Although historians have established that gender was a crucial element of the Cold War competition between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, there is not much historical literature yet exploring that aspect of the Cold War.1 Even less literature specifically addresses the role of gender and/in the Cold War in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (CESEE), the region that Aspasia covers. Since Aspasia’s first issue (2007), each volume has had a Forum, though in different formats. This Forum, based on an email exchange conducted over several months between four regional experts, addresses questions about gender and/in the history and historiography of the Cold War in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Of these countries, the first three were Soviet dominated, but Yugoslavia, after the Tito–Stalin split in 1948, developed its own branch of state socialism.

Based on the limited but nonetheless growing scholarship about gender and the Cold War, Bonnie Smith’s introduction to the recent collection Women and Gender in Postwar Europe (2012) summarizes some of the consequences of that conflict for women and men in “the Soviet bloc” as follows. In the early Cold War, “individual women activists [were] purged [and] women’s organizations, including feminist ones, were closed down…. From the 1950s on, the eastern and western blocs carried out the Cold War over consumer issues such as which side could provide the best domestic appliances and styles in furniture, dishware, and household decoration.”2

Smith continues that, in order to enhance the birth rate, popular culture across Europe was resexualized. In her words:

“This resexualization and regendering entailed setting strict lines between masculinity and femininity to give society a heterosexual look…. Even in eastern Europe, the young demanded the highly sexualized ‘rock and roll’, including its paraphernalia of tight blue jeans for men and sexy blouses for women.
... Because of the Cold War and the belief that the population needed to be replenished, homosexuality came under explicit attack, [in Western Europe] even being equated with communism.”

Finally, she points out that, in addition to labor migrants coming to Western Europe, in part from former European colonies, “[m]any migrants from southeast Asia arrived in Europe to escape the Cold War devastation taking place in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and were sheltered on both sides of the Cold War divide.” We have taken this recent assessment as starting point for our exchange and will refer to it several times below.

The commonly used language of “blocs” for the two sides in the Cold War, but especially regarding the so-called Soviet bloc, may suggest a homogeneity that did not exist among socialist countries in Europe at any time. That language also invokes the notion of the Soviet regime as an all-powerful monolith, in line with what Sheila Fitzpatrick has called scholarship written in a totalitarian vein. Such scholarship through the 1990s and 2000s “continued to rely on the main tenets of Cold War discourse by ‘viewing the Soviet system as evil’, and ‘the regime as a monolith’ that controlled a ‘passive society’ through ‘terror’.” Recent histories of Eastern Europe, however, “seek a more complex explanation of the workings of the socialist system and the state-society relationship than the antagonism between an all-oppressive dictatorship and an oppressed society as provided by scholars writing from a totalitarianist perspective.” Our Forum on the Cold War also starts from the assumption “that understanding socialism and its worlds cannot be limited to the widespread delegitimizing narrative about totalitarian systems.”

Much recent revisionist work focuses on the history of women, gender, and everyday life. Along similar lines, we hope to explore here whether “gendering the Cold War” is a useful lens to examine the history and agency of ordinary women and men, and the role of gender in politics, systems of governance, and culture in CESEE—as influenced by or part of the Cold War competition between “the West” and “the East.” What has been the impact of the Cold War on women and men in the region? Does the perspective of “gendering the Cold War” allow us to see similarities and differences within the state socialist world, as well as in comparison with “the other side” in the Cold War? Can it help to identify important research desiderata?

The four Forum participants are Malgorzata (Gosia) Fidelis, whose research focuses on social and cultural history of post-1945 Eastern Europe with an emphasis on Poland; Renata Jambrešić Kirin, who specializes in oral literature and contemporary women’s history in Croatia and Yugoslavia; Jill Massino, whose research deals with everyday lives of women and men in socialist and post-socialist Romania; and Libora Oates-Indruchova, whose research interests include censorship, narrative research, gender and social change, and cultural representations of gender in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic.

At the end of the Forum there is more information about the Forum contributors.
By way of a more general introduction, please write a short narrative auto/biography that explains your interest in “Gender and the Cold War.”

**Malgorzata (Gosia) Fidelis:** My interest in the gender dimension of the Cold War emerged from more than ten years of research on women industrial workers in post-war Poland. The primary goal of my first book was to understand how gender conditioned constructing a new society based on the principle of “equality.” Eventually, the sources (I credit the contemporary popular press, in particular) asked me to look more closely at the global connection, and at how the East–West competition and the Polish ambivalence towards that competition shaped official culture and everyday life. These issues are now central to my new book on youth cultures in 1960s Poland.

Exploring how the Cold War shaped gender ideas and vice versa makes me question the simplified dichotomy of East and West so prominent in conventional accounts of the Cold War focused on political elites and international relations. I am particularly intrigued by how the link between gender and the Cold War was used to overcome Stalinism and “Sovietization” in Poland after 1956, and how the rejection of the supposedly “masculine” female tractor driver in favor of more “feminine” roles for women helped enact new terms of the East–West interaction. To me, the most intriguing questions about gender and the Cold War emerged in the mid-1950s, when Eastern and Western Europe became less hostile and less divergent, especially in the realm of cultural and social aspirations. How does a society act when it is asked to reject the capitalist West and at the same time to be fascinated by aspects of Western-style consumption, and lifestyle, including the emphasis on the standard of living (themes which were quite prominent in the Polish media)? What role did gender play in the project of postwar modernities, both East and West.

I would be remiss if I did not mention my personal experiences of growing up in Poland in the 1970s and 1980s. I remember learning about the Cold War at school as a thing of the past, a confrontation between East and West that happened in the late 1940s and 1950s and that seemed hardly relevant to our lives. Of course, there was a lot of official talk on the superiority of the socialist camp, but that did not occupy my mind as my friends and I were more interested in listening to the latest songs by George Michael, Madonna, and David Bowie than in pondering the meaning of socialism or capitalism. Years later, when I took a writing class as a college student in the United States, my American teacher was dumbfounded upon reading in my paper that I did not undergo, as he expected, a “culture shock” after arriving for the first time in New York. Perhaps this personal memory—or rather the lack of memory of the “Cold War” as told in political narratives—illustrates the kind of subjective, volatile, and ambiguous boundaries between East and West during the time known as the Cold War.

**Renata Jambrešic’ Kirin:** My childhood in socialist Croatia was marked more by the drives and desires of my parents’ baby boomer generation than by fear, suspicion, and rivalry fueled by the Cold War, closer to the worldview of my grandparents. The horizon of expectations and the value system of the working family I belonged to
in the late 1960s was not so different from the matching American family. However, if Yugoslav socialism of two postwar decades can be characterized as “socialism on American wheat,” then the socialism of the late 1960s and 1970s substantially relied on the American film industry and rock music. The Cuban missile crisis, China’s Cultural Revolution, the Vietnam War, RAF terrorism, Star Wars, or the summits of the Non-Aligned Movement left fewer traces in national cultural and social memory than did the plot of the soap opera Peyton Place, the rock poems by Bob Dylan and The Rolling Stones, or the visit of Orson Wells, Elizabeth Taylor, and Richard Burton to Yugoslavia. The Lexicon of YU Mythology, edited by Dragan Mileusnić and Željko Serdarević (2004), includes more than forty mythemes adopted from American culture, and a dozen of those from other cultural areas (i.e., Jacuzzi, punk, Polish people, pizza, Pretis [pressure cooker], Sandokan, Spacek, Wartburg), but only few coming from world politics. This originally virtual lexicon was compiled by internet correspondents who responded with “imaginative and inexpert analysis” of everyday Yugoslav life from 1945 until 1990. The most surprising is the explanation of the item “stranci” (foreigners/strangers), meaning foreign musicians who used to play in Yugoslav rock bands!

My interest in the process of building Yugoslav national self-esteem and the image of a global player during the Cold War is informed by the question in what way the “new woman”—designed by the revolutionary ideal, state feminism, and American movies—was crucial for promoting urbanization, industrialization, and consumption in socialist Yugoslavia on the shortest path from penury to a prosperous welfare state. While reflecting on it I am aware of the permanent conflict between emancipatory and traditional values that generated various antagonisms and compromises as well as the “linkages of conflicting complementarity” (G. W. Creed) of the communist and patriarchal systems with a common interest in reinstating discourses of femininity and domesticity and expelling women from the political sphere. Thus, the number of women in the central bodies of the Yugoslav Communist Party was never higher than 10 percent.

Jill Massino: My interest in “gender and the Cold War” stems from my experience growing up in the United States during the latter part of the Cold War and from my graduate studies. My introduction to gender history and my recognition of gender injustice followed shortly on the heels of the fall of the Berlin Wall, and both proved to be transformative experiences for me. It was only natural then (or perhaps fate?) that I would devote some part of my life to the study of gender and the Cold War. Connected to this is my interest in communism, not simply as an abstract ideology or failed experiment, but as a lived experience. As such, my research blends archival, legislative, and media resources with oral history interviews to examine the ways in which women’s and men’s roles, identities, and relationships were shaped by a variety of institutions, beliefs, and practices in communist Romania. While I analyze how ideas about gender inflected state policy, I also explore how individuals were affected by and responded to state policies in their daily lives. My investigations have not only enhanced my understanding of communism, but also of the Cold War. Since nearly everything during the period assumed political significance—reproduction, leisure, consumption, spousal relations—focusing on gender and everyday life provides ad-
ditional vantage points for analyzing the Cold War struggle. Moreover, this approach underscores the similarities between communist and liberal-democratic policies, challenging the East–West binary that characterized conventional scholarship on Cold War Europe.

Libora Oates-Indruchova: My interest in East–West comparisons concerning gender dates back to the MA in Contemporary Literary Studies at Lancaster University, UK, that I began in 1991. One of the modules on offer was Feminist Literary Theory and I took it with the resolve to gather enough arguments why “we” in Czechoslovakia did not need feminism. Like many other Czechs who grew up under state socialism, I had no knowledge of the rich tradition of the women’s movement in the Czech lands, did not know what feminism was, except that it was something invented in the West during the Cold War, and was absolutely sure that “we” did not need it because “we” had equality of the sexes in Czechoslovakia. Needless to say that the course, taught by the brilliant feminist literary scholar Lynne Pearce, ended with me writing an MA dissertation on the applications of “Western” feminist theory to a range of Czech texts, from literary to then mushrooming soft-pornographic texts—and writing it with the vehemence of a feminist awakening. Several years later, I wrote my PhD thesis (supervised by Lynne) on the subject of discourses of gender in Czech culture before and after 1989. I was interested in the effects the state-socialist ideology of the equality of the sexes and the Cold War dichotomy in language had on heterosexual gender discourses, as conceived in contemporary Western (since there was, obviously, no other) gender theory.

That interest still holds for me. I work mainly on the 1980s and 1970s and am interested in the interactions of the various conflicting discourses circulating in the Czech cultural and social arena and what those interactions do to gender. What happens if all language has to observe the Cold War dichotomy of socialist good and capitalist evil? Where does that leave the male/female dichotomy? If pre-state-socialist Czech society was more or less Western-traditional in terms of the gender order (although with a strong feminist influence dating back to the nineteenth century), what happens to gender culture and gender discourse under the rhetoric of women’s emancipation?

As is apparent from this self-positioning in gender research, I have always dealt with discourses, rather than with policies and institutions and so my responses to the questions in this Forum will be limited to this area of work.

**Question 1 (December 2012):** Do you see identifiable trends in scholarship about the Cold War in the country you are working on? And what about scholarship that could be characterized as gendering the Cold War?

**Malgorzata (Gosia) Fidelis:** Historians in Poland are only beginning to explore questions about gender and the Cold War. In general, the historical literature on post-1945 Poland is highly politicized, and the “totalitarian paradigm” dominates historical ac-
counts, including those focused on social history. These works usually cast Polish society in the role of heroic resister against the totalizing communist regime. Women and gender are sometimes incorporated into these narratives, but usually as victims of the regime; for example, women as forced to work outside the home, or devoted mothers and wives fending for their families in the context of endemic shortages. In other words, it is rare to find works that give voice to women as active and diverse historical agents. Needless to say, the dominant stress on Polish women’s victimization by the communist regime does not promote the inclusion of the international and comparative contexts.

There are signs, however, that this trend is changing as a new generation of historians starts to reevaluate the recent past and to ask new questions. For example, Polish historian Malgorzata Mazurek has explored the relationship between gender hierarchies and consumption in innovative ways and with an eye on the Cold War framework. Likewise, a group of young and dynamic scholars from Warsaw, Cracow, and Gdańsk is currently working on a multi-author book project on women and gender in Poland after 1945. These scholars are determined to make gender analysis central to postwar Polish history, and to situate experiences of Polish women in the broader European and Cold War contexts. The project has just won a major grant from the National Program for the Development of the Humanities in Poland, which may indicate that the need to incorporate a gender perspective has been recognized by the wider academic community.

Libora Oates-Indruchova: As Gosia writes about Poland, Czech history writing about the Cold War period also largely embraces the totalitarian paradigm and the same goes for social science (sociologists, political scientists) research. Nevertheless, there have been some recent signals in the work of researchers belonging to “the last state-socialist generation,” to paraphrase Alexei Yurchak, who are looking for continuities rather than dichotomies, indicating that that approach may be changing.

Women and gender issues are mostly absent from mainstream history writing on the Cold War. In one striking example, in which women are the focus of a work by a historian, women politicians are summarily labeled “fanatics” simply by virtue of being in politics and in the Communist Party, it seems, regardless of whether, for example, they later signed Charter 77 or not. This demonization of apparently “unfeminine” behavior in the title of this 2006 book harks back disconcertingly to the view on progressive American feminists held by the House Un-American Activities Committee in the early Cold War, as analyzed by Franciscas.

After the lively East–West debates on the relevance of feminist and gender theory for East Central Europe that took place in the 1990s with a substantial contribution by Czech feminist scholars (particularly, Hana Havelková, Jiřina Šiklová, and Jiřina Šmejkalová), the interest among Czech gender scholars in the Cold War period has been patchy at best. In gender work that does not focus specifically on state socialism, but refers to it cursorily, two notions have been perpetuated: that feminism was imported to the Czech Republic from the West and that communists sent women to work in the 1950s. As to the first of these notions, there is now a growing body of work on pre-state-socialist feminist traditions and even on gender-relevant discussions during
state socialism that should constitute sufficient proof of a more complex and continuous development of feminist thinking in the context of the Czech Republic. Concerning the second notion, substantial data to disprove it are still missing, but research to that effect will have to consider the increase of women’s employment in the 1950s in terms of class and also in the context of earlier events that decreased women’s employment disproportionately more than men’s in the 1930s and 1940s.

Finally, research on gender and state socialism is now enjoying renewed interest. Hana Havelková and I have coedited a collective volume from a three-year project on the transformation of gender culture in Czech society between 1948 and 1989 that was funded by the Czech Science Foundation. The team cooperation motivated several further individual projects by participating researchers that will, hopefully, result in numerous studies in years to come. One of the research tendencies that may come out of this project is a turning away from the “Cold War,” because it appears a problematic and limiting frame of reference in the Czech case, however attractive its use is in the international context of gender research. Both archival historical research and qualitative cultural and social science research have documented continuities from the period preceding state socialism and then from state socialism to the present that cannot be adequately explained with the toolbox of the Cold War approach.

Renata Jambrešić Kirin: There are three important studies on the unique, ambivalent, and pragmatic “third position” of Yugoslavia in the bloc politics during the Cold War. They are written by young historians unburdened by ideological constraints and based on rich archival sources: Socialism on American Wheat (1948–1963) from 2002 and The Third Side of the Cold War (2011) by Tvrtko Jakovina and Yugoslavia and the World: 1968 by Hrvoje Klasić (2012). Despite their indisputable academic credibility, they are promoted in the book market as “amusing and important studies” offering “much more than ordinary scholarly texts.” However, opposing pseudohistorical “black books” on communist crimes, which prevailed in the 1990s, as well as numerous “yellow books” on Tito’s private life and political intrigues, Jakovina and Klasić are explaining the importance of Non-Aligned ideas for the stabilization of the Yugoslav political order and national overconfidence. Detecting steady economic growth, international recognition, and the repressive apparatus as the main pillars of public complicity with the nomenclature, these historians also describe the causes of Yugoslavia’s obvious democratic deficit. However, while they are cautious in their political assessment and sensitive to social and economic issues, these “malestream” studies do not offer a word about the socialist sexist and heteronormative discourses as compatible with the Cold War patriarchal order.

Yet, the gendering of the Cold War historiography happened partially and occasionally with two oral history collections, two books on the history of socialist leisure, and two books of cultural studies. In the 2004 oral history collection by Dijanić, et al. on women remembering their life under socialism, based on Jiřina Šiklová’s feminist methodology, the older generation of women recalls how the official policy of emancipation and their lived practice were at odds, especially in the case of ideologically “unsuitable” women who during the late 1940s and 1950s were often accused of being Western spies or enemies of the people. Narrating about the rather high quality of life
in the following decades, female workers also revealed their first traces of discontent when faced with “real wealth” when shopping in Trieste or Graz, or with the “fortune” Gastarbeiter families earned working abroad. Gordan Bosanac’s and Zvonimir Dobrović’s 2007 collection of interviews, *Usmena povijest homoseksualnosti u Hrvatskoj (An oral history of homosexuality in Croatia)*, is an important book that confirms the open homophobia and patriarchal reproduction of “normality” in the Yugoslav legal and public spheres. The collection has been translated into English by Dean Vuletic, who defended his MA thesis on the gay and lesbian history of Croatia at Yale University. Two books by the historian Igor Duda—*U potrazi za blagostanjem: o povijesti dokolice i potrošačkog društva u Hrvatskoj 1950-ih i 1960-ih* (In pursuit of well-being: On the history of leisure and consumer society in Croatia in the 1950s and 1960s) (2005) and *Pronađeno blagostanje: Svakodnevni život i potrošačka kultura u Hrvatskoj 1970-ih i 1980-ih* (Well-being found: Everyday life and consumer culture in Croatia in the 1970s and 1980s) (2010)—discuss the importance of encouraging leisure and consumer culture for the sustainability of the Yugoslav political system and its desired cosmopolitanism. Thanks to tourism and the entitlement to travel abroad, which led to close encounters with Westerners, their products, images, and values, common people felt as if living on an equal footing, with only a minor sense of real political distance. The same conclusion is drawn in recent books by Reana Senjković and Maša Kolanović about popular and mass culture flourishing in Yugoslavia from the late 1950s onwards. Numerous intellectual pros and cons debates about “decadent” Western popular culture finally confirmed the existence of “decadent socialism” as a prologue to the transition. This decadent, dandy, and sunny side of socialism—unburdened with the political conundrums of the Cold War era—is dominant in a recent exhibition in Zagreb. However, we are still waiting for a study that will combine a deep analysis of the socio-political history of Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) during the Cold War with gender history and feminist epistemology. Such work will be the only way to put the myth of Yugoslav exceptionalism into a more realistic framework.

**Jill Massino:** The last two decades have witnessed a wealth of scholarship on the communist period in Romania. Much of it has focused on individuals or groups who experienced persecution (peasants, dissidents, ethnic minorities, the clergy, precommunist political elites, and those with “unhealthy social origins”) and tends to conform to the standard Cold War narrative or totalitarian paradigm. More recently, sociologists, anthropologists, and historians have explored everyday life under communism, examining the ways that ordinary individuals experienced state policies and exercised agency in their daily lives. These scholars have begun to chip away at the totalitarian paradigm, offering more multifaceted and personalized views of life in postwar Romania. While not centered on the Cold War, their work provides alternative and highly engaging interpretations of politics and everyday life during the Cold War period in Romania.

In the area of gender and women’s movements, Romanian scholars such as Mihaela Miroiu, Raluca Maria Popa, Luciana Jinga, and Corina Dobos, among others, have produced illuminating and theoretically sophisticated work. Much of this work focuses on the intersection of politics and gender, exploring how, through discourse
and policy, the socialist state sought to redefine gender roles and social relationships. Areas of inquiry have included reproduction, sexuality, politics, citizenship, “state feminism,” and the everyday lives of women and men. In comparison with more general works on the communist period, scholarship on gender has engaged with the Cold War as a conceptual framework, emphasizing the ways that communism shaped (sometimes positively) women’s identities and lives, and the ways that women asserted agency in various spheres.

**Question 2 (January 2013):** Were there significant changes in gender policies in your country/the country you are working on, related to the Cold War? And/or, ways in which gender was mobilized to appease or activate the population?

**Malgorzata (Gosia) Fidelis:** Libora’s remark about growing up in postwar Czechoslovakia with little knowledge of the precommunist Czech feminist movement brings up an important point about the effects of the Cold War on history and memory. The Cold War had a profound impact on distancing women from the precommunist women’s history, and from women in the West. It seems that women in Eastern Europe did not see Western feminism of the 1960s and 1970s as relevant to their own experiences, since they already had “equal” legal rights. Most of them were also not fully aware of the diversity of Western feminisms, including efforts of academic women to recover women’s history. This partial isolation (I am careful not to reinforce the problematic idea that Eastern Europeans were completely cut off from the West) influenced how the discipline of history and historical memory developed in Eastern Europe. The official policy and rhetoric of “equality” reinforced the perception that feminism as well as the academic inquiry into women’s history were redundant. Only after the collapse of communism did historians start exploring the precommunist history of women on a significant scale.

At the same time, another type of “forgetting” took place after 1989: the rejection of the communist era as a black hole in the history of feminism. This idea is still quite strong among feminist scholars and activists in Poland. The conviction that “equality” was given by the regime, and therefore the social and political status of women was imposed from above, distorts agency from below and contributes to misconceptions about how communism worked in everyday life. Only now have scholars in Poland begun looking at the diversity and complexity of women’s experiences and agendas under communism. They have rediscovered, for example, female artists such as Alina Szapocznikow and Alina Slesinska and their feminist sculptures from the late 1950s and 1960s. At the same time, many other “sites” of contestation and resistance against the male-dominated society could be found among “ordinary” women. These topics still await their researchers.

To address the January question: I think that it is important to look at how the communist elites used gender difference to advance political goals. In my own research, I found that starting in the late 1950s, images of gender difference often provided the
most accessible way for many social and political actors to articulate their standpoint on being modern and Polish. The woman on the tractor, the iconic image of the Stalinist era and the symbol of female emancipation, disappeared from the official propaganda around 1955. Instead, two different feminine images began to dominate the visual popular culture: the modern homemaker, found most often in women’s magazines; and the seductive cover girl featured in popular magazines intended primarily for students and youth. The modern housewife and the beautiful cover girl symbolized rejections of Stalinism and at the same time exemplified new terms of Cold War competition, increasingly focused on consumption and lifestyle. In that sense, gender can serve as a lens to see how the communist system changed, and how the nature of the East–West interaction changed.

I am currently doing research in Warsaw, and find myself quite surprised at some of the sexualized images of women in Polish popular magazines that appeared as early as 1957. By the late 1960s, in fact, some popular periodicals began to feature photos of topless women (usually at the back cover). In Poland, replacing the “masculine” woman of the Stalinist era with feminine and eroticized beauties was an important statement on not being “Soviet.” Gendered images exemplified these sentiments in particularly visible and convincing ways. Rejecting the tractor driver and embracing the feminine woman indicated not only a return to “Polish tradition,” but also a desire to be part of the contemporary West. Of course, the modern homemaker and the cover girl were not exact emulations of their commercialized Western counterparts. The model homemaker was supposed to be educated and have a profession outside the home; the cover girl was also educated (in fact, women who posed for these pictures were usually university students), and most likely sexually restrained, even if she was wearing a scant bathing suit. Neither was indulging in overconsumption. Still, the images projected values about gender and modernity that were shared by both East and West.

**Jill Massino:** As in other socialist societies, gender policies in Romania were shaped by the exigencies of the Cold War. During the Stalinist period women were urged to “fight for peace” and engage in productive labor in order to stave off the imperialist threat. As such, they were celebrated first and foremost as laborers, and often presented in plain and unfeminine ways. At the same time, efforts were made, albeit haltingly, to lighten women’s domestic load through state-run childcare facilities, and all citizens were granted free healthcare and education. Although my respondents generally lauded welfare entitlements, their attitudes toward paid labor varied. While some women found work arduous and burdensome, others found it empowering since it provided them with new skills, a degree of economic autonomy, and a sense of identity and belonging. With respect to reproductive policies, Romania also conformed to Cold War (read Soviet) policies during this period. In 1948 abortion, the primary source of birth control, became illegal in Romania, though this measure had minimal effects on daily life as most women procured abortions with no legal repercussions.

With the advent of the thaw in the mid-1950s, Romania embraced some of the liberalizing tendencies of its bloc neighbors (including the decriminalization of abortion) while also distancing itself from the USSR. The result was the increased use of
nationalism to legitimate communist policies, a process that began in the late-1950s and reached epic proportions by the 1980s. Economically, Romania distanced itself from the Soviet sphere by trading with the West. However, ideologically, Romania remained firmly within the communist camp. From a gender perspective, the embrace of nationalism under Nicolae Ceaușescu (1965–1989) manifested itself in the implementation of highly restrictive and invasive pronatalist policies and the tightening of divorce legislation. Here Ceaușescu departed from his bloc neighbors, most of who had legalized abortion in the 1950s and kept it legal throughout the remainder of communist rule. In Romania pronatalism included positive incentives such as family allowances, though these did not offset the cost of supporting additional children, especially once rationing was introduced in the 1980s. Consequently, women during the Ceaușescu era found their autonomy sharply compromised—especially in the 1980s when pronatalist policies became more draconian. These repressive policies coexisted with the promotion of women into male-dominated fields and the celebration of youth, beauty, and the modern lifestyle. Thus, in an effort to legitimate communism, Romania followed other countries in the bloc, deploying images of consumer goods and the Western-styled, yet socialist “modern woman” as emblems of mature socialism. When considered with respect to the larger Cold War battle, Romania’s blending of nationalism and communism, as well as its policies on gender, illustrate that by the mid-1970s Romania was not clearly in one camp or another, but in its own.

**Renata Jambrešić Kirin:** Jill’s last remark that Romania was not clearly in one camp or another is even more true for the Yugoslav case, and so is Libora’s conclusion that the Cold War is a problematic and limiting frame of reference. Although I do not support the myth of Yugoslav exceptionalism, we have to differentiate three dimensions along which its progressive incorporation into the world economy and politics might be measured. These are a powerful antifascist movement cum socialist revolution as the political legacy of WWI, the Non-Alignment Movement, and workers’ self-management. Each and all of them have been widely discussed and well examined, but the new gender order in Yugoslav socialism with a human face, “inflected” or not by the Cold War competitive spirit, has remained under-researched. What needs to be explored is how the semifinished process of Yugoslav political modernization and democratization was largely connected with male-dominated, heroic, authoritarian, and heteronormative discourses compatible with the Cold War patriarchal order. Unlike the rhetorical figuration of heroic masculinity and supportive femininity, gender equality had no symbolic or ritual foundation and this “invented concept” was soon adapted to older cultural patterns or used as an ideological buzzword.

According to sociologist John B. Allcock, the communist hegemony or one-party system was not the only cause of the democratic deficit and social stagnation in the SFRY; the passing of traditional society and its values (e.g., in the realm of kinship, family life, and religion) was equally important for the failure of civil society and modernization processes in a number of ways. As the 1990s’ wars showed, the family, locality, and ethno-nationalism were the vestiges of resistance to a rapid and often forced socialist modernization, especially in rural areas. However, I do not want to repeat the communist argument, blaming the moral-religious “backwardness” of the
rural population, for the insufficient emancipation of Yugoslav women. Fact is that the struggle for full gender equality was not prioritized when other aspects of structural and cultural change did tune to the socialist and global modernization.

I share the opinion of Libora, Gosia, and Jill that the socialist modernization (with its radical shifts of Foucauldian technologies of production, technologies of signs, and technologies of power), despite significant improvement in women’s economic and social status, failed to create the conditions for their full emancipation, autonomous action, and self-realization. Historian Sabrina P. Ramet concluded in one of her articles: “no one is surprised that capitalism, which does not make any promises of gender equality or social justice, fails to achieve either of these. But the failure of self-managing socialism to achieve these twin goals, which it had set for itself, invites the question as to whether the radical feminists are right, that is, whether only a struggle which prioritizes the achievement of full gender equality can have any prospects of success.”

And indeed, if the first wave of Yugoslav feminists or “revolutionary mothers” had to construct modern, secular, and gender-balanced social institutions from scratch, their “radical” feminist daughters began to question the Party’s claim that the woman question had been solved. Feminist scholars and artists wishing to challenge this claim were meeting for the first time at the 1978 Belgrade Drug-ća žena: žensko pitanje: novi pristupi or international “Comrade Women” conference. This event is considered the historic start of second wave feminism in Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe, although the women gathered there “had not yet developed any autonomous political practice or any campaign about women’s rights, differently than feminist groups in Western Europe.” Adele Cambria, an Italian participant of the conference, observed that Yugoslav women felt a “great desire for feminism that is emerging in a context that is not totalitarian—but in which it is nonetheless very hard to express one’s womanhood.” Yugoslav participants criticized the socialist halfway measures regarding the implementation of gender equality as well as their Western colleagues’ lack of knowledge of socialist legislation, labor law, and representational practices that enthusiastically used the image of the “new woman” as a symbol of socialist progressive and humanistic orientation. Yugoslav feminists’ respect for but also distance towards their foreign feminist colleagues should have something to do with the Yugoslav propaganda against the capitalist superpowers and the Cold War rivalry.

As I have already mentioned, a permanent conflict but also a strange complementarity between emancipatory and traditional values, i.e., between the communist and patriarchal worldviews, was a common thread of the Yugoslav social fabric from the late 1940s to the late 1980s. Opposing each other within the Party’s official materials and women’s political magazines, both ideologies praised female virtues such as the propensity to self-discipline, readiness to sacrifice and to take responsibility for the well-being of the family and the community as a whole. However, the political pressure to distance Yugoslavia from Stalin and the USSR and the import of American popular culture were triggers for introducing new discourses of femininity and domesticity, and for the secret adoption of bourgeois lifestyles (Milovan Đilas in the mid-1950s accused his former comrades for becoming a “red bourgeoisie”) and having a special Yugoslav “communist chic.” For example, former partisan women who partici-
panied in the legitimization of the new government and created new social trends were not loyal to feminist ideals. We can see this illustrated in the speech of Vida Tomšič, the head of the Antifascist Women's Front (AFŽ) of Yugoslavia, at the fourth plenary session of the AFŽ of Croatia, held on 10 October 1948 in Zagreb: “The women we see in the Russian newspapers are all drably dressed. This alleged requirement of socialism negates all that we want—beauty, joy and diversity. We should teach our women how to dress well and how to clean their homes so they can do it quickly.”

Vida Tomšič’s frivolous explanation of the “aesthetics difference” between Yugoslav and Soviet women is not the only worrying element. In a Copernican reversal typical of socialist demagogical discourse, Tomšič transformed a positive desire for individualism and the good life into an instruction on efficient management of women’s time with the goal of better servicing all members of the household and society as a whole. The thesis that gender equality cannot be attained as long as women’s interests are focused only on the family and household here got an interesting twist. Instead of Lenin’s mission to free women from the difficult and monotonous labor that “ties her to the past with a thousand lines,” the modern Yugoslav woman was told that only a (rational, economic, and swift) performance of that same labor could give her more time for herself. Thus, the former comrade woman “was expected to conduct her domestic duties as if the Revolution never took place” and to cope with many contradictory demands: “to behave nicely and encourage men to do extraordinary deeds,” to “promote novelty, freedom and openness,” as well as to be the incarnation of “beauty, joy, and diversity” (according to women’s magazines of the 1950s).

Feminist sociologist Gordana Bosanac located the failure of Party policies in solving the problem of class, gender, and social inequality in the communist reconstruction of the will for power, and through it the reconstruction of the social state of hegemony, which “reproduces again not only inequality, but also new forms of subordination and non-freedom.”

**Libora Oates-Indruchova:** I said at the outset that my work had not taken me into the realm of gender-relevant policies, but rather, representations. Concerning this question, therefore, I will largely draw on other people’s research on policies and legislation; my own work relates to it in so far as it examines some of the unintended consequences of communist policies. Gosia placed communist policies in the context of modernization. This contextualization is of crucial importance in the case of the Czech Republic/Czechoslovakia, because many of the policies that put women on equal legal footing with men were either already put in place thanks to activists of the pre-WWII women’s movement, or taken over from this movement or its brief post-war revival by the communist legislators. Hana Havelková called this the process of “expropriation” of the women’s movement’s agenda.

At least with regard to the Czech Republic/Czechoslovakia, it is important to distinguish between gender policies and gender-relevant legislation. The Czech historian Denisa Nečasová has made important points—documented through careful archival research—about gender policies, namely the Communist Party’s policy line on women’s equality and on its relation to the women’s movement: gender equality was never a policy goal of the Communist Party, but equality was considered as having been
achieved by virtue of being codified in the 1948 Constitution (already the Constitution from 1920 codified the equality of men and women), and the Party was literally afraid of an autonomous women’s movement. Therefore, more or less immediately after it seized power in 1948, the communist government sought to define its take on the woman question as difference from what it now called the “bourgeois women’s movement” and took practical steps to that end. It first centralized the existing movement that was hitherto formed by various women’s organizations, then instrumentalized it as a tool for ideological work among un-organized women, atomized it into mutually noncommunicating units, and annihilated it—all this by the mid-1950s. In contrast with the interwar women’s movement, the Articles of Association of the umbrella women’s organization established in 1948, the Women’s Council, moved the goal of securing the equality of the sexes to the fourth, i.e., the last, place and its short-lived successor organization, the Union of Czechoslovak Women (1950–1952), did not include equality among its goals at all.24

As far as the legal framework is concerned, however, the Czech Republic/Czechoslovakia followed the general trend of the Bloc. Barbara Havelková published an overview of the relevant legislation. She also emphasizes the context of modernization and continuity from the prewar period. She acknowledges areas of advancement, such as in family law, reproductive rights, access to education, and labor code, but lists also the deficits in gender-relevant legislation. She notes, among other things, that there were no specific provisions concerning domestic violence (only when the violence resulted in bodily harm or murder, could it be prosecuted), sexual harassment, or GLBT rights. She further points out that even if there were appropriate constitutional rights, these were not enforceable, because there was no Constitutional Court. Moreover, both horizontal and vertical segregation continued to exist in the labor market and were at least partially based in the legal framework.25

The unintended consequences of state-socialist policies are difficult to assess and research into this area is still patchy. We can probably safely infer that the necessity of two wages in the family did result in increasing women’s economic independence, as well as in their developing labor skills that came in useful in the economically difficult period of post-state-socialist transformation. In my own research, I tried to show with textual examples from popular literature that even if the Communist Party did not aim at gender equality through its policies, it did use egalitarian rhetoric and perhaps also thanks to that rhetoric the range of discursive positions that became available to women increased, while the same cannot be said about men26—but that is already the subject of another question.

Question 3 (February 2013): How did the Cold War affect women’s activism, whether for their rights, for peace, or other issues? (See, e.g., the examples mentioned in the Introduction above). Can we speak of a “Cold War order” characterized by a “patriarchal denial of equality to women,” which came under attack in the 1960s, as Bonnie Smith put it?27
Libora Oates-Indruchová: The answer to this question is partially contained within my contribution to the discussion of the previous question. The communist rulers in Czechoslovakia saw to it that any organized women's movement was seriously curbed. So far, we have no research available that would document any degree of other than formalistic activism (i.e., signing various petitions for peace or workers’ rights at the behest of the Communist Party) within the framework of the women's organization—unlike, for example, in the case of Bulgaria, where Kristen Ghodsee has researched not just activism from within the Bulgarian women's organization, but the lasting effects of this activism in the developing world in the post-Cold War era. Women were, of course, active in dissident circles, whether as authors, typists, or distributors of samizdat publications, or as Charter 77 spokespersons. However, it would be too far-fetched to claim that their activities could be grouped under the label of “women’s activism” where “women” is a position of self-identification—unlike the situation in the GDR, where a pre-1989 Women’s Movement was associated with the dissent. The first “women’s” NGO—Prague Mothers—was registered in 1988; its members defined the organization as an ecological group and in their self-presentations after 1989 consistently refused to be labeled a “women’s group.”

Still, the group definitely meets the criterion of women’s activism we are discussing here. Whether it also meets the criterion of a Cold War effect is questionable. We would first have to claim that the ecological devastation of Czechoslovakia was primarily a result of the Cold War, which would be a grossly reductionist perspective. Finally, we can perhaps make some inferences concerning women's activism from the post-1989 development. The fact that there were over fifty women’s groups registered by the mid-1990s demonstrates that women did have both the social consciousness and the organizational skills to address issues that were relevant to them as women. To what extent this could be linked to the Cold War competition or divisions is, however, again disputable.

Malgorzata (Gosia) Fidelis: I find it difficult to use the phrase “activism” to describe the diverse actions and movements in which women participated in postwar Eastern Europe. I agree with Libora that this topic requires more research. Moreover, I would suggest that it also requires rethinking the concepts of “activism” and “feminism” to account for the specific Eastern European context. The Western perspective is already entrenched in the very term “activism,” since it usually denotes grassroots initiative and mobilization by citizens in democratic societies. In Poland, this kind of activism outside of official state structures was difficult to pursue until the Solidarity era in the early 1980s. Women did participate in workers’ protests and dissident movements during the political upheavals of 1956, 1968, and 1980, but as Shana Penn powerfully demonstrated in her book *Solidarity’s Secret* (2006), they remained in the shadows of male leaders. It seems that the Cold War definitions of “politics,” “opposition,” and “rebellion,” often shared by male political leaders and dissidents alike, contributed to the marginalization of women as “activists.” In Eastern Europe, male Party leaders and dissidents often shared the belief that women were primarily mothers and domestic beings in need of protection, regardless of their participation in economic and
political life. In Poland, this was especially visible in Solidarity’s repeated demands to limit women’s participation in the workforce and to ban abortion.

Women’s “activism” inside and outside state structures is difficult to discern at first glance, but this may be because we are not looking in the right places. As Libora rightly pointed out, there must have been some kind of feminist social consciousness among women prior to the collapse of the system, if women were able to mobilize as soon as such action became politically feasible. The first women’s groups in Poland that defined themselves as feminist were formed in the mid-1980s by female intellectuals. Today, Poland can boast of one of the most vibrant and diverse feminist scenes in Europe. Already by 1994, more than 120 women’s organizations were active in Poland; many of them were formed in response to the antiabortion legislation the Polish government enacted in 1993. This law, one of the most restrictive in Europe, bans the procedure except in the cases of rape, incest, genetic disorders of the fetus, and the woman’s medical condition. Still, this legislation regularly comes under attack from the extreme right and the Catholic Church, which seek to introduce a total ban on abortion. One of the most successful women’s initiatives in Poland is Kongres Kobiet (the Congress of Women) established in 2009. This loosely structured national organization, which now also has local chapters, seeks to make women more active regardless of political divisions—the Congress attempts to reach out to women of diverse political orientation, including both liberal and conservative—and to raise public awareness regarding gender stereotyping and discrimination.30 Such initiatives have made a significant impact on Polish society and the dominant perceptions of feminism. I find especially striking how the depiction of feminism in the mainstream media has changed over the last twenty-five years. While in the early 1990s, it was not unusual to hear feminist activists vilified as “Bolsheviks” and “murderers” of the Polish nation, a feminist perspective and critique of gender discrimination have now been recognized as legitimate and welcome in a democratic Polish society, a member state of the European Union. Of course, the degree of recognition varies depending on the particular newspaper or news channel, but the change is noticeable.

It might be useful to depart from the conventional definition of activism and explore other ways in which women in Eastern Europe resisted patriarchal norms emanating not only from the state, but also from their families, local and professional communities, and the larger society. We should also be careful not to dismiss women’s activism in official organizations as completely subordinated to male Party leaders and their decisions. It might be helpful to look at unexpected places such as consumption or popular culture as sites of women’s “resistance” and contestation. In my research, I found that women’s periodicals, despite state control, often served as a forum for diverse voices that stood in stark contrast to official policies and prevailing norms. These periodicals also show how women used socialist consumption and everyday culture to create spaces of autonomy. This brings me to Renata’s point about the power of popular culture in defining gender identities. I see many similarities between Poland and Yugoslavia, despite Poland’s different political status as a member of the Soviet Bloc. Polish political elites endorsed selected Western trends (often in response to pressures from below); moreover foreign cultural and material products could be accessed
through semilegal venues such as foreign radio stations or the black market. Gender roles were influenced by Western popular culture, including Hollywood movies and rock-and-roll, to an enormous extent. How did these influences interact with socialist policies? I wonder if the intersection of everyday life, popular culture, and consumption might be the new research area that reveal insights on gender identities in Eastern Europe that we do not easily get from studies of more conventional subjects such as work, family, or political participation.

**Francisca de Haan:** Although I mainly act as facilitator here, I would like to expand on your comments about women’s activism. Libora has pointed out that for Czechoslovakia there is no research available “that would document any degree of other than formalistic activism … within the framework of the women’s organization—unlike, for example, the case of Bulgaria,” as documented by Kristen Ghodsee. Gosia, writing about Poland, agrees with Libora that this topic needs more research, adding that it “also requires rethinking the concepts of ‘activism’ and ‘feminism’ to account for the specific Eastern European context.” I would first like to underscore the importance of an earlier comment Gosia made, about “the rejection of the communist era as a black hole in the history of feminism,” which we also noted when we made the *Biographical Dictionary of Women’s Movements and Feminisms, Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe, 19th and 20th Centuries* (2006) and is a major reason why so little research has been done. Fortunately, young scholars such as Chiara Bonfiglioli (in this volume and elsewhere) and Raluca Popa are now looking into this “black hole” from a post-1989 or post-Cold War perspective and with fresh questions. Their findings, based on detailed archival work informed by a critical rethinking of the categories that have shaped the prevailing insights or assumptions until now, strongly suggest that there was large-scale activism of socialist women on behalf of women, and that many of these women identified as socialist feminists. My own research about the Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF), which was not an “Eastern European” women’s organization but one in which women from the region did play important roles, highlights these women’s international connections and contacts across Cold War divides, as well as their important role in the international domain of women’s rights. So, yes, we do need more research, and especially work that addresses the complexity of women’s situation in socialist countries in national and transnational contexts. This entails, among other things, taking into account their relatively advanced position and what that meant in their own eyes as well as the role this played in the Cold War competition. Another important element is that of change over time from the 1940s through the 1980s. Overall, I would say that historians are only beginning to explore the large-scale and multilayered (local–national–international) work of feminist socialist women activists across the region; any conclusions regarding gender and women’s political agency during state socialism may therefore be premature.

**Jill Massino:** As Libora and Gosia have stressed—as well as the contributors to *Aspasia’s* vol. 1’s Forum “Is Communist Feminism a Contradictio in Terminis?”—the topic of women’s activism in postwar Eastern Europe is a complex and contested one. Much of this stems from the fact that Western definitions of “activism” and “feminism” are
typically employed to evaluate the practices of East European women. Moreover, not all countries have been equally studied with respect to this issue, hampering sustained comparative analyses of the region. This being said, as Libora and Gosia point out, the work of Kristen Ghodsee on socialist Bulgaria illustrates that there were spaces for feminist activism, especially when connected to broader issues such as development and anticolonialism. Moreover, Raluca Popa has documented the important contribution of Romanian and Hungarian activists in promoting peace, development, and gender equality—both within international and national contexts. Thus, while the Cold War clearly influenced the nature of women’s activism, and while East European activists adhered to a particular ideological position, some were nonetheless genuinely committed to gender equality and, indeed, even defined themselves as feminists.

With respect to Romania, the Consiliul Național al Femeilor (National Women’s Council, CNF) was the only legitimate body through which women’s and gender issues could be addressed during the communist period. As an arm of the Party, its programs were directed and mediated by the state. During the early years of communist rule, the organization promoted women’s literacy, education, and employment—initiatives that benefitted many women. However, once abortion was criminalized in 1966, the CNF was charged with fulfilling Ceaușescu’s pronatalist mission and its initiatives were, on the whole, unfeminist. Yet, this is not to claim that no feminists existed within its ranks. Popa’s research demonstrates that some CNF members were well versed in feminist philosophy and genuinely committed to gender equality, albeit within a larger socialist framework. Moreover, a number of women I interviewed (unaffiliated with the CNF) had read Simone de Beauvoir and spoke at length about workplace harassment, the double burden, and other forms of gender inequality they had experienced. Indeed, some even explained how they fought against imbalances in power in their own lives by challenging the dominance of husbands and male coworkers. Yet, while individual women may have personally thought and acted in a feminist manner, they were unable to do so in a collective and fully open manner as independent organizing was impossible during the communist period. That being said, the emergence of women’s organizations after the collapse of communism indicates that some type of shared feminist consciousness existed prior to 1989 and that collective action was considered important and, indeed, necessary—at least by the activists—as the country transitioned to democracy.

Renata Jambrešić Kirin: Respecting Francisca’s cautionary note that any conclusion regarding women’s political agency during state socialism may be premature, I was nevertheless surprised how Libora’s description of bureaucratic measures (instrumentalization, atomization, and abolition) taken by the Czechoslovakian communist government in the 1950s in order to reduce, discipline, and control women’s organizations fits the Yugoslav scenario. In our case, too, as Croatian feminist historian Lydia Sklevicky pointed out in her study based on meticulous archival research, the communist government was literally afraid of an autonomous, strong, and mass women’s movement. Thus, Yugoslav communists abolished the AFŽ (Antifascist Women’s Front) in 1953 and abruptly closed the liveliest period of semirevolutionary and emancipatory women’s activism. The second period, from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s,
was characterized by incorporation of women’s organizations into larger political associations of “working people” and the loss of the second (most important) dimension of women’s activism—“work for the society and work for/on themselves.” The third period of socialist women’s activism was marked by grassroots feminist and civil initiatives called neofeminizam (“new feminism”) or second wave feminism, which was visible only in big Yugoslav cities such as Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana.

As documents show, the range of emancipatory activities and the list of works women’s organizations performed in the first postwar years—under the same name and with the same “revolutionary flag” of the AFŽ (Antifascist Women’s Front)—was really impressive. Yugoslav women’s intense international activity, particularly in the Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF), ended in 1949, due to the Tito–Stalin conflict, when Yugoslav women delegates were thrown out of the Federation on the false accusation of being “Gestapo provocateurs” and “spies.” Because of this disappointment, the AFŽ leaders were no longer seeking admission into any international women’s organization. The main problem regarding the unfortunate alliance of Yugoslav women activists and communists stems from the fact that the Party’s political goal was not to raise autonomous, responsible, and well-informed female citizens. As Josip Broz Tito clearly stated in his speech at the first AFŽ Congress held in 1945 in Belgrade: Yugoslav “forward-thinking women” were expected to justify the trust they had been given, and focus all their forces on “issues of strengthening our government.” Ethnologist Miroslava Malešević commented on this paternalistic and instrumentalist behavior of former comrades, concentrated on consolidating power: “Having fulfilled the task enforced by extraordinary circumstances, a former partisan woman and shock worker would … withdraw from the social scene as quickly as she emerged on it. Energetic breakthrough into all professions, including the highest levels of government, was quickly put to a stop.” Biljana Kašić and Sandra Prlenda added that after the joint victory with their revolutionary male comrades in 1945, women “had to turn back to their private histories and, by decoding the revolutionary symbols (both utopian and traditional), exposed the extent to which women’s history could undo any ideological narrative closure.” Evidence of the downplaying of women’s history is the fact that the SFRY never established a research institution, archive, or museum dedicated to its world-famous women’s partisans and revolutionaries, among them ninety-one war heroines with the highest decoration in the country, the status of National Hero.

The AFŽ was gradually transformed, first into the League of Women’s Associations (1953–1961), and then into KAZDAŽ, the Conference for Social Activity of Woman (1961–1965), fatefuly following the Communist Party line, that is, the conviction that “our socialist society functioned in a genderless way.” A good example of the redirection of political goals and civil initiatives in the domain of gender equity is the changing character of International Women’s Day. According to studies by Lydia Sklevicky, Dunja Richtman Auguštinić, Ivan Čolović, and Miroslava Malešević, this women’s (workers’) holiday, loudly celebrated in Yugoslav urban and rural, formal and informal settings, started as a political manifestation in favor of women’s rights and ended up as a celebration of motherhood, socialist consumerism, and leisure practices. From the biggest female socialist holiday, for which working records were broken and which was dedicated to the international fight for women’s rights, for peace and democracy
in the world, all that remained was an empty festivity, a special and rare opportunity for going out to a restaurant or shopping abroad. Women’s (professional) activists continued to publish their journals, organize their meetings and cultural activities, collect money for partisan monuments, and sign petitions against colonialism and imperialist wars, but the political emancipation of women and their participation in power was no longer on their agenda.

In that sense it is difficult to say whether “the liveliness of women’s political and social activism in Italy and Yugoslavia in the early Cold War period (1945–1957)” can be interpreted as a demonstration of their importance “in everyday Cold War politics at the local and at the international level,” as Chiara Bonfiglioli concluded in her doctoral thesis. I do agree that during the 1940s and the 1950s, due to the tightening of relations between the Cold War parties and the continuing struggle for the implementation of women’s rights (abortion was partly liberalized in 1963, and fully in 1977), Yugoslav women were politically more active and more upset by measures which prevented them in their actions than their successors in the later decades of mature “socialism with a friendly face.” We had to wait for a generational change and the late 1970s to hear some new women, most often the daughters of revolutionary mothers, articulate questions about their perplexed positions in feminist terms and open to the experiences, knowledge, and practices of their Eastern and Western “sisters.” So, the first grassroots feminist groups and activities could be traced in the late 1970s and 1980s when a feminist input came simultaneously from academia and civil initiatives with the idea that “women’s consciousness raising is also a necessity for the humanist and socialist development of our society,” as well as that human rights should be accessible to sexual minorities too.

**Question 4 (March 2013):** Gender is not only about women and femininity, and English-language scholarship is also discussing the role of masculinity as shaping and shaped by Cold War politics. How do you think masculinity was or masculinities were affected, perhaps limited by, the dominant Cold War discourse and/or specific policies regarding for example the military, education, the labor market, cultural policies, or the family?

**Malgorzata (Gosia) Fidelis:** As we are trying to understand the intersection of gender identities and the Cold War, it is crucial to address the role of men and the cultural construction of masculinities. In Poland, recent works on homosexuality and contemporary sexual identities examine, to some extent, the cultural construction of masculinity, but few of these works analyze the communist experience. Scholars generally agree that the policy of gender equality was primarily aimed at uplifting women with the assumption that men were more advanced in their political status and class “consciousness.” Indeed, men’s presumed superiority informed communist policies and the official cultural representation. For example, when women were encouraged to perform male-dominated jobs in industry and professions, no parallel campaign existed to promote typical female jobs for men. Nor were men encouraged to participate
in household work or childrearing on equal terms with women. Yet the male gender role must have undergone some modification and adjustment to “equal rights,” even if that did not result in fully egalitarian relations between the sexes. On the one hand, the communist state reaffirmed men’s superiority by offering them new powers and hypermasculine roles as Party leaders, youth activists, and heroic laborers. On the other hand, the mass participation of women in education and the labor force must have affected male behavior and identity, although the effects were often ambiguous.

When I was conducting interviews with female workers in Poland for my first book, I found that in textile families it was quite common for the husband to participate in domestic chores and childcare, especially if the couple worked alternate shifts. At the same time, I was struck by the persistent labeling of certain tasks as “women’s work” and “men’s work.” One woman who worked as a weaver prior to 1989 praised her husband’s full participation in household duties. Almost every time, however, upon her return from the shift the husband would let her know that he performed a job that did not belong to him: “Dear Irenka,” he greeted her, “I cleaned up the kitchen today, but remember that this was the last time I did it.”

This persistent gender categorization with regard to work, even if the same tasks were regularly performed by women and men, was reinforced by the official discourse and the gender segregation at the workplace. The stress on gender difference in a society that professed “gender equality” is ironic, and suggests widespread anxieties towards attempts to redefine traditional gender order. In this context, we can interpret the images of beautiful, docile, and feminine women that began to dominate the visual culture in Poland after 1956 as a reaction to the perceived dangers that gender “equality” posed to the male-dominated social and political structures.

Libora Oates-Indruchová: “There were no men”—words to that effect were spoken some time in the mid- to late-1990s by a participant of an introductory gender studies course I taught for secondary-school educators, organized by the Open Society Fund in the Czech Republic. The subject of the class was images of masculinity and femininity in state-socialist and contemporary media. The participants were mostly women in their thirties and forties, so old enough to have spent a good deal of their adulthood under state socialism. Together, we went through a list of popular TV series that aired in the 1980s and more or less drew a blank. We could remember hosts of female characters, but hardly any men, except middle-aged, caring, and responsible Party functionaries or doctors. This experience constituted an impulse for me to research the subject. First I looked into mainstream media at political speeches and coverage of certain events to see how men were portrayed. I arrived at the unsurprising conclusion that men were so strongly defined as workers and soldiers in the Cold War context that there was no space left for any other masculine model in the official discourse.

After that, I looked into images intended for entertainment and popular consumption, namely a perestroika cult novel, Memento, by Radek John (later briefly the Czech Minister of the Interior in 2010–2011), to see how masculinity was presented there. I chose the novel, because it came up at the top of the list of the most frequently borrowed books on contemporary themes in a large-scale research of public libraries in...
the 1980s. Apart from that, the book sold over half a million copies, saw several reprints (including in the 1990s and again in 2008) and was translated into some dozen languages in the countries of the Eastern bloc. The “memento” or warning in the book is directed against the dangers of drug abuse, an evil to which the state-socialist countries were not immune, although they pretended that. In other words, the book addressed a taboo topic and thus joined the new voices of perestroika. Interestingly, the destructive effects of drugs and the protagonist’s futile struggle with them are framed within several models of masculinity.

I concluded from the analysis that the protagonist did not have any masculine model available that he would find appealing or even acceptable—and the narrator/author was equally at a loss to provide an alternative to either the kind of masculinity condoned by the state and society (the hard-working, law-abiding, and “proper” socialist citizen) or to masculinities presented as criminal. In the context of my analyses of femininity, I proposed that the discursive environment of state socialism and the Cold War expanded the range of discursive positions available to women, but not to men. So far there has not been research on Czech material that would have arrived at a contradictory conclusion in terms of public discourse, although that does not mean that various groups of men could not construct alternative masculinities in practice.43

**Jill Massino:** Gosia’s claim with respect to the labor force in socialist Poland holds true for Romania: the state made no efforts to promote men in female-dominated jobs. This is unsurprising since these jobs typically paid less than male-dominated jobs and conferred a lower status. However, the state did at least pay lip service to the need for equality in the home. The Party women’s monthly, *Femeia* (Woman), included articles and imagery that promoted progressive ideals of manhood and, at least on the surface, attempted to blur traditional gender roles by stressing the equal importance of both partners in childrearing and domestic duties. Indeed, men who lazed about reading the paper and left the housework to their wives were presented as patriarchal, selfish, and unsocialist.

Moreover, with the onset of Ceaușescu’s pronatalist policies, propagandists urged men to be more sensitive to their wives’ emotional and sexual needs in the hope that this would facilitate procreation. Although it is difficult to determine the degree to which such representations affected the everyday lives of couples, according to a number of women I interviewed there was a good deal of sharing—especially of childcare and shopping/queuing up—during the communist period. However, whether this stemmed from official efforts to refashion masculinity or from necessity cannot be determined with certainty. This being said, patriarchal practices and beliefs were not eradicated, evident in the sexual double standard, the continued existence of domestic violence, and the popularity of the male drinking culture. Moreover, men held higherranking posts within the political sphere and in the labor force. It seems that the communist period witnessed some reshaping of masculine norms, but this was most likely a result of men working alongside women and the increased participation of men in the domestic realm. Thus, practical concerns and everyday experiences, more so than ideology or propaganda, fostered more progressive or, at least more flexible, notions of masculinity.
Renata Jambrešić Kirin: I completely agree that the range of discursive positions and media representations available to socialist women was much broader and more elastic than those offered to men. If the New Yugoslav Woman, represented as a local variant of proletarian Marianne, was the symbol of revolution, modernity, progress, freedom, and democracy, then the Yugoslav president Tito soon took the central place of father figure, charismatic leader, and superior politician whose “two bodies” citizens could hardly distinguish between. If the woman allegory stood for national ideals and dreams, Tito’s body represented the country itself, its (false) perceptions and aspirations, hedonistic drives, and “dandy preferences.” According to historian Maja Brkljačić, with his “body natural” Tito stood for the “body politics” of Yugoslavia: “it was Tito’s real, natural body that was not only the embodiment of central power, but that, paradoxically, was the name and the face of what was supposed to be the continuous Yugoslav social body.”44 Many scholars in Yugoslav studies, who are not familiar with Louis Marin’s theory of representations, agree that Tito was the only truly Yugoslav institution and the common object of identification for almost thirty-five years.45

Studies about Yugoslav representational politics and memorial rituals after 1945, written by Lydia Sklevicky, Bojana Pejić, Svetlana Slapšak, Gordana Stojaković, Vjeran Pavlaković, and others, demonstrate how as early as the 1950s the public realm began to manifest a process of masculinization evident in major memorials and communal monuments, but also in films and posters printed for major state holidays (except, of course, March 8th). Bojana Pejić labeled this process the “de-gendering of collective memory” and saw it as repeating the shift that had occurred in the Soviet Union after the October Revolution. I believe a strong case can be made that the first politically relevant artistic subversion of dominant masculinized representational politics was done by artists and performers such as Sanja Iveković and Marina Abramović, who opposed the official patriarchy cum hegemony with repulsive bodily reaction, unaware of the feminist theory which supported this kind of art in Western countries.

An even more harmful dominance of male figures and values can be found in socialist textbooks. A big study of Croatian textbooks from the late 1970s by Rajka and Milan Polić showed that 73 percent of people depicted in them were men. While men were mostly portrayed as leaders, military persons, intellectuals, and artists, women were depicted as peasants, as female symbols (freedom, patria, motherhood), or portrayed as maternal, beautiful, and indecisive characters. Since the schoolbooks came under the authority of the Communist Party, “the failure to cultivate more equal images and aspirations for girls and boys was, in the final analysis, a failure of the Party.”46

I agree with Gosia’s observation that the stress on gender difference in a society that professed “gender equality” is quite ironic, provoking “defense mechanisms” that helped socialist men to adjust to the changing gender order. It is a cue for understanding the discrepancy between the “perfect” socialist gender mainstreaming and the unsatisfactory lived experiences of women’s emancipation in socialist Yugoslavia. I also agree that, compared with public discourses, trends, and fashions, various groups of men might have constructed alternative masculinities in Yugoslavia with its very diverse population and considerable regional, economic, and sociocultural differences.

Since I have not personally researched the role of Cold War notions of masculinity neither in international nor in the Yugoslav context, I can only share with you my ob-
ervation that homogenizing masculinities in Yugoslav mainstream media and popular culture could be divided into two dominant groups: those of heroic and antiheroic masculinity. The moral crisis relating to social stratification, corruption, consumerism, mediocre politicians, and powerful techno-managers was accompanied by a shift of the dominant male hero in Yugoslav film, TV-serials, and popular prose works called “blue jeans fiction.” The iconic “immortal” partisan hero—adored in the Soviet Union, Cuba, and even China—was replaced in literature and in the “black wave” film production of the 1960s with the figure of the criminal, libertine, mischief-maker, or vagabond. These alternative masculinities were associated with the values of freedom, nonconformity, urbanity, disobedience, and transgressiveness, although they were more often than not characterized by strong heterosexual desires and manners typical for the figure of the macho man.

This is, perhaps, the explanation why “alternative masculinities,” detached from the patriarchal value settings, have not been cultivated and praised in socialist times, nor became part of later reconciliation processes. According to anthropologist Stef Jansen, who did research on this topic in postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is not politically comfortable to admit that a “common ground for mutual recognition could be negotiated through boundary-crossing performances not of ‘alternative’ but of hegemonizing, patriarchal masculinities.” He identified two major gendered patterns of masculine behavior—those associated with the father figure and those connected with the frajer (some kind of stylized, cultured, and nice antihero) figure—which played crucial roles in everyday reconciliation processes among fellow-nationals associated with opposite sides in the 1990s’ war.

Drawing on the experience of dominant masculinities mediated through new Croatian films and fiction based on neorealist procedures, we are puzzled by the narrowed choices of male characters’ identity positions and the very predictable gendered modes of their self-fulfillment. Much like an antihero of socialist “blue jeans fiction,” the fictional homo postcommunisticus is a paradigmatic “superfluous man” who does not fit in the new ideological and social context and who is constantly exhausted by the struggle with the disciplining strategies of global capitalism and with the specters of nationalism, chauvinism, and egoism spreading across postwar Croatia.

**Question 5 (April 2013):** Even though we use “gender” as our central lens, we know that “gender” never exists by itself and interacts with categories such as class, “race” and ethnicity, sexuality, religion, age, location (rural-urban) and more. How did the Cold War impact the situation of sexual and ethnic minorities in the country you are working on?

**Jill Massino:** The Cold War decisively impacted the lives of homosexuals in socialist Romania. For Ceaușescu, demographic growth was fundamental to the viability of socialism and all practices that did not contribute to this goal were deemed nonproductive and antinosaur. Thus, in 1968 (two years after the criminalization of abortion), Article 200 of the Penal Code criminalized homosexuality. Punishments ranged from
one to five years in prison (if both parties were adults), to two to seven years (for the adult) for relations with a minor. Moreover, if relations were found to have caused grave physical harm or suicide, the prison term could be anywhere from fifteen to twenty-five years. Indeed, even professing one’s homosexuality to friends and family was defined as proselytization and thus illegal. As such, Romania differed from Western European countries whose policies towards homosexuals, while repressive during the early part of the Cold War, became less so with the advent of the gay rights movement in the 1970s. Such activism was impossible in Romania, however, not only because the Party prohibited independent organizing, but also because homosexuality was not accepted in Romanian society more generally.

Renata Jambrešić Kirin: The intersectional approach to the problem of human rights violations in socialist Yugoslavia is absolutely crucial for understanding “deviances” of its political regime and social practices of (hidden) oppression or subordination of the (ethnic, racial, religious, cultural, or sexual) other. As philosopher Boris Buden recently said: “It would be nice to conduct a large-scale study in the history of Yugoslav inner imperialism, colonialism, racism, anti-immigrant policies and so on, and then see how the conservative right-wing prejudices were built on within the political and institutional forms of the communist project.”48 Such a study would also explain how recent right-wing xenophobia and phantasms about dangerous or suspicious neighbors are directly connected with communist practices of discrimination within the repressive apparatus, the army, and state services, but also in everyday encounters. Tensions and open animosities along the North–South axis, i.e., among national representatives of the rich and industrious North and the poor and profuse South were particularly prominent in times of economic crises and political regression. Phantasms about “linguistically inferior,” “uneducated,” or “prolific” others (Albanians, Muslims, Roma, Bosnian migrant workers) have been often accompanied by accusations of sexual deviances or excessive pleasure. The already mentioned oral history of homosexuals in Croatia—the book by Gordan Bosanac and Zvonimir Dobrović (2007)—and Dean Vuletic’s doctoral thesis are important sources of knowledge about homophobia in the Yugoslav political and sociocultural spheres.

Further historical, sociological, and anthropological research is more than desirable if we realize that homosexuality was illegal according to the Yugoslav Penal Code (Article 186), but in practice was not prosecuted. Some examples of symbolic violence, ritual punishment, and degradation ceremonies against homosexuals come from literature and memoirs. Prophetically or not, Vitomil Zupan (1914–1987) Slovenian writer and political prisoner, victim of early Cold War spy hysteria, and the writer who first wrote about the harsh treatment of homosexuals in communist prisons, was the author of the scenario for the movie Doviđenja u sledećem ratu (See you in the next war) (1980).

♩ About the Forum Contributors

Malgorzata Fidelis is Associate Professor in the Department of History at the University of Illinois at Chicago, USA. Her research focuses on social and cultural history in

Renata Jambrešić Kirin is senior researcher at the Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research in Zagreb, Croatia, in the field of oral literature and contemporary women’s history. She has coedited monographs War, Exile, Everyday Life (1996), Izmedu roda i naroda [Between gender and nation] (2004), and four collections of papers on feminist research in transnational perspective following the postgraduate courses at the Inter University Center in Dubrovnik (2007–2013, http://www.zenstud.hr/hr/izdavastvo/knjige). Her researches encompass the issue of women’s cultural memory in Croatia (the book Dom i svijet: o ženskoj kulturi pamćenja [Home and the world: On women’s cultural memory], 2008); representations of women in WWII propaganda and socialist media (Aspasia 4 (2010): 71–96); the position of women in “formative socialism” (in the exhibition catalogue Refleksije vremena 1945–1955 [Reflections on the time of 1945–1955], 2012: 182-201); the forty-year-long silence around women political prisoners in Yugoslav communist prison camps (Up&Underground, 2010, 17–18/231–242 and http://sjecanjazena.eu); testimonial discourse between the national war narrative (1991–1995) and refugee women’s self-empowerment (Collegium antropologicum 19, no. 1 (1995), 17–27); and feminist critique of political history in contemporary women’s novels (Ethnologie française 43, no. 2 (2013), 243-254). E-mail: renata@ief.hr.

Jill Massino is an Assistant Professor of modern European history at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, USA. Some of her recent publications are: Gender Politics and Everyday Life in State Socialist Eastern and Central Europe, coedited with Shana Penn (2009); “From Black Caviar to Blackouts: Gender, Consumption, and Lifestyle in Ceaușescu’s Romania,” in Communism Unwrapped: Consumption in Cold War Eastern Europe, ed. Paulina Bren and Mary Neuburger (2012); and “Something Old, Something New: Marital Roles and Relations in State Socialist Romania,” Journal of Women’s History 22, no. 1 (2010): 34–60. Her current project, “Ambiguous Transitions: Gender, the State, and Everyday Life in Romania from Socialism to Postsocialism,” explores the interplay between state constructions of gender and citizenship and the everyday lives of women and men in socialist and postsocialist Romania. E-mail: jmassino@uncc.edu.

Libora Oates-Indruchova is Associate Professor at the Department of Sociology at Palacký University. Her research interests include censorship, narrative research, gender and social change, and cultural representations of gender. Her publications in-

**Notes**


3. Ibid., 3–4.


10. These might include the question whether a focus on “gender and the Cold War” helps foreground relevant differences in histories and historiographical traditions between various socialist and nonsocialist countries in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe; something that we initially hoped to do here but that did not work out.


19. Ibid., 121.


33. Sklevicky thinks that from the summer of 1948 to the abolishment of the Antifascist Women’s Front (AFŽ) in 1953, “the organisation becomes hardened in the hierarchy that stresses the need for firmness, i.e. control of its members … in the obedient fulfilment of Party directives.” Lydia Sklevicky, *Konji, žene, ratovi* [Horses, women, wars], compil. by D. Rihtman Auguštin (Zagreb: Ženska infoteka, 1996), 132.

34. For a different interpretation of these changes, see Chiara Bonfiglioli’s article in this volume.


36. *Aktivnosti i akcije AFŽ-a 1945* [Activities and actions of the AFŽ in 1945], Croatian State Archive (HDA), Zagreb, Conference for Social Activity of Women (KDAŽH), f. 1234, box 162.


41. Rada Iveković, “Il femminismo che viene dall ’East” [The feminism that comes from ‘the East’], *Noi Donne* [We, women], no. 42.

42. See, for example, Zbyszek Sypniewski and Błażej Warkocki, eds. *Homofobia Po Polsku* [Homophobia Polish Style] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sic!, 2004); Paweł Leszkowicz and Tomek Kitliński, *Miłość i Demokracja: Rozważania o kwestii homoseksualnej w Polsce* [Love and Democracy. Thoughts on the Question of Homosexuality in Poland] (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Aureus, 2005); and Paweł Kurpios, *Poszukiwani, poszukiwane. Geje i lesbijki a rzeczywistość PRL* [Men and Women We Are Looking For. Gays, Lesbians, and the Reality of the Polish People’s Republic], on the Wrocław University website, http://www.dk.uni.wroc.pl/texty/prl_02.pdf. The first part of the title (Poszukiwani, poszukiwane) is a reference to a popular Polish comedy from 1973, in which the male main character dresses as a woman to hide from the police.


