

**Expressive Partisanship:
Campaign Involvement, Political Emotion, and Partisan Identity**

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Abstract

Party identification is one of the most important variables within empirical American political science yet there remains disagreement over whether it is largely *instrumental* or *expressive* in nature. We draw on social identity theory to develop the expressive model and conduct three studies to compare it to an instrumental explanation of campaign involvement. We find strong support for the expressive model: a multi-item partisan identity scale better accounts for campaign activity than ideological intensity or a strong stance on subjectively important policy issues. A series of experiments underscore the power of partisan identity to generate action-oriented emotions that drive campaign activity. Strongly identified partisans feel angrier when threatened with electoral loss and more positive about an anticipated electoral victory but strong ideologues do not. Threat and reassurance to the party's status aroused more intense anger and positive emotions among partisans than a threatened loss or victory to central policy issues.

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Party identification is one of the most important variables within empirical American political science, explaining vote choice, political engagement, partisan reasoning, and the influence of partisan elites (Bartels 2002; Campbell et al 1960; Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2002; Lavine, Johnson and Steenbergen 2012; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Miller & Shanks 1996; Sniderman & Stiglitz 2012). No other single variable comes close to accounting as well or as consistently for American political behavior. Yet, there remains disagreement on the exact nature of partisanship. Campbell et al. (1960) defined partisanship in *The American Voter* as both a set of beliefs and feelings which culminate in a sense of “psychological attachment” to a political party. This has generated two competing views of partisanship (Arceneaux and Vander Wielen 2013; Lupu 2012). From an *instrumental* perspective, partisanship is a running tally of party performance, ideological beliefs, and proximity to the party in terms of one’s preferred policies. In a competing *expressive* approach, fleshed out by Green, Schickler and Palmquist (2002) in *Partisan Hearts and Minds*, partisanship is an enduring identity strengthened by social affiliations to gender, religious, or ethnic and racial groups. These social affiliations with a party and its associated groups promote an emotional attachment to the party, generate stability over time in partisan identification and vote choice, and diminish the political influence of short-term events.

The instrumental approach to partisanship has dominated political science research since at least the mid-1970s, eclipsing the original conception of partisanship developed by Campbell and colleagues in *The American Voter* which involved a mix of instrumental beliefs and expressive feelings. In the last decade, however, the expressive view of partisanship has reemerged among political behavior researchers (Fowler and Kam, 2007; Gerber, Huber, and Washington 2010; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002; Greene 2002; Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes 2012; Lupu, 2012; Nicholson 2012; Miller and Conover 2012). The approach was resurrected to account for the stability of partisan attachments, their relative immunity to short-term economic and political fluctuations, the powerful influence of partisanship on vote choice independently of issue preferences, and the power of partisan elites to

influence rank-and-file partisan opinion, evidence that is difficult to reconcile with an instrumental model (Green et al 2002; see also Cohen 2003; Dancey and Goren 2010).

Our goal in this paper is not to definitively resolve this theoretical debate but rather give it needed nuance. Both models can claim at least some empirical support and there is growing evidence that instrumental and expressive accounts of partisanship may explain vote choice and public opinion at different times, under differing conditions, and among different segments of the electorate (Arceneaux and Vander Wielen 2013; Bullock 2011; Lavine et al. 2012).¹ We advance this research by moving beyond the study of public opinion and electoral choice to focus on political action. Researchers have paid relatively little attention to the influence of partisanship on political engagement. But this is an obvious oversight at a time when American politics is characterized by increasing levels of political activity, heightened voter turnout, partisan polarization, strengthened partisanship, and partisan sorting along ideological lines (Abramowitz 2010; Bafumi and Shapiro 2009; Levendusky 2009; Mason 2013; Mason *forthcoming*). We draw profitably on the link between partisanship, political activity, and related emotions to explore the expressive and instrumental nature of partisan activity. From our perspective, political action constitutes a realm of political behavior in which expressive partisanship should be especially powerful because emotion is so intimately tied to action. We examine the effects of partisanship on political activity and engagement and find that partisan actions taken during an election campaign, such as donating money and working for a candidate, are driven by partisan identity, and that the emotions that drive action are highly responsive to the threats and reassurances implicit within an

¹ There is strong evidence, for example, of elite partisan influence on partisan public opinion and competing evidence on parallel evidence on the limits to this influence (Cohen 2003, Bullock 2012). Individuals with a high need for cognition best fit an instrumental account of partisanship whereas those with a high need for affect better fit the expressive model (Arceneaux and Vander Wielen 2013). Partisans who feel ambivalent about their party (holding both positive and negative views) fit the expectations of an instrumental model whereas partisans who lack such ambivalence look more like expressive partisans (Lavine et al. 2012).

election campaign. These findings lend added support to an expressive model of partisanship and underscore a realm of political behavior in which it plays a central role.

Political Participation

It has been known for some time that partisans participate more actively in politics than political independents, care more about it, and follow it more closely (Campbell et al 1960; Green et al 2002; Lewis-Beck et al 2008). Unfortunately, this fact has not been widely acknowledged in popular models of political participation and engagement. Current political science research has largely focused on stable motivations for political involvement, such as the availability of an individual's time, money or other resources, the internalization of civic norms (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995), the possession of political information (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Levendusky 2011), or stable individual differences such as risk acceptance (Kam 2012), openness to experience, and extraversion (Dawes, Loewen and Fowler 2011; Mondak et al 2010), that vary little with the dynamics of a political campaign. Such static approaches lend weak insight at best into the dynamic nature of political activity over time, and have difficulty accounting for current levels of partisan fervor.

Over the last decade, American politics has been characterized by increased partisan disagreement and heightened levels of political activity (Mason 2013; Mason *forthcoming*; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). On the surface, there is reason to believe that this heightened political activity could stem from either expressive or instrumental partisan motives. On one hand, involvement could be expressive, grounded in partisan loyalty and the protection and advancement of the party independently of policy issues. Partisan identities have strengthened in recent years, potentially increasing political activity and driving the powerful emotions that underlie action. On the other hand, campaign involvement could be largely instrumental, based on the protection and advancement of valued public policies and political ideology. There is a growing link between ideology and partisanship

that may have strengthened the instrumental basis of partisan identification, generating strong emotions and action in defense of cherished policy issues (Abramowitz, 2010; Bafumi and Shapiro 2009).

In this research, we compare an instrumental and expressive account of partisanship and examine the degree to which each model explains campaign involvement and the strong emotions in which it is grounded. Before turning to this comparison, however, we flesh out in greater detail social identity theory which provides a strong theoretical foundation for the expressive approach, including the dynamic nature of partisanship. The theory generates a number of novel insights into the origins of campaign involvement and action-oriented emotions that fuel our empirical predictions. Much has been written concerning the instrumental approach (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981) but the intellectual origins of expressive partisanship in social identity theory are less well known in political science and require further elaboration.

Partisanship as an Expressive Social Identity

Social identity theory provides a strong foundation for the study of partisanship and political involvement (for reviews see Brown 2000; Ellemers & Haslam 2012; Huddy 2001;). A social identity involves a subjective sense of belonging to a group which is internalized to varying degrees, leading to important individual differences in identity strength, and a desire to positively distinguish the group from others, leading to the development of ingroup bias. Moreover, once identified with a group, or in this instance political party, members are motivated to protect and advance the party's status and electoral dominance (Huddy 2001; 2013). This motivation to protect party status increases with partisan strength, generating the expectation that the strongest partisans will work most actively to increase electoral victory and partisan group status. The social identity model of partisan politics is not very different from that advanced to explain the ardor and actions of sports fans. Weakly identified fans may

attend games when the team is doing well and skip those where defeat is likely, but strong fans hang on and participate, even when the team is sure to lose, in order to boost their team's chances of victory.

Our emphasis on partisan action grounded in the need for positive social status differs from the approach outlined by Green et al (2002) who consciously distance themselves from social identity theory's motivational aspects, saying "Our perspective....differs from what is commonly termed *social identity theory*". They go on to say "We focus on how people categorize themselves and remain agnostic about the underlying psychological motives that impel people to form social identities" (p. 11). From our perspective, the motivational underpinnings of social identity theory are *central* to understanding its expressive nature and ability to motivate political action. Partisans take action precisely because they wish to defend or elevate the party's political position. Their internalized sense of partisan identity means that the group's failures and victories become personal. In that sense, we provide a more complete and dynamic account of expressive partisanship than found in previous political behavior research.

The maintenance of positive group distinctiveness is an active process, especially when a group's position or status is threatened, helping to account for the dynamic nature of partisan political activity (Huddy 2013; Mackie et al 2000). Elections pose threats to both a party's power and less tangible goods such as group members' collective social standing, and electoral involvement is one way in which partisans can defend their party against such potential losses or ensure gains.² When fully developed, a social identity account of partisanship accommodates fluctuations in political interest and involvement, viewing it as a response to intergroup threat and reassurance. The strongest partisans respond actively to threat as a way to defend the group. This is consistent with extensive research on

² Threat also transforms amicable intergroup relations into one of hostility and dislike, helping to explain Iyengar and colleagues' (2012) finding that Democrats and Republicans have come to increasingly dislike each other over the last several decades in an era characterized by partisan discord, belligerence, and heightened electoral competition. This dislike should be most pronounced among the strongest partisans.

the dynamics of collective action which frequently occurs in response to threatened group status and is most common among strong movement identifiers (Simon et al, 1998; Simon and Klandermans 2001; Sturmer & Simon, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears 2008).³ But strong partisans should also respond actively to reassurance because such expressive behavior feels inherently good in much the same way that assured victory increases fan enthusiasm and turnout at a sporting event.

Expressive Partisanship and Action-Oriented Emotions.

Emotions play a central role in explaining political engagement because they are intimately tied to action (Damasio 1994; Frijda 1986; Izard 1993). Self-reported emotions can be sorted into very basic positive and negative dimensions that are equated with behavioral approach and avoidance tendencies. On balance, anger and positive emotions are considered approach emotions that are most likely to drive action (Carver 2004; Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones 2004; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Lerner and Keltner 2000; Lerner and Tiedens 2006). In politics, anger motivates political interest and protest activity, and positive enthusiasm is associated with political engagement (Groenendyk and Banks 2013; Huddy et al. 2007; Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al 2000; Smith et al 2008; Thomas, McGarty & Mavor, 2009; van Zomeren, Spears, and Leach 2008; Valentino et al 2008; Valentino et al 2011). For political partisans, anger is most likely to arise in response to electoral threats and positive emotions increase under conditions of reassurance; both threat and reassurance are thus conditions that are likely to arouse action-oriented emotions and generate political activity among strong partisans.

Emotions are a major facet of group life, including partisan politics, and are often most intense among the strongest group identifiers who feel angrier than weak identifiers in response to a collective threat (Musgrove & McGarty 2008; Rydell et al., 2008; van Zomeren, Spears & Leach 2008). Green et al

³ Van Zomeren et al. (2008) conducted a meta-analysis of collective action research and found that strongly identifying with an aggrieved group is one of three key factors that are reliably associated with political action. The two other determinants are the existence of a group-based grievance and a sense of group efficacy.

(2002) note differing partisan emotions after George W. Bush was deemed to be the winner of the contentious 2000 presidential election with Republicans feeling “thrilled” and “relieved”, Democrats feeling “angry” and “cheated”, and independents feeling far less emotion. Strong group identifiers are also more likely than weak identifiers to vilify an opposing group under conditions of threat (Cadinu and Cerchoni 2001; Huddy 2013; Mackie et al 2000). A similar dynamic is at work within electoral politics. Miller and Conover (2012) found that strong partisans were angrier than weak partisans at the actions of the other party in the 2010 Congressional elections.

Strong group identifiers also feel more positive emotion when their group status is enhanced. For example, strong partisans in the U.S. felt increased *schadenfreude*, a complex positive emotion, when they read about bad things happening to or reflecting poorly on a political candidate of the other party. They even felt this positive emotion in reaction to events that were clearly negative, such as increased U.S. military deaths in Iraq (Combs et al., 2009). We expect strong partisans to feel similarly positive when something good happens to their party or they anticipate electoral victory. This expectation helps to explain an interesting paradox. If strong partisans expect to win an election there is little instrumental need for them to participate. Yet the heightened positive feelings generated by an expected victory will motivate them to get involved because positive emotion is a prelude to action.

Measuring Partisan Social Identity

To test an expressive approach to partisanship we measure *partisan identity* as a multi-item scale that assesses an internalized sense of party membership. Measuring gradations in social identity strength is crucial to identifying the individuals who react most strongly to collective threat, feel the strongest emotions, and are most likely to take action in defense of their group or political party (Huddy 2001; 2013). Indeed, an individual’s actions on behalf of a group vary in direct accordance with the strength of her group identity, a point that cannot be over-emphasized. As a consequence, psychologists typically measure social identities with multiple items to create a fine-grained scale of identity strength,

an approach that has only rarely been applied to partisanship (Huddy 2013). There is some precedent and empirical support for measuring partisanship in this way. Steven Greene (1999, 2002, 2004) developed a ten item scale of partisan social identity, based on Mael and Tetrick's (1992) Identification with a Psychological Group Scale, which had good measurement properties and was a better predictor than the standard partisan identification measure of a range of political variables including political involvement. Green et al. (2002) also measured partisanship with 3 items, similar to those in Greene's (2002) scale, for inclusion in a 1999 Roper Starch survey, finding close ties between this scale and the traditional partisanship measure. Unfortunately, the multi-item identity measure of partisanship has not been widely adopted and is sorely needed to understand variation in levels of partisan political action.

Instrumental Partisanship: An Alternative Perspective.

The instrumental approach to partisanship and political involvement differs from an expressive approach in several key respects. First, instrumental political involvement should arise in support of important issues or a strong ideologically issue-based agenda (Abramowitz and Saunders 2006). This is consistent with the instrumental view that partisanship conveys support for the party that most consistently and strongly represents one's interests, ideology, and issue preferences (Fiorina 1981; Franklin and Jackson 1983). There is evidence that contemporary American partisanship has a stronger instrumental foundation than in the past as partisanship has become more closely aligned with ideology and salient political issues (Abramowitz, 2010; Bafumi and Shapiro 2009). From this instrumental perspective, partisanship should drive political action among those who hold the most intense and ideologically consistent position on issues championed by their political party. This action has little or nothing to do with protection of the party's group status but is motivated instead by a defense of ideology and issues.

Second, from an instrumental perspective action-oriented emotions such as anger should arise in response to a threat to a valued policy issue, broad ideology, or to the party which adopts issue stances closest to one's own. From this vantage point, Republican Tea Party activists get angry and take political action in defense of a political agenda that includes lowered taxes and smaller government whereas activist Democrats become angry and politically involved in defense of health care reform and progressive taxation. In an instrumental framework, partisans feel positive enthusiasm when their ideology, an important issue, or the political party which best represents their interests is likely to succeed or advance. Thus, political action on an issue such as gay marriage will escalate as the likelihood increases of its legislative passage, arousing heightened levels of enthusiasm among its supporters. If partisanship is largely instrumental in nature, action-oriented emotions should be grounded in the defense or advancement of key policy concerns.

Third, a multi-item partisan identity scale should have little influence on political activism and action-oriented political emotions independently of issue-linked and ideological instrumental concerns. The instrumental approach views issue concerns as the driving force in political action and emotion. In contrast, the expressive approach predicts that partisan identity will have powerful influence on political action and action-oriented emotions independently of issues and ideology, especially under conditions of party losses and gains. From an expressive perspective, the identity scale should also be more politically effective than the traditional folded partisan strength scale because it is focused solely on identity (not a mix of instrumental and expressive concerns) and captures very fine gradations in the strength of subjectively internalized identity.

Hypotheses

In summary, we test both the instrumental and expressive approaches to partisanship. First, we examine political action as a function of instrumental concerns such as ideological strength, strong

stances on specific issues, and strong stances on important issues, and contrast their effects with that of expressive partisan identity, measured by the multi-item partisan identity scale. Second, we examine the degree to which action-oriented political emotions – anger and enthusiasm-- are instrumental or expressive in nature. Specifically, we examine the degree to which political anger is driven instrumentally by threats to ideology and issue positions and is felt most intensely by the strongest ideologues, or whether it is expressive in nature, reflecting a threat to one’s party status that is experienced most intensely by those with the strongest partisan identity. We also examine the degree to which political enthusiasm is driven by similar competing forces: the likely success of one’s ideology and issues positions or promised electoral victory and enhanced party status.

Research Studies

To compare instrumental and expressive models of campaign engagement, we draw on data from three studies conducted among populations that differ in their level of political activity: a highly engaged sample obtained from political blogs, a less politically engaged sample of students, and a less engaged representative sample of New York state residents. Our goal in surveying all three populations was to ensure that our findings were robust to political sophistication and habitual levels of involvement. The inclusion of an activist population was especially important in this study to ensure a fair test of instrumental and expressive partisanship among those who are most actively engaged in American politics. Respondents in the Blog and Student studies were disproportionately Democratic and all analyses are conducted separately among Democrats and Republicans (see online Appendix 3). Virtually all findings are fully replicated among Democrats and Republicans when analyzed separately, with one exception which we note. For ease of presentation, we combine findings for Democrats and Republicans in the body of this manuscript.

Blog Study: Over 3,000 respondents were recruited from political blogs to participate in an online survey conducted from March 17 until May 2, 2008 during the 2008 presidential election. The study contains 145 Republicans, 1,828 Democrats, and 1,080 independents.⁴ Analyses are confined to Republicans and Democrats (n=1,973).

Student Study: 315 undergraduate students participating in a subject pool at a north-eastern university completed an on-line survey in the spring of 2010. The sample contained 50 Republicans, 168 Democrats, and 97 independents. The analytic sample is also confined to Republicans and Democrats (n=218).

New York State Poll: 806 adult New York state residents participated in an RDD telephone survey conducted during May of 2011.⁵ The sample contained 288 Democrats, 200 Republicans, and 304 independents. Analyses include Republicans, Democrats, and independent leaners (n=677).

In all three studies, respondents answered a series of questions about their political identity, partisanship, and activism. The partisan identity questions were not asked of independent leaners in the Blog and Student study but were asked of leaners in the New York state study. The Blog and Student studies also include an experiment in which the respondents read a fictitious blog entry about the upcoming 2008 Presidential election (Blog Study) or the 2010 Congressional election (Student Study) to gauge their emotional reactions to partisan threat and reassurance.

Sample Description

The characteristics of respondents in all three studies are presented in Table 1. The blog sample is the most partisan and politically active as expected, consistent with evidence that blog readers are among the most politically polarized citizens (Lawrence, Sides and Farrell, 2010). Over 50 percent of blog respondents describe themselves as strong partisans (on the traditional partisan strength

⁴ Subjects were recruited from 6 liberal, 4 conservative, and two bipartisan blogs, including one particularly high-volume liberal blog.

⁵ The household-level cooperation rate was 41 percent.

measure), compared with roughly 30 percent of students and NY state residents. Sixty-seven percent of blog respondents had contributed money to a political campaign compared to less than 40 percent of NY state adults and 12 percent of students, and 33% of blog respondents had worked for a party or candidate compared to 24 percent of students and 20 percent of NY state adults. The blog respondents are also far more politically sophisticated than others. They were asked a standard 5-item knowledge quiz that included questions about the positions held by Dick Cheney, John Roberts, Nancy Pelosi, and Harry Reid, and the name of the majority party in the House of Representatives and over 87% were correct on all five items. In contrast, 53 percent of students and 30 percent of NY state adults were correct on all questions in similar knowledge quizzes.⁶

****INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ****

⁶ The student sample was asked 5 questions concerning the current job position of Joe Biden, Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, John Roberts, and the name of the majority party in the House of Representatives, and the NY state sample was asked 3 questions concerning the current job position of Joe Biden and John Boehner and how many years a US senator serves before he or she needs to face an election.

Table 1. Full Sample Characteristics

	Blog Study	Student Study	NY State Poll
Democrats (%)	58.4	53.3	36.0
Republicans (%)	4.7	15.9	24.1
Independents/Leaners (%)	36.9	30.8	39.9
<i>Partisan Strength</i>			
Strong (%)	52.0	30.2	31.4
Not so strong (%)	11.1	39.1	28.8
Independent leaner (%)	29.7	23.5	26.1
Pure Independent (%)	7.2	7.3	13.8
<i>Activism</i>			
Ever worked for party, candidate, organization (%)	33.3	23.6	20.0
Ever contributed money to party, candidate (%)	67.3	12.1	37.8
<i>Sophistication</i>			
Correct on all political knowledge questions (%)	87.8	53.0	29.7
Post blog comments weekly or more often (%)	24.5	---	---
Female (%)	22.0	47.9	59.8
Average age (years)	47.1	20.4	54.7
College Grad (%)	67.8	---	59.4
N	3055	315	806

Note: All Entries are percentages except for age, which is in years. The Blog Study and Student Study included five political knowledge questions and the NY State Poll included 3. Subsequent analyses are confined to Democrats and Republicans, excluding independents and independent leaners, in the blog and student studies. Data remain unweighted in the NY State poll.

Measures

Traditional Partisan Strength. In all three studies, traditional partisan strength is based on the standard ANES question: “Generally speaking do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, or an Independent?” Democrats and Republicans were asked if they were strong or not so strong partisans and independents were asked if they were closer to Democrats or Republicans (leaners). The scale was then folded to ignore partisan direction. The measure of partisan strength is effectively limited to two levels (strong, not so strong) in analysis of the Blog and Student studies (because Independents were excluded from the partisan identity scale). Partisan strength has three points (leaner, not so strong, strong) in the NY State Poll because partisan identity was assessed among leaners.

Partisan Identity. The partisan identity scale is based on typical questions used to measure social identities such as national identity (Huddy and Khatib 2007; Schildkraut 2011; Sniderman et al., 2004; Theiss-Morse 2009). These items are drawn in turn from standard social psychological identity scales that tap subjective group identity. Wording and frequencies are provided in Table 2. Questions are worded for a specific party based on a respondent’s answer to the initial standard partisanship question for partisans in all three studies, and partisan leaners in the NY state poll.⁷

⁷ 13.8 percent of the respondents in the NY State poll were pure Independents, 11.4 percent were Republican leaners, and 14.7 percent were Democratic leaners.

Table 2. Partisan Identity by Study

	Blog Study, excludes leaners	Student Study, excludes leaners	NY State Poll, includes leaners
“How important is being a [Democrat/ Republican] to you?”			
Extremely important (%)	29.1	6.9	11.6
Very important (%)	39.8	47.5	37.7
Not very important (%)	26.9	43.8	36.6
Not important at all (%)	4.1	1.8	14.1
“How well does the term [Democrat/ Republican] describe you?”			
Extremely well (%)	23.0	6.5	11.3
Very well (%)	55.0	56.0	47.6
Not very well (%)	21.2	36.1	31.9
Not at all (%)	0.9	1.4	9.3
“When talking about [Democrats/ Republicans], how often do you use “we instead of “they”?”			
All of the time (%)	17.1	6.5	9.5
Most of the time (%)	36.6	21.7	13.8
Some of the time (%)	27.6	33.6	26.7
Rarely (%)	14.5	23.5	22.4
Never (%)	4.2	14.8	27.5
“To what extent do you think of yourself as being a [Democrat/ Republican]?”			
A great deal (%)	49.9	22.1	26.6
Somewhat (%)	39.8	53.9	44.8
Very little (%)	9.6	22.1	20.6
Not at all (%)	0.7	1.8	8.1
Partisan Identity Scale (0-1)			
Mean partisan identity, total sample (N)	0.68 (1973)	0.55 (218)	0.51 (675)
Mean partisan identity, Democrats (N)	0.69 (1828)	0.53 (168)	0.53 (396)
Mean partisan identity, Republicans (N)	0.64 (144)	0.61 (50)	0.49 (279)

Note. Entries in the top panels are percentages; entries in the bottom panel are mean scores on the partisan identity scale in which 1 represents the strongest identity.

Partisan identity was far stronger among the more actively engaged blog sample than among students and NY state respondents, ranging from a high of .68 in the Blog study to a low of .51 among NY state residents, on a 0 to 1 scale. Differences in identity strength between the Blog and Student studies are striking. For example, 56% of Democrats and Republicans in the blog sample referred to their fellow partisans as “we” all or most of the time compared to only 28% of student partisans. Fifty percent of the blog partisans but only 22% of the student partisans thought of themselves in partisan terms a great deal. There were also modest differences in partisan identity strength between Republicans and Democrats. Mean levels of partisan identity are lower among Republicans than Democrats in the Blog Study ($t=-2.641$, $df=1845$; $p<.01$) and the NY state poll ($t=-1.958$, $df=673$, $p<.1$), and slightly higher among Republicans than Democrats in the Student Study ($t=2.49$, $df=216$; $p<.05$). The four identity items were combined to form a reliable partisan identity scale in each study (α ranged from .81 to .83).

**INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE **

Current electoral activity was assessed in the Blog and Student study. Blog study respondents were asked about their likely involvement in the ongoing 2008 presidential election campaign and students about their involvement in the 2010 Congressional campaign.⁸ Respondents in both studies were asked four questions: whether they planned to contribute money to (1) presidential/Congressional candidates, (2) political organizations, and planned to volunteer (3) for presidential/Congressional candidates, and (4) political organizations. All four questions were combined to form a reliable scale of current electoral activity in the Blog ($\alpha=.74$), and Student Study ($\alpha=.74$).

Past electoral activity was assessed in the Blog and NY State Poll with two items drawn from the ANES survey: “Have you ever worked for a political candidate, political party, or any other organization that supports candidates?” and “Have you ever contributed money to a political party or candidate?”⁹

⁸ These items were not asked in the NY State Study because it was conducted in May of 2011, too far in advance of the 2012 presidential election to obtain reliable answers.

⁹ Most students were too young to have worked on a previous campaign.

The past electoral activity scale was somewhat less reliable than current activity; the correlation between the two items was .30 in the Blog Study and .36 in the NY State Poll.

Ideological Strength. Respondents were asked to place themselves on a 5-point liberal-conservative ideology scale: very liberal, moderately liberal, moderate, moderately conservative, very conservative. This was folded to form a 3 point ideological strength scale (very, moderately, or moderate).

Ideological Issue Intensity. To measure instrumental facets of partisanship, respondents in the Blog Study were randomly assigned to three questions on social (gay marriage, abortion, and prayer in schools) or economic issues (taxes on the wealthy, government spending on health care, and government spending on public education) (see online Appendix 1 for exact question wording in all studies). A measure of ideological issue intensity was created from these questions by first combining them into a multi-item issue scale and then folding the scale to assess intensity (following Erikson and Tedin 2010; Asolabehere et al. 2010). Before folding, items formed reliable social ($\alpha=.71$) and economic issue scales ($\alpha=.86$) that ranged from very liberal to very conservative.¹⁰

Students were asked three policy questions on a mix of social and economic policies— public health insurance, gay marriage and government services vs. spending which were combined to form a moderately reliable scale of ideological issue preferences ($\alpha=.59$). New York state residents were asked three questions on public health insurance, tax increases versus spending cuts, and gay marriage that were combined to form a moderately reliable issue scale ($\alpha=.59$). In each sample, the scale was folded in half so that a higher score on the issue intensity scale indicates a stronger position on issues in a consistent liberal or conservative direction.

The mean level of ideological issue intensity among partisans varied (on a 0-1 scale) across populations from a high of .82 in the Blog study (.85 for Democrats and .58 for Republicans), to a

¹⁰ The two ideological issue intensity measures were considered equivalent; for some respondents ideological issue intensity was social and for others economic.

moderate .43 in the Student Study (.37 for Democrats and .45 for Republicans), and .48 (.50 for Democrats and .48 for Republicans) in the NY State Poll. The bivariate correlation between partisan identity and ideological issue intensity was relatively weak in all three studies (.06 in the Blog Study, .27 in the Student Study, and .13 in the NY State Poll).

Partisan Threat and Reassurance Experiment

We conducted an experiment in both the Blog and Student studies to determine whether the action-oriented emotions of anger and enthusiasm aroused in response to electoral threat or reassurance were best explained by expressive or instrumental partisanship. In both studies, respondents read an experimentally altered blog entry (blended from actual political blogs) that promised electoral victory or threatened electoral defeat for the respondent's party.

In the Blog Study respondents were randomly assigned to one of 4 experimental conditions (threat vs. reassurance X inparty vs. outparty source) and a fifth control condition. They read a fictitious blog entry in which a member of their own or the other party claimed their party would win (reassurance) or lose (threat) the upcoming election. In the *threat* condition, sample blog phrases for Democrats included "Republicans will hold onto middle Americans", "Republicans will be back in control in 2008," and "America remains a conservative country with a clear preference for Republican ideals of smaller ... government." In the Republican threat conditions, Democrats served as the source of threat.

In the *reassurance* condition, sample phrases for Democrats included "Republicans should get used to being in the minority for the foreseeable future", "Hey, Republicans, it sucks but it's time to seriously face facts. We're in trouble in 2008," and "in 2008, we're [Democrats] taking even stronger control of Congress." For Republicans in the reassurance condition, Republicans were portrayed as the likely winners. All threat and reassurance conditions referred primarily to the party's gain or loss of status and secondarily to policy losses. The threatening message generated far more anger than did the reassuring message regardless of in or outparty source, and reassurance generated far more enthusiasm

than did threat. For this reason, in and outparty reassurance conditions are combined, and the in and outparty threat conditions are combined to form a single dummy variable for threat vs. reassurance regardless of source.¹¹ Exact wording of the experimental blog postings is included in online Appendix 2.

The experiment in the Student Study included a third factor to better compare the effects of instrumental and expressive threat and reassurance in a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design (threat vs. reassurance X in vs. outparty source X party status vs. issues) resulting in 8 conditions plus 3 others that are omitted from analyses.¹² The rhetoric in the party status conditions was comparable to that used in the Blog Study (without any reference to issues). The issue-based rhetoric referred to policy gains or losses without mentioning a loss or gain in status for either political party. For example, Democrats in the *issue threat* condition read a blog entry that included the following phrases: “This election is shaping up as a backlash against larger government”, and “We can forget about improving our health care system.” In the Democratic *issue reassurance* condition, the blog entries suggested victory for health care and gay marriage. Republican threat made reference to the success of health care and gay marriage initiatives whereas the Republican reassurance condition suggested there would be a backlash against massive government spending and an end to socialized medicine (see online Appendix 2 for full wording).

Emotions. After reading the blog entry, respondents were asked 6 questions on how they felt while reading it: angry, hostile and disgusted (*anger*) and hopeful, proud, and enthusiastic (*enthusiasm*), responding on a four-point scale (a great deal, some, a little, not at all). Reliable scales were created for both anger and enthusiasm in each of the studies (α ranged from .88 to .93).

¹¹ An added control condition containing roughly a fifth of respondents in the Blog study is excluded from the analysis because respondents were not exposed to the blog message, leaving 1,497 partisans in the emotions analyses.

¹² The Student Study contained a control condition without a message (and thus no measure of emotion) and 2 conditions in which experts threatened a loss or gain for party issues. The “expert” conditions were not crossed with party status and are dropped from analyses to ensure a comparable test of status and issue threat, leaving 153 partisan in the emotions analyses.

All variables are coded on a 0 to 1 scale, with the exception of age which is measured in decades.

Partisan Identity and Campaign Activism

The first analyses provide support for an expressive view of partisan political action. Partisan identity has a more powerful effect on past and current political activity than ideological issue intensity, or the traditional folded measure of partisan strength. Findings, reported in Tables 3-4, are based on regression analyses in which past and current political activism are regressed onto partisan identity, ideological issue intensity, traditional folded partisan strength, education (to measure the resource model of participation) and key demographics linked to political engagement (gender, age, racial/ethnic background). The results are similar across all three samples. Partisan identity has a powerful effect on past electoral activity in Table 3 and current activity in Table 4 that is substantively large and independent of instrumental concerns as seen in a large and significant coefficient for partisan identity in columns 2 and 4 of both tables.¹³ In the Blog Study, partisan identity has a large effect on current levels of electoral activity that is more than twice the size of the coefficient for educational attainment (column 2, Table 4). The multi-item ideological issue intensity scale is linked to past electoral activity among New York state residents and blog activists, and thus political activity stems to some degree from the ideological defense or advancement of specific policy issues (Tables 3 and 4).¹⁴ But it has no significant effect on past electoral activity in the Blog Study or on current activity in the Student Study, suggesting its effects are weaker and less consistent than that of partisan identity.

****INSERT TABLE 3 & 4 ABOUT HERE ****

¹³ Partisan identity and traditional partisan strength are correlated at .47 in the blog sample, .50 in the student sample, and .54 in the New York State poll. Diagnostic tests for multicollinearity do not return a variance inflation factor greater than 2.92 for any variable, suggesting that multicollinearity is not significantly affecting the results.

¹⁴ In the Blog Study, strong, ideologically consistent positions on social issues significantly increases past ($\beta=.26$, $s.e.=.22$) and current electoral activity ($\beta=.09$, $s.e.=.05$) whereas strong, consistent positions on economic issues does not. Nonetheless, the coefficient for social issues remains far smaller than that of partisan identity.

The impressive relationship between partisan identity and electoral activity is apparent in Panels A and B of Figure 1 which show the predicted level of current electoral activity across levels of partisan identity (based on analyses in columns 2 and 4, Table 4). In the Blog Study, a highly engaged political group, white males with the weakest partisan identity are predicted to score between .1 and .2 on the activity scale. This increases to over .5 for white males with the strongest partisan identity as seen in Panel A, Figure 1. In the Student Study, white males with the weakest partisan identity are essentially at 0 on the scale whereas those with the strongest identities are at roughly .3, as seen in Panel B.¹⁵ Partisan identity is thus powerfully associated with current electoral activity in both a non-activist and activist sample.¹⁶ The effects of partisan identity are also larger and more consistent than ideological issue intensity measures in all instances, as can be seen by comparing Panels A and C, and B and D in Figure 1. The slopes for partisan identity are substantial and positive as already noted. In contrast, the slope for ideological issue intensity is weakly positive in the Blog study and slightly negative in the Student Study.

The power of partisanship is far less evident when partisanship is measured in the traditional fashion and folded. This measure of partisan strength predicts past and current political activity but its coefficient is much smaller than that of partisan identity. As seen in Tables 3 and 4, the traditional partisan strength measure has a modest positive effect on past and current political activity when partisan identity is omitted from the model (as shown in columns 1 and 3, Tables 3 and 4). Moreover, the coefficient for partisan identity is 2 to 4 times greater than that of partisan strength in the initial models.

****INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ****

¹⁵ There are only two white males below .2 on the partisan identity scale suggesting caution in placing undue emphasis on the negative score for current electoral activity.

¹⁶ In the NY State Sample, an alternative model that included a control for income (not available in the blog sample) obtained the same findings.

Table 3. Determinants of Past Electoral Activity

	1	2	3	4
	Blog Study, Partisan Strength	Blog Study, Partisan Strength & Identity	NY State Poll, Partisan Strength	NY State Poll, Partisan Strength & Identity
Partisan strength	.27 (.07)***	.13 (.08)	.37 (.12)***	.12 (.14)
Partisan identity	--	.56 (.16)***	--	.91 (.25)***
Ideological issue intensity	.14 (.12)	.15 (.12)	.55 (.16)***	.52 (.16)***
Education	.92 (.12)***	.97 (.12)***	2.10 (.34)***	2.26 (.35)***
Gender (male)	-.24 (.06)***	-.22 (.06)***	.25 (.10)**	.22 (.10)**
Age (decades)	.21 (.02)***	.20 (.02)***	.20 (.04)***	.18 (.04)***
White	--	--	.34 (.26)	.32 (.27)
Black	--	--	.60 (.30)**	.48 (.30)
Children in household	--	--	-.07 (.13)	-.06 (.13)
<i>/Cut 1</i>	<i>1.01 (.19)</i>	<i>1.28 (.21)</i>	<i>3.53 (.45)</i>	<i>3.83 (.49)</i>
<i>/Cut 2</i>	<i>2.27 (.20)</i>	<i>2.54 (.21)</i>	<i>4.54 (.46)</i>	<i>4.86 (.50)</i>
<i>Pseudo R²</i>	<i>.06</i>	<i>.06</i>	<i>.10</i>	<i>.11</i>
<i>N</i>	<i>1828</i>	<i>1828</i>	<i>601</i>	<i>601</i>





Note. Entries are ordered probit coefficients with robust standard errors reported in parentheses. All variables range between 0 and 1 except for age which is measured in decades. Partisan strength has two points in the Blog Study and 3 points in the NY State Poll (see text for details). All tests of significance are two-tailed. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 4. Determinants of Current Electoral Activity

	1	2	3	4
	Blog Study, Partisan Strength	Blog Study, Partisan Strength & Identity	Student Study, Partisan Strength	Student Study, Partisan Strength & Identity
Partisan strength	.13 (.02)***	.03 (.02)	.12 (.04)***	.03 (.04)
Partisan identity	--	.38 (.04)***	--	.49 (.10)***
Ideological issue intensity	.07 (.04)**	.07 (.04)**	-.07 (.06)	-.08 (.06)
Education	.14 (.04)***	.17 (.04)***	--	--
Gender (male)	-.07 (.02)***	-.05 (.02)***	-.02 (.03)	.01 (.03)
Age (decades)	.02 (.01)***	.02 (.00)***	--	--
White	--	--	-.06 (.05)	-.09 (.05)*
Black	--	--	-.10 (.07)	-.15 (.06)**
Asian	--	--	-.01 (.05)	-.03 (.05)
Constant	.10 (.05)**	-.09 (.05)*	.14 (.06)**	-.07 (.07)
<i>Adj. R²</i>	.06	.09	.07	.17
<i>N</i>	1825	1825	210	210

Note. Entries are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables range between 0 and 1 except for age which is measured in decades. All tests of significance are two-tailed. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Figure 1: Predicted Value of Current Electoral Activity by Partisan Identity and Ideological Issue Intensity



Note. Entries are predicted values of current electoral activity across levels of partisan identity or ideological issue intensity for white males (all other values held at their mean or mode) estimated from equations in columns 2 and 4 of Table 4.

As noted, the samples tend to be skewed towards Democrats, the Blog Study seriously so, and all analyses were repeated separately for Democrats and Republicans. The greater power of partisan identity than instrumental concerns to shape political action is replicated among both Democrats and Republicans. Partisan identity significantly increased current and past political activity among both Democrats and Republicans with one exception (in 8 separate tests; online Appendix 3). In every instance, strong Democrats are more likely than weak Democrats to have engaged in past and current electoral activity, whereas ideological issue intensity only increased past activity among Democrats in the NY State poll but had no effect on past activity in the Blog Study or on current activity levels in the Blog and Student Studies. In a similar vein, a strong Republican identity was associated with heightened past electoral activity in the NY State poll (but not the Blog Study in the one non-finding) and higher levels of current activity in the Blog and Students studies whereas ideological intensity was not associated with greater past or current levels of political action in any of the studies.

A measure of ideological intensity may not fully capture the influence of instrumental concerns on political activism, however, and we conducted a number of other tests to compare its effects with that of partisan identity. First, we ran separate analyses for social and economic ideological intensity in the Blog Study. Ideologically consistent positions on social issues increases past ($\beta=.25$, $s.e.=.18$) electoral activity although this is barely significant in a one-tailed test of significance and the coefficient remains far smaller than that of partisan identity ($\beta=.54$, $s.e.=.22$). A strong, ideologically consistent position on social issues does not increase current activism, however. Moreover, an ideologically consistent position on economic issues affects neither past nor current activity. Second, when the strength of a respondent's stance on each individual issue is included in the analyses, a strong position on gay marriage increased past ($\beta=.34$, $s.e.=.15$) and current involvement ($\beta=.10$, $s.e.=.04$) but did not decrease the size of the coefficient for partisan identity in the Blog Study. And a strong position on the

other two social issues (prayer in schools and abortion) or the three economic issues (health care, taxes on the wealthy, education) did not boost activism.

Third, in the Student Study the importance of each issue and the respondent's position on it was measured and analyses were conducted to determine if current activism was increased among those who felt strongly about a specific issue which they rated as personally important.¹⁷ The analysis yielded no support for this prediction, however. In an equation similar to that shown in Table 4, ideological issue intensity was replaced by the three issues, their rated importance, and the interaction between each issue and its importance.. None of the three interactions between rated importance and strength of issue stance significantly increased activism

Fourth, we replaced ideological intensity with a folded measure of ideological strength but it had no significant effect on past or current activism in any of the three studies. Fifth, we created a measure of party issue congruence (a dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent held the "correct" party position on an issue) in the Blog Study. Current activism was greater among those who held the party position on health insurance ($b=.08$, $s.e.=.04$), gay marriage ($b=.05$, $s.e.=.03$), and prayer in school ($b=.06$, $s.e.=.03$). Party congruence on prayer in school ($b=.18$, $s.e.=.10$) also increased past activism. But the coefficient for partisan identity remained large and significant in all models. These analyses bolster the conclusion that partisan identity has a far more powerful influence on activism than ideological intensity or specific issue concerns.

In other respects, electoral activity conforms to expectations. It is greater among better educated, older, and male respondents in the NY State sample, and among better educated and older respondents in the Blog Study. Somewhat surprisingly, male activists were less politically active than women in the Blog study. Black and white students were less active in the 2010 campaign than other

¹⁷ Respondents were asked "How important is this issue to you personally?" on a 5-point response scale. Issues were gay marriage, government health care, and government spending.

students (largely Latino and Asian), although racial differences in past activity were not evident in the NY state sample.¹⁸

In sum, a multi-item scale of partisan identity is a far better predictor of past and current campaign involvement than the traditional measure of partisanship or instrumental issue-based concerns. This result holds among highly engaged political activists, and moderately engaged students and NY state residents. Even among highly involved political activists, partisan identity provides unique insight into past and current electoral activity that cannot be explained by education, ideological issue intensity, ideological strength, or the traditional folded measure of partisanship. Moreover, the identity scale works well even when it excludes partisan leaners (in the Blog and Student Studies).

Partisan Identity and Emotion

We turn next to contrast expressive and instrumental models as explanations for the arousal of action-oriented emotions in response to partisan threat and reassurance. We focus first on respondents in the Blog Study who are politically knowledgeable and thus present a tough test of the hypothesis because they may be desensitized to arousing messages. In the following analyses, reported in Table 5, feelings of anger and enthusiasm are regressed onto threat and reassurance and their interaction with partisan identity and ideological issue intensity. The expressive model gains support if partisan identity interacts with threat and reassurance to generate more intense emotion, whereas the instrumental model gains support if ideological issue intensity interacts with threat and reassurance. We also test several alternative instrumental models, including whether partisans who hold strong issue positions congruent with those of their party react with greater emotion to electoral threat and reassurance. Finally, we also examine whether partisan or issue-based threat and reassurance arouses the strongest emotions among respondents in the Student Study.

¹⁸ The blog sample was overwhelmingly white (91%) and there were too few ethnic and racial minority respondents to distinguish in analyses.

Anger and Enthusiasm

Strongly identified partisans respond to a threatening message with greater anger than weak partisans, and to a reassuring message with greater enthusiasm. These effects are large and dominate other factors in Table 5 (columns 2 and 4). The traditional folded partisan strength measure has a modest significant interaction with threat and reassurance when identity is excluded from the model, as seen in columns 1 and 3 of Table 5. But this effect is erased by the inclusion of party identity and its interaction with threat or reassurance. Overall, strongly identified partisans react most emotionally to threat and reassurance. The large and significant interaction between partisan identity and threat on both emotions is fully replicated when analyses are run separately among Democrats and Republicans (online Appendix 3, Tables A3_5 – A3_6).

** INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE **


Instrumental concerns also influence emotions. Strong issue ideologues in the Blog Study do not react more angrily to threat but do feel more enthusiastic when exposed to a reassuring message. When analyses (not shown here) include individual issues, those with the same position as their party on abortion felt most angry when the party was threatened with an electoral loss ($\beta=.19$, $s.e.=.07$; for the interaction term), those who shared their party's position on government spending on health care ($\beta=.10$, $s.e.=.04$), public education ($\beta=.14$, $s.e.=.09$), and taxing the wealthy ($\beta=.25$, $s.e.=.11$) felt most positive when reassured. But in this same analysis, there was an even larger interaction between partisan identity and threat or reassurance (similar in magnitude to that seen in Table 5). Overall, the coefficient for the interaction between ideological issue intensity and reassurance in the Blog Study is less than half the size of the coefficient for the comparable interaction with partisan identity in Table 5 (column 4). Analyses thus provide intriguing evidence that action-arousing emotions are a product of both expressive and instrumental concerns, although those with a strong partisan identity react most emotionally.

Table 5. Experimental Threat and Reassurance as Determinants of Anger and Enthusiasm, Blog Study

	Anger		Enthusiasm	
	1 Party Threat	2 Party Threat	3 Party Reassurance	4 Party Reassurance
Partisan strength	-.01 (.03)	.01 (.03)	-.01 (.03)	-.04 (.03)
Partisan Identity	--	-.07 (.07)	--	.11 (.06)*
Party threat/reassurance	.26 (.06)***	.04 (.08)	.11 (.07)	-.06 (.08)
Partisan strength × threat/reassurance	.10 (.04)**	-.01 (.04)	.15 (.04)***	.05 (.05)
Partisan identity × threat/reassurance	--	.44 (.09)***	--	.37 (.09)***
Ideological issue intensity	.06 (.05)	.06 (.05)	.00 (.04)	.01 (.04)
Ideological intensity × threat/reassurance	-.03 (.07)	-.03 (.07)	.17 (.07)**	.15 (.07)**
Gender (male)	-.04 (.02)**	-.03 (.02)*	.04 (.02)**	.05 (.02)***
Education	-.05 (.04)	-.04 (.04)	-.12 (.04)***	-.10 (.04)***
Age (decades)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.02 (.01)***	.01 (.01)*
Constant	.24 (.07)***	.27 (.07)***	.18 (.06)***	.13 (.07)*
<i>Adj. R</i> ²	0.22	0.24	0.28	0.31
<i>n</i>	1482	1482	1482	1482

Note. Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients (robust standard errors in parentheses). All variables range between 0 and 1 except for age which is measured in decades. Issue and party threat are coded 1 and reassurance is coded 0 in columns 1-2; reassurance is coded 1 and threat is coded 0 in columns 3-4. All tests of significance are two-tailed. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Figure 2. The Marginal Effect of Experimental Party Threat and Reassurance on Anger and Enthusiasm By Partisan Identity and Ideological Issue Intensity



Note. Entries are the marginal effect of threat on anger or reassurance on enthusiasm across levels of partisan identity or ideological issue intensity for white males (all other values held at their mean or mode) estimated from equations in columns 2 and 4 of Table 5.

The stronger effect of partisan identity than ideological intensity on emotional response to partisan threat and reassurance are apparent in Figure 2 which depicts the marginal effects of threat and reassurance on anger and enthusiasm across levels of partisan identity (Panels A and B) and ideological issue intensity (Panels C and D). The figure shows clearly that threat and reassurance arouse the most powerful emotion among the strongest partisan identifiers. In contrast, ideologically intense respondents are no more likely than others to react to threat with anger, and are only slightly more likely to react positively to reassurance.

**** INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ****

Instrumental and Status-Based Threat and Reassurance

The degree to which action-oriented emotions are aroused by losses and gains to party status or policy issues is contrasted directly in the Student Study. Findings reveal that those with a strong partisan identity react with increased anger to a party defeat but not a policy loss, and feel greater enthusiasm when faced with the prospect of partisan rather than issue-based gains (see Online Appendix 2 for exact wording).¹⁹ When students are exposed to a threat to their party's electoral status, the most strongly identified partisans react with greater action-oriented emotion than do weak partisans as seen by a large, significant interaction between identity and threat in columns 1 and 4 of Table 6. There is little evidence, however, that a threat to issues arouses strong action-oriented emotions. Strongly identified partisans do not react to issue threat with greater anger, nor do they react to issue reassurance with greater enthusiasm (column 2 and 5, Table 6).

Moreover, ideological issue intensity does not interact with a policy threat or reassurance to increase anger or enthusiasm (Table 6, columns 3 and 6). In the experimental issue-based blog post, the

¹⁹ Findings hold for both Republicans and Democrats when analyzed separately but are unreliable for Republicans due to a small sample size (n=29) and we only present analyses for Democrats in online Appendix 3 (Tables A3_7 and A3_8).

party position on health care and gay marriage was either threatened or reassured. But anger did not increase among those who held the party's position most strongly on gay marriage, or rated it as personally important. Likewise, those with a strong position on gay marriage that was consistent with their party did not feel more enthusiastic when the party's position was bolstered by the experimental blog message. The same holds for health care. Those who most strongly endorsed the party's position on government health care spending or rated it as important did not react more emotionally than others when that position was threatened or reassured in the blog posting. These findings make clear that the emotional ups and downs of an election campaign are tied far more closely to status-related concerns over winning and losing the election than to policy-related gains and losses, lending further empirical support to an expressive model of partisanship.

Table 6. Experimental Party and Issue-Based Threat and Reassurance as Determinants of Anger and Enthusiasm, Student Study

	Anger			Enthusiasm		
	1 Party Threat & Partisan Identity	2 Issue Threat & Partisan Identity	3 Issue Threat & Ideological intensity	4 Party Reassurance & Partisan Identity	5 Issue Reassurance & Partisan Identity	6 Issue Reassurance & Ideological Intensity
Partisan identity	-.21 (.16)	.20 (.14)	.24 (.14)*	.22 (.16)	.40 (.14)***	.32 (.14)**
Ideological issue intensity	--	--	-.21 (.11)*	--	--	.22 (.11)*
Party threat / support	-.51 (.14)***	--	--	-.08 (.16)	--	--
Issue threat / support	--	.15 (.21)	.15 (.12)	--	.26 (.19)	.26 (.11)**
Partisan identity X Party threat/support	1.04 (.23)***	--	--	.57 (.29) **	--	--
Partisan identity X Issue threat/support	--	-.04 (.40)	--	--	-.19 (.35)	--
Ideological intensity X Issue threat/support	--	--	-.01 (.24)	--	--	-.24 (.23)
Gender (male)	-.09 (.05)*	-.11 (.05)**	-.13 (.05)**	.02 (.05)	.01 (.05)	.02 (.05)
White	.03 (.06)	.04 (.07)	.08 (.06)	.07 (.06)	.03 (.06)	.01 (.06)
Black	-.11 (.11)	-.04 (.12)	-.00 (.11)	.05 (.10)	-.00 (.12)	-.02 (.11)
Asian	-.02 (.07)	.01 (.07)	.02 (.07)	.06 (.07)	.02 (.07)	.01 (.07)
Constant	.50 (.10)***	.27 (.10)***	.32 (.10)***	.06 (.10)	.03 (.09)	-.01 (.10)
Adj. R ²	0.16	0.08	0.08	0.19	0.11	0.09
n	146	146	144	146	146	144

Note: Issue and party threat are both coded as 1 and support is coded as 0 in columns 1-3; support is coded as 1 and threat is coded as 0 in columns 4-6. Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). All variables range between 0 and 1. All tests of significance are two-tailed.

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Conclusion

The current research extends the study of partisanship by focusing on its link to political campaign involvement and examining whether partisan political actions largely reflect an expressive social identity and the defense of party status *or* the instrumental protection and advancement of policy and ideology. Findings underscore the power of an expressive partisan identity to drive campaign involvement and generate strong emotional reactions to ongoing campaign events. The greater power of partisan identity over the effects of instrumental issue positions suggest that partisan identity is capable of driving passionate behavior beyond the cool, logical considerations typically understood to motivate political engagement among political sophisticates (Miller 2011).

The findings generated by this research are grounded in social identity theory, a well-established approach to intergroup relations that is supported by a vast empirical literature (Huddy 2013). When partisanship is viewed as a social identity, it is easier to account for the dynamic nature of political campaign involvement. Strong partisans react to partisan threat with increased action, helping to explain rising levels of political involvement in recent close elections when the threat of loss is real and control of the presidency and Congress has moved back and forth across the political landscape. Social identity theory also generates a slew of other predictions, most of which remain untested, about American political behavior as partisan identity intensifies: elevated elite partisan influence, increased conformity around key party issues, growing intolerance of those in the other party, heightened party cohesion that reduces internal conflict, the vilification of internal dissenters, the optimism of strong partisans who are motivated tend to see the party as infallible, and so on.

Findings uncovered in this study also suggest that an “all or nothing” approach to partisanship as either instrumental or expressive, but not a mix of both, may prove to be an unnecessary simplification. We come down firmly on the side of expressive partisanship as the primary driver of campaign involvement, especially in close elections when the threat of electoral loss is ever present. These are the circumstances in which victory or defeat is most palpable and status loss or gain most obvious and dramatic. Not surprisingly, someone with a strong partisan

identity will feel elated after an election victory and depressed after defeat. But party status is less likely to be affected by a single policy victory or defeat outside of an election because it does not alter the formal balance of partisan power and status. At these times, between elections, other identities and political considerations may drive political involvement and action, based on concerns about a specific issue or event. In that sense, a singular focus on the collection of data during an election campaign may inadvertently elevate the power of expressive over instrumental concerns, which is appropriate for the study of campaign involvement but perhaps not for other aspects of political behavior.

The greater emotionality of strong partisans, especially their greater anger in response to threat, helps to explain the vitriolic nature of current party politics (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, *in press*). Once angry, partisans are less influenced by information, more likely to act, minimize the risk associated with action, take riskier actions, and in general drive politics in an extreme direction (Huddy et al 2007). In a revealing study, Hartbridge and Malhotra (2011) found that strong partisans were the only group of Americans to express less support for bipartisan than partisan politicians of their party. Of course, the positive side of intense partisan identities is increased political involvement. Strong partisan enthusiasm for party candidates increases voter turnout and other forms of electoral activity (Marcus et al 2000).

The social nature of partisanship revealed in our research provides a tantalizing glimpse of the insights to be gained by regarding partisanship and partisan emotions as a product of intergroup relations and conflict. We look forward to a growing body of research in this vein.

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Online Appendix 1: Ideological Issue Intensity Items

Blog Study, Social Issues

What is your position regarding the unconditional legalization of abortion?

What is your position regarding a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage?

What is your position regarding Christian prayer in public schools during classroom time?

[Response options: Strongly support, Support, Weakly support, Weakly oppose, Oppose, Strongly oppose]

Blog Study, Economic Issues

What is your position regarding government spending on public health care?

[Response options: The federal government should spend a lot more, some more, a little more, a little less, some less, a lot less]

What is your position regarding the amount of taxes the wealthy should pay?

[Response options: The wealthy should pay a lot more taxes than they do now, some more, a little more, a little less, some less, a lot less.]

What is your position regarding government spending on public education?

[Response options: The federal government should spend a lot more, some more, a little more, a little less, some less, a lot less.]

Student Study

Do you agree or disagree that the government should reduce spending by providing fewer services, even in areas such as health and education?

[Response options: Strongly disagree, disagree, Neither, Agree, Strongly agree]

How important is this issue to you personally?

[Response options: Extremely important, Very Important, Moderately important, Slightly important, Not important at all]

Do you agree or disagree that it is the government's responsibility to make sure that everyone in the United States has adequate health care?

[Response options: Strongly disagree, disagree, Neither, Agree, Strongly agree]

How important is this issue to you personally?

[Response options: Extremely important, Very Important, Moderately important, Slightly important, Not important at all]

Do you approve or disapprove of allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry legally?

[Response options: Strongly disagree, disagree, Neither, Agree, Strongly agree]

How important is this issue to you personally?

[Response options: Extremely important, Very Important, Moderately important, Slightly important, Not important at all]

NY State Poll

How strongly would you support or oppose creating a public health insurance option administered by the federal government that would compete with plans offered by private health insurance companies?

[Response Options: Strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, strongly oppose]

Which approach to reducing the United States' deficit and debt would you prefer to see the government focus on more...?

[Response Options: Increasing taxes a great deal, increasing taxes some, cutting spending on government services some, cutting spending on government services a great deal.]

How strongly do you support or oppose gay and lesbian couples marrying legally?

[Response Options: Strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, strongly oppose]

Online Appendix 2: Experimental Blog Comments

Blog Study:

All comments were preceded by the following: We are interested in your reactions to statements about the outcome of the recent Congressional elections and the upcoming 2008 Presidential election that have been circulating on the web. The following statement is taken from one of the following web sites: Redstate.com, Dailykos.com, Townhall.com/blog, Firedoglake.com, Freerepublic.com, Mydd.com, Anklebitingpundits.com, Huffingtonpost.com. Please read through the statement carefully. You will be asked some questions about it after reading it.

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of five conditions (the four experimental conditions below of threat and reassurance originating with an in or out-partisan plus a control condition). Threat and reassurance were worded differently for Democrats and Republicans to give the messages greater political realism. The wording used to threaten or reassure Republicans was flipped to reassure or threaten Democrats.

Republican Threat/ Democratic Reassurance

Republican Outgroup Threat/Democratic Ingroup Reassurance:

"I love watching Republicans sweat! This is my favorite election ever! We are raising more money than them, we are more excited about our candidates than they are, and they are running in circles desperately trying to convince themselves that America still trusts them! Our current Congress is no aberration. It is a big shift, towards responsible, reasonable, government. And in 2008 we're taking even stronger control of Congress, and we're taking back the White House! People are fed up with the conservative anti-government attitude toward governing. Republicans lost a lot of credibility over the years, it's going to take more than fearmongering to get it back. In just one short year it'll be our turn, and the American people will see what governing is supposed to be. I am so glad that little experiment is over and Americans have finally returned to their senses. Republicans should get used to being the minority for the foreseeable future. I can't wait for January 2009!"

Republican Ingroup Threat/Democratic Outgroup Reassurance:

"Hey Republicans, it sucks but it's time to seriously face facts. We're in trouble in 2008. McCain sucks for so many reasons. Even if you like his policies, there's no way he can win. The Dem candidates are actually raising more money than we are, which puts us in some kind of bizarro-world where our greatest advantages are now our weaknesses. It feels like it's just not going to be a pretty picture for the next 5 years. Our policies are not getting through to people. It looks like most voters have never heard of the founding fathers, much less care what they founded this country to be. It pains me to say this, but we may as well admit that our ideas are out of favor right now and we're not going to win the presidency in 2008. The Democrats are going to ruin our country and there's nothing we can do to stop them. We'd better all get ready for being the minority in Washington for the foreseeable future and hope that Americans finally come to their senses."

Republican Reassurance /Democratic Threat

Republican Ingroup Reassurance /Democratic Outgroup Threat:

"I love watching Democrats delude themselves! They're talking a big game, but look closer and they know they're in trouble. In head to head presidential match-ups we are neck and neck with them, and that's with Bush's approval ratings in the toilet. America clearly wants Republican leadership, and the Democrats are running in circles desperately trying to convince themselves that anyone in America trusts them! People don't trust Democrats and they don't like their politics. Republicans will hold on to middle America... the middle class we've held for decades. As long as middle America agrees with us, these two years in Congress will be a short trip for

Democrats. Unfortunately for them, the middle class disagrees with most of their platform. They lost a lot of credibility over their years of flip-flopping, it's going to take more than a couple of years to get it back. But, I'm glad they are in denial. They shouldn't get too comfortable in those Congressional offices."

Republican Outgroup Reassurance/Democratic Ingroup Threat:

"Ok Democrats, it's time to seriously face facts. Things are not as good as they appear for 2008. We may very well lose this election. Republicans in 2008 are well-organized, have a strong get-out-the-vote machine, already have a nominee, and because Bush is no longer on the ticket to weigh them down, they may just surprise us all. Republican ideology is far from dead. Conservatives outnumber liberals in this country and have for a long time! America remains a conservative country with a clear preference for Republican ideals of smaller, LESS effective government. Unfortunately, the American public WANTS conservative politicians. It pains me to say this, but it's a definite possibility that Republicans will be back in control in 2008, and we'll be totally screwed for the foreseeable future."

Student Study:

All comments were preceded by the following: "The following statement recently appeared on a Democratic blog. Please read it and then tell us how it made you feel." Students were assigned to the 8 listed below plus 3 that are not analyzed in this study.²⁰ The latter three conditions are omitted from analyses in this study. (a control with no message plus 10 experimental conditions in which threat and reassurance originated with an in or out-partisan. In addition, the threat and reassurance was aimed either at the party or specific issues.

STATUS-BASED THREAT

Republican Threat/ Democratic Reassurance

Status-based Republican Outgroup Threat/Democratic Ingroup Reassurance:

"2010 is going to be an important election for Democrats. We are raising more money than Republicans, our candidates are in safer seats, and Republicans have lost Americans' trust. Our current Congress is the beginning of a long-term Democratic majority that will be strengthened by the 2010 midterm election. Finally, we'll take a super-majority of Congress and won't have to worry about the Republican filibuster anymore! I am glad that Americans have finally returned to their senses. Republicans should get used to being the minority for the foreseeable future. Democrats will hold our central place in the leadership of the country."

Status-based Republican Ingroup Threat/Democratic Outgroup Reassurance

"2010 is going to be a bad election for us Republicans. We have a lot of vulnerable seats opening up in this election, and Americans still don't trust us. We're being blamed for everything that's wrong right now. It pains me to admit this, but our party is out of favor and we're not going to take back Congress in 2010. The Democrats are going to win a super-majority in Congress and there's nothing we can do to stop them. We'd better all get ready for remaining in the minority in Washington for the foreseeable future."

Republican Reassurance /Democratic Threat

Status-based Republican Ingroup Reassurance /Democratic Outgroup Threat

"2010 is going to be an important election for Republicans. We are raising more money than Democrats, our candidates are in safer seats, and Democrats have lost Americans' trust during the last few years of a Democratic Congress. Our current Congress is proving to Americans that

²⁰ Omitted conditions include a control condition with no message and two conditions in which the message was not from a partisan source.

Democrats do not deserve to be in the majority, and Americans will make that known in 2010. Finally, we'll take Congress back. I am so glad that Americans have finally returned to their senses. Democrats should not get used to being the majority party. Republicans will take back our central place in the leadership of the country."

Status-based Republican Outgroup Reassurance /Democratic Ingroup Threat

"2010 is going to be a bad election for us Democrats. We have a lot of vulnerable seats opening up in this election, and Americans are losing trust in us to get the job done. The economy is not getting any better and we're being blamed for everything that's wrong right now. It pains me to admit this but our party is in a bad spot and we could lose Congress in 2010. The Republicans are going to take Congress back and there's nothing we can do to stop them. We'd better all get ready for being the minority in Washington for the foreseeable future."

ISSUE- BASED THREAT

Republican Threat/ Democratic Reassurance

Issue-based Republican Outgroup Threat/Democratic Ingroup Reassurance:

"2010 is going to be an important election for political ideas. After this election there will finally be enough votes available in Congress to fix the economy using actual knowledge instead of blind ideology. The elections will provide a super-majority in Congress that can provide health care for all Americans, not just those with jobs and money, and make it easier for all adults to get married if they want to, no matter who they are. Finally, the day is arriving where these ideas will hold a central place in the leadership of the country."

Issue-based Republican Ingroup Threat/Democratic Outgroup Reassurance

"2010 is going to be a bad election for sensible political ideas. After this election Congress could be in a position to completely socialize the economy by nationalizing banks, raising taxes on hard working Americans, and expanding government bureaucracy. Expect to see socialized medicine, government meddling in a family's health decisions, and enforced gay marriage all across the country. It appears that reasonable ideas are losing their power in this country and we will be in the minority in Washington for the foreseeable future."

Republican Reassurance /Democratic Threat

Issue-based Republican Ingroup Support/Democratic Outgroup Threat

"2010 is going to be an important election for political ideas. This election is shaping up as a backlash against larger government and massive government spending. Proven free-market strategies and tax cuts that give Americans the free right to their own money will make a comeback in 2010. The election will provide enough votes in Congress to stop socialized medicine, health decisions, and enforced gay marriage all across the country. Finally, the day is arriving where sensible ideas will hold a central place in the leadership of the country."

Issue-based Republican Outgroup Support/Democratic Ingroup Threat

"2010 is going to be a bad election for sensible political ideas. After this election Congress could be in a position to wreck the economy using blind ideology instead of actual knowledge. We can forget about improving our health care system, or allowing all adults to get married if they want to, no matter who they are. It will be back to the same market strategies and tax cuts that failed so badly in the past. After 2010, reasonable ideas may be out of favor once again in Washington for the foreseeable future."

**Online Appendix 3: Key Analyses Re-estimated Separately
for Republicans and Democrats**

Table A3_1: Determinants of Past Electoral Activity for Republicans and Democrats, NY State Poll

	Republicans		Democrats	
	1	2	3	4
	Partisan Strength	Partisan Strength & Identity	Partisan Strength	Partisan Strength & Identity
Partisan Strength	.21 (.19)	.06 (.22)	.50 (.16)***	.17 (.19)
Partisan Identity	--	.57 (.38)*	--	1.14 (.35)***
Ideological Intensity	.25 (.23)	.22 (.23)	.79 (.23)***	.78 (.23)***
Education	2.08 (.58)***	2.17 (.61)***	1.93 (.41)***	2.17 (.41)***
Gender (male)	.30 (.16)**	.28 (.16)**	.26 (.14)**	.23 (.14)*
Age (decades)	.25 (.07)***	.23 (.07)***	.17 (.05)***	.15 (.05)***
White	-.08 (.52)	-.06 (.55)	.65 (.29)**	.58 (.30)**
Black	-.31 (.53)	-.30 (.56)	.76 (.32)***	.59 (.33)**
Children in household	-.09 (.22)	-.09 (.23)	-.04 (.16)	-.04 (.16)
/Cut 1	3.26 (.92)	3.43 (.98)	3.65 (.51)	4.07 (.53)
/Cut 2	4.41 (.95)	4.58 (1.02)	4.60 (.52)	5.05 (.54)
Pseudo R ²	.10	.10	.11	.13
N	257	257	344	344

Note. Entries are ordered probit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables range between 0 and 1 except for age which is measured in decades. Tests of significance are one-tailed.

* $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Table A3_2: Determinants of Past Electoral Activity for Republicans and Democrats, Blog Study

	Republicans		Democrats	
	1	2	3	4
	Partisan Strength	Partisan Strength & Identity	Partisan Strength	Partisan Strength & Identity
Partisan Strength	.38 (.24)*	.28 (.30)	.25 (.08)***	.12 (.09)*
Partisan Identity	--	.35 (.57)	-	.57 (.16)***
Ideological Intensity	-.12 (.31)	-.12 (.32)	.10 (.14)	.11 (.14)
Education	.05 (.51)	.08 (.51)	.99 (.12)***	1.04 (.13)***
Gender (male)	.43 (.24)**	.43 (.24)**	-.27 (.07)***	-.25 (.07)***
Age (decades)	.25 (.08)***	.24 (.08)***	.21 (.02)***	.20 (.03)***
/Cut 1	1.15 (.53)	1.31 (.59)	0.98 (.21)	1.25 (.22)
/Cut 2	2.41 (.55)	2.58 (.61)	2.24 (.21)	2.52 (.23)
<i>Pseudo R</i> ²	.07	.07	.06	.06
<i>N</i>	138	138	1690	1690

Note. Entries are ordered probit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables range between 0 and 1 except for age which is measured in decades. Tests of significance are one-tailed

* $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Table A3_3: Determinants of Current Electoral Activity for Republicans and Democrats, Blog Study

	Republicans		Democrats	
	1	2	3	4
	Partisan Strength	Partisan Strength & Identity	Partisan Strength	Partisan Strength & Identity
Partisan Strength	.20 (.05)***	.14 (.06)***	.12 (.02)***	.02 (.02)
Partisan Identity	--	.21 (.15)*	--	.39 (.05)***
Ideological Intensity	.05 (.09)	.05 (.09)	.02 (.04)	.03 (.04)
Education	.06 (.13)	.07 (.13)	.16 (.04)***	.19 (.04)***
Gender (male)	-.00 (.08)	-.00 (.08)	-.07 (.02)***	-.05 (.02)***
Age (decades)	.04 (.02)***	.04 (.02)**	.02 (.01)***	.02 (.01)***
Constant	-.13 (.17)	-.23 (.18)*	.16 (.06)***	-.04 (.06)
<i>Adj. R</i> ²	.13	.14	.05	.09
<i>N</i>	138	138	1689	1689

Note. Entries for the blog and student studies are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All variables range between 0 and 1 except for age which is measured in decades. Tests of significance are one-tailed.

* $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

Table A3_4: Determinants of Current Electoral Activity for Republicans and Democrats, Student Study

	Republicans		Democrats	
	1	2	3	4
	Partisan Strength	Partisan Strength & Identity	Partisan Strength	Partisan Strength & Identity
Partisan Strength	.25 (.08)***	.10 (.09)	.09 (.04)***	.01 (.04)
Partisan Identity	--	.58 (.21)***	--	.46 (.12)***
Ideological Intensity	-.01 (.11)	-.10 (.12)	-.06 (.07)	-.08 (.07)
Gender (male)	-.04 (.07)	-.05 (.07)	-.02 (.04)	.01 (.04)
White	.01 (.16)	-.05 (.16)	-.08 (.05)*	-.08 (.05)**
Black	--	--	-.10 (.07)*	-.15 (.06)***
Asian	.05 (.17)	.00 (.17)	-.01 (.06)	-.03 (.05)
Constant	.02 (.16)	-.18 (.16)	.16 (.06)***	-.02 (.08)
<i>Adj. R</i> ²	.18	.28	.05	.14
<i>N</i>	48	48	162	162

Note. Entries for the blog and student studies are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All variables range between 0 and 1. Tests of significance are one-tailed

* $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

Table A3_5: Determinants of Anger for Republicans and Democrats, Blog Study

	Republicans		Democrats	
	1	2	3	4
Partisan Strength	-.17 (.10)*	-.10 (.09)	.01 (.03)	.03 (.04)
Partisan Identity	--	-.26 (.14)**	--	-.06 (.07)
Party Threat	.21 (.14)*	-.18 (.21)	.24 (.07)***	.03 (.09)
Partisan Strength × Threat	.17 (.13)*	-.04 (.13)	.08 (.04)**	-.02 (.05)
Partisan Identity × Threat	--	.85 (.29)***	--	.41 (.09)***
Ideological Issue Intensity	-.02 (.09)	-.00 (.09)	.01 (.06)	.01 (.06)
Ideological Intensity × Threat	-.02 (.16)	-.04 (.16)	-.00 (.08)	.01 (.08)
Gender (male)	-.02 (.08)	-.02 (.06)	-.04 (.02)**	-.03 (.02)*
Education	-.23 (.13)**	-.22 (.13)**	-.03 (.04)	-.02 (.04)
Age (decades)	.01 (.02)	.01 (.02)	.01 (.01)*	.01 (.01)
Constant	.46 (.17)***	.48 (.18)**	.25 (.07)***	.28 (.08)***
<i>Adj. R</i> ²	0.32	0.37	0.22	0.24
<i>n</i>	112	112	1370	1370

Note. Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). All variables range between 0 and 1 except for age which is measured in decades. Tests of significance are one-tailed

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A3_6: Determinants of Enthusiasm for Republicans and Democrats, Blog Study

	Republicans		Democrats	
	1	2	3	4
Partisan Strength	-.05 (.08)	.04 (.11)	-.00 (.03)	-.04 (.03)
Partisan Identity	--	-.35 (.23)*	--	.15 (.06)***
Party Reassurance	.04 (.15)	-.31 (.18)**	.18 (.08)***	.03 (.09)
Partisan Strength × Reassurance	.24 (.12)***	.02 (.14)	.13 (.04)***	.04 (.05)
Partisan Identity × Reassurance	--	.83 (.31)***	--	.33 (.10)***
Ideological Issue Intensity	.22 (.12)**	.23 (.12)**	-.03 (.06)	-.02 (.05)
Ideological Intensity × Reassurance	-.21 (.18)	-.24 (.18)*	.13 (.09)*	.12 (.08)*
Gender (male)	-.02 (.09)	-.02 (.08)	.05 (.02)***	.06 (.02)***
Education	-.01 (.13)	.00 (.13)	-.12 (.04)***	-.10 (.04)***
Age (decades)	.03 (.02)**	.03 (.02)*	.02 (.01)***	.01 (.01)
Constant	-.01 (.14)	.17 (.18)	.20 (.07)***	.14 (.07)**
<i>Adj. R</i> ²	<i>0.15</i>	<i>0.21</i>	<i>0.30</i>	<i>0.32</i>
<i>n</i>	<i>112</i>	<i>112</i>	<i>1370</i>	<i>1370</i>

Note. Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). All variables range between 0 and 1 except for age which is measured in decades. Issue and party threat are both coded as 1 and support is coded as 0 in columns 1-2; support is coded as 1 and threat is coded as 0 in columns 3-4. Tests of significance are one-tailed

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A3_7. Experimental Party and Issue-Based Threat as Determinants of Anger among Democrats, Student Study^a

	Democrats		
	1 Party Threat & Partisan Identity	2 Issue threat & Partisan Identity	3 Issue Threat & Issue Intensity
Partisan Identity	-.05 (.18)	.36(.16)**	.36 (.15)***
Issue Intensity	--	--	-.14 (.11)
Party Threat	-.50 (.15)***	--	--
Issue Threat	--	.12 (.21)	.19 (.14)*
Partisan Identity X Party Threat	1.03 (.26)***	--	--
Partisan Identity X Issue Threat	--	-.01 (.45)	--
Ideological Intensity X Issue Threat	--	--	-.15 (.26)
Gender (male)	-.11 (.06)**	-.12 (.06)**	-.15 (.05)***
White	-.05 (.07)	.03 (.07)	.02 (.07)
Black	-.13 (.11)	-.06 (.12)	-.03 (.12)
Asian	-.06 (.08)	-.04 (.07)	-.03 (.07)
Constant	.43 (.11)***	.20 (.11)**	.24 (.12)***
<i>Adj. R</i> ²	0.20	0.13	0.16
<i>n</i>	117	117	115

Note: Issue and party threat are both coded as 1 and support is coded as 0. Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). All variables range between 0 and 1.. Tests of significance are one-tailed.

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

a. There were too few Republican respondents to analyze separately

Table A3_8. Experimental Party and Issue-based Reassurance as Determinants of Enthusiasm among Democrats, Student Study^a

	Democrats		
	1 Party Reassurance & Partisan Identity	2 Issue Reassurance & Partisan Identity	3 Issue Reassurance & Issue Intensity
Partisan Identity	.12 (.17)	.43 (.16)***	.31 (.15)**
Issue Intensity	--	--	.17 (.13)
Party Reassurance	-.16 (.17)	--	--
Issue Reassurance	--	.44 (.20)**	.22 (.10)**
Partisan Identity X Party Reassurance	.69 (.32) **	--	--
Partisan Identity X Issue Reassurance	--	-.61 (.37)**	--
Ideological Intensity X Issue Reassurance	--	--	-.21 (.22)
Gender (male)	.03 (.06)	.02 (.06)	-.02 (.06)
White	.07 (.06)	.07 (.07)	.04 (.07)
Black	.06 (.10)	.01 (.11)	-.01 (.11)
Asian	.08 (.07)	.04 (.07)	.01 (.07)
Constant	.12 (.11)	.01 (.10)	.01 (.10)
<i>Adj. R²</i>	<i>0.18</i>	<i>0.09</i>	<i>0.09</i>
<i>n</i>	<i>117</i>	<i>117</i>	<i>115</i>

Note: Issue and party support is coded as 1 and threat is coded as 0. Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). All variables range between 0 and 1.. Tests of significance are one-tailed

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

a. There were too few Republican respondents to analyze separately