

DEBATES AND DEVELOPMENTS

Competitive Cities and Secure Nations: Conflict and Convergence in Urban Waterfront Agendas after 9/11

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Abstract

In this exploratory article we investigate how longstanding 'competitive city' projects are actively reshaped by recent national security initiatives in urban waterfronts. We argue that port districts in large waterfront cities are becoming critical sites where actors are struggling to further different agendas. While proponents of competitive city projects appear directly concerned with promoting a particular vision of capitalist urban development in contrast to the national security agenda of port and border securitization, we contend that a simple dichotomy between 'economy' and 'security' cannot capture their complex intermingling. We examine the emergent public discourses of port (in)security in the US and Canada since 9/11, paying particular attention to the convergences between port security and waterfront gentrification initiatives, while also noting conflicts between these agendas. We identify four key areas of change: relations of power in the governance of port spaces, rationales of urban planning decisions, physical redesign of urban port spaces, and conflicts between 'economy' and 'security'. Post 9/11 port security initiatives are sometimes at odds and other times at ease with the competitive city agendas that are readily apparent in urban waterfront redevelopments. Both projects have disturbing implications for social justice in waterfront cities.

Introduction

Since the World Trade Center attacks of 11 September 2001, and the US-led response in the global 'war on terror', an important literature has emerged that investigates the evolving connections between cities and securitization. A number of scholars have turned their attention to the complex ways in which cities are being re-imagined and rebuilt as a potential space of terrorist threat. This work traces the rapid introduction of new forms of surveillance and security in urban spaces, and shifts in the governance of cities and urban citizens in the context of the large-scale militarization and securitization of national politics (Sorkin and Zukin, 2002; Swanstrom, 2002; Graham, 2002; 2004; Molotch and McClain, 2003; Coaffee, 2003; 2004). This dynamic scholarship provides some of the foundations for the research findings presented in this article, which extends this field of inquiry by looking specifically at security in port cities in Canada and the United States. We investigate the policies and practices of port security that have emerged since 9/11 that characterize these areas as vulnerable border spaces for

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terrorism and espionage. Through this research we seek to understand the ways in which longstanding urban redevelopment projects and discourses — specifically ‘competitive city’ plans associated with neoliberal globalization — intersect with the recent militarization and securitization of urban waterfronts. We argue that port districts in large waterfront cities are becoming increasingly important sites where a range of powerful actors are struggling to further different agendas for these spaces, and for urban development more broadly. These agendas and actors appear at times to be in conflict with one another, and at other times working in coalition. While proponents of the competitive cities project appear directly concerned with promoting a particular vision of capitalist urban development *in contrast* to the national security agenda of port and border securitization, we contend that a simple dichotomy between ‘economy’ and ‘security’ cannot capture the complex intermingling of both agendas. It thus becomes crucial to examine the different articulations of these concepts in practice. In the US and Canada, many urban ports are adjacent to or are components of waterfront areas that are subject to comprehensive redevelopment projects. Urban ports and waterfront areas are simultaneously local spaces and heavily contested sites where the multi-scalar politics of urban development, national security, continental defence and the global ‘war on terror’ are territorialized through built form.

Our research investigates how apparently competing agendas of urban competitiveness and national security are shaping urban waterfront futures. Some key questions that guide our research include the following: will urban waterfronts in North America continue to be rebuilt as gentrified spaces of consumption and recreation according to competitive city doctrine? Will national security experts and agendas transform these spaces into militarized zones for controlling the flow of goods and people in and out of the ‘homeland’? Will these different agendas create new ‘compromise’ futures for urban waterfronts that have yet to be defined? What kinds of conflicts are emerging between these actors as they work towards their diverging goals? What are the implications of these struggles for control of port spaces between differently scaled networks and actors for the future of competitive cities and secure nations?

In this article we offer an investigation of these questions. We draw on preliminary research; analysis of primary documents such as parliamentary and legislative debates over post-9/11 security policy; commentaries by trade unions representing longshore workers; a thorough review of popular media sources; and a small number of interviews with port workers and waterfront planners in Vancouver and Toronto, Canada. We begin by first tracing the links between two bodies of scholarly literature that have remained largely distinct; the literature on urban securitization, and the literature on inter-urban competitiveness. We mobilize insights from both areas of scholarship and extend them in new directions in our analysis of urban port securitization. We then examine the emergent public discourses of port (in)security in the US and Canada since 9/11, paying particular attention to various conflicts that have emerged between port security and waterfront gentrification initiatives, as well as instances where these agendas are working in complimentary ways, if not in direct coalition. We suggest that significant changes are emerging most clearly in four key areas: relations of power governing port spaces, rationales of urban planning decisions, physical redesign of urban port spaces, and conflicts between ‘economy’ and ‘security’. Post 9/11 port security initiatives are sometimes at odds and other times at ease with the competitive city agendas that are readily apparent in urban waterfront redevelopments. Both projects have disturbing implications for social justice in waterfront cities.

Urban waterfronts in competitive cities

For more than 20 years, scholars have debated the rise of the ‘global’ city. This work identifies major and now well-known shifts in the nature of the global economy and its relationship to urban areas. The global city thesis claims that cities today operate in

direct relations of competition with one another, both within and across national borders. It is argued that this inter-urban competition is eclipsing the privileged role that the nation-state played in post-war Fordism (Keil and Lieser, 1992; Sassen, 2001; Brenner, 2004; McGuirk, 2004). Over the past few decades, urban and national economies have been reoriented to attract mobile capital. Cities that play a financial 'command and control' role in the global economy, as opposed to specializing in industrial production, are also increasingly competing to attract highly educated, professional labour. In order to facilitate competition with other cities, municipal governments have been creating infrastructures and policies to encourage investment in built form and the establishment of new business enterprise, the professionalization of labour, and high-end recreation and consumption in an attempt to reorient cities to the real and imagined interests of globally mobile investment, corporations and people (Sassen, 1994; Cox, 1995; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Loftman and Nevin, 2003). The role of urban planning in the context of competitive city strategies is to facilitate the redevelopment of the built environment and engage in place marketing in order to ameliorate conditions for such inter-urban competition (Keil and Kipfer, 2002).

Urban waterfronts play an important and specific role in the competitive city. The redevelopment of waterfronts in cities with declining traditional industry in the downtown core has been a hallmark of urban revitalization strategies since the 1980s (Hoyle *et al.*, 1988; Gordon, 1997; Malone, 1997; Harvey, 1999; Meyer, 1999; Marshall, 2001; Gastil, 2002). Canadian waterfront cities such as Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver, and American waterfront cities such as New York City, Baltimore and Chicago, for example, have all been subject to comprehensive redevelopment plans. Toronto's central waterfront authority contends that the redevelopment plans that are currently being implemented are the most comprehensively planned development scheme in Canadian history (Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation, 2003). Urban waterfronts share spatial proximity to the central financial districts and downtown commercial core of cities; they have appeal as amenity areas for leisure and recreation (Dovey, 2005), and provide terrain for residential and commercial development most often geared toward middle-class professionals (Florio and Brownill, 2000; Sandercock and Dovey, 2002; Desfor and Jorgensen, 2004). Such factors contribute to the revalorization of de-industrializing waterfront land and have become common priorities for revitalization policies and design plans directed at urban waterfronts. In keeping with competitive city strategies, the redevelopment of urban waterfronts into gentrified residential and commercial areas produces new spaces for investment and accumulation and provides symbolic visuals for entrepreneurial 'city branding' campaigns.

The development of waterfront areas according to these logics proceeds apace, but is also increasingly entangled with a new security agenda, fuelled by a different problematization of waterfront spaces, and a different set of proposed solutions. Where competitive city plans construct urban waterfronts as derelict spaces that need 'revitalizing', national security policies conceptualize waterfronts as risky border areas that need to be made 'secure'. Rather than looking at the eclipse of one set of politics, policies and agendas by another, we argue that research must investigate the ways in which post-9/11 port securitization is being embedded into existing discourses to create (as-of-yet) undefined futures. Fuelled by big fears and big budgets, and a complex scalar geography of local, national, continental and global policy, port security is an important and rapidly evolving maze to navigate.

'Securing' the city

War, armed conflict, terrorist attack and state securitization are all being urbanized. In keeping with these shifts, an important literature in critical urban studies has emerged which investigates this urbanization of armed conflict and violence, and more

specifically, the relationships between the production of urban space and security practices based upon perceptions of risk and terrorism. The majority of this research has explored the political and spatial implications of security practices in cities in response to governmental concerns about potential terrorist attacks. The attack on the World Trade Center, which was also considered an attack on New York City and its residents, helped materialize a new emphasis on cities as existing and potential sites of assault, battle and fortification. The prior cold war concern about Soviet nuclear arsenal attacks on the large metropolises of NATO-member nations has been transformed into a focus on cities as actually existing sites for random terrorist attacks. As Graham (2002: 589) has noted, 'issues surrounding international, military, geopolitical security now penetrate utterly into practices surrounding the government, design and planning of cities and urban regions'.

The militarization of urban space is proceeding through both public and private initiatives. For example, city governments have embedded security practices against perceived and real terrorist attacks in plans and designs for their cities. Coaffee (2003; 2004) has described how the fear of terrorism has increased the policing of urban spaces in Britain through the expanded presence of police and military personnel and the construction of physical barricades intended to regulate the use of space. These initiatives are rationalized as measures that will mitigate terrorist attacks as well as target everyday criminal activity. The barricading and surveillance of urban spaces and the policing of individuals perceived to be involved with criminal activities have been documented in research on urban surveillance systems and targeted policing (Coleman and Sim, 2000; Koskela, 2000; Bannister and Fyfe, 2001; Hermer and Mosher, 2002; Raco, 2003), as well as by social scientists concerned with the militarization and privatization of urban space (Davis 1990; 1998; Sorkin, 1992; Zukin, 1995; Marcuse, 2002; Sorkin and Zukin, 2002).

Since 9/11, there has been a notable increase in the use of barricades, fencing and policing for security purposes in North American cities. In a study of security in post 9/11 New York City, Marcuse (2002: 602) observes that securitization practices are now concomitant with a restructuring process that he terms 'citadelization'. Marcuse defines citadelization as the concentration of major corporations and upscale residential development in the central city as a built form response to the World Trade Center attacks. 'Security' is used as rhetoric for defining *who* is able to occupy urban spaces and for *what* reasons, and as a method for regulating these distinctions by the way of heightened surveillance and policing practices. In sum, what amounts to the classed and racialized policing of urban space can be understood as a feature of both gentrification and securitization. This also suggests that an analysis of both securitization and gentrification as classed and racialized strategies that re-territorialize social relations in the city could provide some fruitful ways for thinking about the convergences of both projects in urban waterfronts.

Urban waterfronts in secure nations

While the emerging body of work outlined above demonstrates that cities are increasingly being conceptualized as spaces of national (in)security, scholars have yet to address the specific changes under way in port regulation and the implications for urban waterfront futures in a sustained manner. And yet, ports have become highly scrutinized and subject to a spate of new policy in the past four years because of their dual role as international gateways and border spaces, as well as being busy urban residential spaces and transportation nodes. Policymakers and politicians are increasingly conceptualizing urban ports as places where residents and boat passengers could be vulnerable to terrorist attack (Dresser, 2002; 2005; Government of Canada Senate Report, 2003). They also identify shipping containers as potential vehicles of illegal and dangerous cargo — from bombs and bio-chemical weapons to the people

that might use them. Customs and security inspections of containers arriving at maritime borders have been much less regular and far less intensive than screenings of passengers and goods at air or land crossings in North America. This has become the source of tremendous social anxiety and growing fear about the dangers of port spaces. Stephen Flynn, a former Coast Guard Commander and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, expressed these sentiments when he explained how 'it wouldn't be difficult for a terrorist to track a container with a global positioning system and detonate a weapon hidden inside. In fact, a terrorist could even use a shipping container to smuggle himself into the country' (Kroft, 2003). Panic regarding the potential for terrorists to 'penetrate' US cities, particularly through large urban ports, has prompted a proliferation of new policy.

After 9/11, port security policy in both the US and Canada initially remained a secondary priority behind the securitization of airports. However, in response to pressure from political advocates such as New York Senator Charles Schumer for increased port security, US funding has expanded significantly to a current annual budget of US \$1.9 billion.¹ In 2001, Schumer wrote in a Senate report that 'our ports are a gaping hole in our national security . . . terrorists have every opportunity to import and stash weapons of mass destruction — whether chemical, nuclear or biological, in containers. Protecting ourselves means protecting our ports' (Schumer, 2001: 1). The notion that ports are especially vulnerable to terrorism was reiterated by John Lehman, a member of the US September 11 Committee of Representatives subcommittee. Lehman noted that, 'US ports lack plans, threat reviews and funding to protect them from attacks' (Joshi, 2004: 1).

Recent Canadian port security policy has evolved directly in response to US activities and agendas after 9/11. In response to accusations from US officials about lax security at maritime ports of entry, Canadian security officials have uncritically adopted the language and mythologies. This was done despite the fact that Canadians have been inspecting containers at a much higher rate than the US for many years (Walkom, 2004). Nevertheless, US Customs officials identified Canada's ports as 'sieves' for terrorists following a 2002 inspection. Canada's own Transport Minister, Jean Lapierre, repeatedly evoked this imagery and it has since migrated through government to become oft-repeated common wisdom (Larocque, 2004). In 2003, Canadian Senator Colin Kenny reiterated this notion by writing a senate report entitled *Our Porous Ports*. Since that time, Canadian and American government officials and media pundits have repeatedly described Canada as having a 'leaky border', most notably in a recent report on US border patrols from the US Congress. As Sokolsky (2005) explains, the report emphasizes US homeland security concerns about terrorists entering the US from Canada and calls for stronger cross-border securitization measures as a solution.

Canada's port security has become a priority for US security policy and derives institutional and ideological support in a variety of ways. The perceived permeability of the Canadian border and its port spaces has led the US to make heavy interventions in restructuring security practices in Canadian ports. Canada's federal cabinet committee on security has further encouraged this securitization. The committee recently emphasized that security will continue being a priority in Canada because it is an important issue for the United States, and that a close integration of Canadian and US security networks is favourable (Binkley, 2005). Canada's Ministry of Transport has received directives from US officials about procedures to harmonize port and seaway security standards. For instance, the Department of Homeland Security recently insisted that Canada adopt a standardized, i.e. *American*, verification system for ships entering the Canadian St Lawrence Seaway and Great Lakes waterway systems (Transport Canada, 2005).

1 The 2005 Department of Homeland Security budget provides US \$1.9 billion for port security, including US \$1.7 billion for Coast Guard port, waterway and coastal security activities, over US \$160 million for container security programs, and close to US \$50 million for port security grants (Homeland Security, 2005b).

In response to this pressure, Canada's transport ministry has focused on increasing funding for port security measures. Canada's 2004 National Security Policy committed US \$690 million to strengthen security at Canadian ports (Larocque, 2004), while the government has repeatedly pledged to commit funds into the billions (*ibid.*). The budget is structured around a six-point plan for securitization, with components that include increased police presence on water and enhanced aerial surveillance techniques; increased security infrastructure at ports; increased cooperation with US on security policy and practice; and federal inspection of port workers (Transport Canada, 2005: 1).

Protecting US citizens from terrorist threat has become the central rationale for the intensification of port security far beyond American national or continental borders. Port security initiatives have developed in response to US national security interests at a global scale. Following 9/11, the United States called for new forms of global port securitization and pushed the United Nations International Maritime Organization (IMO) to develop a code of standards that would apply to all ports and ships that are involved with international shipping and trade. As of July 2004, the resultant code, *The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code* (ISPS), coordinates the security efforts of 152 nations and requires the compliance of 55,000 ships and 20,000 ports. National approaches to the implementation of the ISPS vary significantly, but the code ensures minimum standards with regards to the certification of ships, 'security vulnerability assessments' and the development of security plans for all ports, designation of security officers for all ports and ships, and new, strict standards for accessing and handling cargo. This last point has been particularly pernicious in the re-regulation of port workers' conditions of work and employment security. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is another example of a global port security initiative, although unlike the ISPS which is run by a supranational organization, the CSI is run by the US Customs and Border Protection Agency. This post-9/11 program aims to 'extend [the US] zone of security outward so that American borders are the last line of defense, not the first' (Homeland Security, 2005a). Indeed, more than 36 cities from 20 countries are currently participating in CSI, and more are working towards inclusion.² These two programs are central to the new regime of global port securitization, but represent only a small sampling of the proliferation of new security projects.

Urban waterfronts: local, national, and global spaces of conflict

Everything has changed in [the] harbour since Sept. 11, 2001 (Angus Armstrong, Harbor Master and Chief of Security for the Toronto Port Authority; Friesen and Rook, 2005).

Our preliminary research suggests that port areas of urban waterfronts in Canada and the US are being reconfigured in quite dramatic ways since 9/11. This is striking in terms of the visions and agendas that are being promoted for these places, and in the institutions, actors and spaces that are being constructed in response. We have identified four particularly prominent ways in which the politics, economies, and geographies of urban ports are being reformed as a result of the introduction of post-9/11 national security policies. The most dramatic changes are evident in the relations of power that

2 Cities that are currently participating in CSI include Montreal, Vancouver and Halifax, Canada; Rotterdam, The Netherlands; Bremerhaven and Hamburg, Germany; Antwerp and Zeebrugge, Belgium; Le Havre and Marseille, France; Gothenburg, Sweden; La Spezia, Genoa, Naples, Gioia Tauro and Livorno, Italy; Felixstowe, Liverpool, Thamesport, Tilbury and Southampton, United Kingdom; Piraeus, Greece; Algeciras, Spain; Singapore; Yokohama, Tokyo, Nagoya and Kobe, Japan; Pusan, South Korea; Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia; Laem Chabang, Thailand; Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Hong Kong and Shanghai, People's Republic of China; Durban, South Africa. A number of other cities are working towards implementing CSI including Lahore, Pakistan. See Homeland Security (2005a).

govern port spaces, in the rationales at work in urban planning decisions, in the physical redesign of urban port spaces, and in various conflicts between priorities of economy and security in port activities.

Changing relations of power: actors, networks, scale

One very direct consequence of security initiatives in both countries has been a complete reshuffling of relations of power in big city ports. US Homeland Security, together with the US Coast Guard and the American Association of Port Authorities, have become responsible for the monitoring and enforcement of security initiatives such as increased video surveillance of port areas, gamma ray screening of container goods, tracking devices for containers, and routine identity inspections of port workers. These moves are rapidly transforming the range of actors that can exercise authority over port spaces. Most notably, through the new role of Homeland Security federal policing powers have been tremendously augmented.

In Canada, federal power has also been expanded in port districts. In November 2003, for example, the RCMP installed investigation offices at the three biggest Canadian ports: Montreal, Vancouver and Halifax. Not only has *Canadian* federal power and presence in ports been expanded, but there are now *US officials* posted in several key Canadian ports as part of the CSI. As we have noted, the CSI is a global initiative and so it is worth considering that the growing strength and presence of national security in ports in Canada and around the world may be as much a growing presence of US national power in those ports, and not necessarily of the 'local' national governments themselves. This raises a variety of interesting opportunities for empirical investigations of contemporary politics of 'empire', geographical scale and actor networks.

In addition to the expanded role of federal and international policing bodies in ports, security initiatives have also been used to discipline workers (Moynihan, 2005) and unions representing longshoremen and warehouse workers (Bentley, 2002; Walkom, 2004). In 2002, Tom Ridge, the former director of the Office of Homeland Security, warned the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) that strikes would not be tolerated because they were not in the 'national interest' (Bentley, 2002). In October of that year, President Bush declared the longshore labour conflict a crisis of national security and invoked the Taft-Hartley Act.³ In both Canada and the US, new methods for the screening and inspecting of port workers, for example with biometric security cards, has led to large-scale labour mobilizations against port security initiatives. The ILWU-Canada in Vancouver has led an energetic struggle against highly intrusive screenings of workers, which have the potential to be generalized across the transportation sector. They have critiqued port securitization on the grounds that it invades the privacy of workers by tracking not only the travel, work, intimate and sexual relations, and criminal histories of workers, but perhaps even more surprisingly, of workers' families. One of the most serious allegations that labour unions and journalists have mounted against the screening of port workers in Canada is that they rely on a form of racial and religious profiling by targeting employees who have connections to Muslim and Arab countries (Walkom, 2004).

While complexity in the networks and relations of power in urban waterfronts is certainly not a new phenomenon, port securitization has added new actors and dimensions to the existing tangle. The power struggles that have shaped urban waterfronts for the past couple of decades between harbour commissions, city governments, appointed public-private redevelopment boards, urban planners, real-estate capital, condominium residents, federal coastguards and others, are deeply affected by the new powerful presence of port security agents and agendas. How and where decisions will be made on the future of urban waterfronts, and which actors will

3 The Taft-Hartley Act allows the US Attorney General to obtain an 80-day injunction when a potential or actual strike is considered to pose a threat to 'national interests' of health and safety.

coordinate and contest them is still not entirely unclear, but a brief outline of emerging conflicts is nevertheless suggestive.

'Security' and 'economy'

The major conflict that we have identified in our research is one occurring for control of these spaces between agents and agendas of the competitive city versus those of national security. Both projects articulate visions of and for urban ports with local and global dimensions and both projects also include elements of commerce *and* security. It is therefore much too simple to contrast an agenda of (urban) commerce with one of (national) security. Instead we must be attentive to how these different visions are conflicting on the ground as well as the ways in which they may be finding opportunities for alliance and cooperation.

Much of the support for post-9/11 port securitization comes out of concern about the impact of maritime and port terrorism on trade. In the US, there has been notable concern among politicians, business coalitions and port authorities about the potential impact of terrorism on national productivity levels because of the large proportion of US imports that arrive via maritime transport. Ninety percent of global trade is conducted through maritime shipping, and 95% of US overseas trade passes through that country's 361 ports, which illustrates the crucial role of ports as transit nodes for imported goods. The securitization of urban ports against potential terrorism in the US is imagined by government officials and security strategists as a front-line strategy in the protection of goods that flow into national transportation systems (Dresser, 2005; Wekerle and Jackson, 2005), as well as the transportation structures that support just-in-time production. As Margaret Wrightson, the Government Accountability Office's director of homeland security and justice issues, has recently warned: 'A successful attack on a seaport could result in a dramatic slowdown in the supply system, with consequences in the billions of dollars' (quoted in Dresser, 2005). This is one example of the many ways in which economic globalization is articulating itself through post 9/11 US national defence and security policy.

At another scale, the securitization of urban ports can be considered a strategy to protect the economic interests of cities as 'command and control centres' within the global economy. The spatial proximity of ports, as historical and contemporary points of commodity importation and exportation, to the financial districts in the downtown core of cities is a central rationale for this strategy.⁴ For instance, the World Trade Center attacks elevated concern about the serious economic impact of future terrorist attacks on global financial trade and fuelled new discussions about moving the NYC Stock Exchange from the centre of New York to New Jersey. Thus, security is rationalized as a crucial means of protecting commerce at both the urban and national scale, rather than a conflicting agenda.

The imperatives of commerce and security are not always compatible. Movement across land borders has provoked serious concern in the business world that national security initiatives are hindering trade by creating long waits at border crossings. The US, Canadian and Mexican governments are still trying to mediate these competing imperatives, although with little success, through the creation of expensive pre-clearance cards that allow repeat border crossers to expedite their passage. These kinds of problems are beginning to emerge at the maritime borders as well. Federal legislation in Canada, for example, requires that port authorities must act on a strictly commercial basis. The Vancouver Port Authority reports that this duty to principles of commerce 'conflicts with

4 While airports are mostly located in suburban areas of North American cities, ports are most often located in the central territory of waterfront cities as a result of patterns of urban development based upon maritime trade. Although airport security measures were given primary emphasis in US security funding, it can be argued that a reason for the US policy shift towards the enhancement of port security is because of concerns about the impact of terrorist attacks on the central financial districts of major waterfront cities.

the imperatives of public security since the systematic checking of containers and cargo causes delays and irritates importers and exporters alike. Since all parties have a financial interest in expediting traffic, security is deemed to be expensive and time-consuming' (Port Security — Maritime Defence, 2004). Indeed, in Toronto, officials encountered similar problems when increased border inspections undermined the efficiency of a passenger ferry travelling back and forth to Rochester. The heightened security on the first US/Canada border crossing to open since 9/11 generated long lines at the makeshift customs and immigration station. The increased queues and wait times for the ferry undermined its purpose, which was to provide fast and efficient service for business and tourist day trips. When the ferry service ceased operation in 2004 due to financial difficulties, Lisa Raitt, President and CEO of the Toronto Port Authority, noted that one of the main reasons for its closure was the high cost of customs services charged by the Canada Border Services Agency in monitoring the route (Binkley, 2005: 1). By investigating conflicts between these two agendas, we can begin to better understand the divergent scalar interventions in policies and practices on urban waterfronts; for example, the potential for differences between national-scale security policies, their localized implementation, and flows of private capital investment in waterfront revitalization.

Urban planning practice and rationalities

Conflicts and convergences between competitiveness and security are emerging in local planning and development agendas, particularly with regards to which actors each agenda imagines as having a legitimate presence on the waterfront. The intensification of residential and commercial built form as a component of waterfront revitalization projects is an element of the desire for denser infrastructure and more 'eyes on the street' surveillance for security purposes. Here, the derelict lands of de-industrializing urban waterfronts are conceived as a potential threat to security. Redevelopment through the creation of high-income residential communities serves as a way to 'recolonize' and secure urban waterfront spaces. Indeed, advocates for both port security measures and waterfront redevelopment projects have found common ground in their respective social exclusion practices. In Toronto, a recent provincial planning ruling that blocked the development of a low-income seniors' housing project on the waterfront utilized security rhetoric to legitimize the decision. In the ruling, it was considered that the seniors' housing would be made vulnerable if terrorist attacks occurred on key landmarks located near the waterfront: the CN Tower and the Rogers Center, Toronto's baseball stadium.⁵ It is important to note here that such a security rationale was not a factor in planning discussions over the development of condominium developments for middle-class professionals in the same area, which suggests that 'security' is at least at times used to rationalize social exclusion. Another issue of security was raised in 2002, when both private investors and municipal officials identified homeless people who lived in a squatter community adjacent to the port area as a threat to the establishment of the waterfront as a space for revitalization (Blackwell and Goonewardena, 2004; Bunce and Young, 2004). Both of these examples illustrate the potential for coalition across security and revitalization agendas and help with analyses of the emerging associations between security, built form and spatial practices of exclusion.

Securitization and urban space design

The port security agenda has the potential to hinder revitalization efforts of new residential and commercial activity on urban waterfronts. The increased presence of policing and security infrastructure, such as flood lighting, fencing and video

5 This planning decision was made in 2004 by the Ontario Municipal Board, a quasi-judicial planning board of the Province of Ontario designed to re-evaluate contested planning decisions made at the municipal level. This information was provided in conversation with an official from 'Let's Build', an affordable housing program of Toronto's municipal government.

surveillance of the kind adopted for national security projects, seem far from aesthetically compatible with new 'family friendly' waterfront residential communities and recreational spaces. In fact, the securitization of ports has in some cases led to a direct and significant loss of recreation and leisure spaces along the waterfront. In Vancouver, for example, a network of cycling trails and public roads was closed down over the past two years so that access to the port area could be limited to workers who must now use security cards to get into their work site. Cycling paths had previously connected the prime gentrifying areas west of the Burrard Inlet to the downtown core, and were meant to be part of a celebrated and well-publicized national cycling trail. Securitization measures in Vancouver have closed prime port lands to public access thereby removing the very amenity — access to the waterfront — that currently makes waterfront living so desirable. Furthermore, tensions could arise between the overtly political agenda of securitization and public fears about living in proximity to sites targeted for possible terrorist attack as well as the kind of tranquil 'quality of life' desires embedded in the development of new residential waterfront communities.

Conclusion: battling it out on the waterfront

This short intervention is clearly investigative in form and content rather than conclusive. We have raised questions about the future of urban waterfront spaces in the context of the colliding agendas of competitive urban development and national security programs. We have highlighted key areas of change and conflict emerging out of this collision, namely, changing relations of power between actors, conflicts between security and economy, changing urban planning practice, and new forms of physical design and securitization. We have also speculated on general tendencies in urban waterfront futures that are emerging out of contemporary conflicts. We have refrained from making more conclusive arguments about the implications of these trends. This is in part because the project is in the early stages of development, but more importantly because of the 'fast policy' (Peck, 2002) environment that constitutes port security in North America today. Governments are proposing and implementing new policies and programs in such quick succession that the synthesis and analysis of these rapid changes in regulation is a significant undertaking in itself. An additional and related reason for an exploratory analysis of the kind we present here is the deeply political and contested nature of port securitization. So, for example, rapid changes in port securitization in Vancouver, combined with large-scale resistance by the International Longshore Warehouse Union–Canada has resulted in a very recent decision on the part of the Transport Minister to reconsider the extensive screening of workers and biometric identity cards as recently as late September 2005. We would like to suggest that it is precisely the contested and uncertain nature of these relations and practices that make them so worthwhile for study.

It thus remains to be seen how these different actors and agendas will work with or around each other to achieve their goals. Of course, the future will unfold out of struggle and in the context of the histories and geographies of power in particular places. Thus, future research needs to engage in case study analysis of particular port cities in order to understand the manoeuvres of actors and the tactics of competing agendas. Most important for our future research are the implications of the reconfiguration of power and priorities in urban ports for the rights of citizens. Whether urban waterfronts are rebuilt and policed in the interests of national security, local property developers and professional condominium residents, or all of these simultaneously, a large proportion of urban citizens are not a part of that picture. Poor, working-class, and racialized people, the homeless, youth and countless other 'others' may only be welcome as cleaners, landscapers, domestic workers, and in other kinds of disciplined, casualized and precarious employment to service the lives of elites. Urban waterfronts may be planned as amenity areas for transnational professionals in a global economy or alternatively as

national border spaces in a world at war, or most likely a combination of both, but of central importance is the impact that these agendas will have on spatial justice in waterfront cities.

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Résumé

Ce travail exploratoire étudie comment d'anciens projets de 'ville compétitive' sont profondément remaniés du fait des récentes initiatives de sécurité nationale dans les zones urbaines des fronts de mer. Les quartiers portuaires des grandes villes du littoral deviennent des sites sensibles où divers acteurs luttent pour réaliser différents programmes. Même si les partisans des projets de ville compétitive semblent directement préoccupés par la promotion d'une vision spécifique de l'urbanisme capitaliste en opposition au plan de sécurité nationale concernant les ports et les frontières, une simple dichotomie 'économie'–'sécurité' ne peut traduire leur imbrication complexe. L'article examine les nouveaux discours publics sur la sécurité ou l'insécurité des ports aux États-Unis et au Canada depuis le 11 septembre, en s'intéressant aux convergences entre les initiatives de sécurisation des ports et d'embourgeoisement des quais, tout en soulignant les conflits entre ces programmes. Quatre grands domaines de changement sont identifiés: les relations de pouvoir dans la gouvernance des espaces portuaires, la logique des décisions d'urbanisme, la refonte physique des espaces portuaires urbains, et les oppositions entre 'économie' et 'sécurité'. Après le 11 septembre, les initiatives sécuritaires concernant les ports sont parfois en contradiction, parfois en harmonie, avec les programmes de ville compétitive qui sont directement observables dans les réaménagements urbains des fronts de mer. Les deux types de projets présentent des implications inquiétantes pour la justice sociale dans les grandes villes du littoral.