers.

Current theories of democratization integrally assume that a change from predominantly land- to increasingly capital-based economies was one of the most important factors underlying democratization, and provide causal mechanisms that are assumed to work on the micro level (Boix, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). However, although these theories are about individual decision-making, they are not tested on the individual level, but rather using aggregate data (if at all). This lack of microfoundations means that an ecological fallacy cannot be ruled out (Robinson, 1950). It was on the individual level that decisions were made, and it was at this level that asset form should really have mattered, both alone and in combination with other individual-level pressures. If distributive conflicts of the type proposed by Acemoglu and Robinson and Boix structure democratization by influencing elite incentives, evidence of such conflicts should be present within the context of parliamentary debate and voting.

Further, this distributional conflict literature has largely ignored other factors that could possibly affect the decision-making of these elites; for MPs, this includes party and constituency interests as two of the most important factors (Cox, 1987; Ziblatt, 2008; Schonhardt-Bailey, 1998; Schonhardt-Bailey, 2003; Moser and Reeves, 2012; Leeman and Mares, 2011; Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart, 2001; Spirling and Quinn, 2010, p.2; Spirling and Eggers, 2013). As previous work has shown (Capoccia & Ziblatt, 2010; Collier, 1999;

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1 This was not always the case; sometimes, an unelected executive (such as Bismarck) made such decisions (Collier, 1999, p.3). However, in many cases, such democratizing or autocratizing bills were sanctioned by parliament.
McLean, 2001; Seymour; 1915; Bendix, 1964; Close, 1977; Himmelfarb, 1966; Smith, 1966; Hall, McClelland and Rendall, 2000; Llavador and Oxony, 2005; Firth and Spirling, 2003), there is reason to believe that partisan incentives in particular matter for MPs, and, indeed, that they can mediate the impact of material interests.

This, then, leads to the question this thesis asks:

How did MPs’ incentive structures, particularly their partisan electoral pressures and whether their source of income was were land- or capital-based, affect their votes on democratizing legislation?

Structure of the thesis

The thesis is structured as follows. Section II reviews the literature on first-wave democratizations. Section III outlines the theoretical framework underlying this paper and sets out the hypotheses that will be tested. Section IV discusses the data and methods used. In sections V to VII, the results of this analysis will be presented. Specifically, section V uses a hierarchical model to predict MPs’ democratizing votes. As it will show, while party and material interests both mattered, party allegiance is by far the most important substantive variable structuring MP vote for democratization, mediating the impact of material interests on democratic vote. Due to this overwhelming importance of party, section VI uses similar hierarchical models to examine party allegiance; particularly, it focuses on which MPs defect from the party line when voting on democratization. This analysis shows further how party mediates the importance of material, especially landholding, interests. Finally, section VII uses evidence from the parliamentary debates to support the notion that MPs were concerned both about partisan electoral advantages - Conservative MPs in particular were very concerned about the electoral viability of their party if the Reform Bill passed - and about the redistributive consequences of enfranchising the working class, and the potential costs this would have for landowners in particular. Finally, section VIII concludes.
II Literature Review

The notion that while landowners are inherently conservative and opposed to political reform, the middle class in particular is somehow crucial to democratization, has repeatedly resurfaced in democratization theories, first made explicit by Barrington Moore, who famously stated, “No bourgeoisie, no democracy” (Moore, 1966, p.418), and repeated and rephrased later by scholars such as Huntington. However, the causal mechanisms underlying this seeming relationship have been debated, with Moore arguing that the middle class's importance was in forming coalitions against the monarchy, while Huntington (1991, p.65-8) focuses on education as the intervening factor which increases the social capital of middle class people and makes them more demanding of civil rights and political influence (see also e.g. Inglehart, 1988, p. 1209). More recent theories have attempted to elaborate these causal mechanisms in more detail, considering, in particular, how a growing middle class affects the calculations of those in power. Boix (2003), for example, argues that the most important factor for democratization is income inequality, as it affects the elites’ calculations regarding how much they stand to lose from eventual redistribution; here, a growing middle class matters because it reduces inequality and thereby reduces the scale of future redistribution (and thus the cost to elites). As will be elaborated further below, Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) also argue that middle classes are less anti-democratic as their assets are more difficult to expropriate, so they have less to fear from redistribution. Other theories argue that the rising capitalist middle class is not concerned with redistribution, but that it seeks credible protection from the predatory state, which leads it to favor democracy (Ansell and Samuels, 2010). As the literature on democratization is exhaustive, this literature review will focus on theories that specifically target the 19th and 20th century European experience of democratization, as this was quite substantively different from later and non-European experiences; further, it will consider only theories that deal with elite-driven democratization. This is not because pressures from below

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2 See, for example, biographical political literature such as Cacroft, 1867; Woolley, 1938.
were irrelevant, but rather because this project focuses on why elites reacted to these pressures in
the way they did.

Threat from below

Important current theories of democratization, most notably those of Acemoglu and
Robinson and Boix, argue that pressure for democratization tends to come from the
disenfranchised, who want redistribution. Without this popular pressure, these theories posit,
democratization would not come about, as elites fear its redistributive consequences: franchise
extensions cause redistribution due to the changing preferences of the median voter (Meltzer
and Richard, 1978, p.117). These theories are more problematic when applied to the recent
past, as Mulligan et al. (2004, p.60) have shown that since 1960, democracies’ economic policies
do not differ significantly from those of dictatorships; the theories’ main utility thus ought to lie
with historical cases. According to their argument, the option for elites to simply redistribute
while retaining undemocratic institutions is unsatisfying to citizens because these gains could be
revoked in the future when citizen pressure dies down. The establishment of democratic
institutions, on the other hand, is a credible commitment to future redistribution, and the chance
of transition depends in part on the composition of wealth in a country (Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2006, p.25-6).3

Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, p.32) theorize that landowners will be more likely to
resist democratization than physical and human capital owners because they are more
vulnerable to its redistributive consequences. More recent work also supports the idea that
capital ownership can lead to more positive, or at least fewer negative, attitudes towards
democracy (Ansell and Samuels, 2010; Freeman and Quinn, 2012). However, existing tests of

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3 Such concerns have also been supported by contemporaries and later scholars. Thus, Cacroft wrote in
1867 that “It is the nature of things that a man’s self should be nearer to him than his constituency” (Cacroft, 1867, p.117), and Thomas added, in 1925, “with all the goodwill in the world, a parliament of Property Owners cannot but legislate with an eye on their own property” (Thomas, 1925, p. 61). The intuitive importance of personal property is also lent credence by the repeated efforts scholars have made to categorize legislators and/or cabinets by occupation, economic interests and social background (e.g. Cacroft, 1867; Thomas, 1925; Woolley, 1938; Aydelotte, 1954; Matthews, 1964; Guttsman, 1968). As Guttsman himself notes, though (1968, p.82; see also Himmelfarb, 1966, p.128), these existing works often lack rigor and thoroughness, an observation which is particularly accurate for pre-1868 parliaments, which suffer from an even greater dearth of detailed scholarly attention, which is in fact often focused on cabinet composition, ignoring the importance of backbench MPs.
these theories have used aggregate capital and land-owning measures, or, for historical periods, proxies such as the average percentage of nonagricultural population and the urban percentage of the population (Boix, 2003, p.90); Thus, this work does not test the theory adequately; it tests only whether a change in the population as a whole from predominantly land-owning to predominantly capital-owning brings about societal democratization, leaving out whether and how this technically micro-level mechanism applies in the people actually making the decisions. For their part, Ansell and Samuels (2010) do not actually measure capital ownership, instead simply theorizing that this is the causal mechanism behind their empirical finding that income inequality has a positive effect on democratization. Further, while scholars have started rigorously testing whether reform was driven by a threat of revolution (Przeworski, 2008; Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Aidt and Franck, 2008, Aidt and Jensen, 2009; Conley and Temimi, 2001), and even whether landholding inequality in an MP’s constituency was related to their vote on democratizing legislation (Ziblatt, 2008), whether MPs’ asset form actually has an effect on the likelihood of their voting for reform has not been subject to such tests.\footnote{The importance of the economic interests of the representatives themselves, not just their electorate, is given credence in an essay by Cacroft, published in 1867 (p.119), in which he effectively argues that suffrage expansions do not bend the power of the landed classes as long as landowning MPs are so dominant in the House of Commons} Fundamentally, though Acemoglu and Robinson consider democracy to be instigated by mass pressure, it is elites who choose to react by concessions or repression. More precisely, it is MPs who make the crucial decision of whether to support a piece of democratizing legislation or not, and so it is on the individual level that asset form should really make a difference.

Another theory of 19th century European democratization, developed by Lizzeri and Persico (2004, p.713), argues instead that rather than being forced into it by pressure from below, elites extended the franchise out of self-interest, as they suffered from a waste of resources due to clientelism, and stood to gain from the public goods provided when a wider suffrage made them

\footnote{Both Acemoglu and Robinson and Boix also make arguments about the effect on democratization of income inequality, with the former arguing that increasing inequality should increase democratization while the latter argues the opposite, that increasing equality increases the chance of democratization. Przeworski (2008) finds support for the latter thesis in his test of suffrage reforms. However, the effect of income inequality will not be tested here, as it is difficult to test on the individual level; rather, it will be controlled for.}
viable. Iversen and Soskice have attempted to combine these ‘threat from below’ and ‘public goods’ theories by suggesting that the threat of revolution was crucial in proto-corporatist countries such as in Northern Europe, and public goods were the main factor in liberal countries such as the UK, France and the British colonies. They argue that in proto-corporatist countries, public goods were adequately provided by local institutions and the working class was seen as politically threatening, so elites had no incentive to extend the suffrage (Iversen and Soskice, 2009, p.21-2). In liberal countries, on the other hand, public goods like education were not provided at the local level, and the working class was divided and weaker (Iversen and Soskice, 2009, p.14-5), so here industrial elites were the key forces pushing for democracy to ensure the provision of public goods. Przeworski (2008, p.294), meanwhile, argues that the Acemoglu and Robinson theory applies to class-based franchise extensions, while the Lizzeri and Persico thesis may hold for class-blind extensions such as female suffrage.

Party competition

However, MPs’ incentives can also arise from party membership. Scholars such as Capoccia and Ziblatt (2010, p.949-51) argue that parties can by no means be treated as pure representatives of socioeconomic interests; instead, ideologies and strategic inter- and intra-party competition and alliances may also have a role to play. This literature holds that the franchise was extended for strategic political reasons, if politicians thought those they were enfranchising were likely to vote for their party (see also McLean, 2001, p.62; Collier, 1999; Bendix, 1964; Seymour, 1915). Seymour (1915, p.37), for example, writes that the Conservatives opposed the 1832 Reform Act at least in part because it would increase Whig voters, while Bendix (1964, p.97) argues that Liberals feared Conservatives would manipulate economically dependent voters. Similar arguments have been made about other British reforms (see e.g. Smith, 1966, p.42, on 1859; Close, 1977, p.895, on the early 20th century), including, crucially, the 1867 Reform Act, which some have argued was an attempt by Disraeli to enfranchise lower middle-class voters.

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6 This argument is also supported by contemporary scholars of legislative behavior (e.g. Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart, 2001, p.548-9)
who were thought to vote Conservative (e.g. Himmelfarb, 1966) while others have focused on Liberals’ partisan gain (e.g. Hall, McClelland and Rendall, 2000, p.7-8). Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, p.1187-90), however, criticize this approach, claiming it did not apply in most cases they consider. Llavador and Oxony (2005, p.1-3) fuse the public goods and party competition theories, arguing that liberal parties would extend the franchise if they saw the working class as supporting pro-industrial policies, such as tariff reductions and public goods, while conservative parties would extend the franchise if they thought peasants would vote as their landlords told them to, thus supporting conservative policies.

The 1867 Reform Act

Due to the unexpected way it came into being, the 1867 Reform Act has puzzled historians for almost 150 years. The majority Liberal government of 1865-6 tried to pass a reform bill in 1866; however, this bill not only failed to pass, but its failure brought down the Liberal government. Despite lacking a majority in the House of Commons and having been instrumental in preventing the previous bill, when it came into office the subsequent Conservative minority government, headed in the Commons by Benjamin Disraeli, passed an even more radical Reform Act in 1867. But even aside from its puzzling birth, the 1867 Reform Act is an interesting case for multiple reasons. Firstly, it was vastly significant in its consequences. It almost doubled the enfranchised population (though more so in industrial towns than other places; it was tripled in towns like Newcastle and Birmingham and quadrupled in Leeds and Bolton), gave industrial working-class men the right to vote for the first time, and made the industrial working class the majority of the electorate (Guttsman, 1963, p.75; Derry, 1966, p.46; Himmelfarb, 1966, p.107). Himmelfarb (1966, p.97) calls it “one of the decisive events, perhaps the decisive event, in modern English history”, claiming that “It was this act that transformed England into a democracy”.

Secondly, it passed in a period during which MPs were subject to a very specific set of pressures, making it a particularly interesting case to consider. It came at a time at which the cost
of running for a parliamentary seat was higher than ever before (Guttsman, 1863, p.18), and members received no remuneration, but as property qualifications for MPs had just recently been abolished in 1858 (Carrington and Hampden Jackson, 2011, p.651), there was variation in where those necessary resources came from. The composition of the political elite was changing as the old generation died out and was replaced by the new one (Guttsman, 1863, p.76). Further, though parties were important as parliamentary groups, they were yet to become the cohesive, whipped organizations that stamped out all other variation in MP voting behavior; rather, MPs were still elected as individuals, rather than as party members (Cox, 1987, p.21; Carrington & Hampden Jackson, 2011, p.651; Wright, 1970, p.66; Evans, 2000, p.61). According to some accounts, it was the expansion of the electorate caused by the 1867 Reform Act that made parties so crucial in British politics, as it resulted in the necessity of local party infrastructure to entice voters, which in turn meant that MPs needed to demonstrate party loyalty in order to make use of this infrastructure to get elected (Evans, 2000, p.59). The Reform Act was, in fact, passed by a Conservative minority government, while the previous majority Liberal government had been brought down by defections over this very issue; thus, cross-party activity was crucially consequential.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) specifically discount party as an explanation in their brief examination of the 1867 Reform Act, which they consider an exemplary case for their theory. They claim that Conservatives did not pass the bill in order to gain electorally, as proposed, for example, by Himmelfarb (1966), as it extended the franchise much more in the Liberal urban areas than in the Conservative rural areas, and resulted in a Conservative defeat in the subsequent 1868 election. Acemoglu and Robinson give greater credence to the argument that the scramble among the parties to pass a reform bill was a race to exert active control over the framing of seemingly inevitable reform (e.g. Cowling, 1967). Ultimately, however, they focus on the pressure from below caused by the the National Reform Union and the Reform League, founded in 1864 and 1865, respectively, and particularly the Hyde Park riots in 1866, which they

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7 As Guttsman shows, in the three elections of 1868, 1874 and 1880, the a county election cost £3,000 to contest, while a borough election cost £742-1,212; in total the annual cost of being an MP or a candidate was estimated to lie around £500 p.a. for boroughs, and £1,100 p.a. for counties. It cost even more to run for corrupt constituencies, which in 1865 returned 113 MPs in total. Guttsman, p.80-1.
argue was crucial in prodding reluctant politicians into action. Thus, the interparty competition for reform was due in essence, they argue, to the pressure from below, which was driven at least in part by demands for economic regulation and redistribution (see Dicey, 1917, p.254; Himmelfarb, 1966, disputes this explanation, though she acknowledges that among redistributive demands, those targeting landlords were most common). Other scholars, notably Himmelfarb (1966, p.104-5; also Evans, 2000, p.48), have called into question the importance of pressure from below, arguing that the Hyde Park gatherings were not very riotous and popular pressure in general not a crucial element of the puzzle. However, it seems clear that the popular agitation, as well as the threat of further rioting if the public's demands were not met, did make politicians aware of the issue and the need to solve it (e.g. Cowling, 1967, p.61; Smith, 1964, p.319).^8

Yet other historians of the period have seemingly despaired of finding any generalizable explanation for the 1867 Reform Act, claiming instead that it can best be explained ideographically, such as by focusing on intraparty groupings such as the Adullamites and “Liberal waverers who were afraid of a dissolution”. In his influential monograph *The Making of the Second Reform Bill*, Smith (1966, p.234) writes, for example, “Every important division which destroyed the Bill of 1866 and shaped its successor was decided by an unpredictable floating vote composed of these individuals entering one lobby or the other according to their whim or muddled understanding of the question.” However, this thesis shows that systematic statistical analysis of the variables predicting MP vote uncovers that more was at play than just ad-hoc inter-party coalitions and ignorance.

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^8^ This is supported, further, by evidence from the parliamentary debates themselves. On May 27th, 1867, for example the Conservative MP Algernon Fulke Egerton argued that “The hon. Member further declared that if they did not accept this £10 figure universal agitation would be the result”, while on May 17th of the same year, the Liberal MP Thomas Chambers asked, “Under what conditions were they discussing this question? Were they discussing it as a free Parliament, or under the terror of out-of-doors agitation? Observations had been made by leading Members of the House (Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Childers) which rather implied that what hon. Members were doing they were to do under the influence of an agitation out of doors.” Though this evidence is anecdotal, it shows that MPs were aware of public gatherings, and saw preventing more agitation as a crucial aim of the passage of the bill.
III Theoretical Framework

Though scholars commonly focus on collective actors such as classes or parties as crucial to democratization, this assumes awareness of and ability to act in their collective interests, assumptions that may not always be justified (Capoccia and Ziblatt, 2010, p.936-7). Further, literature that theorizes about ‘elite’ motivations and actions often underspecifies whether the elites they refer to are economic, political, or a mixture, and fail to acknowledge that different members of the elite may have different, and possibly even conflicting, motivations (Bermeo, 2010). This thesis concretizes the concept of ‘the elite’ by focusing on a country’s legislators, who had political power as well as being economically successful enough to pay the high cost of parliamentary membership. In all cases of legislative democratization, which made up a large proportion of first-wave transitions, legislators were the crucial section of the political and economic elite that personally shaped and passed the terms of enfranchisement. This makes the study of the parliamentary passage of democratizing legislation a uniquely appropriate way to examine how elites shape democratization, and, in particular, to test whether theories which ascribe certain motivations to ‘the elite’ hold water; if distributive conflicts of the type proposed by Acemoglu and Robinson and Boix structure democratization by influencing elite incentives, evidence of such conflicts should be present within the context of parliamentary debate and voting.⁹

As party members, constituency representatives, and members of certain social classes MPs are subject to multiple (and perhaps, at times, competing) pressures to act in the interests of their parties, their constituencies or the protection of their own assets. This thesis focuses, in particular, on the interplay between party pressures and material incentives. The theory behind the argument that material incentives matter is that set out in the literature on distributive conflicts (Boix, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2006). It assumes that the active pressure

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⁹ There were, of course, other members of the political and/or economic elite who were not in the House of Commons (indeed, some of them sat in the House of Lords); however, it is reasonable to claim that the House of Commons contained a subsection of the most politically and economically powerful individuals, allowing us to meaningfully test the theory. The House of Lords was important to British politics (see e.g. McLean, 2001, on Corn Law Repeal in 1846) but its study falls outside the scope of the current project and will be dealt with in later research.
for democracy comes from a ‘threat from below’, as economically disadvantaged citizens call for
economic redistribution, and the only way for the elites to credibly commit to redistribution in
the long term is to share political power (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, p.23-7). This
argument does not rely on whether democracies actually are more redistributive than non-
democracies, but merely on whether the actors involved anticipate that it may be, and that this
may affect their own assets. The theory as outlined here focuses on asset form (i.e. whether
MPs own land or capital) as the operative variable, as this is the crucial factor that is theorized to
make a difference to MPs’ calculations. It argues that land-owners would be less supportive of
democratizing legislation than capital-owners for two reasons. Firstly, land is less mobile and
therefore easier to tax and potentially expropriate than human and physical capital, so while
capital-owners can hide or move their assets abroad to avoid taxation or expropriation in a more
democratic regime, landowners cannot (a theory which finds support for the post-1945 period in
Freeman and Quinn, 2012). And secondly, capital-owners rely more on the cooperation of the
working classes to make a profit, so if the ‘threat from below’ takes the form of domestic unrest
of some sort, such as strikes, demonstrations and riots, they will have more interest in ending this
unrest than landowners, who are less reliant on workers and to whom resisting democratization
is therefore less costly (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, p.32). This results in two separable
effects; on the one hand, landowners are seen to be less democratic than non-landowners of all
types, while on the other, capitalists (particularly those who hold manufacturing, rather than
finance, trade or insurance interests) are seen to be more democratic than non-capitalists. In order
to get at the two distinct causal mechanisms, and because there is overlap between the two
groups, this analysis does not compare landowners to capitalists. Rather, landowners are
compared to all those MPs who did not own land (with both groups containing some MPs who owned capital) while capitalists are compared to those MPs who did not own capital (again, with both groups containing landowners).

However, though this thesis assumes that distributive conflicts matter, it does not disregard the effect political institutions, particularly parties, may have on MPs’ incentive structures. Parties are not only conduits of the interests of the individuals that make them up or of the constituencies they represent; rather, as institutions, they generate incentives among their members to help the parties themselves survive and flourish (Capoccia and Ziblatt, 2010, p.937). It thus follows that parties should exhibit different attitudes towards the enfranchisement of different electorates; different groups within the population were expected to vote differently, and their enfranchisement would thereby benefit different parties. The artisanal and industrial working class was expected to vote for the more left-wing party - the Liberals in mid-19th century Britain - while agricultural laborers were seen as supporting more right-wing, or Conservative parties as they were expected to be under the economic and social influence of their (largely Conservative) landlords (Llavador & Oxony, 2005, p.2-3; Himmelfarb, 1966, p.127). In this case, as the franchise extension on the legislative agenda was aimed at expanding the vote in the borough constituencies, which were mainly towns, the theoretical expectation for MPs in the 1865-8 Parliament is that on the whole, Liberal parties would support reform, while Conservatives should oppose it.

These two posited causal mechanisms - electoral considerations and material interests - have different sources and effects on MPs. Therefore, the presence of both mechanisms is expected to have the potential to create cross-pressures. More specifically, cross-pressurization is hypothesized to occur when MPs’ partisan and material incentives oppose one another. A Conservative landowning MP, for example, is not hypothesized to be cross-pressured (as his partisan and material interests are both seen to incentivize him to vote anti-democratically); similarly, a Liberal capitalist MP is also subject to reinforcing rather than cross-pressuring motivations to vote pro-democratically. However, Liberal landowning and Conservative capitalist MPs are both hypothesized to be subject to cross-pressurization; in the former case,
partisan considerations incentivize the MP to vote for democratization, which may threaten his material interests, while in the latter case, partisan electoral strategies drive the MP to vote against democratization, while the theory holds that material interests should incentivize him to support it. Partisan considerations are thus seen to mediate MPs’ material incentives.13

Hypotheses

The three main-effect hypotheses this thesis sets out to test are thus:

**Party**

**H1**, the party hypothesis:

*Ceteris paribus*, Liberal MPs will be more likely to vote for democratization than Conservative MPs.

**Material interests**

**H2a**, the landowning hypothesis:

*Ceteris paribus*, landowning MPs will be less likely to vote for democratization than those MPs who do not own land.

**H2b**, the capital-owning hypothesis:

*Ceteris paribus*, capital-owning MPs will be more likely to vote for democratization than those MPs who do not own capital.

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13 This theory thus ignores the third proposed pillar of the MP incentive structure, his constituency’s interests. Though we attempt to control for many constituency-level variables, as we are aware of their importance and intend to account for their effect, we are as yet missing a coherent theory for how these variables mediate the incentives created by material and partisan electoral concerns. The impact of constituency interests is further complicated by the fact that as the franchise was restricted, it would be false to assume that MPs’ electorates were representative of the population in their constituencies (McLean, 2001, p.35). During the course of my doctoral research, a more comprehensive attempt will be made to disentangle these different incentives both theoretically and empirically.
These two different types of main-effect hypotheses intersect with one another, leading to the formulation of two specific interaction hypotheses:

**Cross-pressurization of party and material interests**

**H3**, the liberal landowner hypothesis:

Liberal landowning MPs will be less likely to vote for democratization than Liberal non-landowning MPs.

**H4**, the conservative capitalist hypothesis:

Conservative capitalist MPs will be more likely to vote for democratization than Conservative non-capitalist MPs.

No *a priori* prediction is made about the expected effect of landowning for Conservatives, or of capital-owning for Liberals. This is because in these two cases, since the two proposed types of effects work in the same direction, there is no reason necessitating a visible difference in democratic vote between the groups; for Conservative landowners, both partisan and material interests incentivize the MP to vote anti-democratically, so we do not necessarily anticipate a difference between Conservative landowners and Conservative non-landowners, who have the same partisan pressures. The converse situation is true for Liberals - here, capital interests and partisan interests reinforce one another in a pro-democratic direction, so we do not have *a priori* predictions about whether owning capital will matter for Liberals’ votes on democracy. Due to the large number of cases in the first wave of democratization which proceeded via similar instances of legislation, the interactions between partisan and material incentives suggested by this case study are potentially generalizable to all of these other cases of legislative democratization.
IV Data and Methods

Data

Dependent variables

The Liberal majority government of 1865-6 attempted to pass a reform bill in 1866, and failed; the Conservative minority government which subsequently came to power then passed a similar, but even more radical bill. The 1867 Reform Act was ultimately passed without a recorded roll call at its third reading, posing a challenge for roll call analysis. However, multiple divisions were called on amendments during the course of its passage through the House of Commons. Similarly, amendments to the 1866 bill were also voted on, including one amendment which Gladstone declared a vote of confidence; the failure of this amendment brought down the Liberal government. This thesis examines how MPs voted on 30 amendments to these two bills - five on the 1866 Liberal bill, and 25 on the 1867 Conservative bill.14 These amendments cover multiple different issues, but the 30 selected above were included as they dealt clearly with issues surrounding democratization. They have been grouped into seven categories by type, as they dealt with suffrage questions, seat redistribution, corruption and other issues relevant to democratization; table IV.1 shows these categories, an example amendment for each, and the criterion according to which each amendment was coded as pro- or anti-democratizing in intention.

14 However, if the 1866 amendments are excluded, the results remain robust.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of amendment</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Intent coded as democratic</th>
<th>Example amendment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Determining the voter qualification threshold (suffrage)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Increasing the number of people who could vote</td>
<td>Division 39, 2nd May 1867: Amendment to prevent the reduction of the residency requirement from 2 years to 12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reapportioning the number of seats to differently sized constituencies</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Making the seat apportionment more proportional to population</td>
<td>Division 70, 31st May 1867: Amendment to reduce the number of seats for boroughs with a population of under 10,000 from 2 to 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulating vote-buying</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Intending to make vote-buying more difficult to perpetrate, easier to detect, or subject to harsher penalties</td>
<td>Division 120, 4th July 1867: Amendment to retain a clause banning electioneering in alcohol-dispensing localities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introducing the cumulative vote system in constituencies with three seats, such that voters should only have two votes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Preventing such measures, as they were meant to undercut the voting power of the newly enfranchised workers in these constituencies (McLean, 2001, p.69; Smith, 1966, p.212)</td>
<td>Division 124, 5th July 1867: Amendment to introduce cumulative voting in 3-member constituencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing candidate expenditure during electoral campaigning</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Reducing expenditure, as it was intended to allow less wealthy candidates to run</td>
<td>Division 103, 27th June 1867: Amendment to provide expenses to cover campaigning costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adding dimensions strategically to the bill</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Intending for the added dimensions to prevent its passage through the House</td>
<td>Division 51, 7th June 1866: Amendment to postpone the Reform Bill until after the passage of a seat redistribution bill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introducing women’s suffrage</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Introducing women’s suffrage</td>
<td>Division 52, 20th May 1867: Amendment to retain the word “man” in the bill’s clause and avoid its replacement with “person”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frequency refers to the number of amendments, out of 30 in total, belonging to each category. Intent coded as democratic refers to the side of the amendment which, if triumphant, would have had a democratic outcome (i.e. the proposition side for pro-democratic amendments, and the opposition side for amendments which were anti-democratic in intent. For the last three categories, the example amendment is the only amendment in the category.

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15 This is subject to one important caveat. At the time, it was possible for citizens to vote multiple times if they qualified through separate property ownership. Several amendments were identified which would have expanded the suffrage, but rather than enfranchising previously unenfranchised citizens, the effect was or would have been to thereby substantially increase the number of voters who had multiple votes. This was difficult to classify as it seems, according to current standards, severely undemocratic for the same citizen to have multiple votes; however, this is a somewhat anachronistic interpretation, as contemporaries, even those generally on the side of democratization, did not see this as a problem (see e.g. the debate on copyhold owners, *Hansard*, June 24, 1867 (458-61), in which it is clearly held that while MPs rejected the notion that one man could vote twice on the basis of ‘one qualification’, the same property in the same constituency, they ought to be able to vote in *every* constituency in which they held a property qualification). Due to this difficulty of classification, these amendments (13 in total) have been dropped from the analysis.

16 There is only one amendment in this category, introduced by John Stuart Mill, who was the MP for Westminster in this parliament. Though it is a suffrage amendment, it was not included with the other suffrage amendments because existing literature supposes a somewhat different mechanism at work (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, p.1186; Przeworski, 2008, p.294).
For part of the analysis, a second dependent variable was constructed out of MPs' votes on these 30 amendments. For each MP, a ‘democratic proportion’ was calculated by dividing the number of times he voted pro-democratically by the number of times he voted in total. Each MP thus had a democratic proportion ranging from 0 to 1, which expressed his cumulative ‘democraticness’ over the course of the 1866 and 1867 Reform bills.

Though 30 amendments are considered, some crucial amendments to the Reform Bill are not included in this dataset as they were never subject to a division. This includes, most importantly, the Hodgkinson amendment of May 17th, 1867, which effectively eradicated the heretofore common practice of compounding (which had entailed the payment of rates together with the rent to the landlord) and thereby greatly expanded the number of people who paid their rates directly and thus qualified for the vote (McLean, 2001, p.68; Cowling, 1967, p.282; Hall, McClelland and Rendall, 2000, p.4). It also includes, for example, the Torrens amendment, the acceptance of which, on May 13th, permitted the lodger franchise and thus directly contravened Disraeli’s principle that voters should pay their rates personally and directly. Both of these amendments were simply accepted by Disraeli without a division, as were amendments which dropped the fancy franchises, educational qualifications and other regulations limiting the suffrage on May 28th (Smith, 1966, p.207; Himmelfarb, 1966, p.107). Though there is no way roll call analysis can be used to investigate these crucial changes, future research will attempt to address this lacuna by examining the parliamentary debates surrounding them.

**Independent variables**

Though comparisons of the aggregate numbers of landowners, businessmen, lawyers and other occupations represented in the British House of Commons or the Cabinet are common (e.g. Aydelotte, 1954; Thomas, 1925; Guttman, 1963; Woolley, 1938; Cacroft, 1867; Matthews, 1964), there has not previously been a detailed biographical study of the members of the 1865-8 parliament, which both prevented the 1866 bill and passed the 1867 Act (Himmelfarb, 1966, p.128). Therefore, occupation and other individual-level data for these MPs
had to be collected to allow for analysis. It was collected using a wide variety of historical reference works, most importantly *Debrett’s Illustrated House of Commons, and the Judicial Bench*, compiled by Robert Henry Mair, 1868; the *Who’s Who of British Members of Parliament*, compiled by Michael Stenton and Steven Lees, 1976 and 1978; and the online *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* and *History of Parliament Online* archive, though these sources were supplemented by others (Burke, 1869; Burke, 1879; Foster, 1883; and several webpages listed in the bibliography). These were the main sources of data on MPs’ occupations, though they also provided contextual data such as year of birth, education, and years in parliament. MPs were coded, using dummy variables, as having **Manufacturing interests** if they owned or managed factories or manufacturing businesses, including breweries, glassware factories, printers, and the like. They were coded as having **Financial or Trade interests** if they held occupations such as banker, merchant, or director of insurance companies.

The main variable used to test whether landholding matters for MP voting is a dummy variable, *Landowner*. The data was collected from *The Great Landowners of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*, compiled by John Bateman, 1883, which is also the source used by other historians interested in the land held by individuals (e.g. Vincent, 1966; Guttsman, 1968). These data have the advantage of including a comprehensive list of all landowners who held at least 3000 acres of land worth at least £3000 in gross annual value. Bateman himself, in the preface, laments the arbitrariness of the boundary chosen, but argues that using the 3000/3000 cut-off creates an adequate dividing line to “distinguish the sheep from the goats, amongst those who

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17 See Aydelotte (1954, p.252-3) on the difficulties of gathering and interpreting biographical information on an entire parliament.

18 Though father’s occupation is sometimes analyzed as an indication of socio-economic background (e.g. Guttsman, 1968), and this was considered as an option in this analysis, ultimately the decision was made not to include it. There data were subject to a high degree of non-random missingness, as the information available was biased towards those MPs whose fathers had been publicly notable in some way, with much more data on peers and former MPs (the *History of Parliament Online* has very detailed information for pre-1832 MPs) than on less notable individuals occupied in more working- or middle-class professions.

19 It was decided that a minimum of 2 directorships was necessary for an MP to be classified as having financial or trade interests, as it was possible that a single place on a board of directors was more about status than about actually engaging with the financial/trading world (36 MPs fell into this category). The full coding scheme is elaborated in the codebook in Appendix A1.

20 Note that this category of landowners partially overlaps with the preceding category of MPs holding manufacturing or finance/trade interests; these interests were not mutually exclusive.
would have us believe them to be cream upon the milk of English society” (Bateman, 1883, xvi). Further, this data was, in most cases, verified at least cursorily by the individuals themselves (Bateman, 1883, xxvii). Some MPs were, in 1867, not yet in possession of lands, but were heirs to their families’ estates. As these individuals lived in expectation of future landownership, and as fear of redistribution and expropriation should not distinguish between whether the land was held currently, or whether it was to be held in the future, the analysis in this thesis treats landowners and land-heirs equally.

The major disadvantage of the data is that it was published in 1883, a full 16 years after our case study (though it was largely collected in the preceding decade). This causes three main problems. Firstly, some MPs died between 1867 and 1883, such that they did not appear in the Bateman volume. This has been addressed by tracing who their heirs were, and attributing the property held by their heirs in 1883 to the MPs themselves in 1867. Secondly, and more problematically, it is of course possible that these estates changed in those 16 years, as MPs (or their heirs) bought or sold land. This has not been addressed, and remains a potential downfall of this measure. However, as the landowning measure used is a dummy variable, this would only affect the reliability of the data if it caused MPs to pass the 3000/3000 threshold, which is fairly unlikely. Thirdly, the 1870s and 1880s saw an agricultural depression in the UK, meaning that income from land plummeted (Perren, 1995, p.7). Though the Bank of England inflation

21 Bateman also includes 1300 landholders who held under 3000 acres worth £3000 annually, but over 2000 acres worth £2000 annually. These have been added to the dataset in the interest of attention to detail, but it is possible that this list is incomplete, as Bateman did not set out to achieve comprehensiveness in this listing. Moreover, as less information is provided for these individuals, it was on some occasions harder to verify whether they corresponded to MPs, so the data on this category of landowners must be seen as somewhat less reliable than the data on the larger landowners. For this reason, as well as the theoretical justification provided by Bateman himself, above, the general analyses in this thesis have been done classifying those as landowners who own over 3000 acres, though the results generally hold even when the 2000+ acre measure is used instead.

22 This does include a few individuals who were, in 1867, the heirs to landed estates, but died before they inherited them. As they would not have known about their imminent death prior to the event, however, it is reasonable to assume that they would have acted as if they were, eventually, to inherit. This means that the present analysis draws a dividing line between two hypothetical sons of the same great landowner; while his heir is considered a landowner himself, his second son is not considered a landowner at all, even though it is possible that his career is in fact financed by income deriving from land as well. This is a potential flaw; however, it was unavoidable, as it was not possible to entirely eliminate the possibility that land-based income contributed at all to their career; further, it was held to be preferable to include heirs but not second sons than include either both or neither. In some analyses, an attempt was made to control for this possibility by including a dummy variable for those MPs whose father was a peer (see discussion of control variables, below) but this was not significant, nor did it significantly change the other results.

- 22 -
calculator was used to calculate all MP income from land in constant 1867 pounds, this did not take into account the separately changing value of land. However, as all the data on MP land wealth was taken from Bateman, it can at least be assumed that even if the values given are not exactly accurate for 1867, they are at least comparable across MPs; further, as the depression lowered landed income, we can assume that any systematic effect on our data would be to make our landownership criterion more conservative, which should not cause undue problems for our analysis.

MPs party affiliations were obtained from Mair (1968) and Stenton (1976, 1978); the variable in the models, Party, is a dummy for Liberal MPs, with Conservatives used as the base category as they formed the government for most of the amendments under consideration. In some cases, MPs were listed in these sources as Liberal-Conservatives; this was often a result of the prior split of the Conservative party after the divisive Corn Law Repeal of 1846, or due to MPs holding unusual ideological positions within the party or even party switching over the course of an MP's career. For these MPs, the party was selected which Craig (1977) or Walker (1978) claimed the MP ran for in the 1865 election, regardless of prior or subsequent affiliations.23

Control variables

Previous qualitative work focuses heavily on the importance of the Cave of Adullam, a faction of rebellious, anti-reform Liberal MPs who voted against the Liberal government on the 1866 Reform Bill and thereby brought it down (e.g. Winter, 1966; Himmelfarb, 1966). In order to control for membership of the Cave among Liberals and test whether its importance continued into the 1867 parliamentary process, a dummy variable for Adullamite was created which included as members all MPs mentioned as having belonged to the faction at any point in time (Oxford Dictionary of National Biography; Winter 1966). Though this dummy is included to catch variation driven by the ideological commonalities of these MPs and their coherence as a rebellious parliamentary faction, it is necessary to emphasize that selection into this group was

23 According to Craig (1977, p.xvi), though the lingering effects of the 1846 Corn Law Repeal on partisanship were long felt, by 1859 it was again possible to reliably assign party membership to MPs.
not random, and in fact moderately correlated positively with landowning (correlation of 0.14, significant at 99% confidence) and negatively with ownership of finance/trade interests (-0.15, significant at 99% confidence) among Liberals. This muddies the clarity of the conclusions we can draw from this variable somewhat, as will be discussed in section V.

Heckelman and Dougherty (2011) discuss how previous political experience at a local or other level may have influenced members of the 1787 Constitutional Convention in the US, so dummies for low-level (local) political positions were included in the analysis.

Data on the parliamentary constituencies was sourced from Craig (1977) and Walker (1978), who provided information on the number of electors, whether candidates were elected unopposed or in a contest, whether they won again, ran and lost, or did not run in the 1868 election, and constituency boundary changes. Ziblatt (2008) finds that for Prussian legislators, the landholding inequality in their constituency affected their votes on suffrage extension, with MPs from constituencies with greater landholding less likely to vote for democratization. This is a control variable because regional landholding inequality is not assumed to affect MPs’ potential losses from redistribution (potential redistribution is assumed to work on a national, rather than regional, scale); rather, regional landholding inequality is assumed to impact MPs’ voting behavior via the representation of their constituents’ interests. I was unable to obtain landholding inequality data at the constituency level, but was able to construct a rudimentary approximation of a landholding Gini index for English and Welsh counties (though not those in Scotland and Ireland) from data provided by Bateman (1883) on the number and respective total landownership of landowning peers, great landowners, squires, greater yeomen, lesser yeomen, small proprietors and cottagers in each county. However, although Bateman (1883) gives the number of cottagers (owners of less than 1 acre), this category was dropped in the analysis. This was done because it was largely differences within this cottager category that drove variation between the counties, and it is likely that due to the small size of these holdings, the reporting was not entirely accurate. Having a measure hinging in large part on an inaccurate category was deemed unsatisfactory, so the measure of landholding inequality used only reflects this inequality.
among landholders over 1 acre.\textsuperscript{24} Following Ziblatt (2008), due to the non-linear relationship between inequality and democracy sometimes predicted by scholarship (especially Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006), squared and cubed landholding inequality terms were added to the model.

Qualitative literature also emphasizes that as the 1867 Act redistributed seats among constituencies, MPs whose constituencies would lose seats - “dying swans”, in the words of Julian Goldsmid, Liberal MP for Honiton\textsuperscript{25} - may have voted against the bill for that reason. This can be interpreted as being due to enthusiastic local representation; Liberal MP Henry Bouverie Brand, for instance, argued, “‘I could not ... be a party to the introduction of a Bill which thus mutilated a Borough at my own door which I have represented for 14 years.’”\textsuperscript{26} However, it can also be interpreted less charitably as being due to fear of losing their own seat, as in the case of Marmaduke Wyvill, who represented the borough of Richmond, Yorkshire; though Wyvill was a Liberal who voted for almost all amendments proposing to expand the suffrage, he voted anti-democratically on all amendments proposing to redistribute seats among constituencies, including the crucial amendment to take one seat away from boroughs under 10,000 people. Indeed, Richmond had only 5134 people, subsequently lost one of its two seats, and Wyvill himself lost his membership of parliament. Using data obtained from Craig (1977) and Walker (1978) dummy variables have been created to measure whether constituencies were to lose seats in 1868 \textit{(seat lost 1868)}. One may argue that by including this variable in the model, the dependent variable (MP democratizing vote) precedes the independent variable (his constituency losing a seat). This is indeed an issue; however, those constituencies that lost seats largely did so for reasons of corruption and/or population size (e.g. those whose population was under 1000 were disenfranchised entirely), so including a dummy variable for seat loss can be seen to measure

\textsuperscript{24} Another landholding inequality measure was created by adding to the frequency distribution, as a residual category, the population of each county which did not own any land. However, once this was included there was so little variation between the counties - all the approximate Gini measures were now between 0.98 and 1.00, with most over 0.99 - that this variable was not significant.

\textsuperscript{25} Hansard, 31st May 1866, vol.183, 1554, cited in McLean, 2001, p.65

\textsuperscript{26} Quoted in Smith, 1966, p.92
underlying undemocratic attributes of a constituency (it was either corrupt, or vastly overrepresented given its population size).

Further, other constituency-level variables were used as controls as they may well have had certain systematic effects on the MPs elected and their views on democracy. This includes a dummy variable if the constituency was a borough as opposed to a county seat. This inclusion was because, firstly, the occupation structure of the voting population is assumed to be different, such that county MPs are sometimes held to be representatives of the landed interest (e.g. Cacroft, 1867, p.120) and secondly, the bill only lowered the suffrage for voters in boroughs, so this may have been important to MPs’ decision-making for direct reasons. Further, a dummy variable was created for constituencies in which Mair (1868) reported that a locally notable individual or a family dominated elections (dominant interest), as this might lead to reliance on accountability to this dominant notable rather than on their own or constituency interests.

Yet other variables were initially included in the model but dropped as they were not significant and did not affect the size or significance of the other coefficients. This includes MP age, their relationship to the peerage and their educational background (operationalized as separate dummy variables for having attended one of the nine prestigious public schools identified in the 1868 Public Schools Act, and having attended Oxford or Cambridge). Further, since the amendments considered took place in two different years, under two different governments, a dummy variable for 1866 was included in the multilevel and clustered logit analyses (in which the amendments were separable; in those analyses whose dependent variable was a proportion, this was not possible). However, this dummy 1866 variable was never

27 A separate dummy was included in some analyses for university seats, which, however, did not affect many MPs.

28 The effect of boroughs is not always expected to be uniform; for example, boroughs could be large or small, burgeoning or dwindling, and fully urban or partially agricultural (see e.g. Disraeli letter to Derby, 1857, cited in McLean, 2001, p.62; parliamentary debate on the effect of the borough franchise on the unusually agricultural borough of East Retford, Hansard, 27th May 1867, vol.187, 1159-61.) However, due to the fact that boroughs were a different category of constituency which was affected in a systematically different way by the bill, a dummy is seen as appropriate even though it may not catch all of this variation.

29 As this variable was expected to have a significant effect (e.g. Cacroft, 1867, p.125), it was coded in multiple different ways to make sure that it was not the coding decisions which made it insignificant. However, contrary to expectation, it did not matter for their vote on democratization whether MPs were baronets or Irish or foreign peers or whether they stood to inherit English peerages when their fathers died.
statistically significant, so taking it out for the GLM analyses in particular was not deemed problematic. Another variable which was insignificant when included was a dummy for whether MPs were elected in a contested vote in 1865 (rather than having run unopposed). The insignificance of this variable, on which data is fairly reliable (it being recorded in the Craig [1977] and Walker [1978] books on electoral statistics), is interesting; distributive conflict theories focus on pressure from below as driving elite action, and while it is conceivable that pressure such as the Hyde Park Riots galvanized MPs from all over the country, one would assume that such pressure was more acutely felt by MPs who had an electoral constituency to please.

**Method**

This thesis uses a mixed-methods approach, so as to attempt to make up for the weaknesses in each single method. The quantitative element consists of roll call analysis on the votes of 707 MPs in the 1865-8 British House of Commons on 30 amendments to the 1866 and 1867 reform bills. These votes are tested in order to see whether individual-level characteristics of MPs, in particular their party and asset type, was correlated with their vote on democratization. This quantitative element, elaborated on in sections V and VI, is supplemented in section VII by a qualitative investigation of the House of Commons debates on these bills. This qualitative section is used to examine whether the correlations established in the quantitative section of the analysis are supported by evidence that the causal mechanisms proposed by Acemoglu and Robinson at, in fact, present in MPs’ arguments.

Neither of these two methods is flawless. Roll call analysis of legislator voting has been criticized by scholars who claim that it does not yield an adequate representation of legislator preferences. Spatial models of legislator voting have been developed to determine where in ideological space legislators are relative to one another, which can provide an approximation of latent ideological dimensions underlying MP voting on a large sample of roll calls (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985). However, as Spirling and McLean (2006, p.588) show, such models are inappropriate for legislatures like the UK House of Commons, as they cannot cope with
strategic voting. For this reason, spatial models such as NOMINATE were not used in this analysis, and instead amendments were hand-coded on a single dimension of pro- vs. anti-democratic intention (see data section).

Carrubba *et al.* (2006) point out the problems caused by bias in the selection of which votes are subject to roll calls for analyses of party cohesion and ideological dimensionality; however, this analysis does not measure dimensionality but rather looks at which factors made legislators prefer one outcome over another on only one issue, and its examination of cohesion does not compare cohesion between parties, but instead, again, considers the variables that predict defection *within* parties. Further, Carrubba *et al.*’s analysis (2006, p.694) assumes that, as in the European Parliament, roll calls can be called by party leaders whenever it suits them, meaning that they are often called strategically, for reasons of disciplining their own party and signaling cohesion and/or policy positions to other parties or the public. Thus, calling a roll call is endogenous to the cohesion and/or the policy position expected by party leaders, making making it difficult for roll call analysis to yield unbiased conclusions about party cohesion and ideological dimensionality (Carrubba *et al.*, 2006, p.652). However, the situation in the British House of Commons is different; here, recorded roll call votes (‘divisions’) are necessary when a vocal vote is not decisive enough (in volume) for the speaker or committee chair to declare it for one side or, if one side is declared to have won it, if MPs challenge this decision (May, 1855, p. 234-5; Evans, 2002, p.90), which occurs frequently for both sincere and strategic reasons (Saalfeld, 1995, p.532). This means that close calls, or controversial ones, are likely to consistently lead to a division, decreasing the politicization of recorded votes.\(^{30}\) Since the selection bias as a whole is thus likely limited, and it seems unlikely that recorded votes were somehow systematically different to merely vocal votes with regard to underlying factors determining legislator preference for democratization, selection bias is unlikely to meaningfully affect our analysis.

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\(^{30}\) In the British House of Commons, divisions are the standard way of voting, and it has one of the highest totals of recorded votes among legislative lower houses in Western Europe (Saalfeld, 1995, p. 538-41).
According to the procedural rules of the House of Commons, a division (both in the House itself and in committees, May, 1855, p.291) requires two tellers on each side, usually the party whips,\textsuperscript{31} who count the votes rather than voting themselves. As these men had to be associated with the side they counted (May, 1855, p.287), they have been categorized, for the purposes of this analysis, as having voted for that side. Rosas \textit{et al.} (2009) argue that in many cases, abstention is a meaningful option for MPs to purposely refrain from taking either side, such as if they do not want to commit to either side. In fact, Ziblatt (2008)'s analysis of the vote preventing the introduction of manhood suffrage to Prussia in 1911 is based entirely on analyzing why MPs abstained (which he measures via ‘unexcused absences’) rather than voting with the party line, as no MPs voted directly in opposition to their parties. However, a similar analysis is made difficult in the British case as the House of Commons does not provide data on abstentions or ‘unexcused absences’ (e.g. Firth and Spirling, 2003, p.2).\textsuperscript{32} Thus, it is not clear whether a lack of vote on an amendment is a meaningful abstention, or rather a comparatively meaningless absence for other (perhaps excused or unrelated) reasons.

The qualitative method used in section VII, the examination of parliamentary debates for supportive evidence, also has severe drawbacks, though it is the preferred method used by the most prominent historical scholars of this case (e.g. Cowling, 1967; Smith, 1964, 1966; Himmelfarb, 1966). In particular, citations are used to suggest an underlying causal mechanism to explain the conclusions found in sections V and VI; they are not used to independently test these conclusions. The advantage of the qualitative element is that it provides complementary information which the quantitative analysis cannot reveal - namely, the motivations MPs aired in parliamentary debates - in order to support the explanations proposed to underlie the correlations found in sections V and VI. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that the evidence used in this section is anecdotal rather than systematic; rather than looking for

\textsuperscript{31}http://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/tellers/, accessed 12.01.2013, 21:14

\textsuperscript{32}In the UK House of Commons, non-voting can be due to absence, deliberate abstention (while present), or ‘pairing’, the practice of agreement between members of opposite sides that neither should vote to cancel the non-votes (Firth and Spirling, 2003, p.2; Evans, 2002, p.91; May, 1855, p.286). The difficulty of distinguishing between these motives has meant that analysis is limited to Aye and No votes.
evidence in support of all possible causal mechanisms that have been proposed in the literature, and evaluating which is the most frequent or prominent, the collection of evidence was limited to speeches in support of the ideas that partisan electoral strategic concerns and fear of redistribution mattered to MPs. A further issue with this approach is that it relies on MPs expressing their sincere opinions in debates, an assumption which can quite easily be called into question. It is possible that MPs would not express such concerns about potential expropriation by the working class or partisan strategies to gain votes via franchise extension, even if they mattered to them. However, rather than inflating our findings, this would only bias them downwards - since voicing these motives cannot be argued to have political benefits, we can relatively safely assume that any evidence we find of these concerns was genuine.

**Models used**

This thesis aims to predict pro- and anti-democratic votes using variables at the individual- and constituency level. For each MP, our dataset includes multiple roll call vote observations, ranging from 0 for MPs who never voted to 30 for MPs who voted on all amendments. The first dependent variable to be modeled was each MP’s vote on each of 30 amendments. The variables of primary interest are at the MP level (party and material interests) and there is reason to believe that an MP’s separate votes will be similar to one another. Therefore, disaggregating the data and running a logit model on all the observations together would artificially inflate the number of units and violate the assumption that the observations are independent of one another (Snijders and Bosker, 2012, p.16; Hox, 2010, p.14). As the data is structured in two levels, with each MP on the second level containing a set of 0-30 different votes on the first level, the most appropriate model is a random-effects multilevel logit regression.

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33 This would be much more interesting and valuable, of course, but it is too time-intensive for the purposes of this MPhil thesis. Such rigorous analysis using content analysis will hopefully be done, however, in the subsequent doctoral research.
model using MPs as the groups, with their votes as observations nested within the groups.\(^{34}\) Random intercepts were specified for each MP, allowing each MP’s baseline predilection to vote for democratic reform to vary.\(^{35}\)

Though there is variation at the level of each individual amendment, it is difficult to include variables in the model to predict these differences, as there were no a priori expectations about the effects different amendments would have on MPs’ votes and on the individual-level independent variables. Therefore, in order to be able to prevent unexplained variation at the amendment level from biasing the model, fixed effects for each amendments were included.\(^{36}\)

The independent variables were included as fixed rather than random effects, as the expectation was that their impact would remain constant at the group level; that is, the impact of party or landowning was specified to remain the same for each of the 30 times the MP voted.

The model used is thus of the form

\[
\text{Logit}(Y_{ij}) = \beta_{00} + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \ldots + \beta_n X_n + \alpha_i + u_{ij}
\]

Or, in this case,

\[
\text{Logit}(\text{Democratic vote}_{ij}) = \beta_{00} + \beta_1 \text{Landowning}_j + \beta_2 \text{Party}_j + \ldots + \beta_n X_n + \alpha_i + u_{ij}
\]

where \(\beta_1, \beta_2, \ldots\) are the coefficients of all the independent and control variables in the model, \(\alpha\) is the coefficient of each individual amendment and \(u\) is the error term.

\(^{34}\) MPs for whom fewer than 6 observations (20% of the possible 30 observations) were reported were excluded from the analysis, as it was assumed that this small number of observations was not enough to create a reliable estimation of their voting behavior. This was also done to increase the comparability between this multilevel model and the other models estimated (see below), which use proportions as dependent variables and are thus particularly sensitive to reliability issues if proportions calculated on such few observations are included. 53 MPs, or 7.5% of the sample as a whole, were thus excluded from the analysis.

\(^{35}\) A Chi\(^2\)-test on the random MP intercept shows it to be highly significant, with a p-value of 0.000, as intra-group correlation is high.

\(^{36}\) However, the results are robust regardless of whether amendment fixed effects are included.
As a robustness test, and to allow for more clarity in the post-estimation illustration of the results obtained, a second dependent variable - an overall 'democratic proportion' for each MP over the course of the two bills - was constructed by dividing their number of pro-democratic votes by the total number of votes they cast. A generalized linear model (GLM) with a binomial distribution and a logistic link function, identical in variables to the hierarchical model, was estimated to predict this democratic proportion. In section VI, the same model types will be used when predicting defections from the party line; a multilevel model with a binary dependent variable, and a GLM model using a proportion (each MP’s ‘defection proportion) as the dependent variable. The hierarchical model is of a very similar structure, and will be estimated separately for each party:

$$\text{Logit}(\text{Defection}_{ij}) = \beta_{00} + \beta_1 \text{Landowning}_j + \beta_2 \text{Manufacturing Interests}_j + ... + \beta_n X_{ij} + \alpha_i + u_{ij}$$

After MPs’ overall likelihood of defecting is thus predicted using the above model, a second model will be estimated to be able to determine whether the independent variables have different effects between defections on amendments where the party line is pro-democratic, and those where the party line is anti-democratic. For each party, the default party line used is the more common one (pro-democratic for Liberals, anti-democratic for Conservatives), and a dummy variable for the non-default party line is interacted with each independent variable. For Liberals, this leads to the following model:

$$\text{Logit}(\text{Defection}_{ij}) = \beta_{00} + \beta_1 \text{Anti-democratic vote}_i \text{Landowning}_j + \beta_2 \text{Anti-democratic vote}_i \text{Manufacturing Interests}_j + ... + \beta_n \text{Anti-democratic vote}_i X_{ij} + \alpha_i + u_{ij}$$

---

37 More detail on the GLM model used, as well as elaborations on additional robustness checks, can be found in section V.
For Conservatives, the model is almost exactly the same, but it has a dummy for a pro-democratic party line interacted with each independent variable. This specification allows us to test whether the independent variables’ effects predicts defection in general, or whether it actually depends on the content of the amendment and the context of the party line; that is, whether defections are driven by concerns over democratization rather than simply being measures of MPs’ lack of party discipline.

Similar to the ‘democratic proportion’ constructed for section V, a ‘defection proportion’ was then calculated for Liberals by dividing the number of times they defected by the total number of times they voted. This was then similarly used in a GLM model which was used as a robustness test to check the results obtained in the multilevel model, and to generate post-estimation illustrations of various substantive effects. Such a ‘defection proportion’ was not similarly calculated for Conservatives, as the multilevel logit model did not show any effects that needed to be checked or illustrated.
Table 2: Multilevel Logistic Regressions with Random MP Intercepts to Predict Pro-Democratic Vote

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party and Material Interests</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H3</strong> Party (Liberal) * Landowner</td>
<td>0.588 (0.135)*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.526 (0.115)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H4</strong> Party (Liberal) * Manufacturing interest</td>
<td>1.555 (0.557)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.326 (0.468)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H4</strong> Party (Liberal) * Finance/trade interest</td>
<td>1.121 (0.335)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.983 (0.291)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H1</strong> Party (Liberal)</td>
<td>145.301 (18.905)**</td>
<td>130.738 (16.941)**</td>
<td>136.596 (27.084)**</td>
<td>180.792 (34.770)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adullamite</td>
<td>0.0755 (0.0214)**</td>
<td>0.0851 (0.0239)**</td>
<td>0.128 (0.0356)**</td>
<td>0.123 (0.0300)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Political Office (Liberal) * Vote Year (1866)</td>
<td>4.262 (2.240)**</td>
<td>4.346 (2.219)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Political Office (Conservative) (in 1867)</td>
<td>1.599 (0.381)*</td>
<td>1.753 (0.409)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Material Interests</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H2a</strong> Landowner</td>
<td>0.480 (0.139)*</td>
<td>0.793 (0.0923)*</td>
<td>1.057 (0.181)</td>
<td>1.080 (0.184)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>H2b</strong> Manufacturing interest</td>
<td>4.233 (1.728)**</td>
<td>1.522 (0.249)*</td>
<td>0.935 (0.287)</td>
<td>1.006 (0.305)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>H2b</strong> Finance/Trade interest</td>
<td>2.836 (1.010)**</td>
<td>1.148 (0.165)</td>
<td>1.080 (0.265)</td>
<td>1.161 (0.291)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constituency</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borough</td>
<td>1.369 (0.184)*</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.208 (0.155)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominant Interest</td>
<td>0.684 (0.119)*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.678 (0.120)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat lost 1868</td>
<td>0.759 (0.104)*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.718 (0.104)*</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Voting Percentage of the Population</td>
<td>0.908 (0.0253)**</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00796 (0.0204)†</td>
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</tbody>
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### Constituency

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<tr>
<td>Landholding Inequality</td>
<td>535.121 (2068.352)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Landholding Inequality$^2$</td>
<td>0.923 (0.0463)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Landholding Inequality$^3$</td>
<td>1.000 (0.000216)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.709 (0.109)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>1.166 (0.336)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>0.913 (0.217)</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Observations</td>
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<td>9263</td>
<td>9263</td>
<td>9263</td>
<td>11298</td>
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<tr>
<td>No. of Groups</td>
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<td>486</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>617</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>6102.536</td>
<td>6863.665</td>
<td>6092.651</td>
<td>6034.794</td>
<td>7200.964</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>6337.951</td>
<td>7106.214</td>
<td>6349.468</td>
<td>6398.617</td>
<td>7574.915</td>
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### Likelihood-Ratio Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Compared to Model 1</th>
<th>Compared to Model 2</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3DF; 15.88**</td>
<td>2DF; 775.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18DF; 103.74****</td>
<td>17DF; 862.87***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Odds ratios reported; standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests; †p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Included, but not reported for clarity, dummy variables for each amendment (all models); interaction between High Political Office (Conservative) and Vote Year (1866) (models 3, 4 & 5); dummy variable for prior low political office (models 3, 4 & 5).

Note: In all of these models, MPs are only included when a 6 or more votes (20% of the total possible votes) is recorded for them in the dataset. This is to minimize noise due to those MPs for whom a reasonably comprehensive assessment of their views on democratic reform was not presented (other roll call analyses also impose a minimum vote restriction, e.g. 25 out of 186 possible votes in Schonhardt-Bailey, 2003). This restriction is particularly important in later models, where a democratic proportion is used as the dependent variable, but makes sense for these models as well. However, when this restriction is not imposed, the models in this table are not vastly changed; in Model 5, for example, all effects remain in the same direction and with the same significance level, with only very minor changes in size.
V Party and material interests and votes for democratization

Analysis

Statistical analysis of the factors driving MP voting shows that while both party and material interests matter, party is by far the most substantively important variable, directly contradicting Acemoglu and Robinson’s argument that party was irrelevant to the passage of the 1867 Reform Act in the UK. The argument that both party and material interests matter is first tested using hierarchical logistic regressions with random MP intercepts and fixed effects for amendments, displayed in Table 2. Model 1 tests the effect of being a Liberal and a member of the Adullamite Liberal faction on MPs’ likelihood of voting for the pro-democratic side of a division. The findings support H1; being a Liberal has a substantively very large and statistically highly significant pro-democratic effect, compared to being a Conservative.

Model 2 is estimated to show the effect of only material interests - owning land, manufacturing and finance or trade interests - on MPs’ likelihood of voting for the pro-democratic side of a division. The findings support hypotheses H2a and H2b; owning land has a negative effect on MPs’ likelihood of voting pro-democratically on amendments to the 1866 and 1867 reform bills, while owning either manufacturing or finance or trade interests has a significant positive effect. Showing the effect of material interests in the absence of controls is useful, as party, constituency, and other later variables such as political office or Cave of Adullam membership are conceptually subsequent to economic interests. To put it another way, Conservative party membership was probably unlikely to make an MP a landowner, while being a landowner may have made it likelier for them to be a Conservative. Figure 1, for example, shows how landowning is negatively correlated in the data with Liberal party membership. 62% of non-landowners are Liberals, compared to only 38% who are Conservatives; conversely, 53% of landowners are Liberals, while 47% are Conservative, a correlation which is low (-0.15) but highly significant (p-value of 0.000). Similarly, of MPs with a manufacturing interest, 73% are Liberals while only 27% are Conservatives, and among for those with a financial or trade
interest, 74% are Liberals and 26% are Conservatives, while the figures among MPs without such interests are effectively 50:50; these are correlations of 0.13 and 0.19 with p-values of 0.001 and 0.000, respectively. This relationship between material interests and party membership is likely based on the reasons for MPs’ selection into the different parties, an issue which would benefit from closer investigation. While obviously it is necessary to include controls at later stages to make sure the observed effect is not simply an artifact of unobserved intervening variables, it is also important to establish that the effect of material interests on democratizing votes actually exists in the raw, pre-‘treatment’ data. While manufacturing and finance/trade interests both have significant effects in the hypothesized direction on how MPs vote in model 2, these effects of capitalist interests become insignificant once controls are included. On the other hand, the effect of landowning remains.

![Figure 1: The distribution of landownership by party](image)

Figure 1: The distribution of landownership by party

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38 As part of my doctoral research, I intend to use a 2-stage model to attempt to use material interests to predict party choice, with a second model for how these factors then affect vote choice on democratization. This will hopefully allow me to test the impact of material interests both directly and via party choice, allowing for the development of a fuller picture.
In model 3, both partisan and material interests are included in the model. Although it is clear that both types of interests matter, comparing the odds ratios shows that the effects of the former - particularly of the dummy for being a Liberal - is much larger substantively.\(^{39}\) Including partisan and material interests together shows that controlling for party diminishes the size of the effect of material interests; in fact, holding a financial or trade interest now no longer has a significant positive effect on MPs' likelihood of voting pro-democratically, and the size and significance of holding manufacturing interests is also lower. In comparison, the size of the partisan interests barely decrease in model 3, and they remain highly significant. Model 3 thus shows that despite the correlation between material interests and party likely arising from politicians selecting into different parties based on their interests, the effect of party remains highly significant once material interests are controlled for.

In model 4, partisan and material interests are interacted; further, constituency-level controls, and controls for whether MPs held high political office are added. Importantly, interacting the material interests with party shows that as expected by our cross-pressurization theory, when interacting party and material interests, party membership does indeed mediate the effect of material interests. This mediation effect is, however, true only for landownership. Landowning has a negative effect on MPs' likelihood of voting pro-democratically for Liberals, but it does not have the same effect for Conservatives, supporting H3. This is in accordance with the argument that Conservative MPs' partisan and land-based pressures work in the same direction, while it is only for Liberal MPs' that owning land creates a situation of cross-pressurization, where their partisan incentives pressure them to support democratic reform while their concern about the potential expropriation of their land causes a pressure in the anti-democratic direction. At the same time, party remains highly significant and substantively important, an effect that is robust to the inclusion of all controls. Party is not simply a stand-in variable for material interests, but rather generates crucial incentives in its own right.

\(^{39}\) Direct comparison of the size of the odds ratios is permissible because all the variables in models 1 and 2 are dummies, so the odds ratio is, in each case, the effect of going from 0 to 1 for that category.

- 38 -
However, this model also shows that hypothesis H4 is not borne out by the data; the effect of capital - both manufacturing and finance/trade - interests is not as expected according to the theoretical framework. Based on Acemoglu and Robinson’s argument that capital-owners, particularly owners of manufacturing interests, are willing to democratize due to concerns about the cost of conflictual labor relations, hypothesis H4 set out the expectation that owning manufacturing interests in particular would cause a similar cross-pressurization for Conservatives as owning land does for Liberals; however, this does not seem to be the case. In fact, model 4 shows that neither manufacturing nor finance/trade interests appear to have a significant negative effect on Conservative MPs’ likelihood of voting pro-democratically. This finding casts doubt on theories which focus on the positive effect of capital-owning on democratic attitudes, while supporting those theories, like Boix and A&R, who provide plausible explanations for why owning land has a negative effect on democratic attitudes.

However, due to the limitations of the data on landholding inequality, models 1-4 are limited only to MPs from English and Welsh constituencies. In order to test whether the effect holds once Scotland and (pre-independence) Ireland are included as well, model 5 excludes our measure of landholding inequality and instead includes dummy variables for Irish, Scottish and Welsh constituencies, to account for systematic regional differences. This model shows that both the importance of party and the negative effect of landowning for Liberals are true even when these other nations are included, so it is clear that the results in model 4 were not driven by English and Welsh MPs alone.

40 Since there is some (minor) collinearity between those who hold land, manufacturing and finance/trade interests (manufacturing and finance/trade interests have a correlation of 0.19; landholding and manufacturing interests have a correlation of -0.2, and landholding and finance/trade interests have a correlation of -0.3, all significant at 99.9%), it is somewhat conceivable that manufacturing or finance/trade interests would have a significant effect if they were considered on their own in a model. However, this is not the case; neither manufacturing nor finance/trade interests have a significant effect on MP behavior - either by themselves or in interaction with party - even when the other ownership variables are excluded (see Table A1.1 in Appendix A1).

41 Model 5 shows that MPs from Irish constituencies were significantly less likely to be democratic than English ones, but this does not diminish the size of the significance of the effect of landowning for Liberal MPs.
The importance of party is illustrated in figure 2, which shows MPs’ ‘democratic proportion’ in the raw data; that is, the proportion of their total votes which was pro-democratic, by party. Clearly, Conservative MPs’ democratic proportions are concentrated below 0.25, while Liberal MPs’ proportions show more variation, but are overwhelmingly over 0.5, with particular concentration over 0.75. The partisan effect seems to be strongly in accordance with hypothesis H1. Though we do not know, at this point, what causes this immense partisan difference, it is consistent with the explanation that electoral considerations - namely, Liberals’ calculation that the bill would increase their electorate, and Conservatives’ fear that Liberals were right - mattered enormously to MPs. As section VII will show, moreover, qualitative evidence shows that such considerations were, in fact, voiced by Conservative MPs in debate.

Figure 2: The spread of MPs’ ‘democratic proportions’ by party
The strong partisan effect raises a puzzle, however. While Liberals were much likelier to vote pro-democratically, it was in fact the Conservatives who were in government when the Act was passed. Thus, these results show that while the Conservatives initially proposed the legislation, Liberals were largely responsible for the addition of amendments making it more democratic. This detail explains in part why Acemoglu and Robinson missed party's importance here; they argue that one reason party cannot have been important is that the Conservatives, who passed the bill, lost the next election, while in fact it was Liberals who made the bill as democratic as it eventually became.\textsuperscript{42} But while the Liberals were the pro-democratic force in the amendments, it was the Conservative government’s prerogative to decide, at any point, that the bill had become too radical to support. The fact that they did not do so reveals that though they would have preferred a less radical bill, it did not cross the line of acceptability. This initially seems to contradict the conclusions arrived at here with regard to Conservative preferences, but on closer examination it can be explained with recourse to Benjamin Disraeli’s unique ideological and strategic position; as both contemporaries and scholars of the period have found, Disraeli, who was the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the leader of the government in the House of Commons, seemed willing to accept any amendment so long as the Reform Bill itself passed (McLean, 2001, p.70; Hall,McClelland and Rendall, 2000, p.8).\textsuperscript{43} This counter-intuitive finding makes up a large part of the puzzle of the 1867 Reform Act.

\textsuperscript{42} Acemoglu and Robinson also disregard the fact that Conservatives may simply have miscalculated, which likely also played a role.

\textsuperscript{43} As the Conservative MP Sir Rainald Knightley indignantly argued in parliament, “He thought the policy of the right hon. Gentleman [Disraeli] had been that of catching whatever he could get. Let the House look at the course which he had taken with regard to the compound-householder. ... On that [May 17th] morning, hon. Members on the Conservative side of the House received the usual intimation from the Secretary to the Treasury earnestly requesting their attendance, as an Amendment of great importance was about to be proposed—an Amendment of vital importance. He would venture to say that every Gentleman who read that circular imagined that he was pressed to come down to the House for the purpose of opposing the Amendment of the hon. Member for Newark (Mr. Hodgkinson.) ... He believed that was the universal feeling on his own side of the House. During the discussion he retired for a short time; and on his return was perfectly astonished to hear that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had embraced the proposition of the hon. Member for Newark with joy and gratitude, stating that it was in perfect accordance with the conclusions to which the Government had originally arrived, and that it was also in perfect harmony with what he still had the assurance to call the principle of the Bill.” (Hansard, May 20th, 1867, 803-4) Later on, from the other side of the parliamentary aisle, Gladstone had a similar assessment, claiming that Disraeli’s “governing idea ... seemed to be not so much to consider what ought to be proposed and carried, as to make sure that, whatever it was, it should be proposed and carried by those now in power” (quoted in Himmelfarb, 1966, p.110).
Owning land had an anti-democratic effect for Liberals which it did not have for Conservative MPs. Figure 3 shows this effect among Liberal MPs in the raw data; the two graphs are the frequency of different democratic proportions for non-landowners (left) and landowners (right). Though both sets of MPs tend to have democratic proportions over 0.5, as they are all Liberal, particularly democratic proportions over 0.9 are much more common among non-landowners than among landowners.

![Figure 3](image)

**Figure 3**: Difference in ‘democratic proportion’ among Liberals, by landownership

In order to aid understanding of the differential effect of landowning by party, predicted democratic proportions have been generated, which vary theoretically from 0 (every registered vote is anti-democratic) to 1 (every registered vote is pro-democratic). As table 2 (below) shows, for Conservatives, the difference between a landowner and a non-landowner is only 0.01, and in this case actually being a landowner makes the Conservative MP more...

---

44 In the post-estimation illustration of effects, a GLM model (model 8, table 2) was used to aid understanding, as predicted democratic proportions are easier to understand than the predicted probability of going from an anti- to a pro-democratic vote on any individual amendment. Moreover, since the proportions take into account the entire set of amendments, one is not forced to choose only one in the predictive model, which is always fairly arbitrary given 30 possible amendments.
democratic, though this effect is not statistically significant. However, for a Liberal MP, being a landowner gives him a predicted democratic proportion of 0.75, compared to one of 0.82 for non-landowners (figures in red). Though the confidence intervals overlap, a t-test shows this difference to be significant at 95% confidence (p-value of 0.029). Thus, all else equal, a Liberal non-landowner is predicted to vote democratically 82% of the time, compared to 75% for a comparable landowner. Again, it is clear that party is the most important single factor (among non-landowners, a Conservative MP is predicted to vote democratically only 8% of the time, compared to 82% if he is Liberal), but the cross-pressure created for Liberal MPs by the ownership of land does seem to make those individuals significantly less democratic than non-landowners of various types.

Table 3: Predicted Democratic Proportions by Party and Landownership (using Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Predicted democratic proportion</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>95% Confidence Intervals</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Non-Landowner</td>
<td>0.0799</td>
<td>0.0135</td>
<td>0.0534 0.106</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservative Landowner</td>
<td>0.0933</td>
<td>0.0148</td>
<td>0.0644 0.122</td>
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<tr>
<td>T-test</td>
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<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Non-Landowner</td>
<td><strong>0.816</strong></td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.762 0.871</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Landowner</td>
<td><strong>0.754</strong></td>
<td>0.0394</td>
<td>0.676 0.831</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers given to 3 significant figures.
Democratic proportions predicted for MPs from county constituencies without dominating interests, with mean voting percentages, mean landholding inequality, who did not lose their seats 1868 and did not have high or low political office, nor manufacturing or finance/trade interests, and were not members of the Cave of Adullam.

Another way of thinking about the effect of landowning is in terms of the counterfactual; to consider, for example, whether individual amendments would have had different outcomes if the number of landowners in the House of Commons had been different. Division 128, on July 12th, 1867, was an amendment to introduce the secret ballot in elections (Hansard, 12th July 1867, vol. 188, 1443). This amendment, proposed by the Liberal Henry Berkeley, failed by 161 votes to 112; the secret ballot was eventually instated by the 1872 Ballot Act. To illuminate the substantive impact of landowning for Liberals, model 6 has been used to...
generate predictions about how the House of Commons would have voted if none of the Liberals had been landowners. If, in other words, the Liberal party did not contain any landowners whose material interests caused cross-pressurization, would the secret ballot have been instated five years earlier? 100 simulations were run to estimate how this counterfactual House of Commons would have voted.

![Figure 4: The distribution of loss margins of the amendment to introduce a secret ballot (Division 128, 12th July 1867) in 100 simulations of the vote if no Liberals were landowners; the black line shows the actual loss margin, 49 votes.](image)

As figure 4 shows, while the results would have been slightly altered, the outcome of the vote would not have changed. While the ballot amendment lost by 49 votes, the mean loss margin in the simulations was 36 votes. This demonstrates the substantive effect of landowning for Liberals - out of the 273 MPs who voted on this amendment, of which 141 were Liberals, an average of 13 would have changed their vote if no Liberals had been landowners. Since only 27
Liberals voted against the bill to begin with, this means that around half of those Liberals who voted against it would have changed their vote to support it. However, this impact does not even come close to changing the outcome of the bill. In fact, in order for the outcome to change, almost all the Liberals who voted against the bill would have had to change their mind, as all 136 Conservatives who voted on this amendment opposed it. Landowning clearly has a substantive effect on MP voting, but it pales in comparison to the effect of party.

Though the control variables are not the subject of our study at this point, it is worthwhile to point out that their effects are largely in the expected directions. Belonging to the rebellious Liberal Cave of Adullam faction made MPs much less democratic than comparable non-Adullamites, in accordance with the qualitative literature; thus, the predicted democratic proportion for an Adullamite is 0.55, compared to 0.84 for a non-Adullamite Liberal, the difference being significant at 99.9% confidence. As noted earlier, selection into the Adullamite faction was non-random, and indeed likely related to landownership among Liberal MPs; however, the significance of the Adullamite dummy in this model shows that belonging to the Cave made MPs less democratic even when controlling for asset type.\textsuperscript{45} Holding high political office during the 1865-6 Liberal administration made MPs more democratic, increasing their predicted democratic proportion from 0.81 to 0.88.\textsuperscript{46}

As regards constituency variables, MPs from borough constituencies are more democratic than those from county constituencies (this effect is significant at the 95% confidence level in the multilevel model, but at only 90% confidence in the GLM model, which also holds the effect to be substantively quite small, increasing MPs’ predicted democratic percentage by

\textsuperscript{45} Though this is beyond the scope of my MPhil thesis, a multi-stage model will be used as part of my later doctoral research in order to account for the fact that the decision to join the Cave of Adullam is made subsequently to one’s asset ownership, but prior to one’s vote on democratizing legislation, and landowning likely factors heavily into decision-making at both stages. A multi-stage model will hopefully help to disentangle how landowning affects Cave of Adullam membership, and these factors subsequently jointly affect Liberal MPs’ votes on democratizing legislation.

\textsuperscript{46} Though we can see, when comparing Models 4 and 6, that when interacting this variable with a dummy for whether the vote in question was in 1866 this interaction term remains significant and increases substantively, while the main high political office effect, which now refers only to 1867 votes, is insignificant; however, as the GLM model aggregates all amendment votes so as to arrive at more accurate measures for each MP, the 1866 year dummy cannot be added to this model.
Table 4: Robustness Check: Different Model Types Used to Predict Pro-Democratic Vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party and Material Interests</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H3</strong> Party (Liberal) * Landowner</td>
<td>-0.608 (0.214)**</td>
<td>-0.531 (0.198)**</td>
<td>-0.413 (0.189)*</td>
<td>-0.358 (0.142)*</td>
<td>-0.480 (0.163)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landowner (Conservative)</td>
<td>0.101 (0.164)</td>
<td>0.112 (0.153)</td>
<td>0.131 (0.142)</td>
<td>0.0509 (0.0869)</td>
<td>0.0481 (0.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H1</strong> Party (Liberal)</td>
<td>5.045 (0.166)***</td>
<td>4.618 (0.156)***</td>
<td>3.841 (0.121)***</td>
<td>3.304 (0.106)***</td>
<td>3.802 (0.105)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashakamite</td>
<td>-2.078 (0.276)***</td>
<td>-1.845 (0.314)***</td>
<td>-1.400 (0.276)***</td>
<td>-1.411 (0.304)***</td>
<td>-1.609 (0.352)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Political Office (Liberal)</td>
<td>0.664 (0.262)*</td>
<td>0.540 (0.205)***</td>
<td>0.555 (0.179)***</td>
<td>0.439 (0.128)***</td>
<td>0.627 (0.172)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Political Office (Conservative)</td>
<td>0.192 (0.229)</td>
<td>0.0913 (0.171)</td>
<td>0.213 (0.193)</td>
<td>0.0900 (0.100)</td>
<td>0.157 (0.137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Material Interests</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H2b</strong> Manufacturing interest</td>
<td>0.240 (0.164)</td>
<td>0.222 (0.154)</td>
<td>0.089 (0.136)</td>
<td>0.115 (0.108)</td>
<td>0.116 (0.126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H2b</strong> Finance/Trade interest</td>
<td>0.136 (0.142)</td>
<td>0.149 (0.134)</td>
<td>0.151 (0.129)</td>
<td>0.0915 (0.0866)</td>
<td>0.0796 (0.107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constituency</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borough</td>
<td>0.298 (0.134)*</td>
<td>0.265 (0.118)*</td>
<td>0.226 (0.118)†</td>
<td>0.157 (0.0916)</td>
<td>0.204 (0.982)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Interest</td>
<td>-0.376 (0.173)*</td>
<td>-0.366 (0.195)†</td>
<td>-0.287 (0.299)</td>
<td>-0.230 (0.152)</td>
<td>-0.261 (0.155)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat lost 1868</td>
<td>-0.279 (0.136)*</td>
<td>-0.222 (0.140)</td>
<td>-0.238 (0.146)</td>
<td>-0.110 (0.108)</td>
<td>-0.120 (0.114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Percentage of the Population</td>
<td>-0.0946 (0.0276)**</td>
<td>-0.0877 (0.0307)**</td>
<td>-0.0817 (0.0285)**</td>
<td>-0.0562 (0.0204)**</td>
<td>-0.0571 (0.0237)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landholding Inequality</td>
<td>6.476 (3.846)†</td>
<td>5.376 (3.462)</td>
<td>6.473 (3.385)†</td>
<td>2.154 (2.648)</td>
<td>3.994 (2.839)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landholding Inequality²</td>
<td>5.376 (0.0453)</td>
<td>6.473 (0.0443)†</td>
<td>-0.0269 (0.0347)</td>
<td>-0.0567 (0.0371)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landholding Inequality³</td>
<td>0.000348 (0.000215)</td>
<td>0.000289 (0.000197)</td>
<td>0.000149 (0.000192)†</td>
<td>0.000111 (0.000151)</td>
<td>0.000212 (0.000161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Observations</td>
<td>9263</td>
<td>9263</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>413[^b]</td>
<td>413[^b]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Groups</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correctly predicted (positive) (Sensitivity)</td>
<td>88.24%</td>
<td>88.24%</td>
<td>88.24%</td>
<td>88.24%</td>
<td>88.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correctly predicted (negative) (Specificity)</td>
<td>86.43%</td>
<td>86.43%</td>
<td>86.43%</td>
<td>86.43%</td>
<td>86.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>6066.863</td>
<td>6237.034</td>
<td>328.604</td>
<td>-756.209</td>
<td>986.568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>6402.151</td>
<td>6565.188</td>
<td>395.769</td>
<td>-687.811</td>
<td>1050.943</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests; †p<0.1  *p<0.05  **p<0.01  ***p<0.001

Included, but not reported for clarity: dummy variables for each amendment (models 5 & 6); dummy variable for prior low political office (all models).

a Model 6 differs from model 4 (Table 1), in order to make it more comparable with the other model types. The interactions between the voting year (i.e. whether the roll calls took place in 1866 or 1867) and whether MPs held high Conservative or Liberal political office were problematic in models 8, 9 and 10 as the democratic proportion dependent variable comprises all votes taken together. Due to the insignificance of the voting year variable when included in the previous models, removing the voting year variable and the interactions and including just the high political office main effects was deemed acceptable. As capitalist interests did not seem to have significant effects when interacted with party (see Tables 1 and A1), for all the models in Table 4 only landowning was interacted with party, while the other two material interests were included without such interactions. However, these changes between models 4 and 6 have only very minor effects on the other variables' effects.

b In these models, 73 cases were dropped as their democratic proportion was 0 or 1.
only 1 percentage point for Conservatives and 2 for Liberal MPs). In the multilevel model, moreover, MPs from constituencies in which a certain notable individual or family effectively controlled the electoral process were less democratic than those from constituencies without such a dominant interest, and MPs from constituencies which lost a seat due to the 1867 Reform Act itself were less democratic than those from constituencies whose seat count remained the same or increased as a result of the Act; however, these effects, though going in the same direction, are insignificant in the GLM model.\(^\text{47}\)

Interestingly, the effect of landholding inequality seems to square largely with Acemoglu and Robinson’s predictions, showing an inverse U-shaped relationship with MPs’ democratic proportions, though all three landholding inequality terms are significant only at the 90% level. This seems to imply that MPs from very equal and very unequal counties are considerably less democratic than those from counties with middling landholding inequality, a difference of around 0.1 in predicted democratic proportions. The final control variable included is the enfranchised percentage of the population in each constituency; this variable remains significant across all model types estimated and is substantively large and negative, going from predicted democratic proportions of 0.86 when only 1% of the population could vote, to 0.64 when 16% could vote. Though it may at first be counterintuitive that a larger enfranchised population would lead an MP to vote less democratically, on closer examination it becomes clear that as enfranchisement was property-based, a larger enfranchised population effectively means that men in the constituency hold comparatively more property. Thus, it seems that this substantial effect implies that MPs from constituencies with more property-holders were less democratic, which makes theoretical sense.

\(^{47}\) For comparison’s sake, having a dominant interest reduces the predicted democratic percentage by about 3 percentage points for Conservatives, from 10% to 7% democratic vote, and by about 5 percentage points for Liberals, from 84% to 79% democratic; representing a constituency which was to lose a seat is predicted to have had a similar effect, from 11% to 8% democratic among Conservatives, and from 84% to 80% democratic vote among Liberals. However, neither effect is statistically significant (p-values of 0.15 and 0.10, respectively).
Robustness checks

As robustness tests, in order to make sure that the results obtained are not an artifact of the model used, several alternative model types have been estimated (Table 4). In order to allow for direct comparison with the other models, model 6 was estimated as a variation of 4; the two models are largely the same, except for the exclusion of the dummy variable for the year in which the vote took place. This was excluded as it makes no sense in models 8-10, in which the dependent variable is the overall democratic proportion over the entire period; its elimination from the model (as well as the interactions with other variables) was deemed acceptable as its effect in the previous models was small and insignificant. Moreover, as capitalist interests did not seem to have significant effects when interacted with party (see Tables 1 and A1), for all the models in Table 4 only landowning was interacted with party, while the other two material interests were included without such interactions. However, these changes between models 4 and 6 have only very minor effects on the other variables’ effects.

In model 7, a logit model was estimated using the full set of pro- and anti-democratic votes, with standard errors clustered by MP to account for the correlation of standard errors at the group (MP) level. As table 4 shows, both the strong effect of party for non-landowners and the anti-democratic effect of landowning for Liberals are robust to this type of estimation. This specification further has the advantage of allowing the calculation of the percentage of cases that were correctly predicted, both for the pro-democratic (sensitivity) and the anti-democratic votes (specificity). As table 4 shows, this percentage is very high; 88% of pro-democratic votes were correctly predicted, and 86% of anti-democratic ones. This is a measure of fit, and reveals that the model is doing very well at predicting the actual outcomes. In comparison, a similar model (not reported) which includes all the same variables but excludes party predicts only 66% of pro-democratic votes and 72% of anti-democratic votes correctly, illustrating the importance of including party in the model. This makes clear that a model which does not take party into account would drastically underpredict the pro-democratic vote in these amendments.

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48 However, Nichols and Schaffer (2007) point out that this can have potentially misleading results if the size of the clusters is very uneven, which is true in our case. In this case, the clusters range in size from 1 to 30, showing the unevenness.
The other models (8-10) use each MP’s ‘democratic proportion’ as the dependent variable, which was calculated by dividing their number of pro-democratic votes by the total number of votes they cast (as in the predicted democratic proportions used above to illuminate the effects of landowning). Although the dependent variable is continuous, simple OLS regression is inappropriate, as the dependent variable is bounded between 0 and 1 and thus variance is highest in the middle and decreases as one nears the bounds (Buis, 2010). Instead, a GLM model was estimated with the exact same independent variables (using a binomial distribution and a logit link function), as this is an estimation procedure that can analyze proportions while taking outcomes of 0 and 1 into account (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). Though this estimation (model 8) gives slightly different significance levels on some of the control variables (though the direction of their effects is always the same), it clearly supports the results of models 6 and 7 with regard to both the direction and the significance of the effects of party among non-landowners, and landowning among Liberal MPs, despite having much fewer observations. As further tests, additional models were estimated; one using the beta-distribution estimation procedure (Smithson and Verkuilen, 2006) and one OLS model after having run a logistic transformation of the dependent variable (as in Saeigh, 2009). These additional tests are inferior, as they exclude outcomes of 0 and 1 (MPs who had perfect pro- or anti-democratic voting scores) for which there is no theoretical justification, but the fact that they reinforce the conclusions drawn from the other models can give us extra confidence that the results are not simply an artifact of the specific estimation procedure used. Otherwise, the variables used in these robustness test models are exactly the same. Regardless of the type of model run, being a Liberal makes non-landowning MPs significantly more likely to support the pro-democratic side of an amendment, while among Liberal MPs, landowning has a consistently anti-democratic effect.

This section has shown that both material, particularly landholding, and partisan interests matter for MPs’ votes on democratizing amendments to the 1866 and 1867 reform bills; in fact, party mediates the effect of landownershipship, such that owning land has an anti-
democratizing effect only for Liberal MPs. While both factors create incentives for MPs to vote in certain ways, it seems that for Conservative MPs partisanship and landownership create reinforcing pressures towards anti-democratic positions, while for Liberal MPs pro-democratic electoral incentives and anti-democratic material concerns create a situation of cross-pressurization by these diverging interests. This seemingly anti-democratic effect of landownership among Liberals is consistent with the argument that landowners are less democratic than non-landowners because they fear the redistributive consequences of democratization more than those whose income comes from other sources. However, there is no support for the theory that owning financial, physical or human capital makes MPs any more likely to support democratization than non-capital-owners, casting doubt on theories which focus on the supposedly more democratic nature or economic incentive structure of capital-owners. The findings hold for England and Wales, when income inequality is controlled for, but it also holds when Ireland and Scotland are included; moreover, the finding is not sensitive to the model type or the form of the dependent variable used.

VI Material interests and defections from the party line
Table 5: Multilevel Logistic and GLM Models Predicting Liberal Defections on Democratization Votes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material interests</th>
<th>[11] Multilevel logistic regression with random MP intercepts (Odds Rations)</th>
<th>[12] Multilevel logistic regression with random MP intercepts; dummy for anti-democratic party line interacted with independent variables (Odds Rations)</th>
<th>[13] GLM model with binomial distribution and logistic link function predicting ‘defection proportion’ when the party line is pro-democratic (Coefficients)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H3 Landowner</strong></td>
<td>1.296 (0.238)</td>
<td>1.522 (0.295)*</td>
<td>0.379 (0.181)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H3 Landowner * Anti-democratic party line</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.222 (0.0867)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing interest</td>
<td>0.996 (0.218)</td>
<td>0.768 (0.185)</td>
<td>-0.130 (0.199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing interest * Anti-democratic party line</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.595 (1.516)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance/Trade interest</td>
<td>0.764 (0.151)</td>
<td>0.718 (0.153)</td>
<td>-0.262 (0.194)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance/Trade interest * Anti-democratic party line</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.272 (0.478)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Party-related interests | | | |
| Adullamite | 9.692 (3.162)**                                                                 | 11.238 (3.812)**                                                               | 1.432 (0.295)**                                                                 |
| Adullamite * Anti-democratic party line | | | 0.00259 (0.00425)**                                                                 |
| High Political Office | | | -0.934 (0.265)**                                                                 |
| High Political Office (Vote Year 1867) | 0.333 (0.114)**                                                                 | 0.315 (0.112)**                                                                  |                                                                                                                                |
| High Political Office * Vote Year (1866) | 0.0000000725 (0.0000152) | 0.0000000169 (0.0000739) |                                                                                                                                |

<p>| Constituency interests | | | |
| Borough | 0.866 (0.193) | 0.746 (0.175) | -0.311 (0.220) |
| Borough * Anti-democratic party line | 2.932 (1.359)* | | |
| Dominant Interest | 1.336 (0.346) | 1.565 (0.422)† | 0.491 (0.285)† |
| Dominant Interest * Anti-democratic party line | 0.139 (0.109)** | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency interests</th>
<th>[11] Multilevel logistic regression with random MP intercepts (Odds Rations)</th>
<th>[12] Multilevel logistic regression with random MP intercepts: dummy for anti-democratic party line interacted with independent variables (Odds Rations)</th>
<th>[13] GLM model with binomial distribution and logistic link function predicting 'defection proportion' when the party line is pro-democratic (Coefficients)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat lost 1868</td>
<td>1.765 (0.398)*</td>
<td>1.890 (0.436)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat lost 1868 * Anti-democratic party line</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Percentage of the Population</td>
<td>1.197 (0.0526)***</td>
<td>1.229 (0.0578)**</td>
<td>0.160 (0.0364)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Percentage of the Population * Anti-democratic party line</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landholding Inequality</td>
<td>0.0000000226 (0.00000134)*</td>
<td>0.0000000813 (0.000000501)**</td>
<td>-11.653*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landholding Inequality^2</td>
<td>1.218 (0.0944)*</td>
<td>1.235 (0.0991)**</td>
<td>0.150 (0.0715)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landholding Inequality^3</td>
<td>0.999 (0.000334)*</td>
<td>0.999 (0.000346)**</td>
<td>-0.000635 (0.000310)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amendment variables</th>
<th>[11] Multilevel logistic regression with random MP intercepts (Odds Rations)</th>
<th>[12] Multilevel logistic regression with random MP intercepts: dummy for anti-democratic party line interacted with independent variables (Odds Rations)</th>
<th>[13] GLM model with binomial distribution and logistic link function predicting 'defection proportion' when the party line is pro-democratic (Coefficients)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-democratic party line</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Year (1866)</td>
<td>0.940 (0.306)</td>
<td>0.937 (0.312)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Gladstone Vote</td>
<td>6.033 (2.012)**</td>
<td>6.589 (2.244)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| No. of Observations | 4579                                                                     | 4579                                                                             | 257                                                                  |
| No. of Groups       | 257                                                                      | 257                                                                              | 257                                                                  |
| AIC                 | 2982.517                                                                | 2893.591                                                                         | 177.133                                                             |
| BIC                 | 3232.545                                                                | 3215.053                                                                         | 233.271                                                             |
| Likelihood-Ratio Test (compared to Model 1) | -                                                                      | 8DF; 104.92***                                                                  |                                                                                                                                 |

Standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests; †p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Included, but not reported in table for clarity: dummy variables for each amendment (models 1 & 2)
Section V has shown the importance of two factors in MPs’ decision-making on democratization in 1866 and 1867 - party and material interests. In particular, it has suggested that party mediates the impact of landowning among MPs. Since party is such an important variable, and party voting was clearly the norm, it is important to consider what made MPs defect from the party line when it came to votes on democratization. This section considers Liberals and Conservatives separately, as their respective party lines on amendments are theoretically separate; moreover, in accordance with the findings in section V, it seems possible that party may mediate variables other than landownership, as well.

Multilevel logistic regressions with random MP intercepts and fixed effects for amendments were used, similar to the main models used in the previous section, but predicting MPs’ likelihood of defecting from the party line as the dependent variable, rather than their likelihood of voting for the pro-democratic side of an amendment. The party line was determined based on how the party leader (Gladstone for Liberals, Disraeli for Conservatives) voted. When the party leader did not vote (Gladstone did not vote on five amendments; Disraeli missed one), an attempt was made to establish the party line by considering the votes of those party soldier MPs whose votes usually perfectly followed the party leader. For Liberals, this allowed us to determine a distinct party line on three of the five amendments on which Gladstone did not vote; on the other two, these party soldiers were fairly split in their votes, and so these amendments were excluded from this analysis as the party line was deemed unclear. However, as it is possible that amendments on which Gladstone did not vote were systematically different with regard to party discipline from those on which he did - for example, it is conceivable that abstaining from the vote was a way of allowing MPs to vote their conscience rather than the party line - and so a dummy variable was included for those amendments on which Gladstone abstained. Disraeli only abstained on one occasion, and it was easily possible to establish the Conservative party line on this amendment.

In general, the Liberal party line was pro-democratic, with only three amendments (out of 28 considered here) in which the party line was anti-democratic. Conversely, Conservatives were largely anti-democratic, with only three amendments (not the same ones,
However) in which the party line was pro-democratic. Due to this imbalance, it is conceivable that the results in section V may have been driven by differences between MPs in party discipline, regardless of the actual content of the bills. In order to distinguish between MPs who simply have a higher rate of defection overall, and those whose defection is dependent on the content of the amendment and the party line, a second model has been estimated in which each (independent and control) variable is interacted with a dummy variable representing the less-frequent party line, that is, anti-democratic for Liberal MPs and pro-democratic for Conservatives. This gives us two values for each explanatory variable, one each for when the party line is pro- and anti-democratic. If the effects are in the same direction, we know that the variable simply predicts more or less defection overall, regardless of the direction of the party line; if, however, the effects are in opposite directions, we can tell that it is the content of the amendment which matters.

**Defections in the Liberal Party**

Among Liberals, model 11 shows the impact of the independent and control variables on Liberal MPs’ likelihood of defecting from the party line. The model shows that when considering defections from the party line overall, landowning does not actually have a significant effect. Overall, landowners are neither significantly more nor less likely to defect. Holding manufacturing or finance/trade interests also do not have a significant effect in predicting defections from the party line. In model 12, however, the variables were interacted with a dummy variable for those amendment roll calls in which the party line was anti-democratic. Crucially, once the amendments are separated into those with a pro- and an anti-democratic party line, the results show that owning land does in fact have a significant effect on defections, in accordance with hypothesis H3. Moreover, as we would expect if the important element was the content of the amendment rather than simply party discipline overall, landowning Liberal MPs are significantly more likely than non-landowners to defect when the party line is pro-democratic, and they are significantly less likely to defect when the party line is
anti-democratic. Thus, in both cases, they are significantly more likely to opt for the less
democratic option.

With regard to hypotheses H2a and H2b, model 12 shows that while the effects also
appear to go in the expected direction - that is, MPs with either manufacturing or finance/trade
interests appear to be less likely to defect than MPs without such interests when the party line is
pro-democratic, and more likely to defect when the party line is anti-democratic - these effects
are largely statistically insignificant (with the exception of holding a manufacturing interest in
anti-democratic amendment roll calls, which is significant). The control variables generally affect
MPs’ defections as expected. For most of the control variables, model 12 makes clear, again, that
their effects are due to the content of the amendment in question, rather than simply predicting
defection regardless of content. Thus, rebellious Adullamite MPs, MPs from constituencies in
which a local notable controls the election process, MPs from constituencies which lost seats as a
result of the seat redistribution of the 1867 Reform Act, and MPs from constituencies in which
much of the population could vote, are more likely than their counterparts to defect from a pro-
democratic party line and less likely to defect from an anti-democratic party line; on the other
hand, MPs from borough constituencies are less likely than county MPs to defect from a pro-
democratic party line (though this effect is not statistically significant) and more likely to defect
from an anti-democratic party line.

Using a GLM model generated with largely the same variables as the previous models
(model 13 in Table 5) allows us to generate predicted defection proportions for Liberal MPs on
amendments in which the party line was democratic (which comprises 25 out of the 28
examined amendments). Table 6 (see below) highlights the effect of landowning of Liberal MPs’
predicted likelihood of defecting. Thus, on pro-democratic amendments, non-landowners are
predicted to defect around 18% of the time, while landowners are predicted have a defection
rate of 24%. This difference is statistically significant despite the overlapping 95% confidence
intervals, with a p-value of 0.036. In contrast, an MP without manufacturing interests is
predicted to defect 18%, compared to a rate of 16% for an MP with manufacturing interests.
This difference is not only small, it is also not statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.515. The other control variables behave as expected. Adullamites are predicted to defect significantly more (48% compared to 18% for non-Adullamites) in amendments in which the party line is pro-democratic. MPs from constituencies in which a larger percentage of the population can vote are also predicted to defect more frequently from a pro-democratic party line. With regard to landholding inequality, again, there is a U-shaped relationship with democratizing vote, as predicted by Acemoglu and Robinson; MP defection from a pro-democratic party line is more likely at very high and low values of landholding inequality, and less likely in counties in the middle of the inequality distribution.

Table 6: The effects of material interests on Liberal MP democratic proportion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Predicted democratic proportion</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>95% Confidence Intervals</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Landowner</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.0424</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landowner</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.0593</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-test of difference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Manufacturer</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.0424</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturer</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.0488</td>
<td>0.0642</td>
<td>0.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-test of difference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.515</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers (except Chi^2 test) given to 3 significant figures. Democratic proportions predicted for Liberal MPs from county constituencies without dominating interests, with mean voting percentages and mean landholding inequality, who did not lose their seats 1868 and did not have high or low political office, any other material interests, and were not members of the Cave of Adullam.

Once we disaggregate the data by party and consider defections from the party line for Liberal MPs, we can see that the conclusions we have drawn for material and constituency interests in section V hold. Indeed, it is clear from this analysis that the findings are due to the democratizing content of the amendments considered, rather than being based on defection likelihood in general. Liberal landowners are clearly more likely to defect from a pro-democratic party line, and less likely to defect from an anti-democratic party line, than their non-
### Table 7: Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Conservative Defections on Democratization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landowner</td>
<td>1.222 (0.328)</td>
<td>1.314 (0.387)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landowner * Pro-democratic party line</td>
<td>0.778 (0.276)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H4</strong> Manufacturing interest</td>
<td>1.181 (0.587)</td>
<td>1.498 (0.784)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H4</strong> Manufacturing interest * Pro-democratic party line</td>
<td>0.250 (0.186)†</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H4</strong> Finance/Trade interest</td>
<td>0.765 (0.295)</td>
<td>0.970 (0.402)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H4</strong> Finance/Trade interest * Pro-democratic party line</td>
<td>0.487 (0.243)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party-related</td>
<td><strong>High Political Office (Conservative)</strong></td>
<td>0.0804 (0.0412)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency interests</td>
<td><strong>Borough</strong></td>
<td>1.115 (0.331)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Borough</strong> * Pro-democratic party line</td>
<td>0.740 (0.281)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dominant Interest</strong></td>
<td>1.134 (0.473)</td>
<td>0.835 (0.393)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dominant Interest</strong> * Pro-democratic party line</td>
<td>2.379 (1.282)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seat lost 1868</strong></td>
<td>1.161 (0.348)</td>
<td>1.105 (0.365)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seat lost 1868</strong> * Pro-democratic party line</td>
<td>1.194 (0.464)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Constituency interests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seat lost 1868</td>
<td>1.161 (0.348)</td>
<td>1.105 (0.365)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat lost 1868 * Pro-democratic party line</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Percentage of the Population</td>
<td>1.093 (0.669)</td>
<td>1.074 (0.0716)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Percentage of the Population * Pro-democratic party line</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landholding Inequality</td>
<td>0.00000700 (0.000180)</td>
<td>0.00000552 (0.000144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landholding Inequality^2</td>
<td>1.157 (0.370)</td>
<td>1.161 (0.378)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landholding Inequality^3</td>
<td>0.999 (0.00132)</td>
<td>0.999 (0.00134)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Amendment variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-democratic party line</td>
<td>53.879 (41.163)****</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Year (1866)</td>
<td>0.0000000000154 (0.00000570)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>[14]</th>
<th>[15]</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Observations</td>
<td>4542</td>
<td>4542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Groups</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>1834.676</td>
<td>1841.666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>2083.1</td>
<td>2156.301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Likelihood-Ratio Test (compared to Model 1) |

- 10DF; 13.01

Standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests; †p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Included, but not reported in table for clarity; dummy variables for each amendment (models 1 & 2)
landowning co-partisans, while manufacturing or finance/trade interests do not appear to have this effect. This is consistent with hypothesis H3; while Liberal non-landowners are seen as having reinforcing sets of pro-democratic pressures, Liberal landowners are subject to competing pressures, with electoral tactics urging them in a pro-democratic direction while their own material interests have an anti-democratic effect.

**Defections in the Conservative Party**

Though the previous section has shown that owning land affects how democratically Liberal MPs vote, this effect does not hold true for Conservatives, as was shown in section V. Indeed, Table 7 shows that owning land does not seem to have a significant effect on defections among Conservatives, regardless of whether amendments are considered together (model 14) or whether they are split into pro- and anti-democratic (model 15). This is consistent with the expectations outlined in the theoretical framework; as the partisan and material pressures for Conservative landowners should reinforce rather than cross-cut, we do not expect a significant difference between Conservative landowners and non-landowners. However, Table 7 also shows that holding manufacturing or finance/trade interests does not have the expected cross-cutting pro-democratic effect on Conservative MPs. While this effect was expected to mirror that of landowning for Liberals, in fact it does not seem to be statistically significant. This casts doubt on the veracity of the causal mechanisms relating to the increased democratic attitudes of capitalists (especially holders of manufacturing interests) compared to non-capitalists.

In fact, examining the table shows that none of the variables that were found to have an effect for Liberals matter for Conservative MPs - including whether one's constituency was a borough or a county, whether it lost seats in the 1867 Reform Act, whether its elections were controlled by a dominating local interest, and the state of the constituency's landholding inequality or proportion of enfranchisement. The only individual-level variable that significantly affects Conservative MP behavior is whether the MP held high political office in the 1867-8 Parliament, which, as expected, reduced the defection rate. Further, it is clear that MPs are much more likely to defect when the Conservative party line is pro-democratic (which only
occurred on three out of the 30 amendments). Together with the first part of this section, these results show that party does not only mediate the importance of material interests, but in fact mediates the impact of constituency-level variables, as well; while being elected in a borough, in a constituency dominated by certain local interests, in a constituency about to lose one of its seats, or in a constituency with a high degree of enfranchisement affects Liberal MPs’ stance towards democratization, these factors do not seem to impact Conservatives.49

This section has shown very clearly how party mediates the effect of landowning. Among Liberal MPs, landowners were more likely to defect from the party line when it was pro-democratic, and less likely to defect when the party line was anti-democratic; overall, thus, their vote was not driven by higher likelihood of defection in total, but rather by the specific content of the amendment in question and by their party’s stance towards it. To put it simply, Liberal landowners were less democratic than their non-landowning counterparts. Among Conservatives, owning land did not matter significantly for their defections from the party line, but neither did the ownership of manufacturing or finance/trade interests, contrary to our expectations.

VII The 1866 and 1867 reform bills in parliamentary debates

49 Conservatives have a lower defection proportion overall, so there is less variation to explain than for Liberals. This is possibly at least in part due to situational factors, such as that Conservatives were in the minority in the 1865 parliament, and that they were the governing party for most of the amendments considered. However, the latter concern is addressed by the inclusion of a dummy variable for amendments in 1866, which is not significant. Moreover, this lower Conservative defection proportion overall is part of the explanandum rather than the explanans.
Sections V and VI have established that partisanship matters greatly for MP voting on amendments to the 1866 and 1867 reform bills, and that it mediates the effect of landowning. However, what is not entirely clear at this point is why exactly this is the case. The quantitative findings are consistent with hypotheses H1, H2a and H3. On the party level, it seems plausible that the large difference between Liberals and Conservatives could be due to electoral concerns. On the material level, Acemoglu and Robinson’s claim that landed elites may be more fearful of democratization and eventual redistribution than non-landowners also seems to be supported. For Liberal MPs, the findings are in accordance with the causal mechanisms underlying hypothesis H3, as it seems plausible that electoral and landholding-based concerns cross-cut one another for Liberal MPs, while they reinforce one another for Conservative MPs. However, the findings do not support hypothesis H4 (that manufacturing or finance/trade roles would create similarly cross-cutting pressures for Conservative MPs as landownership does for Liberals). However, though these proposed mechanisms are consistent with the findings so far, quantitative correlations alone cannot prove that these mechanisms were indeed at work. Thus, as the final element of this project, the parliamentary debates pertaining to the 1866 bill and 1867 Act were examined for evidence that MPs expressed such partisan considerations, and that landed elites indeed expressed concerns about the potential redistributive consequences of the bill. Though this analysis does not possess the rigor of full, software-assisted content analysis,\(^{50}\) it can be illuminating nonetheless to show that at least some MPs were concerned with both partisan electoral fortunes and redistribution at least some of the time (though of course this does not imply that other concerns were not also present). The evidence presented here thus complements the correlations found in the prior quantitative analysis by confirming the plausibility of the causal mechanisms this thesis suggests underlie them, a crucial step in theory development.

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\(^{50}\) Though as noted above, this will be done at a later date.
Partisan electoral concerns

Evidence suggests that concerns about the future electoral prospects were very real among MPs in the 1865 parliament. In particular, MPs worried about the unforeseeable effects of enfranchising the industrial working class; Conservatives feared that as these voters would tend towards the Liberal party, this would spell doom for their own electoral fortunes. The Conservative lawyer William Balliol Brett clearly encapsulates the dilemma Conservatives faced at this point: “The very introduction of such a Bill was a great point gained from the Conservative party. ... If an objection might fairly be raised to the Bill, that objection might, in his opinion, more fairly come from Members of the Conservative party than from hon. Gentlemen opposite. Still, he must remind those Gentlemen among his own party, who were discontented, that they ought steadily to contemplate the alternative before them. If they threw out the Bill before the House, ... they would have to submit to a Bill which would be brought in by the right hon. Gentleman [Gladstone, the likely leader of any subsequent Liberal government], the effect of which would, he could not doubt, be the entire annihilation of the Conservative party in the House and in the country.” (Hansard, 9th May 1867, vol.187, 280).

He thus supported the passage of the bill despite his serious misgivings, because of his fear that the alternative would be even more radical in its effects on the Conservative party’s electoral fortunes. General Jonathan Peel, former Secretary of State for War, agreed that the dilemma existed, but came down on the other side: “The hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Brett) said that if there is to be any objection started, it might more naturally be expected to come from the Conservative Benches. Well, I entertain a strong objection to the Bill. If I am asked how I reconcile this with the expression of my wish that this question should be finally settled, I say that if there is to be any objection started, it might more naturally be expected to come from the Conservative Benches. Well, I entertain a strong objection to the Bill. If I am asked how I reconcile this with the expression of my wish that this question should be finally settled, I say that I still wish to see a settlement, but I am not therefore bound to accept the worst settlement possible. A man may wish to see himself settled; but he does not, for the purpose of securing a settlement, throw himself into the river or cut his own throat, which is the settlement the

51 In fact, this echoes arguments Wellington used to convince the House of Lords to support Corn Law Repeal in 1846; to get the reluctant landowning peers to support Peel’s bill, he threatened that if it failed, they would be faced with Cobden’s undoubtedly much more radical one (McLean, 2001, p.40, 44).
Conservative party are, in my opinion, making for themselves by this Bill.” (Hansard, 9th May 1867, vol.187, 286).

Other Conservatives, too, worried about what the bill would mean for their party. “The real and true object of the Bill was to extinguish utterly the great Constitutional Conservative party,” Colonel Henry Edwards, a Conservative politician, argued in June 1866, “and he warned the hon. Gentlemen opposite who sat behind the Treasury Bench that, should they succeed in annihilating the Conservative party, which had by its power in opposition upheld the interests of the country for so many years, they must look out for themselves.” (Hansard, 11th June 1866, vol.184, 202). The 1866 Liberal reform bill differed from the 1867 Conservative proposal as it postponed the question of the redistribution of seats between constituencies to a later date, resulting in particular uncertainty due to this further unknown variable. Even Liberal MP Samuel Laing asked, in the debate on the 1866 bill, “But how, he would ask, were hon. Members to know what effect the present Bill would have; how it would affect the one political party or the other, unless they were in a position to deal with the important question of the redistribution of seats? It was quite possible, for instance, to put forward a scheme of redistribution under which forty or fifty seats would be almost certainly gained by one side or the other, according to the principle adopted.” He continued, “If, for instance, the House were to proceed upon the plan which had been formerly advocated by the hon. Member for Birmingham, and to take away a large number of Members from small boroughs and give them almost exclusively to very large and populous cities, the effect would clearly be to unduly strengthen the democratic and weaken the Conservative interest.” (Hansard, 13th April 1866, vol. 182, 1314). Conservative MP Hugh Cairns, in his contribution to the debate, cited an article published in an unnamed American newspaper, claimed “If it [the reform bill] pass, it will gradually change the whole character of Parliament and of English political life. Henceforth, unless the distribution of boroughs be very unjust, the Liberal, Democratic, progressive party, headed by Mr. Bright and his friends, will have a prodigious increase of power.” (Hansard, 16th April 1866, vol. 182, 1576).
The next year, in the debate on the Conservative Reform bill of 1867, Colonel Edwards argued against a Liberal amendment to require voters in boroughs to own a £5 house on their land in order to be able to vote. He claimed that “he would be the last man in the House to impute motives, but he must say that if the Amendment of the hon. Member for Knaresborough [Liberal MP Isaac Holden, who had thus far shared the representation of the borough with the Tory Basil Thomas Woodd] were agreed to, it would leave him and any future Liberal candidate in possession of the borough.” (Hansard, 24th June 1867, vol.188, 454). In March 1867, Conservative MP James Lowther, a lawyer and career politician, expressed his dismay with the bill proposed by his own party, saying that “He feared this measure in its present shape, and still more after the introduction of a compound householder franchise, would be found to be not a Conservative measure, and that it would end in giving undue preponderance to one class.” (Hansard, 25th March 1867, vol. 186, 545). The next day, Conservative MP Henry Butler-Johnstone, a landowner and author of political pamphlets, concurred, though he couched his objection to the bill in more cross-partisan terms: “He believed that the consequences of a Bill like that now introduced by the Government, would be that they would lose the counties, and the counties which had hitherto been the stronghold of Conservative feeling—he did not use the word in a party sense—and they would become centres of democracy, the result would be they would have a pure democracy, equal electoral districts, and the reign of the 50,000 tailors.” (Hansard, 26th March 1867, vol. 186, 574). At the third reading of the bill - which passed without a division, likely so that Disraeli did not need to face the extent of his party’s rebellion - Viscount Cranborne, the later Lord Salisbury, summarized this fearful Conservative position, declaring “The Conservative party, whose opinions have had my most sincere approval, have, to my mind, dealt themselves a fatal blow by the course which they have adopted.” (Hansard, 15th July 1867, vol.188, 1539).

**Partisan concerns and the lowering of the county franchise**

The Reform Bill mainly expanded the franchise in the boroughs, which Conservatives opposed as they feared that the urban working classes would elect Liberals. However, a minor
portion of the bill also dealt with the county franchise, lowering it from £50 to £12 over the
course of the session. Given that Conservatives are expected, theoretically, to support an
extension of the franchise in rural areas for electoral reasons - due to the general belief that
landlords would hold economic and charismatic power over their agricultural workers - the fact
that the Tories opposed this rural extension as well may initially seem counter-intuitive.
However, closer examination of the specifics of the bill shows that this first impression hides the
actual dynamics at work in the debate. One example is the discussion of an amendment to
reduce the county franchise from £15, what it had initially been lowered to, to £10 (the motion
was eventually withdrawn by its proposer in favor of a compromise solution offered by Disraeli
which settled the county franchise at £12). Rather than enfranchising rural workers, both
Liberals and Conservatives agreed that the primary effect of lowering the county qualification
would be the enfranchisement of workers in towns that were not separate parliamentary
boroughs. Joseph Whitwell Pease, a Liberal banker and colliery owner, justified his support for
this amendment arguing that “there were a number of towns with populations ranging from
32,000 and 16,000 to 10,000 and 8,000, either in his own county (Durham) or the one adjacent,
which would not be Parliamentary boroughs, and the people of which would be discontented
with their position. In these towns the only persons who had votes possessed them under the
county franchise. If the Amendment reducing that franchise to £10 were not carried, a strong
feeling of discontent would be fostered among the inhabitants of those towns.” (Hansard, 27th

While the enfranchising of urban workers underlay Liberal support for the
amendment, it was the same fact that engendered Conservative opposition. Tory MP and
landowner Henry George Liddell pointed out, “Those £10 occupations were found either in the
immediate neighbourhood of Parliamentary boroughs or within the limits of unrepresented
towns. .... He hoped that the county representation would not be handed over to the towns, as it
inevitably would if the £10 proposal were acceded to. ... He earnestly hoped they would bear in
mind that by infusing this large amount of town element into the counties, property would be
deprived of its legitimate influence in that House.” (Hansard, 27th May 1867, vol.187, 1157-8).
Charles Newdegate, another Conservative landowner, agreed, saying that “he must oppose the proposal ..., as it tended to give still greater influence to the town population, which was already over-represented.” (Hansard, 27th May 1867, vol. 187, 1166). Conservative MP and Scottish landowner Henry James Baillie voiced his concerns. “In consequence of the changes about to be made in the borough franchise the lower classes would be very largely represented in the boroughs. The middle classes looked to the counties for their representation,” he argued. “The consequence [of this amendment] would be that the holders of this franchise would quite swamp those who were connected with land. He wished to know whether that was the object of hon. Gentlemen opposite [the Liberals]?” (Hansard, 23rd May 1867, vol.187, 1167). Charles William Packe, another Tory landowner, drew attention to how this proposed change would affect electoral outcomes: “The grievance of the agricultural interest was that it was not then properly represented, and this would put them in a worse position than ever. The hon. Member for East Surrey ([The Liberal proposer of the £12 county franchise amendment] Mr. Locke King), for instance, was a county Member, but he owed his return to the electors of Southwark. There were many other county Members in the House who owed their return to the electors of the towns.” (Hansard, 27th May 1867, vol. 187, 1167-8). Packe saw that Locke King benefited electorally from having a large proportion of urban electors in his county constituency and worried about what increasing this proportion would mean for the traditional party of the counties, the Conservatives.

Fear of what democratic reform would mean for the electoral fortunes of the Conservative party was thus clearly not uncommon among Conservative MPs. In 1866, the uncertainty of postponing the redistribution portion of reform weighed heavily on their minds, while in 1867, redistribution was seen to compound the prospective injury to their electoral performance so much that their concerns were voiced outspokenly against their own party leadership. They opposed both the lowering of the borough franchise the partial lowering of the county qualification as they worried about what this would mean for their party; they saw the latter as flooding the counties with urban voters and thus eradicating their electoral advantage there, too. It is thus plausible that the causal mechanisms we suggest underlie the strong effect of
partisanship on democratic vote choice - namely, electoral strategizing - are indeed at play for legislators in 1866/7 Britain.

**Fear of redistribution**

Moreover, evidence from the parliamentary debates also reveals the plausibility of the other causal mechanism proposed, that landed elites feared the redistributive consequences that would follow the enfranchisement of the working class. This applied to Conservative as well as Liberal landowners; however, as we outlined above, only for Liberals would partisan and material pressures thus cross-cut and create an observable quantitative effect, while for Conservatives these two types of incentives create reinforcing pressures. Many MPs, mostly Conservatives, expressed concerns about the large-scale enfranchisement of the working class. The Conservative Henry John Selwin, for example, argued that if the 1866 reform bill passed, “the franchise would be handed over to those who were lowest in the scale, and who he could not believe were proper recipients of the entire electoral power. ... Representing as he did a constituency which would be most seriously affected by the Bill, he could not give even a partial consent to a measure which he believed would be so detrimental to the interests of his constituents, and so disastrous to the well-being of the country.” (Hansard, 13th April 1866, vol. 182, 1276-7). Henry George Liddell, a Conservative MP and landowner, called the 1866 bill “an insidious attempt to diminish what he called the legitimate influence of the land” (Hansard, 13th April, 1866, vol. 182, 1267). However, as expected, most Liberals saw this as a benefit. The Liberal academic Charles Neate, who did not own any land, argued, “It should be remembered that after the passing of the present Bill the landed proprietors must exert themselves in order to maintain their present influence; for they were now calling into existence a new class of county voters, especially in the county towns, and they all knew that the right of voting in these towns would be viewed with two greatest jealousy by the county proprietors.” (Hansard, 1st July 1867, vol. 188, 793)

In fact, Tory fears of being outvoted by a working-class majority were so detrimental to the passage of the bill that the Liberal John Stuart Mill proposed a form of proportional
representation. “What is it that persons of Conservative feelings specially deprecate in a plan of Parliamentary reform?” he asked. “It is the danger that some classes in the nation may be swamped by other classes. What is it that we are warned against as the chief among the dangers of democracy? not untruly as democracy is vulgarly conceived and practised. It is that the single class of manual labourers would, by dint of numbers, outvote all other classes, and monopolise the whole of the Legislature. But by the plan I propose no such thing could happen; no considerable minority could possibly be swamped; no interest, no feeling, no opinion, which numbered in the whole country a few thousand adherents, need be without a representation in due proportion to its numbers.” (Hansard, 30th May 1867, vol. 187, 1351-2)

Both Conservative and Liberals, especially landowners, further feared how the elites’ property would fare in a system with an extended franchise. James Banks Stanhope, who held almost 8000 acres in Lincolnshire in 1883, said about the Liberal 1866 proposal, “He believed the result of the new Reform Bill would be an increase of taxation”. (Hansard, 14th June 1866, vol. 184, 415). Lord Elcho, a Liberal landowner who held over 60,000 acres in various counties, was one of the leaders of the Cave of Adullam, was greatly opposed to democratic change because he feared redistribution. “Why is it desirable that we should be cautious with reference to the representation of classes?” he asked. “Because I dread class legislation in this House. ... What are the views the working classes take of this question of Reform? They desire it in order to attain a certain object. A deputation waited upon the Prime Minister, when a working man from Glasgow said that the working classes wanted Reform in order that they might be able to do what they had been obliged to do by strikes—namely, regulate wages and labour.” (Hansard, 19th April 1866, vol.182, 1667-8).

Elcho’s fellow Adullamite, Robert Lowe, criticized both the 1866 and the 1867 bills’ potential redistributive effects. “The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in answer to a deputation the other day, laid down as the principle of a Reform Bill that every man who earnestly and eagerly desired the franchise was entitled to its possession,” he said in April 1867. “He might just as well have said that the right of property was that any one who earnestly and eagerly desired to take
my purse ought to have it.” (Hansard, 8th April 1867, vol. 186, 1312). In May, his argumentation became more explicit:

“You are going to transfer power mainly to the non-electors, who are more numerous than the present constituencies. Now, what do you know of the non-electors of this country? What are their politics? What are their views? What will be their influence for good or for evil upon our institutions? ... You are handing over to new and untried persons the institutions of this country, and everything which is dear to us as Englishmen, and it is well that we should know something about them. The fact is, that the great mass of those you are going to enfranchise are people who have no politics at all. ... But they will not be always without politics; and what will they be? What must be the politics of people who are struggling hard to keep themselves off the parish—whose every day is taken up with hard, unskilled labour, and who are always on the verge of pauperism? With every disposition to speak favourably of them, their politics must take one form—socialism. ... What man will speak acceptably to them except the man who promises somehow or other to re-distribute the good things of this world more equally, so that the poor will get more, and the rich and powerful will get less? ... Do not you see that the first step after the enfranchisement of the unskilled labour class must necessarily be to turn indirect taxation into direct taxation, so assessed as to fall mainly upon the upper classes? Are you so "soft" as to suppose that, when you have stripped yourselves of political power and transferred it to these people—and they have twenty times the motive to use it that you have, for their necessity is sorer and the stake to them greater—they will consider political questions fairly, and will not consider first of all how they can benefit themselves? Of course they will.”. (Hansard, 20th May 1867, vol. 187, 788-90).

Conservatives also feared the redistributive consequences enfranchisement might have.

“[W]hen you take a class as a class,” Conservative MP Sir Hugh Cairns argued in 1866, “... they will act much as members of my own or any other profession would do—that is, in accordance with the overwhelming sense of their own interest.” He cites taxation as one of the specific areas in which lower-class legislation may cause problems for the current elites. (Hansard, 16th April 1866, vol.183, 1474). The spectre of expropriation also loomed menacingly in the 1867 House of Commons. “From the proposed degradation of the suffrage he foresaw most disastrous results”, Alexander Beresford Hope, a Conservative MP who owned over 5000 acres, exclaimed about the Conservative 1867 bill. “Then farewell to the old halls rising over the tall trees, and the spacious deer parks, for the peasantry in their ignorance and cupidity would soon be set fancying that these broad acres would best serve their purpose if cut up into freehold
Edward Bulwer-Lytton, another landowning Conservative, argued that empowering the working classes would endanger property. “[I]f we desire to create a general cause that may make any particular accident of a democratic character fatal to the mixed Constitution of this country, let us at once accept this Bill, which, should any accident occur of a nature to accelerate the impetus and widen the circle of democracy, makes the political leaders of the urban working class the masters of the situation. ... [I]f there be a country in the world in which democracy would be a ruinous experiment, it is surely a country like England, with a very limited area of soil compared to the pressure of its population”. (Hansard, 13th April 1866, vol. 182, 1238-44). His implication is that the existing distribution of land may well be endangered if the urban working classes gain the political upper hand. Viscount Cranborne, the future Marquess of Salisbury, a Tory politician who held over 20,000 acres, agreed, painting an even more menacing picture of class warfare. “If you gave to 100 men of one class power to outvote fifty of another class, you would naturally conclude, were it a matter in which you had no concern, that the fifty would have no chance whatever. ... Depend upon it, if any storm arises, if there is any question of labour against capital, any question of occupation against property, it will be no protection to you that you may have men who belong to the class of proprietors or the class of capitalists in this House; it will be no more protection to you than it was to Louis Seize that a Philippe Egalité was found among the French Revolutionists.” (Hansard, 15th July 1867, vol. 188, 1530-1).

Thus, it seems clear from the parliamentary debates that both of the causal mechanisms proposed to underlie the quantitative results from sections V and VI have textual implications. 

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52 Beresford Hope had already voiced his fears about the redistributive consequences of democratization in the debate on the failed 1859 Conservative reform proposal, arguing “Ten or fifteen years ago any idea of Socialist doctrines prevailing in this country might have been deemed imaginary; but in the year 1848 they had overwhelmed Europe. The great monarchy—now an empire—nearest to ourselves had been flooded with them; they had made their appearance in parts of Germany, and were even lifting up their heads in this country. But then it was said, on the other hand—Look at the United States. Where do you find socialism there in spite of their universal suffrage? He replied that there they did not find socialism at present, because, happily, that land was, as yet, too broad for its inhabitants. There were to be found millions upon millions of acres of virgin soil, where the workman might shoulder his axe and seek his own fortunes by proceeding to the Far West. In those parts, however, of America where population had already, to a great extent, filled up the territory, as in New York, socialist views were already assuming a dangerous proportion in the public eye. It was in an old country, where the population was dense and the struggle for subsistence was great that the spread of socialist views was most to be apprehended.” (Hansard, 24th March 1859, 740).
evidence to support them. The notion that MPs worried about partisan electoral strategies - in particular, that Conservatives opposed the large extension of the borough franchise and the smaller lowering of the county qualification because they feared that it spelled the death of their party - clearly mattered a great deal to MPs. Similarly, distributive concerns also figured prominently in their priorities, with both Liberal and Conservative landowners outlining their fears that extending the franchise lead to redistribution via taxation and/or expropriation. Though the evidence presented in this section is anecdotal rather than systematic, it complements the quantitative side of the investigation by providing evidence that our causal hypotheses may indeed be accurate.
VIII Conclusion

The first wave of democratization has been one of the primary targets for redistributive conflict theorists, who have claimed that their arguments explain the expansion of the suffrage in 19th and early 20th century Europe. Using an original dataset on the legislators in the 1865 House of Commons, this thesis has been the first to use this extensive micro-level data to put one of the core causal mechanisms proposed by such theories to the test. It has found that contrary to theories such as Acemoglu and Robinson’s, which claim that party is irrelevant, partisanship is in fact the single largest substantive factor affecting how MPs vote, with Liberal MPs being far more likely to support democratizing amendments and oppose anti-democratic ones than Conservatives. Parties are not merely conduits of individual or constituency interests, but generate incentives for self-preservation; while Liberals saw the expansion of the urban working-class vote as benefiting them electorally, Conservatives opposed the bill because they were worried about the future performance of their parties at the polls.

Furthermore, partisanship mediates the effect of landowning. While landowning does not appear to matter for Conservative MPs, Liberal landowners are less democratic than their non-landowning counterparts. They are likelier to vote for the pro-democratic side in amendments to the 1866 and 1867 bills than comparable non-landowners, and their defections from the party line are largely driven by the democratic content of the amendment in question; they are more likely to defect only when the party line is pro-democratic, while they are in fact less likely to defect when the party line is anti-democratic. These findings have been shown to be robust for two different dependent variables, individual vote choice and a constructed democratic proportion, as well as to the type of regression model used. They are also robust to various different specifications, including testing of each type of material interest separately so as to avoid collinearity masking significance; they also remain accurate when the 1866 votes are excluded, when Irish and Scottish MPs are included in the sample, or when fixed effects for each amendment are not included in the model. This robustness to model type and specification increases our confidence in the results obtained, which seem to hold up in many different
conditions. It is clear that partisan and material interests thus interact; for Conservative MPs, electoral concerns and redistributive fears reinforced one another, while they created cross-cutting pressures for Liberals. Among Liberals, partisan electoral considerations pushed MPs to support democratization, but for the landowners among them, concerns about redistribution created a dilemma. The qualitative evidence presented in section VII shows that the causal mechanisms proposed were indeed present among legislators. MPs did in fact worry about how the enfranchisement of the working class would affect both Conservative electoral success and the economic policies in the UK, particularly whether it would lead to increased taxation or even expropriation.

On one level, we can thus conclude that there is some support, on the micro level, for Boix and Acemoglu and Robinson’s claim that landowners were particularly resistant to democratization. This lends credence to their argument on the importance of landholding inequality and its changes for democratization. However, crucially, this thesis has also shown that such redistributive concerns do not operate in a vacuum. MPs are not simply driven by their redistributive concerns, nor are they merely vessels of their constituencies’ interests. Rather, political institutions integrally shape MPs’ incentive structures as well; partisanship, in particular, crucially affects MPs’ calculations. In fact, partisanship mediates the impact of redistributive concerns on MPs’ votes on democratization. Theories which ignore these political incentives in favor of exclusively structural or material explanations are thus overly simplistic and misinterpret the dynamics at work at the micro level.

On another level, this thesis has also attempted to distinguish between two separate causal mechanisms proposed in the literature for the purported difference in democratic attitudes between landowners and capitalists. While the evidence shows that Liberal landowners are less democratic than non-landowners, there is lacking support for the hypothesis that among Conservatives, capital-ownership is associated with a more democratic attitude. This null finding calls into question Acemoglu and Robinson’s other suggested causal mechanism, that capital-owners are more amenable to democracy as they have more to lose from bad labour relations. It also casts some doubt on other theories focusing on the allegedly democratic nature of the
capitalist class, such as the framework put forth by Ansell and Samuels, who suggest that capital-owners support democracy to avoid the predatory state. However, more work needs to be done before dismissing such mechanisms outright; in particular, it is possible that the effect of capital-ownership is expressed via the selection into parties, so two-stage models are needed to disentangle this relationship.

First-wave transitions were not simply a result of redistributive conflict between elites and the masses. Rather, this case study suggests that in fact, in those cases in which transition resulted from legislation, political institutions - especially parties - integrally shaped the way democratization proceeded. Caught in the electoral dilemma William Balliol Brett describes, and fearful of an alternative Liberal bill, Conservatives in 1867 ultimately opted for tacit support of their government and, thus, of a bill that most would rather have rejected. While redistributive concerns were certainly present among some MPs, both the quantitative and the qualitative evidence shows that ignoring the impact of party would be to misrepresent the political battle the 1867 Reform Act represented.
IX Bibliography


**X Appendix**

**Table A1: Multilevel Logistic Regressions with Random MP Intercepts showing the Impact of Separate Party-Mediated Material Interests on Democratic Vote**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Party</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Party (Liberal)</td>
<td>166.779 (27.176)**</td>
<td>118.101 (16.003)**</td>
<td>118.402 (16.608)**</td>
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<td>Adullamite</td>
<td>0.113 (0.0312)**</td>
<td>0.106 (0.0296)**</td>
<td>0.115 (0.0324)**</td>
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<td><strong>Party and Material Interests</strong></td>
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<td>H3 Party (Liberal)*Landowner</td>
<td>0.550 (0.118)**</td>
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<td>H3 Landowner (Conservative)</td>
<td>1.069 (0.172)</td>
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<tr>
<td>H4 Party (Liberal)*Manufacturing interest</td>
<td>1.772 (0.619)</td>
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<td>H4 Manufacturing interest (Conservative)</td>
<td>0.891 (0.265)</td>
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<tr>
<td>H4 Party (Liberal)*Finance/trade interest</td>
<td>1.431 (0.403)</td>
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<td>0.969 (0.223)</td>
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<td><strong>Constituency</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Landholding Inequality</td>
<td>558.145 (2169.579)</td>
<td>233.569 (915.306)</td>
<td>433.004 (1696.143)</td>
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<td>Landholding Inequality^2</td>
<td>0.923 (0.0466)</td>
<td>0.933 (0.0475)</td>
<td>0.926 (0.0471)</td>
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<td>Landholding Inequality^3</td>
<td>1.000 (0.000218)</td>
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<td>1.000 (0.000219)</td>
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<td>Borough</td>
<td>1.381 (0.180)*</td>
<td>1.461 (0.188)**</td>
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<td>Dominant Interest</td>
<td>0.634 (0.108)**</td>
<td>0.649 (0.112)*</td>
<td>0.624 (0.107)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voting Percentage of the Population</td>
<td>0.894 (0.0244)**</td>
<td>0.892 (0.0248)**</td>
<td>0.889 (0.0245)**</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>No. of Observations</strong></td>
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<td>9263</td>
<td>9263</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>No. of Groups</strong></td>
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<td>6077.869</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BIC</strong></td>
<td>6361.46</td>
<td>6368.427</td>
<td>6370.354</td>
</tr>
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Standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests; †p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Included, but not reported in table for clarity: dummy variables for each amendment (all models).

This Table A1 is supplementary to Table 1 in section V, and addresses two main concerns stemming from the inclusion of all the different material interests together. One potential issue is that this may bias the standard errors upward due to collinearity, thus
misrepresenting the significance of each individual effect. The other potential problem is that including all three potentially results in a misleading reference category comprising those MPs who did not have either land or capitalist interests (this reference category is composed of two main groups; one group of lawyers, teachers, engineers, journalists and academics, and one who likely lived off the land in some indirect way (younger sons of peers without any explicitly noted occupation, and army or navy officers). These models address these concerns by separating out these effects and running models including only one of the material interests at a time, interacted with party. They show that even when including each material interest separately (such that the reference category is simply ‘MPs without this interest’), landowning has the differentiated effect (significantly anti-democratic for Liberals, no significant effect for Conservatives) we see in Model 4 of Table 1.1, while neither manufacturing nor finance/trade interests have significant effects for either Liberals or Conservatives.

53 Though the same models have been run without this interaction, and the effects are largely the same.