When praised at all, imperialism is most often commended for the peace it bestowed. By demobilizing armies, deposing marauding princes and subduing war-like states, European powers fashioned a half-century of political order. The question nonetheless arises: Should they be lauded for that? In this chapter, I view Africa’s history through the lens of comparative history and argue that the imperial peace may have retarded Africa’s development.
We revisit Lipset’s law, which posits a positive and significant relationship between income and democracy. Using dynamic and heterogeneous panel data estimation techniques, we find a significant and negative relationship between income and democracy: higher/lower incomes per capita hinder/trigger democratization. We thus challenge the recent empirical literature that found no such significant relationship. We attribute this result to the nature of the tax base, and exploit additional sources of heterogeneity. Decomposing overall income per capita into its resource and non-resource components, we find that the coefficient on the latter is positive and significant while that on the former is significant but negative.
After briefly reviewing the new institutionalism, this article uses the history of political reform in Africa to test its key tenet: that power, if properly organized, is a productive resource. It does so by exploring the relationship between changes in political institutions and changes in economic performance, both at the macro- and the micro-level. The evidence indicates that political reform (Granger) causes increases in GDP per capita in the African subset of global data. And, at the micro-level, it demonstrates that changes in national political institutions in Africa strongly relate to changes in total factor productivity in agriculture.
Those who study the role of agriculture in the political economy of development
focus on government policy choices on the one hand and the impact of price shocks
on the other. We argue that the two should be studied together. We nd that civil
unrest (Granger) causes government policies, pushing governments in poor and medium
income countries to shift relative prices in favor of urban consumers. We also nd that
while civil wars are related to food price shocks, when government policy choices are
taken into account, the relationship disappears. We thus learn two things: Policies
that placate urban consumers may in
ict economic costs on governments, but they
confer political benets. And when estimating the relationship between price shocks
and political stability, equations that omit the policy response of governments are
Africa is largely agrarian and the performance of agriculture shapes the performance of its economies. It has long been argued that economic development in Africa is strongly conditioned by politics. Recent changes in Africa’s political systems enables us to test this argument and, by extension, broader claims about the impact of political institutions on economic development. Building on a recent analysis of total factor productivity growth in African agriculture, we find that the introduction of competitive presidential elections in the last decades of the 20th Century appears to have altered political incentives, resulting in policy reforms that have enhanced the performance of farmers.
Africa experienced a wave of democratization over the past 20 years and this increase in democracy, we find, positively and significantly affects income per capita. Our dynamic panel data results suggest that countries only slowly converge to their long-run income values as predicted by current democracy levels, however: African countries may therefore be currently too democratic relative to their income levels. In keeping with this possibility, a significant number of countries experience political ‘back sliding’: elections are won by the use of illicit tactics, term limits on political leaders have been overturned and there have been unconstitutional seizures of power.
The basis for segregation of sister chromosomes in bacteria is not established. We show here that two discrete ~150-kb regions, both located early in the right replichore, exhibit prolonged juxtaposition of sister loci, for 20 and 30 min, respectively, after replication. Flanking regions, meanwhile, separate. Thus, the two identified regions comprise specialized late-splitting intersister connections or snaps. Sister snap loci separate simultaneously in both snap regions, concomitant with a major global nucleoid reorganization that results in emergence of a bilobed nucleoid morphology. Split snap loci move rapidly apart to a separation distance comparable with one-half the length of the nucleoid. Concomitantly, at already split positions, sister loci undergo further separation to a comparable distance. The overall consequence of these and other effects is that thus far replicated sister chromosomes become spatially separated (individualized) into the two nucleoid lobes, while the terminus region (and likely, all unreplicated portions of the chromosome) moves to midcell. These and other findings imply that segregation of Escherichia coli sister chromosomes is not a smooth continuous process but involves at least one and likely, two major global transition(s). The presented patterns further suggest that accumulation of internal intranucleoid forces and constraining of these forces by snaps play central roles in global chromosome dynamics. They are consistent with and supportive of our previous proposals that individualization of sisters in E. coli is driven primarily by internally generated pushing forces and is directly analogous to sister individualization at the prophase to prometaphase transition of the eukaryotic cell cycle.
In this chapter, we explore patterns of variation in the content of agricultural policies in Africa. We look at the impact of the government’s need for revenues, the incentives for farmers to lobby, and their capacity to affect electoral outcomes. We also explore the political impact of regional inequality, especially insofar as it is generated by cash crop production. These factors operate in ways that deepen our appreciation of the impact of politics on the making of agricultural policies.
The period from 1960 to 2000 was one of remarkable growth and
transformation in the world economy. Why did most of Sub-Saharan Africa
fail to develop over this period? Why did a few small African economies
succeed spectacularly? The Political Economy of Economic Growth in
Africa, 1960–2000 is by far the most ambitious and comprehensive
assessment of Africa's post-independence economic performance to date.
Volume 2 supports and extends the analysis of African economic growth
presented in the first volume by providing twenty-six case studies of
individual African economies. The book is broken into three parts based
on the three main types of economy found in Sub-Saharan Africa:
landlocked, coastal and resource-rich. Eighteen of the case studies are
contained in the book and a further eight are included on an
accompanying CD-Rom. This is an invaluable resource for researchers and
policy-makers concerned with the economic development of Africa.
the later decades of the 20th century, Africa plunged into political chaos. States failed, governments became predators, and citizens took up arms. In When Things Fell Apart, Robert H. Bates advances an explanation of state failure in Africa. In so doing, he not only plumbs the depths of the continent's late-century tragedy, but also the logic of political order and the foundations of the state. This book covers a wide range of territory by drawing on materials from Rwanda, Sudan, Liberia, and Congo. Written to be accessible to the general reader, it is nonetheless a must-read for scholars and policy makers concerned with political conflict and state failure.
In the later decades of the twentieth century, Africa plunged into
political chaos. States failed, governments became predators, and
citizens took up arms. In When Things Fell Apart, Robert H. Bates
advances an exploration of state failure in Africa. In so doing, he not
only plumbs the depths of the continent's late-century tragedy, but
also the logic of political order and the foundations of the state.
This book covers a wide range of territory by drawing on materials from
Rwanda, Sudan, Liberia, and Congo. A must-read for scholars and policy
makers concerned with political conflict and state failure.
Africa and Latin America secured their independence from European colonial rule a century and half
apart: most of Latin America after 1820 and most of Africa after 1960. Despite the distance in time
and space, they share important similarities. In each case independence was followed by political instability,
violent conflict and economic stagnation lasting for about a half-century (lost decades). The parallels
suggest that Africa might be exiting from a period of post-imperial collapse and entering a period of
relative political stability and economic growth, as did Latin America a century and a half earlier.
Chromosome and replisome dynamics were examined in synchronized E. coli cells undergoing a eukaryotic-like cell cycle. Sister chromosomes remain tightly colocalized for much of S phase and then separate, in a single coordinate transition. Origin and terminus regions behave differently, as functionally independent domains. During separation, sister loci move far apart and the nucleoid becomes bilobed. Origins and terminus regions also move. We infer that sisters are initially linked and that loss of cohesion triggers global chromosome reorganization. This reorganization creates the 2-fold symmetric, ter-in/ori-out conformation which, for E. coli, comprises sister segregation. Analogies with eukaryotic prometaphase suggest that this could be a primordial segregation mechanism to which microtubule-based processes were later added. We see no long-lived replication "factory"; replication initiation timing does not covary with cell mass, and we identify changes in nucleoid position and state that are tightly linked to cell division. We propose that cell division licenses the next round of replication initiation via these changes.
We describe a new method for synchronizing bacterial cells. Cells that have transiently expressed an inducible mutant 'sticky' flagellin are adhered to a volume of glass beads suspended in a chromatography column though which growth medium is pumped. Following repression of flagellin synthesis, newborn cells are eluted from the column in large quantities exceeding that of current baby machine techniques by approximately 10-fold. Eluted cultures of 'baby cells' are highly synchronous as determined by analysis of DNA replication, cell division and other events, over time after elution from the column. We also show that use of 'minutes after elution' as a time metric permits much greater temporal resolution among sequential chromosomal events than the commonly used metric of cell size (length). The former approach reveals the existence of transient intermediate stages that are missed by the latter approach. This finding has two important implications. First, at a practical level, the baby cell column is a particularly powerful method for temporal analysis. Second, at a conceptual level, replication-related events are more tightly linked to cell birth (i.e. cell division) than to absolute cell mass.
A number of general medical journals and the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) request authors to disclose their contributions. Little is known about the effect of journal policies on authors' disclosure of their contributions.
Scholars, activists, and policy makers have argued that the route to economic growth in Africa runs through political reform. In particular, they prescribe electoral accountability as a step toward economic reform, seeing it as inducing the choice of publicly beneficial as opposed to privately profitable economic policies. To assess the validity of such arguments, we first characterize a set of political institutions that render political elites accountable and derive their expected impact on the policy choices of governments. Using ratings of macro–economic policy produced by the World Bank and ratings of corrupt practices produced for private investors, we explore the relationship between institutional forms and policy choices on both an African and global sample. While key elements of the model find empirical support, the central argument receives mixed support in the data. Political institutions have a stronger influence on policy making in Africa than elsewhere and variation in African institutions and in the structure of African economies account for differences between policy choices in Africa and those made in the rest of the world. Political accountability however does not influence the choice of macro–economic policies in the manner suggested by reformist arguments; although it does appear to lead to less political predation.
Coercion is as normal a part of life as is exchange; what matters is not its presence or magnitude but rather its structure and form. Violence can take the form of predation; it then results in mere redistribution. But violence can be rendered socially productive; it can be employed to defend property rights, thereby strengthening the incentives to engage in productive activity. To explore how violence can be rendered a source of increased welfare, we develop a model of a stateless society and then introduce a specialist in violence. Using the model and case materials, we explore the conditions under which the specialist will utilize her coercive capabilities not to engage in predation but rather to strengthen the incentives to engage in productive effort.
Prosperity and Violence considers the history of human civilization and explains the origins of the modern state, focusing on the evolution of capitalism as cultures move from dispersed agrarian clans to the dense modern metropolis. Informed by firsthand experience with the political and economic development of many diverse cultures, Bates demonstrates how successful modern states harness ethnic diversity for prosperity rather than for violence and political power. Brief and compelling, Prosperity and Violence is certain to be an excellent supplement in any comparative politics course.
In an effort to address this shortcoming, we develop in this article a model of political competition that seeks to capture important characteristics of political competition in underdeveloped polities. These characteristics include: 1. That the state is weak (Evans, Skocpol, and Rueschmeyer (1985); Evans (1995); Myrdal, Kohli, and Shu (1994)). That is, the state lacks a monopoly over the use of violence (Weber (1958)); the use of coercion is controlled by political ?lites. 2. That democratic institutions are weak. Political competition is not governed by the rules of elections. 3. That politicians compete for private rents, extracted from public revenues (Marcouiller and Young (1995)). 4. That politics is "personalistic". Because of charisma (Apter (1963)); a tradition of "big man" politics (Jackson and Rosberg (1982)); or the forces of cultural identity (Geertz (1963)), personal characteristics can be as important as issue stands in determining the appeal of politicians. To analyze political competition in political settings that share these characteristics, we develop a simple model of political competition in which two politicians compete to recruit tax–paying citizens into their respective political camps.