When writing of the Ottoman forces vanquished near Ankara in 1402 by his patron, Timur, the chronicler Nizamüddin Şami mentions the *Efrenç* (Frankish, Eurochristian?), presumably implying the forces under the command of the Serbian king, an Ottoman vassal, but reserves most of his disparaging remarks for the *Rümeyân*, that is, Turkish-Muslim soldiers serving Sultan Bayezid. To add injury to insult, he cannot resist the temptation to cite the second verse of the sura *al-Rūm* (Qur’an 30), “The Romans [i.e., the Byzantines] have been conquered.” 1 This is harsh but not particularly creative. Many learned and presumably some not-so-learned Muslims of Asia Minor knew the verse well, as did others in the rest of the Muslim world, but saw nothing wrong with identifying themselves as Rumis, or people of the lands of Rum.

Today, the Battle of Ankara is remembered primarily as a confrontation between Ottoman Turks and Central Asian Turks, in narratives that tend to erase all other layers of identity and their historical transformations in favor of a linear story of Turks moving from Inner Asia to the Middle East, building, and of course destroying, state after state. In Orientalist scholarship and its current offshoots, the Turks, even after being rooted in the Middle East and the Balkans for a millennium, remain latecomers, marginal at some levels to the essence of Islamic Middle Eastern civilization, and certainly to the Greco-Roman Mediterranean tradition, even if they are recognized for their military, political, and, perhaps, administrative skills and accomplishments. They may have protected the Islamic Middle East from going under during the destabilizing incursions of the Crusades and the Mongols, or they may have created successful polities by being receptive of Byzantine institutions and traditions, but ultimately they were not wielders of culture (other than, perhaps, the culture of yoghurt), and their high art and literature were but an imitation of Arab, Persian, and Byzantine precedents. Since the latter part of the twentieth century, under the influences of cultural relativism and political correctness, such discourses may have been shunned or pushed beneath the surface, but both the underlying categories and the means of analysis remain intact.

As for Turkish scholarship itself, it developed under the paradox-ridden circumstances of the late Ottoman Empire and after its demise, but even then in the hands of those who grew up with the legacy of those circumstances. On the one hand, there was a project to articulate their archaic empire to the modern imperialist world order as an empire among empires that, statesmen and intellectuals hoped, would survive against all odds and refurbish itself with the techniques and technologies of modernity for proper recognition in the civilized world. On the other hand, there was an anti-imperialist current, not always in opposition to the first project but ensconced within its frustrations and the recognition of what the European powers “really thought” of Turks. The latter attitude would grow strong in the context of the First World War and especially after the invasion of the Greek armies into Asia Minor in 1919. It would also be accompanied by defensive and fanciful theories about Turks civilizing the world, in response to historical theses aimed at robbing those “nomadic and Asiatic” people of any legitimacy in maintaining political control over (western) Anatolia, Thrace, and Istanbul.

The truth is not always somewhere in the middle. I cannot simply say that the two approaches schematically presented above are both wrong or misguided, and that we should find the middle ground and be happy. They cozily share an unproblematic conceptualization of Middle Eastern and Balkan history (of world history, for that matter) in terms of both essences and ethno-national collective agents (Turks, Arabs, Greeks, Germans, etc.)—a conceptualization still dominant in history writing in general, no matter how fashionable it is to crack jokes about trendy
postmodern intellectuals. It might thus be useful to refer not merely to nationalism but to “nationism” as a broader problem, because the implied conception of history and identity can be shared between nationalist and, say, colonialist discourses and in fact derives its very power partly from that double imbrication. Many non-nationalists, or those who embrace (the illusion of?) the downfall of nation-states in an age of globalization, still write history through national identities as primary analytical categories. So long as continuous ethnic-national units and their cultures (Volksgeist defined by Stamm, to use the ur-vocabulary of this discourse) are taken as the main analytical units of historical study, the Turks naturally get to be the descendants of Inner Asian nomads and warriors, and their culture reflects those twin essences: nomadism and militarism.

Modern Turkish historical consciousness generally takes that story to heart, qualifying or reversing some of the attached values, and adding that there were many who emigrated from the urban centers of Central Asia and Khurasan as well, or that the steppe tradition allowed Turks to be much more tolerant than other kinds of Muslims, or that their conquests, achieved with minimal bloodshed, brought order and justice to peoples who were suffering from chaos or tyranny. What others might see as militarism can equally be translated as state building, and that is a matter of deep pride in the long national history of the Turks. At a more popular level, many modern Turkish habits, charming faults, or quirks are often explained as survivals of nomadic customs, just as academics have observed avatars of “shamanism” in all sorts of “unorthodox” practices among Turkish Muslims.

In narratives of this long history, nationism is supplemented by statism, again with variants among Turks and others. From the teleological perspective of “the emergence of modern Turkey,” it can be described as a funnel-vision statism: Manzikert happens (according to Seljuk designs), and Turks pour into Asia Minor; then, in neat order, we have Seljuk Turkish Anatolia, the empire of the Ottoman Turks, and the Turkish Republic. State formation by Turks—conceptualized through moments of real or presumed, but always desirable, unity—provides the backbone of the historical narratives, which in turn provide points of departure and reference for all sorts of cultural analyses. Even if “state” remains a significant category of historical understanding, after historicizing and differentiating types of political organization that are often too sim-
after, ruled over a relatively unified Turco-Muslim Anatolia for only a few decades during that period. Ibn Bibi, for instance, who wrote the only history of the Seljuks of Rum that might be considered an imperial chronicle, starts his book with the reign of Gıyaseddin Keyhusrev (r. 1192–96, 1205–11). In his thoughtful introduction, Ibn Bibi justifies his starting point by saying that he is uncertain of how to organize the earlier materials, since he finds them confusing in their apportioning of the roles of conqueror and sovereign among the Seljuks and mighty emirs like Mengücek, Artuk, and Danishmend. In much of the territory designated as Seljuk Anatolia by modern scholarly convention, dynasties founded by those emirs, particularly the Danishmendids, were in control for several generations after Manzikert, often in rivalry and sometimes in direct confrontation with the Seljuks. The Seljuks themselves seem to have been conscious of their graduation to a higher level of rulership in the age of Kılıç Arslan II (r. 1155–92), who eliminated the Danishmendids in 1177 and established a semblance of political unity in the lands of Rum. The practice of naming Rum Seljuk princes after the heroes of ancient Persian imperial epics began during his reign, which also witnessed the demise of the Great Seljuks of Iran. So long as the latter maintained power, the Anatolian branch was bound to remain the lesser one. Even after Kılıç Arslan, the period between 1192 and 1205 can be deemed an interregnum, and the Seljuks’ power was on the wane after 1243, when Mongol armies defeated them. Ilkhanid-Mongol rule in Asia Minor turned more direct in 1277, only a year after Baybars, the Mamluk sultan of Egypt and Syria, marched all the way into Kayseri, in a context that clearly signaled to the oligarchic elites of the late Seljuk era and to leaders of the Turcoman tribes that the political future of the peninsula might be redesigned without much Seljuk input. Competitive principalities emerged under the leadership of begs (modern Turkish bey, chieftain or lord) from both Seljuk elite and Turcoman backgrounds and included one under a certain Osman Beg.

In considering the vicissitudes of Seljuk rule, it is appropriate to speak of “Turco-Muslim Anatolia,” rather than of all Anatolia, since there were parts of the peninsula outside Muslim control until the Beylik period or even until the reign of Mehmed II, whose imperial vision could not coexist with the Swiss-cheese configuration of the lands of Rum and called for a homogenization of sovereignty in what were eventually considered to be the Ottoman core lands. It is also worth applying some caution in using the term “Turkish Anatolia,” because not all Anatolian Muslims, rulers or subjects, were necessarily Turkish in a strict ethnic sense. Admittedly, terms like “Turco-Muslim Anatolia” or “Turkish-speaking Muslims” are inelegant when compared to “Seljuk Anatolia” or “Turks,” but historical accuracy sometimes does not warrant such shortcuts. At any rate, these qualifications should not in any way detract from the profound association that emerged over time between the historical setting and the Turkish identity scrutinized here. As early as the late twelfth century, the word “Turchia” appears on a Latin map as a caption on Asia Minor, a harbinger of future European-language usages such as “Ottoman Turkey” or “European and Asiatic Turkey” all the way into the early twentieth century. A similar usage can be located in Arabic sources, as in the travel book of Ibn Battuta, whose account of Anatolia in the 1350s introduces the region as barr al-Turkiyya al-ma‘rif bi-bilad al-Rum (the Turkish land known as the lands of Rum). A historicized approach cannot, however, overlook the fact that it is only in the aftermath of the First World War that the predominantly Turkish-speaking Muslims of the peninsula, now adopting wholesale the self-designation “Türk,” embraced the word “Türkiye” for their country.

Based on such considerations, some students of late medieval (tavâ‘if-era) Anatolian and Ottoman studies have been trying to move beyond a critique of the nationist and statist paradigms and to develop, or to forge out of that critique, a more historicized perspective on the dizzyingly complex realities of the lands that we study, without assuming the fixity and transparency of categories like “Turkish” or “Islamic” in designating and analyzing cultural processes. This approach is driven by a search for a new historical geography and cultural history of identity in southwestern Asia and southeastern Europe (after a point, the realm of the Ottoman empire) in the late medieval and early modern periods: hence the focus on Rum and Rumi.

The word “Rum” or diyâr-ı Rûm for defining a cultural as well as a physical space (the lands of Rome, limited over time to the eastern Roman lands, i.e., Byzantium) was adopted from earlier Arabo-Persian usage but now stretched by Turkish speakers to refer to the zone that they inhabited and in large part also governed. Turks and others who moved westward during and after the eleventh century adopted and
reworked many geographical names in the eastern Roman lands on the basis of what had already been “Islamized” and used by Arabs, Persians, or Kurds. They also borrowed or “corrupted” many usages of the non-Muslims of those lands. To take full account of the complexity of ethnic, linguistic, and religious identities they encountered would be impossible here; it cannot be subsumed even under the neat trinity of Muslims, Christians, and Jews. There were other communities, such as Yezidis, who are reported to have fought with the Turcomans against the Mongols in the late thirteenth century; in the 1330s, Ibn Battuta observed that the lineage of the Sons of Germiyan (based in Kütahya, northwest Anatolia) was alleged to go back to Yazid b. Mu’awiya.8

Words like “Rum” and “Rumi” were in common currency among some of those people and moved seamlessly into old Anatolian Turkish. “Istanbul,” too, predates 1071: it is mentioned as early as in the tenth century in an Arabic work by the polymath al-Mas’udi (d. 955).9 Also bearing in mind the legends concerning Abu Ayyub al-Ansari, and his burial site outside the city walls, etc., it is clear that some significant aspects of what the city of Constantinople would become after 1453 had been prepared before Turks (and their associates) settled in Asia Minor. In short, the Turkish encounter with Hellenic Asia Minor was in some measure supplemented and filtered by the Turkish encounter with an earlier Arab (and other peoples’) reception of the heritage of the lands of Rum. As they are written, modern histories tend to erase that filter and prefer to present the whole post-Manzılıkert story in terms of a direct encounter between “Turkish settlers” and “autochtonous” others. The historical consciousness of the Rumis themselves did not operate in the same manner, however. In the Saltuknamı, compiled by a certain Ebu’l-Hayr-i Rumi in 1474 on the basis of oral narratives presumably circulating for generations, we encounter a hero who starts his adventures after receiving, in a dream, blessings and tactics from a legendary Arab warrior of the earlier Islamic-Byzantine frontier operations. Following his onericic instructions, Saltuk retrieves Seyyid Batıtal Gazi’s long-idle weapons and horse, waiting for him in a cave, and only then moves on to his own adventures of conquest deeper in the lands of Rum. Various Arab companions accompany him in his exploits, and they occasionally converse in Arabic.10

All this must be borne in mind in dealing with the current vogue, in Turkey and elsewhere, of speaking about a Turkish Islam—tending toward modernity and democracy in its essence, of course— with respect to relaxed attitudes among Turks toward ritual observance and, primarily, to a worldly pragmatism of Turkish states and certain lenient features of Sufism in Anatolia. Those very features themselves, however, were developed or inspired to a large degree by Arab and Persian Sufis, many of whom spent some part of their lives in Anatolia or settled there. One might recall the likes of Ibn ’Arabi (d. 1240, a Maghribi who lived in Seljuk Konya for several years and inspired the theosophical school of Sadruddin-i Konevi) or Shahab al-Din Abu Hafs ’Omar al-Suhrawardi (1145–1234), who was sent by the Abbasid caliph Nasir li-Din Allah in 1221 to initiate neo-Anatolian Muslims and neo-Muslim Anatolians into the futuwwa. This is not to say that there are no regional dialects of piety and faith, or that it might not be worth speaking of an Islam of the lands of Rum, or of a Turkish Islam as it eventually took shape. Ibn ’Arabi himself was shocked to see certain practices in Rum, particularly the lack of enforcement of certain shari’a principles with respect to non-Muslims there.12 This should not make us overlook the fact that versions of Rumi Sufism, primarily the less rigid ones, owe a good deal to his intellectual legacy. Likewise, the Rumi variant of futuwwa (ahilik) is unthinkable without Suhrawardi. Kalenderism and some other antinomian movements that flourished in the lands of Rum in the late medieval era originated in Iran, and the representatives of these movements in Rum received a good part of their intellectual sustenance and some of their membership through continued migration from and communication with Iran. It is only with such awareness that we may deal with regional dialects or inflections—specific historical configurations—of belief and practice according to a regional habitus among the Muslims of the lands of Rum, who were apparently distinguishable in that manner as of the thirteenth century.

As in the case of many loan words, something new happened in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to the word “Rumi.” It came to be adopted by, or used with respect to, some Muslims of that geography, perhaps at first by outsiders but eventually also by insiders. Mevlana Celaleddin-i Rumi (d. 1273) is the best-known example, as he is invoked today simply as “Rumi” by millions of modern readers around the world. There is no evidence that he called himself thus, nor does the word appear in Manaqib al-carifin, the main source on the life of the poet, compiled be-
among the Rumis.” 15 “Rumi vs. Turk,” in other words, Turkish, like the word religious identity in Turkish workmen if one wanted to demolish, since vants should be preferred if one wanted to build and Celalüddin is reported to have said that Rumi ser-

enemies of “Muslims.”17 It is not so much a matter of thirteenth, “Rumis” regularly appear as the Christian

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likely as their mother tongue) and acquired their social identity within or in some proximity to urban settings, professions, institutions, education, and cultural preferences—as opposed to “Turks,” a usage that primarily had associations of ethnicity-not-transcended and attachment to tribal ways and cultural codes. In his commentary on one of the poems of Yunus Emre (d. 1320–21?), a prominent Sufi intellectual of the seven-

the formation of the polity into a narrative of Seljuk and post-Seljuk Turkish (etvâk) political communities. Moreover, the Ottoman literati (and presumably their audiences) were aware that, no matter what they preferred to call themselves, others called them Turks. It is striking that Ottoman sources often use the word “Turk(s)” to refer to themselves when they are quoting or paraphrasing Byzantine and European charac-
ters. In a chronicle of the early sixteenth century, for instance, seven of eight relevant occurrences of the word are instances of such ventriloquism.21

The Rumi identity was differentiated but not necessarily detached from its Turkish counterpart. The most general and eloquent account of the usage with respect to a collectivity is given by Geliboluлу Mûstafa Ali (1541–1600), who undoubtedly embraced that identity with enthusiasm:

“cultivation of the world belongs to Rumis, and desva-
tation of the universe is confined to Turks.”18 In time, a finer distinction emerged between “Rumi” and the other meaning of “Rum”; when applied to persons or communities, rather than lands, “Rumi” designated the Greeks (or sometimes, even more broadly, the Greek Orthodox) of the former Byzantine realms. The kin-

ship between the two words obviously did not make anyone squirm.

As for the word “Turk” itself, its historical uses demand much more attention than they have hitherto been given. It should suffice here to observe some of the ambiguities and ambivalences, since the conven-
tional scholarly view that “Turk” was a term of den-

igation in late medieval and Ottoman usage is too simplistic.19 Such usage was indeed common, implying Turkish-speaking country bumpkins, ruffians, and uncouth tribal or peasant populations. In its Arabi-
cized plural, etvâk (Turks) often designated Turcoman tribes, sometimes merely descriptively, but at times pejoratively, with the same associations. Still, the Otto-

man elites and Rumi urbanites called their language “Turkish” and knew well that it was related to other kinds of Turkish spoken and written by “Turks” elsewhere. Muterçim Asım’s eighteenth-century translation and elaboration of a Persian dictionary occasionally points to usages in bizim Türkî (our Turkish) as op-

posed to the Turkish spoken in Iran or in Turkistan, highlighting a sense of “we” as defined, in part, by the western Turkish language.20 Genealogies of the House of Osman proudly linked them to the tribal tra-

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sion, when some sources used Anatolian Mus-

lims continued to use “Rumi” to refer to Byzantine or ex-Byzantine Christians. 16 In the Dânismendnâme, written in the first half of the fifteenth century but likely based on an original composition of the mid-
thirteenth, “Rumis” regularly appear as the Christian enemies of “Muslims.”17 It is not so much a matter of religious identity in Manâqib al-’arîfîn, where Mevlana Celalüddin is reported to have said that Rumi ser-
vants should be preferred if one wanted to build and Turkish workmen if one wanted to demolish, since

between 1318 and 1353; but he was called Mevlânâ-i Rûm (our master [who is] of [the lands of eastern] Rome) in Hamdullah al-Mustawfi’s Persian history, Târîkh-i guzîda, completed in Iran in 1330.15 While he is known as Rumi in most of the world today, the heirs of the heritage of the lands of Rum prefer to refer to him as Mevlana, since they know of several other Rumis.

Whether or not it was then tagged onto the name of one of the most respected poets of the lands of Rum, the nisba has been used since the thirteenth century by and for a large number of poets, scholars, and mystics. Moreover, it was also used for men and women (for an instance of rûmiyya, see below) of no such distinction. In fact, the earliest usage I have been able to locate thus far is in Rawandi’s chronicle—again written in Iran, and dedicated to Gıyaseddin Keyhusrev soon after 1207—where the author writes of a certain Cemâleddin Ebu Bekr bin Ebi}l-{Ala el-Rumi, a merchant who came from Asia Minor to Hamadan and brought news of Keyhusrev’s conquests and generosity to the chronicler.14  It was also used regularly to denote the chronicler.14  It was also used regularly to denote the

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Those varied peoples and different types of Rumis living in the glorious days of the Ottoman Rumis, who are not [generically] separate from those tribes of Turks and Tatars... are a select community and pure, pleasing people who, just as they are distinguished in the origins of their state, are singled out for their piety, cleanliness, and faith. Apart from this, most of the inhabitants of Rum are of confused ethnic origins. Among its notables there are few whose lineage does not go back to a convert to Islam... either on their father’s or their mother’s side, the genealogy is traced to a filthy infidel. It is as if two different species of fruitbearing tree mingled and mated, with leaves and fruit; and the fruit of this union was large and filled with liquid, like a princely pearl. The best qualities of the progenitors were then manifested and gave distinction, either in physical beauty or in spiritual wisdom.22

Some might be tempted to romanticize this avowal of hybridity, but it is not devoid of its own manner of pride, even a touch of chauvinism. Still, Âlî’s formulation is striking because of the different conceptualization of identity when compared to the modern obsession with purity of origin and linear narratives of ancestry.

Unlike “Osmanlı,” “Rumi” was not a signifier forged by or for a state; it was not even a part of the official discursive grid of the Ottoman administration. Various place names, as used by the state and the public, had “Rum” in them, but all of them were strictly localized and frozen. Such usage was merely a legacy of the process whereby Turkish-speaking conquerors and settlers, as they moved westwards, found it useful to mark some regions or cities in terms of their location in Roman lands: Erzurum (short for Erzen er-Rüm), the province of Rum (former Danishmendid lands in central and east-central Anatolia), or Rumeli (designating Ottoman lands to the west of Istanbul). Diyar-i Rüm, or the lands of Rum, was not itself a regular part of the official language used in documents to denote “Ottoman lands.” As for “Rumi,” no land survey, tax register, or court document would use it as an operational category. Somewhat anachronistically and tongue in cheek, it can be said that “Rumi” is a category shaped by the civil society.

This is important because premodern states, too, were ready to manipulate or engineer identities and collective memories. The Ottoman enterprise was successful in turning itself into an imperial state in part because it was able to erase or marginalize other narratives of conquest and settlement, competing memories of accomplishments that were once attributed to others. Before that, it was able to turn “Osmanlı” (those who belong to [the ruling apparatus shaped around the House of] Osman) into the corporate identity of a political elite, namely a growing number of warriors and scholar-bureaucrats. The misty beginnings of that corporate identity can be found in the tribal inclusiveness of the first generations of begs, or chieftains, from the House of Osman. Along the way, it was able to forge a prestigious lineage for what became the dynastic family. There was no unanimity on this issue at first, but the Kayi lineage from the legendary Oghuz Khan, which makes its appearance in written sources in the 1430s, is accepted by an overwhelming majority of our sources after the late fifteenth century.23 Their rivals among the competitive lot of emirs with their own principalities, some older and once more distinguished, evidently considered the Ottomans to be upstarts: in both the Bazm u Razm and the pro-Karamanid chronicle of Şikari, the sons of Osman are called bi-âsl (without [a worthy] origin).24

As for the members of society, there were several different pigeonholes into which they could be placed, according to religious affiliation, tax-status, etc. Over time—rather gradually over centuries—there is an unmistakable trend in official documents toward improving the scribal means of making distinctions among subjects of different sorts. There were no identity cards or fingerprints, of course, but subjects had to be somehow identified and differentiated into functional categories when they appeared or were counted in front of authorities. The means for doing so were ever refined by increasingly sophisticated bureaucratic cadres.

Cadastral surveys of the fifteenth century, for instance, are likely to use veled as well as ibn (or bin) for a Muslim as “son of” so-and-so. From the sixteenth century onward, veled is used only for non-Muslims and ibn only for Muslims. The earliest surviving court documents were rather sloppy in naming each person’s father and his or her residential neighborhood; beginning around the mid-sixteenth century, probably after the judicial reforms of Sultan Süleyman (r. 1520–66) and Şeyhüislam Ebussuud Efendi (d. 1574), every individual was also identified by these bits of information. Again in the court records, where thousands of Muslims and non-Muslims appear regularly, a Muslim would “pass away,” but a non-Muslim would “perish”; that was standard, based on assumed inequalities between Islam and other faiths. Some distinctions, however, are not so easy to explain, and these appeared
only over time. Muslims were always sakin (resident, but the word also has connotations of being peaceful) of a neighborhood, non-Muslims sometimes mütenekkhin (established). In the eighteenth century at the latest, that distinction became standard usage, and another one was introduced. A second (or further) reference to a Muslim involved in a case would mention him or her as mesekur[e] (the above-mentioned); if a non-Muslim were involved, the second reference would use mesfür[e] (the foregoing)—not necessarily a denigration, but a differentiation. Again in the eighteenth century, if not earlier, “misspellings” for non-Muslim names also became standard if those names could be shared with Muslims: Ishak, for instance, would be spelled, consistently, with a correct sin for a Muslim but an incorrect sâd for a Jew. In other words, Ottoman bureaucrats and scribes were developing ever more refined means of making distinctions, by way of inscribing ever more improved identity markers into their ledgers. There are good reasons for calling the Ottoman state an early modern one.

One should not confuse this administrative predilection with social convention, however. Social conventions had their own logic, which displayed a much more freewheeling attitude to identity, by way of labeling or denigrating others through a rich repertoire of slurs and stereotypes but also by recognizing fluidities for what they were. Macaronic texts (also known as aljamiado, from the Andalusian experience) are abundant from the fourteenth century onwards. It is hardly possible to follow the bewildering array of words that appear and disappear to designate minute differences of faith, ethnicity, language, locality, and the like: iğdis, turkopouloi, citak, potur, torbes, gacal, manav, etc. (A similar comment can be made about sexual identities, as defined by various preferences, for which there is a scandalously long list of words.) In fact, what we would like now to think of as ethnonyms were hardly mere ethnic categories; they also carried immediate sociological and moral associations (perhaps a bit like the still unfortunate word “gypsy”).

There was even a word that might be worth introducing for circumstances when “Do you speak this language?” is not a simple yes-or-no question. Çetrefil, which simply means “very difficult” or “complicated” in modern Turkish, once referred to those who spoke a language badly, and to a badly constructed sentence uttered or written by someone who spoke a language badly. This must have been an important part of life in the plural environments of premodern empires.

The loose and linguistically creative attitude to identity and diversity must be understood in light of the fact that things were much more complex than can be subsumed under encounters and exchanges between Turkish invaders and those who were already there (“indigenous” or “autochthonous” populations). Even though Oghuz Turks clearly constituted the dominant element among those who emigrated westward, there were also other Turks, leading for a while to the coexistence of different kinds of Turkish, not just regional dialects. The role of non-Turks as co-wayfarers in the migrations and conquests also needs to be taken into account. The earliest extant piece of writing by Muslims in the lands of Rum after 1071 is a curious artifact in this regard. Some Arabic tombstones from the first, brief conquest of Nicaea (1081–96) by the forces moving in with the Seljuk prince Süleyman bin Kutalmış survive because they were used as slabs to buttress the fortifications after 1096, when the city was captured by the Crusaders and turned over to the Byzantines. Four of these tombstones have writing on them, two of them with the names of the deceased: “a believer, Ahmed, the tanner” and “Mahmud son of ’Abdullah of Isfahan.” The sources for the lands of Rum, it seems, were destined from the outset to confound modern scholars and resist their comfortable conventions.

The areas held by Turco-Muslim warriors were constantly replenished thereafter, by Turks but also by many other emigrants. Most of the Turks came from the east, while there were some movements of Turkish populations from the north—the Kipchak Steppe or the lands of the Golden Horde. The formation and articulation of tribal bodies that accounted for much of that mobility included members of different ethnic communities that joined the Turks, willingly or through coercion. There were also migrating scholars, scribes, Sufis, and artisans from Central Asia, Iran, and the Arab lands. While conquests in many instances led to outward migration by or dislocation of Christian subjects of former Byzantine lands, many Christians simply stayed put because they preferred to or had to, and some moved from Byzantine-held territories to Turkish-held ones.

The sad institution of slavery was another significant factor in the demographic changes in Rum. In 1429, Murad II was presented a treatise on the medical properties of stones, tonics, and perfumes. In the introduction, the sultan is praised for his dominion extending “from the gate of Erzincan to the gate of Hungary,”
wherein “every year more or less fifty thousand male and female infidels are taken from the abode of war as captives; those become Muslim, and their progeny join the rank of the faithful until the day of resurrection.”28 There may be an exaggeration in the numbers, but there is no hesitation about including the converts and their progeny among the faithful, among “us.” In a generation or two, descendants of those former slaves could blend into Rumi society without any stigma, as far as we know now; if there were memories among those later generations of the unhappy circumstances that initiated the process, they are not overtly stated in our written sources (but there is room for some imaginative research here). Ethnic backgrounds were not always obliterated among the slaves/servants of the Sublime Porte, for instance,29 but they do not seem to have mattered—over the long run, at any rate—as much as belonging to larger categories such as Osmanli or Muslim or Rumi.

Above all, the reconfigurations of identity must have been determined by religious conversions, most of which seem to have taken place independent of coercive mechanisms. Some Turkish communities evidently adopted Christianity within the Greek or Armenian Orthodox church, but this process remains marginal compared to the massive conversions in the other direction. Over time, huge numbers of Christians in the lands of Rum moved into the fold of Islam, and thereby into Turk-ness. The account book of Giacomo Badoer, a Venetian merchant, refers a few times to “Choza Isse turco” as one of hundreds of people with whom he had transactions in Constantinople in the 1430s; on one of those occasions, we are given an eye-opening detail, identifying his son with a Greek title and name: “chir Jacob fiuol de Chogia Ise.” Chogia Ise (Hoca or Koca Isa) may or may not have called himself “turco,” but to the Europeans, Muslims of that geography were Turks.30 (Thus also, until now, were Bosnian Muslims to some of their neighbors.) To present the post-1071 cultural transformations in the former Byzantine lands through the encounters of one side with another is simply not going to work, even if we focus on receptivity, adaptability, and similar processes. And even if we prefer to speak in terms of sides, we need to recognize that millions of people changed sides and homelands, bringing with them tales and proverbs and skills and crafts and styles and—not to let the nasty aspects of it out of our minds—experiences of violence and suffering.

It takes a particularly perceptive student of things Ottoman like Jakab Nagy de Harsány, a Transylvanian humanist of the mid-seventeenth century, to look at Ottoman society in its full complexity. After warning his European readers that they should not heed the reductionism in so many travelers’ accounts that speak of an essential Turkish this and Turkish that, he raises the question, “What is the Turkish character?” and responds:

This is a most difficult question, since it is not one nation [millet in the Turkish text; una gens in the Latin] but consists of all sorts of people of the world—Germans, Poles, French, English, Dutch, Hungarians, Muscovites, Czechs, Rus, Cossacks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians, Abkhazians, Georgians, Kurds, Persians, Arabs, Greeks, Armenians, Tatars, Wallachians, Moldavians, Circassians, Croatians, Italians, Jews, Indians, and many others. Whoever wishes to speak of the Ottoman character (Osmanlınnın tabiatı), he must know the character of all [these] people (natio). Those who are born Muslim have different customs than those who have converted from Christianity; the educated have their way, the uneducated theirs; people of the frontiers develop different customs than those who are born in the central lands of the empire; everyone learns both good and bad things from Christians and [other] neighbors.31

Renegadism may have been common among the corsairs, and so, evidently, was the need for denigration of converts: Nasche un greco, nasche un turco (When a Greek is born, a Turk is born) is a saying recorded among the corsairs in the seventeenth century. It was apparently used to disparage Greeks by indicating that they could easily “turn Turk”—a compound verb once readily encountered in English tales of renegades and corsairs.32 From the beginning of the eighteenth century onwards, both the proverb and the verb seem to have lost their relevance and thus their currency.

If only to highlight differences and regional specificities, the circumstances and processes of Turkish settlement in the lands of Rum need to be compared to those in Iran, another realm where substantial Turcophone populations settled in the medieval era. Vladimir Minorsky, for instance, a modern historian of medieval Iran, tendentiously asserts, “Like oil and water, the Turcomans and the Persians did not mix freely.”33 The history of the lands of Rum clearly offers us images very different from oil and water and perhaps parallels the history of South Asia in the same period—a setting of mixture and exchange that included much more than two actors (Turks and Greeks, or Turcomans and Persians) and called for new terms of identity, such as Rumi.
Let us consider the case of Esrefoğlu Rumi (d. 1469–70?). According to a short entry in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, for instance, he was a “Turkish poet and mystic…His father Esref left Egypt as a young man and settled in Iznik.” Here, in a nutshell, is the story of somebody for whom a word like “Rumi” would have had to be coined if it did not already exist. Esrefoğlu indeed wrote some of the most admired lyrical Sufi poetry in Turkish, in the vein of Yunus Emre, but his grandfather’s nisba was al-Misri (the Egyptian), his emigrating father’s was al-Misri al-Rumi, and his own was al-Rumi al-Izniki (the Roman the Nicæan, if you will).

The binary of “Rumi” is not necessarily “Turk,” even though we currently focus on “Rumi” in order to question the facile application of a linear and ahistorical Turkishness to the past. In Ottoman usage, “Rumi” is most often paired with “Acem” (primarily “Persian,” but those who spoke and wrote in “Eastern Turkish” might also be categorized among the “poets of ‘Acem’”), and sometimes both “‘Acem” and “‘Arab,” neither of which should be understood as simply ethnic categories. This is clearer in the case of competitive cultural discourse, when one wishes to speak of the accomplishments of Rumi poets, for instance, as having “surpassed” those of ‘Acem poets. The Rumi-‘Acem binary is also used in a non-competitive vein, namely in descriptive or analytical discourse: “The poetry of so-and-so lacks Rumi qualities; it comes closer to the style of the ‘Acem.” The word “Turk” is of a different order of things; ethnicity, undoubtedly with social and cultural associations, is embedded in it. On the other hand, “Rumi,” in its new meaning, was used in large measure to designate a novel social and cultural constellation, namely the identity of those from a variety of backgrounds but with a shared disposition toward a certain style of expression in the arts as well as quotidian life. The limits of Rumi-ness were delineated, to some degree, by linguistic and geographic criteria. The area around Diyarbakir, for instance, plays a liminal role as a frontier. Someone from Diyarbakir is included among the poets of Rum but at the same time identified as being “from the Eastern lands” (diyar-i Şark). Another poet is “from the Eastern lands; some say he is a Rumi”; yet another is “a Turcoman; he has arrived from the Eastern lands.” All of them nevertheless find a place in books on, say, “the poets of Rum,” since “Rumi” identifies not only social or geographic background but also style and character (iṣve, tarz, ʿiṣve, etc.). A certain Haleti, having served as a judge for many years in Aleppo, Rum, and Diyarbakir, has acquired the grace and generosity of the Arabs, the elegance and politesse of the ‘Acems, and the intelligence and attractiveness of the Rumis.”

The biographical dictionaries of poets (or scholars, calligraphers, and others) spoke about the poets of the lands of Rum, not the Ottoman Empire, and distinguished them from the ‘Acem and Arab poets. Rum was a cultural space inhabited by a community that shared a literary language, Turkish; it included a few Armenian poets who used that language (Mesihi of Diyarbakır, for instance). One of these biographical dictionaries of the poets of Rum was in fact written by an ‘Acem, a certain ‘Ahdı, who is defended by another biographer: “We need to be fair: he did a good job. He does not deny [the qualities of] Rum and Rumis, like other ‘Acems.” Of another poet, we read that he “is ‘Acem. He came to Rum as an envoy, married someone in Istanbul, and settled there. Having lived in the lands of Rum for quite some time, he became like a Rumi (Rûmî gibi olup). Many conversations and disputes of his, making use of the same discourse as most of the poets of Rum, have been committed to memory. He has [also] written Turkish poetry.” One of our poets is “from an area close to the Iranian frontier. Having spent most of his time in this land, he conforms in his style of poetry to the ʾiṣve (inflection) of verse in the Turkish manner and to the ʾiṣve (gesture, manner of flirtation, coquettishness) of the poets of Rum.”

A good Rumi intellectual or artist may have boasted that the Rumis had outdone the ‘Acems and Arabs but would never doubt the need to be steeped in Arabic and Persian classics and compete with contemporaneous exemplars in those traditions, which he or she would consider his or her own. Mihrî Hatun (d. after 1512), for instance, one of the few women to appear among the poets of Rum, is described by another poet of her time as a “poetess of gracious sense.” The word shirîn (gracious) here skillfully alludes to the female protagonist of the medieval Persian romance, Farhad and Shirin, well known among the Rumis and subject to a few Turkish renderings. Whether in Persian or in Turkish, it was not received as a story of “some other people”: Amasya, Mihrî Hatun’s hometown, boasted of being the setting of the original story.

For the truly ambitious, it was almost obligatory to write one’s own poetry collection not only in Turkish but also in Persian and/or Arabic, or venture a commentary on an important work of Arabic or Persian literature (say, the Qasida al-Burda or Sa’dî’s Gulistân). And even if one wrote only in Turkish, rarely but some-
times even called Rûmîce (in the Rumi manner), one would turn to a rich set of allusions deriving from the Persian and Arabic classics, which Rumi’s considered part of their own heritage, as well as from a whole body of Hellenistic, Roman, and late antique concepts and figures, often filtered through those classics.

The quasi-amnesia in modern scholarship regarding the once-abundant usage of “Rumi” is deeply rooted in the preference, long predating Turkish nationalism, for the wholesale designation of the Ottomans, and of Turkophone Muslims of the Ottoman Empire, as “Turks”—a preference manifested since the late medieval era in both European and, to a lesser but significant extent, many non-Turkish Middle Eastern or Balkan languages (Greek and Arabic, for instance). Such a designation remained standard despite the countervailing preference among those very Ottomans and their educated urban Turkophone subjects for calling themselves not “Turks” but “Osmanlı” or “Rumi.” The Moroccan ambassador to Istanbul in 1589 was at least aware of this dissonance, while it obviously confused him a bit:

That city was the capital of the lands of Rum [rendered “grecs” by the French translator], and the seat of the empire, the city of caesars. The Muslims who live in that city now call themselves “Rum” [again rendered “grecs” by the translator] and prefer that origin to their own. Among them, calligraphy, too, is called khatt rûmî (“l’écriture grecque”).

Another sixteenth-century Arabic source was apparently more cognizant of the usage, but that is precisely why it baffled a modern scholar. After having lived in Mecca for a few years, a woman went to the authorities in Istanbul in 1544 and complained of the use of coffee in the holy city (only a decade before coffee conquered Istanbul itself). She must have been so convincing that the caravan going from Damascus to Mecca that year “brought word that coffee was forbidden.” The Arabic source that relates this incident identifies her as a Rumi woman (imra’a rûmiyya), and the modern scholar writes: “It is hardly likely that a ‘Greek,’ as the original reads, would have lived in Mecca...It is therefore best to assume that ‘rumiya’ here means a Turk from Anatolia, or perhaps Istanbul.”

The designations “Rum” and “Rumi” were also common in Iran, Central Asia, and India and are even attested in Indonesia. Bayram Khan (15047–61), statesman and contributor to the flourishing Chagatai literature in India in the sixteenth century, writes of the lands of Rum as being “all the way over there” (tâ dihâr-i Rûm). A Bolognese sailor who was in South Asia with the Portuguese in the first decade of that century relates that Diu was called “Divobandirrumi,” presumably because of the preponderance of Rumi’s.

The heyday of “Rumi” as a socially and culturally meaningful category spans the thirteenth to seventeenth centuries. A certain Isma’îlî Rumi (d. 1643) founded a branch of the Kadiri order of dervishes that was thereafter known as the Rumiyye, indicating that the word was still used to generate new coinages. It seems to have slowly fallen out of favor in the eighteenth century. Still, Nevres-i Kadim (d. 1762), in his history of a Safavid assault on Erevan in 1731, writes of the ‘Acems as planning to massacre the “Rumis”—i.e., the Ottoman soldiers inside the fort.

As the designation of a physical and cultural geography “the lands of Rum,” or simply “Rum,” enjoyed currency somewhat longer. The beginnings of the usage by Turkophone Muslim Anatolian communities to designate their turf is already attested in a poem by Ahmed Fakih (d. 1221?): “I passed through the lands of Rum and Sham [i.e., Syria] and fell upon Arabia.” Thereafter, it appears regularly in both the somewhat rarefied writings of the poets of Rum and the hugely popular art of the likes of Yunus Emre, Karacaoğlan, and Pir Sultan Abdal, in juxtaposition with place names like “Sham,” “Frangistan,” and “‘Acem” (or “‘Acemistan”). In fact, the word “Anadolu” (Anatolia) hardly ever appears in the “folk poetry” that today is considered the “echt-Anadolu” poetry of Turkish bards.

While “‘Acem” constituted the most common binary of “Rumi” in Ottoman cultural discourse, as geographical designations the “lands of Rum” were regularly differentiated from the “Arab lands,” even after the incorporation of the latter into the Ottoman Empire, as well as from the “lands of ‘Acem.” In the capacity of a place name, too, the word “Rum” could carry an emotive content of cultural affinity. In a quatrain attributed to Şeyhülislam Ibn Kemal (d. 1534) and addressed to Sultan Selim I, the scholar is alleged to have expressed the sentiments of the soldiery, who were tired of their lengthy campaign into Arab lands and yearning to return to Rum, in the sense of going back home:

What have we left to do in the Arab realm? Long have we stayed in Aleppo and Sham:
People are all living in pleasure and charm.
Let us go [back] then to the lands of Rum.\textsuperscript{43}

A 1649 \textit{vefeyiatname} of Bursa—namely, a biographical
dictionary of the “distinguished dead” of that city— refers
to Rum on a few occasions with rhyming formulæ of
obvious emotional attachment: \textit{diyar-i Rûm-i cennet-
rûsûm} (paradise-like lands of Rum) or \textit{diyar-i cennet-
ûlûr-i Rûm} (paradise-signaling lands of Rum).\textsuperscript{44}

Perhaps the most striking, even precociously “patriotic,”
expressions of affection for the lands of Rum are
encountered in admiral Seydi Ali Reis’s immensely
popular account of his adventures in \textit{diyar-i Hind}, written
after a disastrous naval expedition in the Indian
Ocean and his return journey. Having described himself
in the introduction as “Kâtibi-i \[his pennname\]
Rûmî, the poor soul” and boasted of generations of ser-
vice by his family members at the arsenal in Istanbul,
his beloved home city, the captain runs through his
expedition to the ocean, the misfortunes of the navy,
and the shipwreck that took him to Gujarat. There
he begins to negotiate his way back home, rendering
services to different rulers in northern India, including
Humayun and Akbar, demonstrating his always-
superior poetic skills at every opportunity, avoiding
palace coups and bandit-infested roads, and turning
down offers of mighty posts. Soon after the section
on Gujarat, he starts to write poems that pepper the
text in Chagatai Turkish, as if to accentuate his sense
of exile (\textit{gurbet}). The very first poem in Chagatai ends
with a prayer that God grant him success in his “jour-
ney back to the patria (\textit{vatan seferi}).” He returns to
composing poems “in the manner of Rum (\textit{Rûm tarzi
üzene})” only when he comes close to the Safavid-Ott-
oman boundary. In the meantime, he tells us that the
“yearning for the patria (\textit{vatan ârzûsû})” never left his
heart. How could it, when he knew that he was a sub-
ject of the grandest of countries? When Humayun asked
him a tricky question as to which country was bigger,
the country of Rum (\textit{vilayet-i Rum}) or Hindustan,
he had boldly answered: “If, by Rum, one means Rum
strictly speaking, that is, the province of Sivas (called
Rum in Ottoman administrative division), then Hindu-
stan is bigger. But if one means the lands under the
rule of the Padishah-i Rum, Hind does not amount
to one-tenth of it...When people speak of Alexander
having ruled over the seven climes, that must be like
the rule of Padishah-i Rum.” He knew well, however,
that “Rum” implied something more limited than
the whole Ottoman Empire. He felt he had found
safety (\textit{selûmet}) when he reached Ottoman Baghdad,
but he quickly headed from there to \textit{diyar-i Rûm}.\textsuperscript{45}

With or without cultural associations, the “lands of
Rum,” or simply “Rum,” referred to the region one en-
tered coming west from the lands of ’Acem or north
from the Arab lands. In this geographical scheme,
Arab lands often start in emotional sympathy, but there is
a grey area, or zone of transition, where Turcoman
tribes mixed freely with Arab and Kurdish tribes
of northern Mesopotamia. An impossibly precise
boundary is sometimes given by sources that take the politi-
cal boundaries of a particular moment or very specific
geographic points to heart: a chronicle written for the
Akooyunlu in the 1470s refers to a site called “Karabel,
which constitutes the line between Rum and Sham.”\textsuperscript{46}

In general, the boundaries were vague. They could be
come to extend as far north as Malatya, for in-
stance: the early-sixteenth-century chronicle of Yusuf
b. Abdullah refers to “Aleppo and Aintab, the whole
Arab province beyond Malatya.”\textsuperscript{47} Firdevsi-i Rumi (d.
after 1512), on the other hand, referred in the 1490s
to “Türk ili (the province/land of Turks) all the way
down to Jerusalem,” even if he did not necessarily have
a political project in mind.\textsuperscript{48} In interpreting Selim I’s
commission to rebuild the shrine of Ibn ‘Arabi outside
Damascus upon his conquest of the “Arab lands,” we
need to consider as the audience of this grand ges-
ture of patronage not only the sedentary Arab popu-
lations of Syria but also those very tribes of different
and sometimes confused identity, many of whom were
potential targets of Safavid propaganda and their kind
of Sufism.

For Fuzuli, a Turcoman of Iraq, who was and is
one of the most revered poets of Ottoman and Azeri
Turkish literature, the significant (and, again, vague)
boundary was not between Syria and Rum but rather
between Baghdad and Rum. He considered himself
out of touch with the patronage networks of the
lands of Rum, where many a lesser poet flour-
ished, while he, a Shi‘a to boot, suffered the fate of
the downtrodden of Karbala. In more prosaic and de-
scriptive fashion, the lands north of Mosul, too, could
function as the entry to Rum in chronicles depicting
the movement of armies or individuals.

Somewhere to the west or north of any of those
points, one crossed into the lands of Rum, which since
the early twentiety century has almost mechanically
been translated as “Anatolia.” But where, exactly, is
Anatolia, historically speaking? Today, the word is
used almost universally to cover all of the lands of
Turkey to the east of the straits. It is also regularly in-
voked in a metaphorical fashion, by Turks in particular, to imply “the deep country,” the soil, the soiled but true essence of Turkey, minus the cosmopolitan corruption and money of Istanbul (and perhaps also “infidel Izmir”). But “Anatolia” was used even as late as the nineteenth century primarily in terms of physical geography, and as such the designation has the same vagueness beyond the diagonal line from Trabzon to the eastern edges of the Taurus Mountains, namely the uncannily overlapping eastern boundaries of the empires of Basili II and Mehmed II. If one ever wanted to consider deep geographic structures à la Braudel, one would also need to take into account a botanical frontier that natural scientists have discovered along, more or less, the same diagonal line.49

In that sense, the usage of “Rum” in our late medieval and early modern sources can indeed be identified most of the time with the current delineation of Anatolia, with the same attendant vagueness about its boundaries, but only those to the east or the south. Rum, in other words, included Asia Minor, or Anatolia, but the Ottoman usage had more than the southwestern Asian peninsula in mind. The Balkans, too, were included in Rum as cultural space after the late fourteenth century. Ottoman lands west of the Marmara Sea were called Rûm ili (Rumelia), which is another way, after all, of saying “the lands of Rum.” Traveling westward from Iran or northward from Syria or Iraq, one would walk into the lands of Rum, but as one crossed the straits of the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles eastward, one entered not Rum but Anadolu. The same Haleti who was mentioned above had held three judgeships, respectively, “in Gelibolu, Yenişehir, and Salonica, of the grand cities in Rum.” In other words, the lands of Rum as a cultural zone had two parts in Ottoman usage: what is now Anatolia and what used to be Rumelia.

Beginning in the late eighteenth century this usage of “Rum” as a geographical designation was likewise gradually abandoned, to be replaced by the broadening semantic field of “Anatolia,” but at first only in the sense of physical geography. Anadolu, the Turkicized form of the Greek word Anatoli (east), had been used for centuries in frozen institutional terminology, as in “the province of Anadolu” (the central and central-western parts of Asia Minor), or “the treasurer of Anadolu” (in juxtaposition with the same office held in Rumelia). In terms of physical geography, “the shores of Anadolu” (Anadolu sevâhîli) had been commonly used since the late medieval era for the northeastern shoreline of the peninsula. The inhabitants of Istanbul had been accustomed for centuries to think of many aspects and landmarks of their city in terms of a playful bipartite division: the castle, lighthouse, etc. of Rumelia vs. those of Anatolia. If one crossed the straits eastward, one crossed into Anatolia.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, however, “Anadolu” acquired a broader usage: coming north from Syria, one now did not necessarily enter the lands of Rum, but one might enter Anadolu. The chronicle of Ahmed Vasif Efendi, written in the 1780s, uses “Rum” only twice in the traditional sense of “Asia Minor” and on two other occasions to refer to a Russian political plot to establish an independent Rûm devleti (Greek state) and to appoint a Russian nobleman as the Greek king (Rûm krâlî).50 In other words, the word “Rum” had acquired a new political meaning that would only intensify during the Greek War of Independence in the 1820s and thereafter. An account of the annihilation of the Janissaries in 1826 castigates the “heretical” soldiers for having been too cozy with the Greek rebels during the “sedition of the wicked Rum infidels (kefere-i fevre-i Rûm) in the year 1820–21.”51 It must have something to do with this new sensitivity that “Anatolia” acquires a broader range. In the same source is another striking usage: the brief vitae of Hacı Bektaş Veli mentions his migration “from Khurasan to Anatolia,” offering a new take on the time-honored Khurasan-to-Rum axis that prevails in late medieval and early modern hagiographies of saintly figures of the lands of Rum, many of whom are said to have hailed from Khurasan.52

It is ironic that, at around the same time, many Greek intellectuals were feeling embarrassed about the Greeks’ self-designation of Romaioi and exerting their energy and influence to replace it by “Hellenes” and “Greeks.” When those intellectuals of the Greek enlightenment and, later, independence started to feel uncomfortable with the Byzantine-Ottoman associations of the word, their observations were based on a perception of Romaioi identity as defining a whole variety of institutions and attitudes. In 1787, for instance, Dimitrios Katartzis, in analyzing the ideas of another writer, wrote:

Two ònai, the Hellenic and the Roman, covering two thousand and more years between them, he holds to be one, the Hellenic, simply because the latter descends from the former; but they differ one from the other in fortune and constitution and religion and customs.
and language and conduct, even in their clothing and utensils.”

“Rum” did not just keel over and disappear, however. No matter what he thought of a Greek state and a Greek king, Ahmed Vasif Efendi took some pride in the “dilâverân (bravehearts) of Rum,” namely, Ottoman soldiers who fought valiantly against some rebels in Egypt in 1787. Seyyid Muhammed Nurü’l-‘Arabi, a prominent nineteenth-century mystic, was sent in 1829 (?) to “the lands of Rum” by his sheikh in Cairo. Even as late as 1874, Namık Kemal, who invented patriotic poetry in the Ottoman/Turkish tradition, would casually drop “Rum” in a couplet and assume that his readers would recognize the word in its old sense. The entry on “Rum” in the celebrated Turkish dictionary of Şemseddin Sami, published in 1900, sealed the trajectory of the usage in the late nineteenth century, however: “People of Central Asia in our day apply this name to Anatolia...According to us, this name belongs only to the new Greek people.” Under “Anadolu” he would write, “It constitutes the most important part of the Ottoman realm in our day.”

For “Anadolu” to acquire regular usage with deep cultural resonance among the Ottomans, one needs to wait until the turn of the twentieth century, or, more definitively, until the end of the Balkan Wars in 1912–13, when the empire had lost nearly all its lands in Europe. Before that, experimentation with a pan-Ottoman identity for the sake of creating a modern sense of citizenship in the late empire, and the application of this new notion of Ottoman-ness in a widening network of schools and print cultures, rendered “Osmani” a broader category than it had been earlier. One could now write about Osmanlı sairleri (Ottoman poets), for instance. Toward the end of the century Turkishness, too, was embraced by a small but intellectual group of intellectuals.

There were, however, new ways of speaking about Anatolia, and perhaps the most original conceptualization is found in a novel published in 1871–72 by Evangelinos Misailidis (1820–90), of the Turcophone Greek Orthodox community. It is both a popular and a scholarly convention to speak of this community as Karamanlı, but Misailidis himself objects to this and tells us that he would like to be called Anatolian. Obviously, he has in mind the Greek Orthodox populations of Asia Minor, whether Turcophone or Hellenophone, and contrasts what he observes to be their backwardness in education and learning to the advancement in these respects of the Greeks of Greece. “The government of the Ottoman Empire” is no obstacle, he writes; “the Rums of Anatolia” or “Anatolians” (Anadolu Rumları and Anadolu eller, interchangeably), should establish new schools and do our best to pull ourselves into the new age.” He then proceeds to a long list of “Anadolu” philosophers, scientists, poets, and painters from ancient and Byzantine history as examples of past achievements that need to be revived. His proud list includes Hippocrates, Strabon, Sappho, Palamas, and many others, who are identified as having hailed from Anadolu, and a few occasional figures from areas such as Antioch, Damascus, and Cyprus, which he obviously considers as natural extensions of an Anatolian cultural geography.

Those lines were written in Istanbul in the 1870s for practical purposes, to serve as a source of inspiration for educational reform in a community rooted in Ottoman Anatolia. Competing designs on the peninsula in the early twentieth century would render Misailidis quaint. All of his Anatolians were forced to leave for Greece as refugees, and Muslim refugees from Rumelia and the Caucasus were moved to Anadolu, the heartland of the new country of Turkey, where they joined others learning to think of themselves as Turks. New histories had to be written about “our people” and “our homeland.”

“Our people,” it has proven relatively facile for nationalists everywhere to argue, have been around for a long time, perhaps since the misty beginnings of history—but where? Some consider themselves to have been “at home” since time immemorial, but most peoples must reckon with the fact that their forebears (the Germans, the Turks, the Slavs, the Aztecs, and all Indo-Europeans if one goes back enough in time) indeed moved around until they struck the felicitous bond with “our patria.” Blut met Boden and acquired Lage. They may have walked into “vast empty lands,” as is said of the Europeans in North America, or they may have come with “offerings of love and fraternity as well as a superior civilization and political stability” (accompanied by the requisite military action). Now that the destined embrace between “our people” and “our patria” is complete (Why did our ancestors share it with others? They were tolerant, to begin with. Moreover, the Seljuks and the Ottomans forgot they were Turks and fell for Persian and Arab and Byzantine cultures...), now that the Greeks and the Armenians are here no more, how do we re-cognize our homeland?
Remzi Oğuz Arık, with his influential explorations of “how geography turns into patria,” provides one of the best examples of the obsession with the question that loomed large in the minds of many early republican intellectuals:

How misty is the initial birth of nations? Which people has freely chosen its patria? How big is the role of chance...? Had Turks passed by the northern side of the Caspian, who knows in what religion and in what place we would now be? Imagine the difference of the countries of origin, the reasons for the departure from those countries, of the people who established the United States. Who among them had the purpose of establishing the country, the state, of today?

Once a people and a geography labor for centuries to mutually shape each other, however, mere land turns into homeland. That is how, according to Arık, the Oghuz Turks made Anatolia their own after 1071, while all other people before the Turks either were too dispersed to unify the land or merely exploited it.62

A different understanding of Anatolia was developed by the “Blue” school of thought that embraced the pre-Islamic past of the peninsula, but only after introducing a sharp distinction between “this land of ours” and Greece; Homeros, for instance, was of “this land” and “ours,” not “theirs.” There were yet other approaches that developed in the context of competing irredentisms in the post-Ottoman political space, including a Turkish one, and in response to the new era of colonialism. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek’s Büyük Doğu (The Great East) paradigm, elaborated in his influential journal of the same name, found nothing worthy of national essence and their exclusivist discourse strike me as deeply worrisome. I am afraid that, in a self-proclaimed age of globalization, undermining nation-based conceptualizations and narratives can also serve new forms of imperialism, articulating them with some hypocritical discourses (on human rights, democracy, minority rights, women’s rights, etc.).63

It has turned into a postmodern sport to take shots—often cheap shots—at nationalisms and national histories. We tend to forget that nationalisms did and do appeal to millions of people because they provide, among other things, a sense of dignity and a pillar of sovereignty, none of which, in my opinion, is to be disdained or undermined. The political discourse of this age of globalization, and its critique of nationalism, has not grown out of a problematization of nation- or ethnos-based narratives as such; it simply wishes to deem certain parts of the world and certain peoples so utterly steeped in ancient hatreds and incomprehensible disputes that they must be taught better.

To return to the lands of Rum, the appropriation of “Roman-ness” by Turcophone Muslims in the late medieval and Ottoman era, or its recognition today, is not comparable to, say, the nineteenth-century British elite’s claims and attachment to the heritage of Rome: what was being appropriated was not the image of Rome but the soil that the Rumis inhabited and some of the continuous cultural traditions and dispositions. Nor was it to draw glamour or political baraka from Roman-ness, as was the case with British colonial administrators and is now true of the neo-cons of the United States.

For different reasons, the avowal of an identity deriving from the physical and cultural geography of eastern Rome among members of Ottoman society, including its most renowned writers and artists, now seems difficult to recognize for many in the Turkish
nation-state. A translator of Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall’s monumental *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches* (published between 1827 and 1835) finds a reference in the original work to Ottoman art as “the art of Rum” unpalatable, even if the Viennese historian’s intention is merely to attribute the glorious dome of the Taj Mahal to Ottoman architects. To the translation is amended a footnote:

> Although Ottoman architecture may have borrowed from Byzantine architecture, the two are not the same; while Ottoman architecture has been influenced by other [traditions of] architecture, it has produced works in accord with an original style in full conformity with Turkish-Islamic taste and as an autonomous [tradition of] architecture, and has thus imposed its stamp in history.

It would be sheer romanticism to present this exercise as an attempt to recycle “Rumi” as a panacea to the excesses of nationalism, a mechanical alternative to “Turkish” or “Ottoman,” or as an attempt to reinsert the “Turks-as-Romans” into European identity. In our rethinking of history writing through essentialized national, religious, and state-based categories, however, we can benefit from deeper excavation of premodern conceptualizations of identity as embodied in the notion of Rumi-ness, among others, and premodern conceptualizations of identity as embodied in the plural environments that we study. That excavation would need to be followed by more intensive microgeographical studies of exchange and reception, formation, or elaboration of cultural identities.

Identity has always been a political resource (“divide and rule” is partly based on that fact), but the ever more refined forms of production of knowledge about identities is now fed directly into the strategic calculus of security assets and security risks. I may forgo Foucault, as I am advised to do by Baudrillard, but how can I forget in this context Sheikh Bedreddin, a child of the lands of Rum who thanks to his education in Egypt grew into a highly accomplished scholar and Sufi and developed a utopian vision and a huge following among diverse sorts of Rumis, only to be executed in 1416 by the Ottoman state? About the ‘ulamāʾ-i ẓāhir (scholars of the exoteric aspects of religio-legal learning) of his time, Bedreddin wrote, “They say their goal is the acquisition of knowledge, but all their knowledge is for power and status (câh ve riyâṣet).”

Ultimately, there is no Rome of one’s own, unless one remains in a position to design and propagate one’s own identity free of history. Self-knowledge, too, is implicated in relations of power. One is always forced to rethink and redesign one’s own conception of self according to others within and outside the “nation,” under historical circumstances shaped by asymmetries of power or seduction of/by others. Thus it was that those who eventually learned (preferred?) to call themselves Turks and Greeks abandoned, for different reasons and toward different ends, their attachment to Rumi/Romaioi identity during the course of the eighteenth century, just as new hegemonic powers were emerging with a new take on the Roman past. That, of course, is the “real” Rome, not the lesser—the Anatolian, i.e., eastern—version.

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### NOTES

1. Nizâm al-Dîn Shâmi, *Zafername*, Turkish trans. Necati Lugal (Ankara, 1987), 307. The Ottoman sources write of Timur’s forces as Tatar (making the important association with the Chingisids) and of themselves primarily as warriors of Islam and the soldiers of Rum.

2. The term has already been applied by Halil Edhem (Eldem) in a more restricted fashion, namely to western Anatolia in the post-Seljuk period: *Garbi Anadolu’daki Selçukluların Varisleri: Tevaif ül-Müluk* (Istanbul, 1926).


4. Franz Taeschner, s.v. “Kaykhusraw I,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition* (henceforth EI2) (Leiden, 1950–2004); also see Alexios G. Savvides, “A Note on the Terms Rûm and Anatolia in Seljuk and Early Ottoman Times,” *Deltio Krontou Mikhraisatokin Spoudôn 5* (1984–85, publ. 1987): 99. The Danishmendids were not modest in this regard, either: there was an adolescent prince of that dynasty in 1177 named Afrîdûn: Irene Mêlikoff, s.v. “Dânishmend,” in EI2. The *Shâhmâna*, which constitutes the font of names for Rum Seljuk rulers after this point, is indeed the “Persian epic par excellence,” as modern scholars often characterize it, but the relationship of medieval Turkish rulers to the epic material is not as predatory as it might seem, and not only because many Turkish rulers were patrons of Persian and Persiante literature, including the *Shâhmâna*. In the epic, the Iranian-Turanian distinction is much more porous than is implied by modern ethno-national conceptualizations of cultural patrimony. First of all, Farîdûn (Feridun) is the ancestor of both
the Iranians and the Turanians. Moreover, Kai Khusraw (Keyhusrev) is born to Siyavush and a daughter of Afrasiyab, after the Iranian prince takes refuge in Turan. Kai Khusraw eventually assumes the Iranian throne, but not without facing an objection that he is “sprung from the race of Afrasiyab.” Cited and analyzed in Şener Aktürk, “Representations of the Turkic Peoples in the Shahnameh and the Greco-Roman Sources,” *Akademik Arastırmalar Dergisi* 8 (2006): 15–26. It was the unusual combination of this heritage and the spirit of the new age that led Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to commission an opera to be composed by a European-trained Turkish musician when Rıza Shah Pahlavi was due to visit the Republic of Turkey. Performed in 1934 during the shah’s sojourn in Ankara, the opera dealt with the story of the two sons of Faridun, from whom descended the Iranians and the Turanians.

5. Note, for instance, the empire of Trebizond; the realm of the Lascarids who ruled parts of western Asia Minor from their base in Nicaea until 1261, and some Byzantine-held towns even thereafter; brief control enjoyed by some Latin warriors after 1204 in some towns; and the tiny but commercially significant autonomous zones of the Genoese in Foça and Samsun.


8. The defeat and execution by the Mongols of Sharaf al-Din Muhammad, the Rum Seljuks’ Yeziidi governor of Harput, is mentioned in Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, ed. Paul Bedjan, trans. E. A. W. Budge, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1932), 1:425. On the dynamics of Islamization and Turkification in late medieval Asia Minor the monumental work of Speros Vryonis is essential reading: *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley, 1971). Also see the informative article by Ahmet Yaşar Ocak in *Türk Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul, 1988–), s.v. “Anadolu: Anadolu’nun Türkleşmesi ve İslamişması.” Ocak has no qualms about characterizing the Yeziids as *sapık* (deviant). The association of Yeziidism with Yazid b. Mu’awiya might well be pop etymology, or simply slander by their Muslim neighbors who thus linked a “bizarre” faith with one of the disliked characters of early Islamic history, but it was accepted by the Yeziids for centuries. In any case, they are of late evidently attempting to disassociate themselves from such a linkage: Sabiha Banu Yalkut, *Mehk Tavus’un Halkı Yeziidiler* (Istanbul, 2001), 86. While, according to Yalkut, Armenian nationalism has claimed them as a proto-Armenian community that experienced a linguistic conversion (13), and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq categorized them as Arabs because of the presumed link with the Umayyad dynasty through Yazid (85), the Yeziids are historically Kurdish-speaking and generally considered Kurds: see John S. Guest, *Survival among the Kurds: A History of the Yeziids* (London and New York, 1993). For some prizemordialist Kurdish nationalists, Yeziidism is indeed the original faith of the Kurds. Ibn Battuta’s reference to Yeziid as the ancestor of the Sons of Germiyan, even if it is related by the traveler as a disparaging remark by their resentful neighbors, has thus led some modern scholars to deem the Germiyans Kurds and occasioned a rebuttal by a Turkish historian: see Mustafa Çetin Varlak, *Germiyanogulları Tarhı: 1300–1429* (Ankara, 1974). The actual circumstances may indeed have been so complex as not to allow for a designation of some of those tribal confederations with a straightforward ethnic marker comfortably recognized by modern readers. Ethnic and linguistic transformations could be drawn-out, complex processes and did not always tend towards Turkification; in the regions traditionally inhabited by the Yeziids (now northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey), for instance, there was also a process of Kurdification, as argued by İhsan Süreyya Srma (who expanded an article by Th. Menzel in the original Encyclopædia of Islam); see *İslam Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul, 1950–88), s.v. “Yeziidler.”

10. Seyyid Battal Gazi himself was revered as a saintly figure among the Turkish Muslims of the lands of Rum, while around his shrine grew one of the most popular cults of post-Manziker Anatolia.

11. See, for instance, the unabashedly presentist political uses of this argument in Seyfi Taşhan and Heath Lowry, “U.S.-Turkish Interests: Convergence and Divergence,” Policy Watch #661 (Sept. 20, 2002): Special Forum Report, Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Internet distribution: policy-peacewatch@washingtoninstitute.org. According to the authors, Arabs lack these qualities.

12. Ibn ʿArabi’s letter is recorded in Kerimüddin Mahmud-i Aktion, Cited in B. Furçu, Çin ve Rum (Greek? Byzantine?) painters compete to obviously preferred the art of the Rumis. In a famous parable, related by al-Ghazali (d. 1111) and Nizami (d. ca. 1200), Chinese and Rum (Greek? Byzantine?) painters compete to determine who will execute the superior painting on two facing walls; while Rum artists labor to produce a magnificent piece of art, the Chinese merely polish their wall for a perfect reflection and thus triumph, since a mirror reflection is a superior rendering of reality by virtue of its pointing to the ideal beauty beyond the phenomenal world. In Mevlana Celaleddin’s rendering of the same parable, the roles are reversed; it is the Rumis who turn out to be wiser and decide to polish, while the Chinese merely display their artistry. The comparison is made by Serpil Bağcı, “Gerçek String Alanı: Ayna,” in Sülalandan Aynalar, catalogue of an exhibition of the same title held at the Topkapı Palace Museum in 1999–99 (Istanbul, 1998), 16–19. We may not be able, at this point, to tell with precision which communities Mevlana Celaleddin’s milieu had in mind when speaking of Rumis, but it clearly included a certain Kalyan and an ‘Aynû’d-devle, both of whom are identified as “Rumi painters” by Afakî (1:552). Kalyan is also known as an accomplished architect. The early republican authors of a work on Seljuk architecture refer to a controversy concerning the Greek or Armenian identity of the famous artist and decide that he must have been Mekhitarist Greek, or rather Orthodox Turk; see M. Ferit and M. Mesut, Selçuk Vezvî Sahib Ata ile ogłosullunun Hayat ve Eserleri (Istanbul, 1934), 121.

19. See, for instance, Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford, 1961). For a consideration of the uses of “Turk” by Mevlana Celaleddin, including both the example given above and more positive ones, which have led some modern Turkish writers to claim him not only as a Turk but even as a Turkish nationalistic, see Abdülbaki Gölpmahr, Mevlana Celaleddin (Istanbul, 1985), 206–7. Gölpmahr rightly insists that ethnonyms were deployed allegorically and metaphorically in classical Islamic literatures, which operated on the basis of a staple set of images and their well-recognized contextual associations by readers; there, “Turk” had both negative and positive connotations. In fact, the two dimensions could be blended: the “Turk” was “cruel” and hence, at the same time, the “beautiful beloved.”


24. Muhammed b. Mahmûd-ə Øirvânî, *Tuhfe-i Murâdî*, to whom I am grateful for his generous note, intended to draw attention to those unparalleled instances of the usage in Asian sources, including one in *Anonim Təvarîhi ʿĀlî Əsəm* (İstanbul, 2005), fols. 111b–112a. The Aydınoğulları at the time of Iznırîglî Câneyd apparently called the Ottomans “rabbits” and themselves “wolves”; see Nihat Azamat, ed., *Anonim Təvarîhi ʿĀlî Əsəm* (İstanbul, 1992), 69.


26. For the proverb see Gillian Weiss, "Back from Barbary: Captivity, Redemption and French Identity in the 17th- and 18th-Century Mediterranean" (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2005).


30. Ralph Hattox, *Coffee and Coffeehouses: The Origins of a Social Beverage in the Medieval Near East* (Seattle, 1991), 38 and 147, n. 23. Özbaran provides a detailed account of modern scholarly literature that tends to conflate Rumis with Turks, Anatolian Turks, or Greeks: see *Bir Osmanlı Kimliği*, 89–98, inter alia.


32. For a compound word with negative connotations see *Bir Osmanlı Kimliği*, 89–98, inter alia.

33. This assessment, which may be worth revisiting, is widely accepted and cited in later scholarship: see, for instance, John Woods, *The Appuyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire* (Chicago, 1976), 9.


36. There is only one mention of Anadolu, for instance, in the early literature that tends to conflate Rumis with Turks, Anatolian Turks, or Greeks: see *Bir Osmanlı Kimliği*, 89–98, inter alia.
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57. Öemseddin Sâmî, *Gülzâr-æ Fütûhât: Bir Görgü Tâbûnu*, ed. Mehmet Ali Beyhan (Istanbul, 2001), 19. The same source refers (40) to the “ulema of Anatolia” in a sweeping manner when speaking of the scholars’ declaration of jihad against the invading Russian armies. The rise to prominence of “Anadolu” may also have something to do with the emergence of the Russians as the major challenger of the Ottoman Empire and patrons of its Rum Orthodox populations; a binary of Rus and Rum is not so easy to imagine from the Ottoman point of view.
59. Evangelinos Misailidis, *Seeöyle Dünyays* (Temaşâ-yi Dünya ve Cefabur-æ Çefâkes), ed. Robert Anhegger and Vedat Gündöl (Istanbul, 1986). From 1849, first in İzmir and then in Istanbul, Misailidis published a periodical called *Anadolu*, which he also used as the name of his publishing house. When his 1871–72 novel was printed in Latin-letter transcription in 1886, a controversy arose as to whether it should be considered “the first novel in Turkish.” The case of Misailidis is a reminder that further study of conceptualizations of Anadolu among Greeks and Armenians should be added to a growing list of related research items.
60. Stéphane Yerasimos has garnered exquisite examples, from various sources published between 1917 and 1920, of the discourse that rendered this task an emergency: “As everyone knows, Turks came from Mongolia. While there, they learned nothing that would enable them to administer a country. They came as soldiers and conquerors and never became anything else. …When Turks came to Asia Minor, they had no women with them. …The primitive Turk will always remain at the level of an animal. …If you scratch the polish on the surface, you will encounter a Tatar. …Their way of living is always military…History has shown us that Turks do not have a faculty for intelligence…It is undeniable that Turks hate commerce…Turks are merely numbers…Do Turks have the capacity to establish a national identity?…Theirs is neither a country nor a nation. …We cannot speak of the existence of a Turkish people. …They have left their real home in Inner Asia and prepared the demise of the eastern Roman Empire. It is a burden placed upon us by civilization to make them return to where they came from, sooner or later.” Yerasimos, “Ne Mutlu Türk’üm Diyene,” in *idem*, ed., *Türkler: Doğu ve Batı, İslam ve Laiklik*, trans. Temel Keşişoğlu (Istanbul, 2002), 40–49.
61. Roughly, blood, soil, and place: held by Josef Strzygowski to be the key determinants of art. See, for instance, his last work, *Europas Machkunst im Rahmen des Erdkreises* (Vienna, 1943), 721, 723, 725.
65. The promise of such an approach is borne out in Oya Pancaroğlu’s article “The Itinerant Dragon-Slayer: Forging Paths of Image and Identity in Anatolia,” *Gesta* 43, 2 (2004): 151–64, in which she brilliantly analyzes exchanges revolving around the dragon-slaying hero of Christians and Muslims in the region of the Arab-Byzantine frontier, the cultural legacy of which played a formative role in the later adventures of the people of the lands of Rum.