Political Order in Changing Societies

by Samuel P. Huntington

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I. Political Order and Political Decay

The Political Gap

The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government. The differences between democracy and dictatorship are less than the differences between those countries whose politics embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, stability, and those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities. Communist totalitarian states and Western liberal states both belong generally in the category of effective rather than debile political systems. The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union have different forms of government, but in all three systems the government governs. Each country is a political community with an overwhelming consensus among the people on the legitimacy of the political system. In each country the citizens and their leaders share a vision of the public interest of the society and of the traditions and principles upon which the political community is based. All three countries have strong, adaptable, coherent political institutions: effective bureaucracies, well-organized political parties, a high degree of popular participation in public affairs, working systems of civilian control over the military, extensive activity by the government in the economy, and reasonably effective procedures for regulating succession and controlling political conflict. These governments command the loyalties of their citizens and thus have the capacity to tax resources, to conscript manpower, and to innovate and to execute policy. If the Politburo, the Cabinet, or the President makes a decision, the probability is high that it will be implemented through the government machinery.

In all these characteristics the political systems of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union differ significantly from the governments which exist in many, if not most, of the modernizing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These
countries lack many things. They suffer real shortages of food, literacy, education, wealth, income, health, and productivity, but most of them have been recognized and efforts made to do something about them. Beyond and behind these shortages, however, there is a greater shortage: a shortage of political community and of effective, authoritative, legitimate government. “I do know,” Walter Lippmann has observed, “that there is no greater necessity for men who live in communities than that they be governed, self-governed if possible, well-governed if they are fortunate, but in any event, governed.” Mr. Lippmann wrote these words in a moment of despair about the United States. But they apply in far greater measure to the modernizing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where the political community is fragmented against itself and where political institutions have little power, less majesty, and no resiliency—where, in many cases, governments simply do not govern.

In the mid-1950s, Gunnar Myrdal called the world’s attention to the apparent fact that the rich nations of the world were getting richer, absolutely and relatively, at a faster rate than the poorer nations. “On the whole,” he argued, “in recent decades the economic inequalities between developed and underdeveloped countries have been increasing.” In 1966 the president of the World Bank similarly pointed out that at current rates of growth the gap in per capita national income between the United States and forty underdeveloped countries would increase fifty per cent by the year 2000. Clearly, a central issue, perhaps the central issue, in inter national and developmental economics is the apparently remorseless tendency for this economic gap to broaden. A similar and equally urgent problem exists in politics. In politics as in economics the gap between developed political systems and underdeveloped political systems, between civic politics and corrupt politics, has broadened. This political gap resembles and is related to the economic gap, but it is not identical with it. Countries with underdeveloped economies may have highly developed political systems, and countries which have achieved high levels of economic welfare may still have disorganized and chaotic politics. Yet in the twentieth century the principal locus of political underdevelopment, like that of economic underdevelopment, tends to be the modernizing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

With a few notable exceptions, the political evolution of these countries after World War II was characterized by increasing ethnic and class conflict, recurring rioting and mob violence, frequent military coups d'état, the dominance of unstable personalistic leaders who often pursued disastrous economic and social policies, widespread and blatant corruption among cabinet ministers and civil servants, arbitrary infringement of the rights and liberties of citizens, declining standards of bureaucratic efficiency and performance, the pervasive alienation of urban political groups, the loss of authority by legislatures and courts, and the fragmentation and at times complete disintegration of broadly based political parties. In the two decades after World War II, successful coups d'état occurred in 17 of 20 Latin American countries (only Mexico, Chile, and Uruguay maintaining constitutional processes), in a half-dozen North African and Middle Eastern states (Algeria, Egypt, Syria, the Sudan, Iraq, Turkey), in a like number of west African and central African countries (Ghana, Nigeria, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Central African Republic, Congo), and in a variety of Asian societies (Pakistan, Thailand, Laos, South Vietnam, Burma, Indonesia, South Korea). Revolutionary violence, insurrection, and guerrilla warfare wracked Cuba, Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic in Latin America, Algeria and Yemen in the Middle East, and Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, China, the Philippines, Malaya, and Laos in Asia. Racial, tribal, or communal violence or tension disrupted Guyana, Morocco, Iraq, Nigeria, Uganda, the Congo, Burundi, the Sudan, Ruanda, Cyprus, India, Ce ylon, Burma, Laos, and South Vietnam. In Latin America, old-style, oligarchic dictatorships in countries like Haiti, Paraguay, and Nicaragua maintained a fragile police-based rule. In the eastern hemisphere, traditional regimes in Iran, Libya, Arabia, Ethiopia, and Thailand struggled to reform themselves even as they teetered on the brink of revolutionary overthrow.

During the 1950s and 1960s the numerical incidence of political violence and disorder increased dramatically in most countries of the world. The year 1958, according to one calculation, witnessed some 28 prolonged guerrilla insurgencies, four military uprisings,
and two conventional wars. Seven years later, in 1965, 42 pro-
longed insurgencies were underway; ten military revolts occurred;
and five conventional conflicts were being fought. Political insta-
bility also increased significantly during the 1950s and 1960s. Viola-
ence and other destabilizing events were five times more frequent
between 1955 and 1962 than they were between 1948 and 1954.
Sixty-four of 84 countries were less stable in the latter period than
in the earlier one. Throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America
there was a decline in political order, an undermining of the
authority, effectiveness, and legitimacy of government. There was
a lack of civic morale and public spirit and of political institutions
capable of giving meaning and direction to the public interest.
Not political development but political decay dominated the
scene.

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<th>Table 1.1. Military Conflicts, 1958–1965</th>
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What was responsible for this violence and instability? The
primary thesis of this book is that it was in large part the product
of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups
into politics coupled with the slow development of political institu-
tions. "Among the laws that rule human societies," de Tocque-
ville observed, "there is one which seems to be more precise and
clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become
so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the
same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased." The
political instability in Asia, Africa, and Latin America derives pre-
cisely from the failure to meet this condition: equality of political
participation is growing much more rapidly than "the art of asso-
ciating together." Social and economic change—urbanization,
increases in literacy and education, industrialization, mass media
expansion—extend political consciousness, multiply political de-
mands, broaden political participation. These changes undermine
traditional sources of political authority and traditional political
institutions; they enormously complicate the problems of creating
new bases of political association and new political institutions
combining legitimacy and effectiveness. The rates of social mobili-
ation and the expansion of political participation are high; the
rates of political organization and institutionalization are low.
The result is political instability and disorder. The primary prob-
lem of politics is the lag in the development of political institu-
tions behind social and economic change.

For two decades after World War II American foreign policy
failed to come to grips with this problem. The economic gap, in
contrast to the political gap, was the target of sustained attention,
analysis, and action. Aid programs and loan programs, the World
Bank and regional banks, the UN and the OECD, consortia and com-
bines, planners and politicians, all shared in a massive effort to do
something about the problem of economic development. Who,
however, was concerned with the political gap? American officials
recognized that the United States had a primary interest in the
creation of viable political regimes in modernizing countries. But
few, if any, of all the activities of the American government affect-
ing those countries were directly concerned with the promotion
of political stability and the reduction of the political gap. How can
this astonishing lacuna be explained?

It would appear to be rooted in two distinct aspects of the
American historical experience. In confronting the modernizing
countries the United States was handicapped by its happy history.
In its development the United States was blessed with more than
its fair share of economic plenty, social well-being, and political
stability. This pleasant conjuncture of blessings led Americans to
believe in the unity of goodness: to assume that all good things go
together and that the achievement of one desirable social goal aids
in the achievement of others. In American policy toward modern-
izing countries this experience was reflected in the belief that po-
political stability would be the natural and inevitable result of the achievement of, first, economic development and then of social reform. Throughout the 1950s the prevailing assumption of American policy was that economic development—the elimination of poverty, disease, illiteracy—was necessary for political development and political stability. In American thinking the causal chain was: economic assistance promotes economic development, economic development promotes political stability. This dogma was enshrined in legislation and, perhaps more important, it was ingrained in the thinking of officials in AID and other agencies concerned with the foreign assistance programs.

If political decay and political instability were more rampant in Asia, Africa, and Latin America in 1965 than they were fifteen years earlier, it was in part because American policy reflected this erroneous dogma. For in fact, economic development and political stability are two independent goals and progress toward one has no necessary connection with progress toward the other. In some instances programs of economic development may promote political stability; in other instances they may seriously undermine such stability. So also, some forms of political stability may encourage economic growth; other forms may discourage it. India was one of the poorest countries in the world in the 1950s and had only a modest rate of economic growth. Yet through the Congress Party it achieved a high degree of political stability. Per capita incomes in Argentina and Venezuela were perhaps ten times that in India, and Venezuela had a phenomenal rate of economic growth. Yet for both countries stability remained an elusive goal.

With the Alliance for Progress in 1961, social reform—that is, the more equitable distribution of material and symbolic resources—joined economic development as a conscious and explicit goal of American policy toward modernizing countries. This development was, in part, a reaction to the Cuban Revolution, and it reflected the assumption among policymakers that land and tax reforms, housing projects, and welfare programs would reduce social tensions and deactivate the fuse to Fidelismo. Once again political stability was to be the by-product of the achievement of another socially desirable goal. In fact, of course, the relationship between social reform and political stability resembles that between economic development and political stability. In some circumstances reforms may reduce tensions and encourage peaceful rather than violent change. In other circumstances, however, reform may well exacerbate tensions, precipitate violence, and be a catalyst of rather than a substitute for revolution.

A second reason for American indifference to political development was the absence in the American historical experience of the need to found a political order. Americans, de Tocqueville said, were born equal and hence never had to worry about creating equality; they enjoyed the fruits of a democratic revolution without having suffered one. So also, America was born with a government, with political institutions and practices imported from seventeenth-century England. Hence Americans never had to worry about creating a government. This gap in historical experience made them peculiarly blind to the problems of creating effective authority in modernizing countries. When an American thinks about the problem of government-building, he directs himself not to the creation of authority and the accumulation of power but rather to the limitation of authority and the division of power. Asked to design a government, he comes up with a written constitution, bill of rights, separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, regular elections, competitive parties—all excellent devices for limiting government. The Lockean American is so fundamentally anti-government that he identifies government with restrictions on government. Confronted with the need to design a political system which will maximize power and authority, he has no ready answer. His general formula is that governments should be based on free and fair elections.

In many modernizing societies this formula is irrelevant. Elections to be meaningful presuppose a certain level of political organization. The problem is not to hold elections but to create organizations. In many, if not most, modernizing countries elections serve only to enhance the power of disruptive and often reactionary social forces and to tear down the structure of public authority. "In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men," Madison warned in The Federalist, No. 51, "the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself." In many modernizing countries governments are still unable to perform the first function, much less the second. The primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order. Men may, of course, have order without liberty, but they
cannot have liberty without order. Authority has to exist before it can be limited, and it is authority that is in scarce supply in those modernizing countries where government is at the mercy of alienated intellectuals, rambunctious colonels, and rioting students.

It is precisely this scarcity that communist and communist-type movements are often able to overcome. History shows conclusively that communist governments are no better than free governments in alleviating famine, improving health, expanding national product, creating industry, and maximizing welfare. But the one thing communist governments can do is to govern; they do provide effective authority. Their ideology furnishes a basis of legitimacy, and their party organization provides the institutional mechanism for mobilizing support and executing policy. To overthrow the government in many modernizing countries is a simple task: one battalion, two tanks, and a half-dozen colonels may suffice. But no communist government in a modernizing country has been overthrown by a military coup d'etat. The real challenge which the communists pose to modernizing countries is not that they are so good at overthrowing governments (which is easy), but that they are so good at making governments (which is a far more difficult task). They may not provide liberty, but they do provide authority; they do create governments that can govern. While Americans laboriously strive to narrow the economic gap, communists offer modernizing countries a tested and proven method of bridging the political gap. Amidst the social conflict and violence that plague modernizing countries, they provide some assurance of political order.

Political Institutions: Community and Political Order

Social Forces and Political Institutions

The level of political community a society achieves reflects the relationship between its political institutions and the social forces which comprise it. A social force is an ethnic, religious, territorial, economic, or status group. Modernization involves, in large part, the multiplication and diversification of the social forces in society. Kinship, racial, and religious groupings are supplemented by occupational, class, and skill groupings. A political organization or procedure, on the other hand, is an arrangement for maintaining order, resolving disputes, selecting authoritative leaders, and thus promoting community among two or more social forces. A simple political community may have a purely ethnic, religious, or occupational base and will have little need for highly developed political institutions. It has the unity of Durkheim's mechanical solidarity. The more complex and heterogeneous the society, however, the more the achievement and maintenance of political community become dependent upon the workings of political institutions.

In practice, the distinction between a political institution and a social force is not a clear-cut one. Many groups may combine significant characteristics of both. The theoretical distinction between the two, however, is clear. All men who engage in political activity may be assumed to be members of a variety of social groupings. The level of political development of a society in large part depends upon the extent to which these political activists also belong to and identify with a variety of political institutions. Clearly, the power and influence of social forces varies considerably. In a society in which all belong to the same social force, conflicts are limited and are resolved through the structure of the social force. No clearly distinct political institutions are necessary. In a society with only a few social forces, one group—warriors, priests, a particular family, a racial or ethnic group—may dominate the others and effectively induce them to acquiesce in its rule. The society may exist with little or no community. But in a society of any greater heterogeneity and complexity, no single social force can rule, much less create a community, without creating political institutions which have some existence independent of the social forces that gave them birth. "The strongest," in Rousseau's oft-quoted phrase, "is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty." In a society of any complexity, the relative power of the groups changes, but if the society is to be a community, the power of each group is exercised through political institutions which temper, moderate, and redirect that power so as to render the dominance of one social force compatible with the community of many.

In the total absence of social conflict, political institutions are unnecessary; in the total absence of social harmony, they are impossible. Two groups which see each other only as archenemies cannot form the basis of a community until those mutual perceptions change. There must be some compatibility of interests
among the groups that compose the society. In addition, a complex society also requires some definition in terms of general principle or ethical obligation of the bond which holds the groups together and which distinguishes its community from other communities. In a simple society community is found in the immediate relation of one person to another: husband to wife, brother to brother, neighbor to neighbor. The obligation and the community are direct; nothing intrudes from the outside. In a more complex society, however, community involves the relation of individual men or groups to something apart from themselves. The obligation is to some principle, tradition, myth, purpose, or code of behavior that the persons and groups have in common. Combined, these elements constitute Cicero's definition of the commonwealth, or "the coming together of a considerable number of men who are united by a common agreement upon law and rights and by the desire to participate in mutual advantages." Consensus juris and utilitatis communio are two sides of political community. Yet there is also a third side. For attitudes must be reflected in behavior, and community involves not just any "coming together" but rather a regularized, stable, and sustained coming together. The coming together must, in short, be institutionalized. And the creation of political institutions involving and reflecting the moral consensus and mutual interest is, consequently, the third element necessary for the maintenance of community in a complex society. Such institutions in turn give new meaning to the common purpose and create new linkages between the particular interests of individuals and groups.

The degree of community in a complex society thus, in a rough sense, depends on the strength and scope of its political institutions. The institutions are the behavioral manifestation of the moral consensus and mutual interest, as well as the voluntary consensus and mutual interest. The isolated family, clan, tribe, or village may achieve community with relatively little effort. They are, in a sense, natural communities. As societies become larger in membership, more complicated in structure, and more diverse in activities, the achievement or maintenance of a high level of community becomes increasingly dependent upon political institutions. Men are, however, reluctant to give up the image of social harmony without political action. This was Rousseau's dream. It remains the dream of statesmen and soldiers who imagine that they can induce community in their societies without engaging in the labor of politics. It is the eschatological goal of the Marxists who aim to re-create at the end of history a perfect community where politics is superfluous. In fact, this atavistic notion could only succeed if history were reversed, civilization undone, and the levels of human organization reduced to family and hamlet. In simple societies community can exist without politics or at least without highly differentiated political institutions. In a complex society community is produced by political action and maintained by political institutions.

Historically, political institutions have emerged out of the interaction among and disagreement among social forces, and the gradual development of procedures and organizational devices for resolving those disagreements. The breakup of a small homogeneous ruling class, the diversification of social forces, and increased interaction among such forces are preconditions for the emergence of political organizations and procedures and the eventual creation of political institutions. "Conscious constitution-making appears to have entered the Mediterranean world when the clan organization weakened and the contest of rich and poor became a significant factor in politics." The Athenians called upon Solon for a constitution when their polity was threatened by dissolution because there were "as many different parties as there were diversities in the country" and "the disparity of fortune between the rich and the poor, at that time, also reached its height." More highly developed political institutions were required to maintain Athenian political community as Athenian society became more complex. The reforms of Solon and of Cleisthenes were responses to the social-economic change that threatened to undermine the earlier basis of community. As social forces became more variegated, political institutions had to become more complex and authoritative. It is precisely this development, however, which failed to occur in many modernizing societies in the twentieth century. Social forces were strong, political institutions weak. Legislatures and executives, public authorities and political parties remained fragile and disorganized. The development of the state lagged behind the evolution of society.

Criteria of Political Institutionalization

Political community in a complex society thus depends upon the strength of the political organizations and procedures in the society. That strength, in turn, depends upon the scope of support for the organizations and procedures and their level of institutionalization. Scope refers simply to the extent to which the political organizations and procedures encompass activity in the society. If only a small upper-class group belongs to political organizations and behaves in terms of a set of procedures, the scope is limited. If, on the other hand, a large segment of the population is politically organized and follows the political procedures, the scope is broad.

Institutions are stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior. Organizations and procedures vary in their degree of institutionalization. Harvard University and the newly opened suburban high school are both organizations, but Harvard is much more of an institution than the high school. The seniority system in Congress and President Johnson's select press conferences are both procedures, but seniority was much more institutionalized than were Mr. Johnson's methods of dealing with the press.

Institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability. The level of institutionalization of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures. So also, the level of institutionalization of any particular organization or procedure can be measured by its adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. If these criteria can be identified and measured, political systems can be compared in terms of their levels of institutionalization. And it will also be possible to measure increases and decreases in the institutionalization of the particular organizations and procedures within a political system.

Adaptability-Rigidity. The more adaptable an organization or procedure is, the more highly institutionalized it is; the less adaptable and more rigid it is, the lower its level of institutionalization. Adaptability is an acquired organizational characteristic. It is, in a rough sense, a function of environmental challenge and age. The more challenges that have arisen in its environment and the greater its age, the more adaptable it is. Rigidity is more characteristic of young organizations than of old ones. Old organizations and procedures, however, are not necessarily adaptable if they have existed in a static environment. In addition, if over a period of time an organization has developed a set of responses for effectively dealing with one type of problem, and if it is then confronted with an entirely different type of problem requiring a different response, the organization may well be a victim of its past successes and be unable to adjust to the new challenge. In general, however, the first hurdle is the biggest one. Success in adapting to one environmental challenge paves the way for successful adaptation to subsequent environmental challenges. If, for instance, the probability of successful adjustment to the first challenge is 50 per cent, the probability of successful adjustment to the second challenge might be 75 per cent, to the third challenge 87.5 per cent, to the fourth 93.75 per cent, and so on. Some changes in environment, moreover, such as changes in personnel, are inevitable for all organizations. Other changes in environment may be produced by the organization itself—for instance, if it successfully completes the task it was originally created to accomplish. So long as it is recognized that environments can differ in the challenges they pose to organizations, the adaptability of an organization can in a rough sense be measured by its age. Its age, in turn, can be measured in three ways.

One is simply chronological: the longer an organization or procedure has been in existence, the higher the level of institutionalization. The older an organization is, the more likely it is to continue to exist through any specified future time period. The probability that an organization which is one hundred years old will survive one additional year, it might be hypothesized, is perhaps
one hundred times greater than the probability that an organization one year old will survive one additional year. Political institutions are thus not created overnight. Political development, in this sense, is slow, particularly when compared to the seemingly much more rapid pace of economic development. In some instances particular types of experience may substitute for time: fierce conflict or other serious challenges may transform organizations into institutions much more rapidly than normal circumstances. But such intensive experiences are rare, and even with such experiences time is still required. "A major party," Ashoka Mehta observed, in commenting on why communism was helpless in India, "cannot be created in a day. In China a great party was forged by the revolution. Other major parties can or are born of revolutions in other countries. But it is simply impossible, through normal channels, to forge a great party, to reach and galvanize millions of men in half a million villages."

A second measure of adaptability is generational age. So long as an organization still has its first set of leaders, so long as a procedure is still performed by those who first performed it, its adaptability is still in doubt. The more often the organization has surmounted the problem of peaceful succession and replaced one set of leaders by another, the more highly institutionalized it is. In considerable measure, of course, generational age is a function of chronological age. But political parties and governments may continue for decades under the leadership of one generation. The founders of organizations—whether parties, governments, or business corporations—are often young. Hence the gap between chronological age and generational age is apt to be greater in the early history of an organization than later in its career. This gap produces tensions between the first leaders of the organization and the next generation immediately behind them, which can look forward to a lifetime in the shadow of the first generation. In the middle of the 1960s the Chinese Communist Party was 45 years old, but in large part it was still led by its first generation of leaders. An organization may of course change leadership without changing generations of leadership. One generation differs from another in terms of its formative experiences. Simple replacement of one set of leaders by another, e.g. in surmounting a succession crisis, counts for something in terms of institutional adaptability, but it is not as significant as a shift in leadership generations, that is, the replacement of one set of leaders by another set with significantly different organizational experiences. The shift from Lenin to Stalin was an intra-generation succession; the shift from Stalin to Khrushchev was an inter-generation succession.

Thirdly, organizational adaptability can be measured in functional terms. An organization's functions, of course, can be defined in an almost infinite number of ways. (This is a major appeal and a major limitation of the functional approach to organizations.) Usually an organization is created to perform one particular function. When that function is no longer needed, the organization faces a major crisis: it either finds a new function or reconciles itself to a lingering death. An organization that has adapted itself to changes in its environment and has survived one or more changes in its principal functions is more highly institutionalized than one that has not. Functional adaptability, not functional specificity, is the true measure of a highly developed organization. Institutionalization makes the organization more than simply an instrument to achieve certain purposes. Instead its leaders and members come to value it for its own sake, and it develops a life of its own quite apart from the specific functions it may perform at any given time. The organization triumphs over its function.

Organizations and individuals thus differ significantly in their cumulative capacity to adapt to changes. Individuals usually grow up through childhood and adolescence without deep commitments to highly specific functions. The process of commitment begins in late adolescence. As the individual becomes more and more committed to the performance of certain functions, he finds it increasingly difficult to change those functions and to unlearn the responses he has acquired to meet environmental changes. His personality has been formed; he has become "set in his ways." Organizations, on the other hand, are usually created to perform very specific functions. When the organization confronts a changing environment, it must, if it is to survive, weaken its commitment to

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10. See the very useful discussion in Philip Selznick's small classic, Leadership in Administration (New York, Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 5 ff.
its original functions. As the organization matures, it becomes "unset" in its ways.  

In practice, organizations vary greatly in their functional adaptability. The YMCA, for instance, was founded in the mid-nineteenth century as an evangelical organization to convert the single young men who, during the early years of industrialization, were migrating in great numbers to the cities. With the decline in need for this function, the "Y" successfully adjusted to the performance of many other "general service" functions broadly related to the legitimizing goal of "character development." Concurrently, it broadened its membership base to include, first, non-evangelical Protestants, then Catholics, then Jews, then old men as well as young, and then women as well as men. As a result the organization has prospered, although its original functions disappeared with the dark, satanic mills. Other organizations, such as the Woman's Christian Temperance Union and the Townsend Movement, have had greater difficulty in adjusting to a changing environment. The WCTU "is an organization in retreat. Contrary to the expectations of theories of institutionalization, the movement has not acted to preserve organizational values at the expense of past doctrine." The Townsend Movement has been torn between those who wish to remain loyal to the original function and those who put organizational imperatives first. If the latter are successful, "the dominating orientation of leaders and members shifts from the implementation of the values the organization is taken to represent (by leaders, members, and public alike), to maintaining the organizational structure as such, even at the loss of the organization's central mission." The conquest of polio posed a similar acute crisis for the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis.  

The original goals of the organization were highly specific. Should the organization dissolve when these goals were achieved? The dominant opinion of the volunteers was that the organization should continue. "We can fight polio," said one town chairman, "if we can organize people. If we can organize people like this we can fight anything." Another asked: "Wouldn't it be a wonderful story to get polio licked, and then go on to something else and get that licked and then go on to something else? It would be a challenge, a career."  

The problems of functional adaptability are not very different for political organizations. A political party gains in functional age when it shifts its function from the representation of one constituency to the representation of another; it also gains in functional age when it shifts from opposition to government. A party that is unable to change constituencies or to acquire power is less of an institution than one that is able to make these changes. A nationalist party whose function has been the promotion of independence from colonial rule faces a major crisis when it achieves its goal and has to adapt itself to the somewhat different function of governing a country. It may find this functional transition so difficult that it will, even after independence, continue to devote a large portion of its efforts to fighting colonialism. A party which acts this way is less of an institution than one, like the Congress Party, which drops its anticolonialism after achieving independence and quite rapidly adapts itself to the tasks of governing. Industrialization has been a major function of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. A major test of the institutionalization of the Communist Party will be its success in developing new functions now that the major industrializing effort is behind it. A governmental organ that can successfully adapt itself to changed functions, such as the British Crown in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, is more of an institution than one which cannot, such as the French monarchy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  

Complexity-Simplicity. The more complicated an organization is, the more highly institutionalized it is. Complexity may involve  

11. Cf. Starbuck, pp. 473-75, who suggests that older organizations are less likely than younger ones to resist changes in goals but more likely to resist changes in social structure and task structure.  
both multiplication of organizational subunits, hierarchically and functionally, and differentiation of separate types of organizational subunits. The greater the number and variety of subunits the greater the ability of the organization to secure and maintain the loyalties of its members. In addition, an organization which has many purposes is better able to adjust itself to the loss of any one purpose than an organization which has only one purpose. The diversified corporation is obviously less vulnerable than that which produces one product for one market. The differentiation of subunits within an organization may or may not be along functional lines. If it is functional in character, the subunits themselves are less highly institutionalized than the whole of which they are a part. Changes in the functions of the whole, however, are fairly easily reflected by changes in the power and roles of its subunits. If the subunits are multifunctional, they have greater institutional strength, but they may also, for that very reason, contribute less flexibility to the organization as a whole. Hence, a political system with parties of "social integration," in Sigmund Neumann's terms, has less institutional flexibility than one with parties of "individual representation." 16

Relatively primitive and simple traditional political systems are usually overwhelmed and destroyed in the modernization process. More complex traditional systems are more likely to adapt to these new demands. Japan, for instance, was able to adjust its traditional political institutions to the modern world because of their relative complexity. For two and a half centuries before 1868 the emperor had reigned and the Tokugawa shogun had ruled. The stability of the political order, however, did not depend solely on the stability of the shogunate. When the authority of the shogunate decayed, another traditional institution, the emperor, was available to become the instrument of the modernizing samurai. The overthrow of the shogun involved not the collapse of the political order but the "restoration" of the emperor.

The simplest political system is that which depends on one individual. It is also the least stable. Tyrannies, Aristotle pointed out, are virtually all "quite short-lived." 17 A political system with several different political institutions, on the other hand, is much more likely to adapt. The needs of one age may be met by one set of institutions; the needs of the next by a different set. The system possesses within itself the means of its own renewal and adaptation. In the American system, for instance, President, Senate, House of Representatives, Supreme Court, and state governments have played different roles at different times in history. As new problems arise, the initiative in dealing with them may be taken first by one institution, then by another. In contrast, the French system of the Third and Fourth Republics centered authority in the National Assembly and the national bureaucracy. If, as was frequently the case, the Assembly was too divided to act and the bureaucracy lacked the authority to act, the system was unable to adapt to environmental changes and to deal with new policy problems. When in the 1950s the Assembly was unable to handle the dissolution of the French empire, there was no other institution, such as an independent executive, to step into the breach. As a result, an extraconstitutional force, the military, intervened in politics, and in due course a new institution, the de Gaulle Presidency, was created which was able to handle the problem. "A state without the means of some change," Burke observed of an earlier French crisis, "is without the means of its conservation." 18

The classical political theorists, preoccupied as they were with the problem of stability, arrived at similar conclusions. The simple forms of government were most likely to degenerate; the "mixed state" was more likely to be stable. Both Plato and Aristotle suggested that the most practical state was the "polity" combining the institutions of democracy and oligarchy. A "constitutional system based absolutely, and at all points," Aristotle argued, "on either the oligarchical or the democratic conception of equality is a poor sort of thing. The facts are evidence enough: constitutions of this sort never endure." A "constitution is better when it is composed of more numerous elements." 19 Such a constitution is more likely to head off sedition and revolution. Polybius and Cicero elaborated this idea more explicitly. Each of the "good" simple forms of government—kingship, aristocracy, and democracy—is likely to degenerate into its perverted counterpart—tyranny, oligarchy, and

mobocracy. Instability and degeneration can only be avoided by combining elements from all the good forms into a mixed state. Complexity produces stability. "The simple governments," Burke echoed two thousand years later, "are fundamentally defective, to say no worse of them." 20

Autonomy-Subordination. A third measure of institutionalization is the extent to which political organizations and procedures exist independently of other social groupings and methods of behavior. How well is the political sphere differentiated from other spheres? In a highly developed political system, political organizations have an integrity which they lack in less developed systems. In some measure, they are insulated from the impact of nonpolitical groups and procedures. In less developed political systems, they are highly vulnerable to outside influences.

At its most concrete level, autonomy involves the relations between social forces, on the one hand, and political organizations, on the other. Political institutionalization, in the sense of autonomy, means the development of political organizations and procedures that are not simply expressions of the interests of particular social groups. A political organization that is the instrument of a social group—family, clan, class—lacks autonomy and institutionalization. If the state, in the traditional Marxist claim, is really the "executive committee of the bourgeoisie," then it is not much of an institution. A judiciary is independent to the extent that it adheres to distinctly judicial norms and to the extent that its perspectives and behavior are independent of those of other political institutions and social groupings. As with the judiciary, the autonomy of political institutions is measured by the extent to which they have their own interests and values distinguishable from those of other institutions and social forces. As also with the judiciary, the autonomy of political institutions is likely to be the result of competition among social forces. A political party, for instance, that expresses the interests of only one group in society—whether labor, business, or farmers—is less autonomous than one that articulates and aggregates the interests of several social groups. The latter type of party has a clearly defined existence apart from particular social forces. So also with legislatures, executives, and bureaucracies.

Political procedures, like political organizations, also have varying degrees of autonomy. A highly developed political system has procedures to minimize, if not to eliminate, the role of violence in the system and to restrict to explicitly defined channels the influence of wealth in the system. To the extent that political officials can be toppled by a few soldiers or influenced by a few dollars, the organizations and procedures lack autonomy. Political organizations and procedures which lack autonomy are, in common parlance, said to be corrupt.

Political organizations and procedures that are vulnerable to nonpolitical influences from within the society are also usually vulnerable to influences from outside the society. They are easily penetrated by agents, groups, and ideas from other political systems. Thus a coup d'etat in one political system may easily "trigger" coup d'etats by similar groups in other less developed political systems.21 In some instances, apparently, a regime can be overthrown by smuggling into the country a few agents and a handful of weapons. In other instances, a regime may be overthrown by the exchange of a few words and a few thousand dollars between a foreign ambassador and some disaffected colonels. The Soviet and American governments presumably spend substantial sums attempting to bribe high officials of less well-insulated political systems, sums they would not think of wasting in attempting to influence high officials in each other's political system.

In every society affected by social change, new groups arise to participate in politics. Where the political system lacks autonomy, these groups gain entry into politics without becoming identified with the established political organizations or acquiescing in the established political procedures. The political organizations and procedures are unable to stand up against the impact of a new social force. Conversely, in a developed political system the autonomy of the system is protected by mechanisms that restrict and moderate the impact of new groups. These mechanisms either slow down the entry of new groups into politics or, through a process of political socialization, impel changes in the attitudes and behavior of the most politically active members of the new group. In a highly institutionalized political system, the most important positions of leadership can normally only be achieved by


those who have served an apprenticeship in less important positions. The complexity of a political system contributes to its autonomy by providing a variety of organizations and positions in which individuals are prepared for the highest offices. In a sense, the top positions of leadership are the inner core of the political system; the less powerful positions, the peripheral organizations, and the semipolitical organizations are the filters through which individuals desiring access to the core must pass. Thus the political system assimilates new social forces and new personnel without sacrificing its institutional integrity. In a political system that lacks such defenses, new men, new viewpoints, new social groups may replace each other at the core of the system with bewildering rapidity.

Coherence-Disunity. The more unified and coherent an organization is, the more highly institutionalized it is; the greater the disunity of the organization, the less it is institutionalized. Some measure of consensus, of course, is a prerequisite for any social group. An effective organization requires, at a minimum, substantial consensus on the functional boundaries of the group and on the procedures for resolving disputes which come up within those boundaries. The consensus must extend to those active in the system. Nonparticipants, or those only sporadically and marginally participant in the system, do not have to share the consensus and usually, in fact, do not share it to the same extent as the participants. 22

In theory, an organization can be autonomous without being coherent and coherent without being autonomous. In actuality, however, the two are often closely linked together. Autonomy becomes a means to coherence, enabling the organization to develop an esprit and style that become distinctive marks of its behavior. Autonomy also prevents the intrusion of disruptive external forces, although, of course, autonomy does not protect against disruption from internal sources. Rapid or substantial expansions in the membership of an organization or in the participants in a system tend to weaken coherence. The Ottoman Ruling Institution, for instance, retained its vitality and coherence as long as admission was restricted and recruits were "put through an elaborate education, with selection and specialization at every stage." The Institution perished when "everybody pressed in to share its privileges . . . Numbers were increased; discipline and efficiency declined." 23

Unity, esprit, morale, and discipline are needed in governments as well as in regiments. Numbers, weapons, and strategy all count in war, but major deficiencies in any one of those may still be counterbalanced by superior coherence and discipline. So also in politics. The problems of creating coherent political organizations are more difficult but not fundamentally different from those involved in the creation of coherent military organizations. "The sustaining sentiment of a military force," David Rapoport has argued,

has much in common with that which cements any group of men engaged in politics—the willingness of most individuals to bridle private or personal impulses for the sake of general social objectives. Comrades must trust each other's ability to resist the innumerable temptations that threaten the group's solidarity; otherwise, in trying social situations, the desire to fend for oneself becomes overwhelming. 24

The capacities for coordination and discipline are crucial to both war and politics, and historically societies which have been skilled at organizing the one have also been adept at organizing the other. "The relationship of efficient social organization in the arts of peace and in the arts of group conflict," one anthropologist has observed, "is almost absolute, whether one is speaking of civilization or subcivilization. Successful war depends upon team work and consensus, both of which require command and discipline. Command and discipline, furthermore, can eventually be no more than symbols of something deeper and more real than they themselves." 25 Societies, such as Sparta, Rome, and Britain, which have been admired by their contemporaries for the authority and justice of their laws, have also been admired for the coherence and

discipline of their armies. Discipline and development go hand in hand.

Political Institutions and Public Interests

Political institutions have moral as well as structural dimensions. A society with weak political institutions lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial desires. Politics is a Hobbesian world of unrelenting competition among social forces—between man and man, family and family, clan and clan, region and region, class and class—a competition unmediated by more comprehensive political organizations. The “amoral familism” of Banfield’s backward society has its counterparts in amoral clanism, amoral groupism, amoral classism. Morality requires trust; trust involves predictability; and predictability requires regularized and institutionalized patterns of behavior. Without strong political institutions, society lacks the means to define and to realize its common interests. The capacity to create political institutions is the capacity to create public interests.

Traditionally the public interest has been approached in three ways. It has been identified with either abstract, substantive, ideal values and norms such as natural law, justice, or right reason; or with the specific interest of a particular individual (“L’état, c’est moi”), group, class (Marxism), or majority; or with the result of a competitive process among individuals (classic liberalism) or groups (Bentleyism). The problem in all these approaches is to arrive at a definition that is concrete rather than nebulous and general rather than particular. Unfortunately, in most cases, what is concrete lacks generality and what is general lacks concreteness. One partial way out of the problem is to define the public interest in terms of the concrete interests of the governing institutions. A society with highly institutionalized governing organizations and procedures is more able to articulate and achieve its public interests. “Organized (institutionalized) communities,” as Friedrich argues, “are better adapted to reaching decisions and developing policies than unorganized communities.” The public interest, in this sense, is not something which exists a priori in natural law or the will of the people. Nor is it simply whatever results from the political process. Rather it is whatever strengthens governmental institutions. The public interest is the interest of public institutions. It is something created and brought into existence by the institutionalization of government organizations. In a complex political system, many governmental organizations and procedures represent many different aspects of the public interest. The public interest of a complex society is a complex matter.

Democrats are accustomed to thinking of governmental institutions as having representative functions, that is, as expressing the interests of some other set of groups (their constituency). Hence they tend to forget that governmental institutions have interests of their own. These interests not only exist, they are also reasonably concrete. The questions “What is the interest of the Presidency? What is the interest of the Senate? What is the interest of the House of Representatives? What is the interest of the Supreme Court?” are difficult but not completely impossible to answer. The answers would furnish a fairly close approximation of the “public interest” of the United States. Similarly, the public interest of Great Britain might be approximated by the specific institutional interests of the Crown, Cabinet, and Parliament. In the Soviet Union, the answer would involve the specific institutional interests of the Presidium, Secretariat, and Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Institutional interests differ from the interests of individuals who are in the institutions. Keynes’ perciptent remark that “In the long run we are all dead” applies to individuals, not institutions. Individual interests are necessarily short-run interests. Institutional interests, however, exist through time; the proponent of the institution has to look to its welfare through an indefinite future. This consideration often means a limiting of immediate goals. The “true policy,” Aristotle remarked, “for democracy and oligarchy alike, is not one which ensures the greatest possible amount of either, but one which will ensure the longest possible life for both.”


other values in the short run often weakens his institution in the long run. Supreme Court justices may, in terms of their immediate individual desires, wish to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional. In deciding whether it is in the public interest to do so, however, presumably one question they should ask themselves is whether it is in the long-term institutional interest of the Supreme Court for them to do so. Judicial statesmen are those who, like John Marshall in *Marbury vs. Madison*, maximize the institutional power of the Court, in such a way that it is impossible for either the President or Congress to challenge it. In contrast, the Supreme Court justices of the 1930s came very close to expanding their immediate influence at the expense of the long-term interests of the Court as an institution.

“What’s good for General Motors is good for the country” contains at least a partial truth. “What’s good for the Presidency is good for the country,” however, contains more truth. Ask any reasonably informed group of Americans to identify the five best presidents and the five worst presidents. Then ask them to identify the five strongest presidents and the five weakest presidents. If the identification of strength with goodness and weakness with badness is not 100 per cent, it will almost certainly not be less than 80 per cent. Those presidents—Jefferson, Lincoln, the Roosevelts, Wilson—who expanded the powers of their office are hailed as the beneficent promoters of the public welfare and national interest. Those presidents, such as Buchanan, Grant, Harding, who failed to defend the power of their institution against other groups are also thought to have done less good for the country. Institutional interest coincides with public interest. The power of the presidency is identified with the good of the polity.

The public interest of the Soviet Union is approximated by the institutional interests of the top organs of the Communist Party: “What’s good for the Presidium is good for the Soviet Union.” Viewed in these terms, Stalinism can be defined as a situation in which the personal interests of the ruler take precedence over the institutionalized interests of the party. Beginning in the late 1930s, Stalin consistently weakened the party. No party congress was held between 1939 and 1952. During and after World War II the Central Committee seldom met. The party secretariat and party hierarchy were weakened by the creation of competing organs. Conceivably this process could have resulted in the displacement of one set of governing institutions by another, and some American experts and some Soviet leaders did think that governmental organizations rather than party organizations would become the ruling institutions in Soviet society. Such, however, was neither the intent nor the effect of Stalin’s action. He increased his personal power, not the governmental power. When he died, his personal power died with him. The struggle to fill the resulting vacuum was won by Khrushchev who identified his interests with the interests of the party organization, rather than by Malenkov who identified himself with the governmental bureaucracy. Khrushchev’s consolidation of power marked the reemergence and revitalization of the principal organs of the party. While they acted in very different ways and from different motives, Stalin weakened the party just as Grant weakened the Presidency. Just as a strong Presidency is in the American public interest, so also a strong party is in the Soviet public interest.

In terms of the theory of natural law, governmental actions are legitimate to the extent that they are in accord with the “public philosophy.” 29 According to democratic theory, they derive their legitimacy from the extent to which they embody the will of the people. According to the procedural concept, they are legitimate if they represent the outcome of a process of conflict and compromise in which all interested groups have participated. In another sense, however, the legitimacy of governmental actions can be sought in the extent to which they reflect the interests of governmental institutions. In contrast to the theory of representative government, under this concept governmental institutions derive their legitimacy and authority not from the extent to which they represent the interests of the people or of any other group, but to the extent to which they have distinct interests of their own apart from all other groups. Politicians frequently remark that things “look different” after they are in office than they did when they were competing for office. This difference is a measure of the institutional demands of office. It is precisely this difference in perspective that legitimizes the demands of the officeholder on his fellow citizens. The interests of the president, for instance, may coincide partially and temporarily first with those of one group and then

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29. See Walter Lippmann, *The Public Philosophy* (Boston, Little Brown, 1955), esp. p. 42, for his definition of the public interest as “what men would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently.”
with those of another. But the interest of the Presidency, as Neustadt has emphasized, coincides with that of no one else. The president’s power derives not from his representation of class, group, regional, or popular interests, but rather from the fact that he represents none of these. The presidential perspective is unique to the Presidency. Precisely for this reason it is both a lonely office and a powerful one. Its authority is rooted in its loneliness.

The existence of political institutions (such as the Presidency or Central Committee) capable of giving substance to public interests distinguishes politically developed societies from undeveloped ones. It also distinguishes moral communities from amoral societies. A government with a low level of institutionalization is not just a weak government; it is also a bad government. The function of government is to govern. A weak government, a government which lacks authority, fails to perform its function and is immoral in the same sense in which a corrupt judge, a cowardly soldier, or an ignorant teacher is immoral. The moral basis of political institutions is rooted in the needs of men in complex societies.

The relation between the culture of society and the institutions of politics is a dialectical one. Community, de Jouvenel observes, means “the institutionalization of trust,” and the “essential function of public authorities” is to “increase the mutual trust prevailing at the heart of the social whole.” Conversely, the absence of trust in the culture of the society provides formidable obstacles to the creation of public institutions. Those societies deficient in trust in the culture of the society provide formidable obstacles to the creation of public institutions. Their political cultures are often said to be marked by suspicion, jealousy, and latent or actual hostility toward everyone who is not a member of the family, the village, or, perhaps, the tribe. These characteristics are found in many cultures, their most extensive manifestations perhaps being in the Arab world and in Latin America. “Mistrust among the Arabs,” one acute observer has commented, is internalized early within the value system of the child.

... Organization, solidarity, and cohesion are lacking. Their public-mindedness is not developed and their


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The prevalence of distrust in these societies limits individual loyalties to groups that are intimate and familiar. People are and can be loyal to their clans, perhaps to their tribes, but not to broader political institutions. In politically advanced societies, loyalty to these more immediate social groupings is subordinated to and subsumed into loyalty to the state. "The love to the whole," as Burke said, "is not extinguished by this subordinate partiality. . . . To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ, as it were) of public affections." In a society lacking political community, however, loyalties to the more primordial social and economic groupings—family, clan, village, tribe, religion, social class—compete with and often supersede loyalty to the broader institutions of public authority. In Africa today tribal loyalties are strong; national and state loyalties weak. In Latin America in the words of Kalman Silvert, "An innate distrust of the state coupled with the direct representation of economic and occupational interest in the government are destructive of party strength, erode pluralism, and deny the sweeping grandeur possible to enlightened political action in its broadest senses." 35 "The state in the Arab environment," one scholar has noted, "was always a weak institution, weaker than other social establishments such as the family, the religious community, and the ruling class. Private interest was always paramount over public interest." In a similar vein, H. A. R. Gibb has commented that "it is precisely the great weakness of Arab countries that, since the breakdown of the old corporations, no social institutions have been evolved through which the public will can be canalized, interpreted, defined, and mobilized. . . . There is, in short, no functioning organ of social democracy at all." 36 So also, Italians practiced within the family "virtues other men usually dedicate to the welfare of their country at large; the Italians' family loyalty is their true patriotism. . . . All official loyalties to groups that are intimate and familiar. People are and can be loyal to their clans, perhaps to their tribes, but not to broader political institutions. In politically advanced societies, loyalty to these more immediate social groupings is subordinated to and subsumed into loyalty to the state. "The love to the whole," as Burke said, "is not extinguished by this subordinate partiality. . . . To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ, as it were) of public affections." 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development is the capacity of a people to establish and maintain large, complex, but flexible organizational forms." The capacity to create such institutions, however, is in short supply in the world today. It is precisely the ability to meet this moral need and to create a legitimate public order which, above all else, communists offer modernizing countries.

Political Participation: Modernization and Political Decay

Modernization and Political Consciousness

Modernization is a multifaceted process involving changes in all areas of human thought and activity. It is, as Daniel Lerner has said, "a process with some distinctive quality of its own, which would explain why modernity is felt as a consistent whole among people who live by its rules." The principal aspects of modernization, "urbanization, industrialization, secularization, democratization, education, media participation do not occur in haphazard and unrelated fashion." Historically they have been "so highly associated as to raise the question whether they are genuinely independent factors at all—suggesting that perhaps they went together so regularly because, in some historical sense, they had to go together." 40

At the psychological level, modernization involves a fundamental shift in values, attitudes, and expectations. Traditional man expected continuity in nature and society and did not believe in the capacity of man to change or control either. Modern man, in contrast, accepts the possibility of change and believes in its desirability. He has, in Lerner's phrase, a "mobile personality" that adjusts to changes in his environment. These changes typically require the broadening of loyalties and identifications from concrete and immediate groups (such as the family, clan, and village) to larger and more impersonal groupings (such as class and nation). With this goes an increasing reliance on universalistic rather than particularistic values and on standards of achievement rather than of ascription in judging individuals.

At the intellectual level, modernization involves the tremen-


doous expansion of man's knowledge about his environment and the diffusion of this knowledge through increased literacy, mass communications, and education. Demographically, modernization means changes in the patterns of life, a marked increase in health and life expectancy, increased occupational, vertical, and geographical mobility, and, in particular, the rapid growth of urban population as contrasted with rural. Socially, modernization tends to supplement the family and other primary groups having diffuse roles with consciously organized secondary associations having much more specific functions. The traditional distribution of status along a single bifurcated structure characterized by "cumulative inequalities" gives way to pluralistic status structures characterized by "dispersed inequalities." 41 Economically, there is a diversification of activity as a few simple occupations give way to many complex ones; the level of occupational skill rises significantly; the ratio of capital to labor increases; subsistence agriculture gives way to market agriculture; and agriculture itself declines in significance compared to commercial, industrial, and other nonagricultural activities. There tends to be an expansion of the geographical scope of economic activity and a centralization of such activity at the national level with the emergence of a national market, national sources of capital, and other national economic institutions. In due course the level of economic well-being increases and inequalities in economic well-being decrease.

Those aspects of modernization most relevant to politics can be broadly grouped into two categories. First, social mobilization, in Deutsch's formulation, is the process by which "major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior." 42 It means a change in the attitudes, values, and expectations of people from those associated with the traditional world to those common to the modern world. It is a consequence of literacy, education, increased communications, mass media exposure, and urbanization. Secondly, economic development refers to the growth in the total economic activity

and output of a society. It may be measured by per capita gross national product, level of industrialization, and level of individual welfare gauged by such indices as life expectancy, caloric intake, supply of hospitals and doctors. Social mobilization involves changes in the aspirations of individuals, groups, and societies; economic development involves changes in their capabilities. Modernization requires both.

The impact of modernization on politics is varied. Numerous authors have defined political modernization in even more numerous ways. Most of these definitions focus on the differences between what are assumed to be the distinctive characteristics of a modern polity and of a traditional polity. Political modernization is naturally then held to be movement from the one to the other. Approached in this manner, the most crucial aspects of political modernization can be roughly subsumed under three broad headings. First, political modernization involves the rationalization of authority, the replacement of a large number of traditional, religious, familial, and ethnic political authorities by a single secular, national political authority. This change implies that government is the product of man, not of nature or of God, and that a well-ordered society must have a determinate human source of final authority, obedience to whose positive law takes precedence over other obligations. Political modernization involves assertion of the external sovereignty of the nation-state against transnational influences and of the internal sovereignty of the national government against local and regional powers. It means national integration and the centralization or accumulation of power in recognized national lawmaking institutions.

Secondly, political modernization involves the differentiation of new political functions and the development of specialized structures to perform those functions. Areas of particular competence—legal, military, administrative, scientific—become separated from the political realm, and autonomous, specialized, but subordinate organs arise to discharge those tasks. Administrative hierarchies become more elaborate, more complex, more disciplined. Office and power are distributed more by achievement and less by ascription. Thirdly, political modernization involves increased participation in politics by social groups throughout society. Broadened participation in politics may enhance control of the people by the government, as in totalitarian states, or it may enhance control of the government by the people, as in some democratic ones. But in all modern states the citizens become directly involved in and affected by governmental affairs. Rationalized authority, differentiated structure, and mass participation thus distinguish modern polities from antecedent polities.

It is, however, a mistake to conclude that in practice modernization means the rationalization of authority, differentiation of structure, and expansion of political participation. A basic and frequently overlooked distinction exists between political modernization defined as movement from a traditional to a modern polity and political modernization defined as the political aspects and political effects of social, economic, and cultural modernization. The former posits the direction in which political change theoretically should move. The latter describes the political changes which actually occur in modernizing countries. The gap between the two is often vast. Modernization in practice always involves change in and usually the disintegration of a traditional political system, but it does not necessarily involve significant movement toward a modern political system. Yet the tendency has been to assume that what is true for the broader social processes of modernization is also true for political changes. Social modernization, in some degree, is a fact in Asia, Africa, Latin America: urbanization is rapid, literacy is slowly increasing; industrialization is being pushed; per capita gross national product is inching upward; mass media circulation is expanding. All these are facts. In contrast progress toward many of the other goals which writers have identified with political modernization—democracy, stability, structural differentiation, achievement patterns, national integration—often is dubious at best. Yet the tendency is to think that because social modernization is taking place, political modernization also must be taking place. As a result, many sympathetic Western writings about the underdeveloped areas in the 1950s had the same air of hopeful unreality which characterized much of the sympathetic Western writing about the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s. They were suffused with what can only be described as “Webbism”: that is, the tendency to ascribe to a political system qualities which are assumed to be its ultimate goals rather than qualities which actually characterize its processes and functions.

In actuality, only some of the tendencies frequently encompassed in the concept “political modernization” characterized the
“modernizing” areas. Instead of a trend toward competitiveness and democracy, there was an “erosion of democracy” and a tendency to autocratic military regimes and one-party regimes. Instead of stability, there were repeated coups and revolts. Instead of a unifying nationalism and nation-building, there were repeated ethnic conflicts and civil wars. Instead of institutional rationalization and differentiation, there was frequently a decay of the administrative organizations inherited from the colonial era and a weakening and disruption of the political organizations developed during the struggle for independence. Only the concept of political modernization as mobilization and participation appeared to be generally applicable to the “developing” world. Rationalization, integration, and differentiation, in contrast, seemed to have only a dim relation to reality.

More than by anything else, the modern state is distinguished from the traditional state by the broadened extent to which people participate in politics and are affected by politics in large-scale political units. In traditional societies political participation may be widespread at the village level, but at any levels above the village it is limited to a very small group. Large-scale traditional societies may also achieve relatively high levels of rationalized authority and of structural differentiation, but again political participation will be limited to the relatively small aristocratic and bureaucratic elites. The most fundamental aspect of political modernization, consequently, is the participation in politics beyond the village or town level by social groups throughout the society and the development of new political institutions, such as political parties, to organize that participation.

The disruptive effects of social and economic modernization on politics and political institutions take many forms. Social and economic changes necessarily disrupt traditional social and political groupings and undermine loyalty to traditional authorities. The leaders, secular and religious, of the village are challenged by a new elite of civil servants and schoolteachers who represent the authority of the distant central government and who possess skills, resources, and aspirations with which the traditional village or tribal leaders cannot compete. In many traditional societies the most important social unit was the extended family, which itself often constituted a small civil society performing political, economic, welfare, security, religious, and other social functions. Under the impact of modernization, however, the extended family begins to disintegrate and is replaced by the nuclear family which is too small, too isolated, and too weak to perform these functions. A broader form of social organization is replaced by a narrower one, and the tendencies toward distrust and hostility—the war of one against all—are intensified. The amoral familism which Banfield found in southern Italy is typical not of a traditional society, but of a backward society in which the traditional institution of the extended family has disintegrated under the impact of the first phases of modernization.

Modernization thus tends to produce alienation and anomie, normlessness generated by the conflict of old values and new. The new values undermine the old bases of association and of authority before new skills, motivations, and resources can be brought into existence to create new groupings. The breakup of traditional institutions may lead to psychological disintegration and anomie, but these very conditions also create the need for new identifications and loyalties. The latter may take the form of reidentification with a group which existed in latent or actual form in traditional society or they may lead to identification with a new set of symbols or a new group which has itself evolved in the process of modernization. Industrialization, Marx argued, produces class consciousness first in the bourgeoisie and then in the proletariat. Marx focused on only one minor aspect of a much more general phenomenon. Industrialization is only one aspect of modernization and modernization induces not just class consciousness but new group consciousness of all kinds: in tribe, region, clan, religion, and caste, as well as in class, occupation, and association. Modernization means that all groups, old as well as new, traditional as well as modern, become increasingly aware of themselves as groups and of their interests and claims in relation to other groups. One of the most striking phenomena of modernization, indeed, is the increased consciousness, coherence, organization, and action which it produces in many social forces which existed on a much lower level of conscious identity and or-


44. See Banfield, pp. 85 ff.
organization in traditional society. The early phases of modernization are often marked by the emergence of fundamentalist religious movements, such as the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt and the Buddhist movements in Ceylon, Burma, and Vietnam, which combine modern organizational methods, traditional religious values, and highly populist appeals.

So also in much of Africa tribal consciousness was almost unknown in traditional rural life. Tribalism was a product of modernization and the western impact on a traditional society. In southern Nigeria, for instance, Yoruba consciousness only developed in the nineteenth century and the term, Yoruba, was first used by Anglican missionaries. "Everyone recognizes," Hodgkin has observed, "that the notion of 'being a Nigerian' is a new kind of conception. But it would seem that the notion of 'being a Yoruba' is not very much older." Similarly, even in the 1950s, an Ibo leader, B. O. N. Eluwa, could travel through Iboland attempting to convince the tribesmen that they were Ibos. But the villagers, he said, simply "couldn't even imagine all Ibos." The efforts of Eluwa and other Ibo leaders, however, successfully created a sense of Iboness. Loyalty to tribe "is in many respects a response to modernization, a product of the very forces of change which colonial rule brought to Africa." 

A traditional society may possess many potential sources of identity and association. Some of these may be undermined and destroyed by the process of modernization. Others, however, may achieve a new consciousness and become the basis for new organization because they are capable—as for instance are tribal associations in African cities or caste associations in India—of meeting many of the needs for personal identity, social welfare, and economic advancement which are created by the process of modernization. The growth of group consciousness thus has both integrating and disintegrating effects on the social system. If villagers learn to shift their primary identity from a village to a tribe of many villages; if plantation workers cease to identify simply with their fellow workers on the plantation and instead identify with plantation workers in general and with an organization of plantation workers in general; if Buddhist monks broaden their allegiances from their local temple and monastery to a national Buddhist movement—each of these developments is a broadening of loyalty and in that sense presumably a contribution to political modernization.

The same group consciousness, however, can also be a major obstacle to the creation of effective political institutions encompassing a broader spectrum of social forces. Along with group consciousness, group prejudice also "develops when there is intensive contact between different groups, such as has accompanied the movement toward more centralized political and social organizations." And along with group prejudice comes group conflict. Ethnic or religious groups which had lived peacefully side by side in traditional society become aroused to violent conflict as a result of the interaction, the tensions, the inequalities generated by social and economic modernization. Modernization thus increases conflict among traditional groups, between traditional groups and modern ones, and among modern groups. The new elites based on Western or modern education come into conflict with the traditional elites whose authority rests on ascribed and inherited status. Within the modernized elites, antagonisms arise between politicians and bureaucrats, intellectuals and soldiers, labor leaders and businessmen. Many, if not most, of these conflicts at one time or another erupt into violence.

**Modernization and Violence**

The Poverty and Modernization Theses. The relation between modernization and violence is complex. More modern societies are generally more stable and suffer less domestic violence than less modern societies. One study produced a correlation of .625 (n = 62) between political stability and a composite index of modernity defined in terms of eight social and economic variables. Both the level of social mobilization and the level of economic development are directly associated with political stability. The relation between literacy and stability is particularly high. The frequency of revolutions also varies inversely with the educational
level of the society, and deaths from domestic group violence vary inversely with the proportion of children attending primary school. Economic well-being is similarly associated with political order: in 74 countries, the correlation between per capita gross national product and deaths from domestic group violence was

Table 1.2. Per Capita GNP and Violent Conflicts, 1958–1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic group</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
<th>Number with conflicts</th>
<th>Per cent of total countries affected</th>
<th>Number of conflicts in group</th>
<th>Rate of conflicts for all nations in group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very poor (under $100)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor ($100–$249)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle income ($250–$749)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich (above $750)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


—43. A different study of 70 countries for the years 1955–60 found a correlation of —.56 between per capita gross national product and the number of revolutions. During the eight years between 1958 and 1965, violent conflicts were more than four times as prevalent in very poor nations as they were in rich nations; 87 per cent of the very poor countries suffered significant outbreaks of violence as compared to only 37 per cent of the rich countries.47

Clearly countries which have high levels of both social mobilization and economic development are more stable and peaceful politically. Modernity goes with stability. From this fact it is an easy step to the "poverty thesis" and the conclusions that economic and social backwardness is responsible for instability and hence


that modernization is the road to stability. "There can, then, be no question," as Secretary McNamara said, "but that there is an irrefutable relationship between violence and economic backwardness." Or in the words of one academic analyst, "all-pervasive poverty undermines government—of any kind. It is a persistent cause of instability and makes democracy well-nigh impossible to practice." 48 If these relationships are accepted, then obviously the promotion of education, literacy, mass communications, industrialization, economic growth, urbanization, should produce greater political stability. These seemingly clear deductions from the correlation between modernity and stability are, however, invalid. In fact, modernity breeds stability, but modernization breeds instability.

The apparent relationship between poverty and backwardness, on the one hand, and instability and violence, on the other, is a spurious one. It is not the absence of modernity but the efforts to achieve it which produce political disorder. If poor countries appear to be unstable, it is not because they are poor, but because they are trying to become rich. A purely traditional society would be ignorant, poor, and stable. By the mid-twentieth century, however, all traditional societies were also transitional or modernizing societies. It is precisely the devolution of modernization throughout the world which increased the prevalence of violence about the world. For two decades after World War II American foreign policy toward the modernizing countries was in large part devoted to promoting economic and social development because these would lead to political stability. The success of this policy is, however, written in both the rising levels of material well-being and the rising levels of domestic violence. The more man wages war against "his ancient enemies: poverty, disease, ignorance" the more he wages war against himself.

By the 1960s every backward nation was a modernizing nation. Evidence, nonetheless, did exist to suggest that causes of violence in such nations lay with the modernization rather than with the backwardness. Wealthier nations tend to be more stable than those less wealthy, but the poorest nations, those at the bottom of the international economic ladder, tend to be less prone to violence and instability than those countries just above them. Even Secre-
tary McNamara’s own statistics offered only partial support for his proposition. The World Bank, for instance, classified six of the twenty Latin American republics as “poor,” that is, they had per capita gross national products of less than $250. Six of the twenty countries were also suffering from prolonged insurgencies in February 1966. Only one country, Bolivia, however, fell into both categories. The probability of insurgency in those Latin American countries which were not poor was twice as high as it was in those countries which were poor. Similarly, 48 out of 50 African countries and territories were classified as poor, and eleven of these were suffering from insurgency. Certainly, however, the probabilities of insurgency in the two African countries which were not poor—Libya and South Africa—were just as high as in the remaining 37 poor countries and territories. Moreover, the insurgency which did exist in 11 countries seemed to be related in four cases to continued colonial rule (e.g., Angola, Mozambique) and in the other seven to marked tribal and racial differences among the population (e.g., Nigeria, Sudan). Colonialism and ethnic heterogeneity would seem to be much better predictors of violence than poverty. In the Middle East and Asia (excluding Australia and New Zealand) 10 out of 22 countries classified as poor were suffering from insurgencies in February 1966. On the other hand, three out of the four countries which were not poor (Iraq, Malaysia, Cyprus, Japan) were also experiencing insurgencies. Here again, the likelihood of insurgency in the richer countries was about twice that in the poorer countries. Here also, ethnic heterogeneity appeared to be a better predictor of insurgency than poverty.

The weakness of the direct correlation between poverty and instability is also suggested by other evidence. While a correlation of $-0.45 \ (n = 74)$ existed between per capita GNP and deaths from domestic group violence, the largest amount of violence was found not in the poorest countries with per capita GNPS of less than $100$, but in those slightly more wealthy with per capita GNPS between $100$ and $200$. Above $200$ the amount of violence tended to decline significantly. These figures led to the conclusion that “underdeveloped nations must expect a fairly high level of civil unrest for some time, and that the very poor states should probably expect an increase, not a decrease, in domestic violence over the next few decades.”

The sharp difference between the transitional and modern countries demonstrates graphically the thesis that modernity means stability and modernization instability. The small difference between the traditional societies and the transitional societies reflects the fact that the line drawn between the two was a purely arbitrary one intended to produce a group of “traditional” countries which internal wars were rare between 1946 and 1959 were divided into two groups. Nine were highly modern (e.g. Australia, Denmark, Sweden), while 18 were “relatively underdeveloped countries whose elites have remained tied closely to the traditional types and structures of life.” Among these were a number of still backward European colonies plus such countries as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia, and Saudi Arabia. Somewhat similarly, a division of countries according to their levels of literacy also suggested a bell-shaped pattern of instability. Ninety-five per cent of those countries in the middle range with 25 to 60 per cent literacy were unstable as compared to 50 per cent of those countries with less than 10 per cent literacy and 22 per cent of those countries with more than 90 per cent literacy. In another analysis mean instability scores were calculated for 24 modern countries (268), 37 transitional countries (472), and 23 traditional countries (420).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of literacy</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
<th>Number of unstable</th>
<th>Per cent unstable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Below 10%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%-25%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25%-60%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>95.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60%-90%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 90%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

equal in size to the modern group. Hence virtually all the societies classified as traditional were actually in the early phases of transition. Again, however, the data suggest that if a purely traditional society existed, it would be more stable politically than those in the transitional phase.

The modernization thesis thus explains why the poverty thesis could acquire a certain seeming validity in the late twentieth century. It also explains seeming reversals in the relation between modernity and stability for particular sets of countries. In Latin America, for instance, the wealthiest countries are at the middle levels of modernization. Consequently, it is not surprising that they should be more unstable than the more backward Latin American countries. As we have seen, in 1966 only one of the six countries classified as traditional were actually in the early phases of transition. Again, however, the data suggest that if a purely traditional society existed, it would be more stable politically than those in the transitional phase.

The frequency of revolution in Latin America is directly related to the level of economic development. For the continent as a whole the correlation of per capita income and number of revolutions is \( r = 0.85 \) (\( n = 14 \)). Thus, the data on Latin America which suggest a positive relationship between modernity and instability actually bolster the argument that relates modernization to instability.

This relationship also holds for variations within countries. In modernizing countries, violence, unrest, and extremism are more often found in the wealthier parts of the country than in the poorer sections. In analysing the situation in India, Hoselitz and Weiner found that "the correlation between political stability and economic development is poor or even negative." Under British rule political violence was most prevalent in the "economically most highly developed provinces"; after independence violence remained more likely in the industrialized and urban centers than in the more backward and underdeveloped areas of India." In numerous underdeveloped countries the standard of living in the major cities is three or four times that prevalent in the countryside, yet the cities are often the centers of instability and violence while the rural areas remain quiet and stable. Political extremism is also typically stronger in the wealthier than in the poorer areas. In fifteen Western countries, the communist vote was largest in the most urbanized areas of the least urbanized countries. In Italy the center of communist strength was the prosperous north rather than the poverty-stricken south. In India the communists were strongest in Kerala (with the highest literacy rate among Indian states) and in industrialized Calcutta, not in the economically more backward areas. In Ceylon, "In a fundamental sense, the areas of Marxist strength are the most Westernized" and those with the highest per capita income and education. Thus, within countries, it is the areas which are modernizing rather than those which remain traditional that are the centers of violence and extremism.

Not only does social and economic modernization produce political instability, but the degree of instability is related to the rate of modernization. The historical evidence with respect to the West is overwhelming on this point. "The rapid influx of large numbers of people into newly developing urban areas," Kornhauser observes, "invites mass movements." So also, the European and particularly the Scandinavian experience demonstrates that wherever "industrialization occurred rapidly, introducing sharp discontinuities between the pre-industrial and industrial situation, more rather than less extremist working-class movements emerged." Similarly, the combined rate of change on six of eight indicators of modernization (primary and postprimary education; caloric consumption; cost of living; radios; infant mortality; urbanization; literacy; and national income) for 67 countries between 1935 and 1962 correlated .647 with political instability in those coun-


56. Kornhauser, p. 145 (italics in original); Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1960), p. 68 (italics in original).
tries between 1955 and 1961. "The higher the rate of change toward modernity, the greater the political instability, measured statically or dynamically." The overall picture which emerges of an unstable country is:

one exposed to modernity; disrupted socially from the traditional patterns of life; confronted with pressures to change their ways, economically, socially and politically; bombarded with new and "better" ways of producing economic goods and services; and frustrated by the modernization process of change, generally, and the failure of their government to satisfy their ever-rising expectations, particularly.57

Political instability was rife in twentieth-century Asia, Africa, and Latin America in large part because the rate of modernization was so much faster there than it had been in the earlier modernizing countries. The modernization of Europe and of North America was spread over several centuries; in general, one issue or one crisis was dealt with at a time. In the modernization of the non-Western parts of the world, however, the problems of the centralization of authority, national integration, social mobilization, economic development, political participation, social welfare have arisen not sequentially but simultaneously. The "demonstration effect" which the early modernizers have on the later modernizers first intensifies aspirations and then exacerbates frustrations. The differences in the rate of change can be dramatically seen in the lengths of time which countries, in Cyril Black's formulation, required for the consolidation of modernizing leadership. For the first modernizer, England, this phase stretched over 183 years, from 1649 to 1832. For the second modernizer, the United States, it lasted 89 years, from 1776 to 1865. For 13 countries which entered it during the Napoleonic period (1789-1815), the average period was 73 years. But for 21 of the 26 countries which began it during the first quarter of the twentieth century and had emerged by the 1960s, the average was only 29 years.58 In a similar vein, Karl Deutsch estimates that during the nineteenth century the principal indicators of social mobilization in modernizing countries changed at about the rate of 0.1 per cent per year, while in

twentieth-century modernizing countries they change at about the rate of 1 per cent per year. Clearly the tempo of modernization has increased rapidly. Clearly, also, the heightened drive for social and economic change and development was directly related to the increasing political instability and violence that characterized Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the years after World War II.

Social Mobilization and Instability. The relationship between social mobilization and political instability seems reasonably direct. Urbanization, increases in literacy, education, and media exposure all give rise to enhanced aspirations and expectations which, if unsatisfied, galvanize individuals and groups into politics. In the absence of strong and adaptable political institutions, such increases in participation mean instability and violence. Here in dramatic form can be clearly seen the paradox that modernity produces stability and modernization instability. For 66 nations, for example, the correlation between the proportion of children in primary schools and the frequency of revolution was —.84. In contrast, for 70 nations the correlation between the rate of change in primary enrollment and political instability was .61.59 The faster the enlightenment of the population, the more frequent the overthrow of the government.

The rapid expansion of education has had a visible impact on political stability in a number of countries. In Ceylon, for instance, the school system expanded rapidly between 1948 and 1956. This "increase in the number of students graduating in the indigenous languages satisfied some ambitions but contributed new social pressures among the articulate educated middle classes." It was, apparently, directly related to the electoral overturn of the government in the elections of 1956 and to the increased instability affecting Ceylon during the following six years.60 Similarly, in Korea during the 1950s Seoul became "one of the largest education centers of the world." Its law schools, it is estimated, produced about eighteen times as many graduates in 1960 as the field could absorb. At the lower levels of education, the expansion was even more striking, with the literacy rate increasing

from less than 20 per cent in 1945 to over 60 per cent in the early 1960s.\footnote{Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, forthcoming, 1968), p. 170.} This expansion of awareness presumably shared some responsibility for the political instability of Korea during the early 1960s, the principal source of which was students. Students and unemployed university graduates were, indeed, a common concern in the 1960s to the nationalist military regime in Korea, the socialist military regime in Burma, and the traditional military regime in Thailand. The extent to which higher education in many modernizing countries is not calculated to produce graduates with the skills relevant to the country's needs creates the paradoxical but common situation "of a country in which skilled labor is a scarce resource, and yet in which highly educated persons are in superabundant supply." \footnote{Hoselitz and Weiner, p. 177.}

In general, the higher the level of education of the unemployed, alienated, or otherwise dissatisfied person, the more extreme the destabilizing behavior which results. Alienated university graduates prepare revolutions; alienated technical or secondary school graduates plan coups; alienated primary school leavers engage in more frequent but less significant forms of political unrest. In West Africa, for instance, "disgruntled and restless though they are, these school-leavers stand not at the center but on the periphery of significant political events. The characteristic forms of political disturbance for which they are responsible are not revolutions but acts of arson, assault, and intimidation directed against political opponents." \footnote{David Abernethy and Trevor Coombe, "Education and Politics in Developing Countries," *Harvard Educational Review*, 35 (Summer 1965), 292.}

The problems posed by the rapid expansion of primary education have caused some governments to reassess their policies. In a debate on education in the Eastern Region of Nigeria in 1958, for instance, Azikiwe suggested that primary education could become an "unproductive social service," and one cabinet member warned that the United Kingdom followed "the pattern of industry and increased productivity first, free education second. Never free education first, as there must be jobs for the newly educated to take up, and only industry, trade and commerce can provide such jobs in bulk. . . . We must hesitate to create political problems of unemployment in the future." \footnote{Quoted in Abernethy, p. 501.} Literates and semiliterates may furnish recruits for extremist movements generating instability. Burma and Ethiopia had equally low per capita incomes in the 1950s: the relative stability of the latter in comparison to the former perhaps reflected the fact that fewer than 5 per cent of the Ethiopians were literate but 45 per cent of the Burmese were.\footnote{Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," p. 496.} Similarly, Cuba had the fourth highest literacy rate in Latin America when it went communist, and the only Indian state to elect a communist government, Kerala, also has the highest literacy rate in India. Clearly, the appeals of communism are usually to literates rather than illiterates. Much has been made of the problems caused by the extension of suffrage to large numbers of illiterates; democracy, it has been argued, cannot function satisfactorily if the vast bulk of the voting population cannot read. Political participation by illiterates, however, may well, as in India, be less dangerous to democratic political institutions than participation by literates. The latter typically have higher aspirations and make more demands on government. Political participation by illiterates, moreover, is likely to remain limited, while participation by literates is more likely to snowball with potentially disastrous effects on political stability.

**Economic Development and Instability.** Social mobilization increases aspirations. Economic development, presumably, increases the capacity of a society to satisfy those aspirations and therefore should tend to reduce social frustrations and the consequent political instability. Presumably, also, rapid economic growth creates new opportunities for entrepreneurship and employment and thereby diverts into money-making ambitions and talents which might otherwise go into coup-making. It can, however, also be argued to the contrary that economic development itself is a highly destabilizing process and that the very changes which are needed to satisfy aspirations in fact tend to exacerbate those aspirations. Rapid economic growth, it has been said:

1. disrupts traditional social groupings (family, class, caste), and thus increases "the number of individuals who are
declasse . . . and who are thus in circumstances conducive to revolutionary protest"; 66
2. produces nouveauux riches who are imperfectly adjusted to and assimilated by the existing order and who want political power and social status commensurate with their new economic position;
3. increases geographical mobility which again undermines social ties, and, in particular, encourages rapid migration from rural areas to cities, which produces alienation and political extremism;
4. increases the number of people whose standard of living is falling, and thus may widen the gap between rich and poor;
5. increases the incomes of some people absolutely but not relatively and hence increases their dissatisfaction with the existing order;
6. requires a general restriction of consumption in order to promote investment and thus produces popular discontent;
7. increases literacy, education, and exposure to mass media, which increase aspirations beyond levels where they can be satisfied;
8. aggravates regional and ethnic conflicts over the distribution of investment and consumption;
9. increases capacities for group organization and consequently the strength of group demands on government, which the government is unable to satisfy.

To the extent that these relationships hold, economic growth increases material well-being at one rate but social frustration at a faster rate.

The association of economic development, particularly rapid economic development, with political instability received its classic statement in de Tocqueville's interpretation of the French Revolution. The revolution, he said, was preceded by "an advance as rapid as it was unprecedented in the prosperity of the nation." This "steadily increasing prosperity, far from tranquillizing the

population, everywhere promoted a spirit of unrest" and "it was precisely in those parts of France where there had been most improvement that popular discontent ran highest." Similar conditions of economic improvement, it has been argued, preceded the Reformation, the English, American, and Russian revolutions, and the agitation and discontent in England in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The Mexican revolution similarly followed twenty years of spectacular economic growth. The rate of change in per capita gross national product for seven years before a successful revolt correlated very highly with the extent of violence in such revolts in Asian and Middle Eastern countries between 1955 and 1960, although not in Latin America. The experience of India, it has been argued, from the 1950s through the 1960s also shows "that economic development, far from enhancing political stability, has tended to be politically unstabilizing." 47

All this data is, of course, also consistent with the finding that during World War II discontent about promotions was more widespread in the Air Force than in other services despite or because of the fact that promotions were more frequent and rapid in the Air Force than in the other services. 68

Much specific evidence thus exists of an apparent association between rapid economic growth and political instability. On a more general level, however, the link between the two is not so clear. During the 1950s the correlation between rate of economic growth and domestic group violence for 53 countries was a mildly negative one of — .43. West Germany, Japan, Roumania, Yugoslavia, Austria, the U.S.S.R., Italy, and Czechoslovakia had very high rates of economic growth and little or no domestic violence. Bolivia, Argentina, Honduras, and Indonesia, on the other hand, had many deaths from domestic violence but very low, and in some cases even negative, growth rates. Similarly, the correlation for seventy countries of the rate of change in national income between 1935 and 1962 and level of political instability between 1948 and 1962 was — .34; the correlation between the change in national income

68. See Samuel A. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier (Princeton, Princeton University, 1949), 1, 251-58, 275-76.
and the variations in stability for the same countries in the same years was \(-.45\). In a similar vein, Needler found that in Latin America economic growth was a precondition for institutional stability in countries with high rates of political participation. 69

Table 1.4. Rapid Economic Growth and Political Instability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual growth of GNP per capita</th>
<th>Deaths from Domestic Group Violence in 53 Countries, 1950–62 (per 1,000,000 population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>LOW 1–9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high, 6% and over</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High, 4%–5.9%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate, 2%–3.9%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low, 1%–1.9%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low, below 1%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bruce Russett et al., *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964), Tables 29 and 45. Periods for the growth figures vary but are generally for 7 to 12 years centering on the 1950s.

This conflicting evidence suggests that the relationship, if any, between economic growth and political instability must be a complicated one. Perhaps the relationship varies with the level of economic development. At one extreme, some measure of economic growth is necessary to make instability possible. The simple poverty thesis falls down because people who are really poor are too poor for politics and too poor for protest. They are indifferent, apathetic, and lack exposure to the media and other stimuli which would arouse their aspirations in such a manner as to galvanize them into political activity. “The abjectly poor, too,” Eric Hoffer observed, “stand in awe of the world around them and are not hospitable to change. . . . There is thus a conservatism of the destitute as profound as the conservatism of the privileged, and the former is as much a factor in the perpetuation of a social order as the latter.” 70 Poverty itself is a barrier to instability. Those who are concerned about the immediate goal of the next meal are not apt to worry about the grand transformation of society. They become marginalists and incrementalists concerned simply with making minor but absolutely essential improvements in the existing situation. Just as social mobilization is necessary to provide the motive for instability, so also some measure of economic development is necessary to provide the means for instability.

At the other extreme, among countries which have reached a relatively high level of economic development, a high rate of economic growth is compatible with political stability. The negative correlations between economic growth and instability reported above are, in large part, the result of combining both highly developed and underdeveloped countries into the same analysis. Economically developed countries are more stable and have higher rates of growth than economically less developed countries. Unlike other social indicators, the rate of economic growth tends to vary directly with the level of development rather than inversely with it. In countries which are not wealthy, the rate of economic growth is not related significantly to political instability one way or another: for 34 countries with per capita GNP below $500 the correlation between rate of economic growth and deaths from domestic group violence was \(-.07\). Thus, the relation between the rate of economic growth and political instability varies with the level of economic development. At low levels, a positive relation exists, at medium levels no significant relation, and at high levels a negative relationship.

The Gap Hypothesis. Social mobilization is much more destabilizing than economic development. The gap between these two forms of change furnishes some measure of the impact of modernization on political stability. Urbanization, literacy, education, mass media, all expose the traditional man to new forms of life, new standards of enjoyment, new possibilities of satisfaction. These experiences break the cognitive and attitudinal barriers of the traditional culture and promote new levels of aspirations and wants. The ability of a transitional society to satisfy these new as-


pirations, however, increases much more slowly than the aspirations themselves. Consequently, a gap develops between aspiration and expectation, want formation and want satisfaction, or the aspirations function and the level-of-living function. This gap generates social frustration and dissatisfaction. In practice, the extent of the gap provides a reasonable index to political instability.

The reasons for this relationship between social frustration and political instability are somewhat more complicated than they may appear on the surface. The relationship is, in large part, due to the absence of two potential intervening variables: opportunities for social and economic mobility and adaptable political institutions. Since Puritanism, the go-getting economic innovator and the dedicated revolutionary have had qualitatively different goals but strikingly similar high aspirations, both the product of a high level of social mobilization. Consequently, the extent to which social frustration produces political participation depends in large part on the nature of the economic and social structure of the traditional society. Conceivably this frustration could be removed through social and economic mobility if the traditional society is sufficiently “open” to offer opportunities for such mobility. In part, this is precisely what occurs in rural areas, where outside opportunities for horizontal mobility (urbanization) contribute to the relative stability of the countryside in most modernizing countries. The few opportunities for vertical (occupational and income) mobility within the cities, in turn, contribute to their greater instability. Apart from urbanization, however, most modernizing countries have low levels of social-economic mobility. In relatively few societies are the traditional structures likely to encourage economic rather than political activity. Land and any other types of economic wealth in the traditional society are tightly held by a relatively small oligarchy or are controlled by foreign corporations and investors. The values of the traditional society often are hostile to entrepreneurial roles, and such roles consequently may be largely monopolized by an ethnic minority.


In these conditions, political participation becomes the road for advancement of the socially mobilized individual. Social frustration leads to demands on the government and the expansion of political participation to enforce those demands. The political backwardness of the country in terms of political institutionalization, moreover, makes it difficult if not impossible for the demands upon the government to be expressed through legitimate channels and to be moderated and aggregated within the political system. Hence the sharp increase in political participation gives rise to political instability. The impact of modernization thus involves the following relationships:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) \quad \text{Social mobilization} & \quad \text{Economic development} \\
(2) \quad \text{Social frustration} & \quad \text{Mobility opportunities} \\
(3) \quad \text{Political participation} & \quad \text{Political institutionalization}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
&= \text{Social frustration} \\
&= \text{Political participation} \\
&= \text{Political instability}
\end{align*}
\]

The absence of mobility opportunities and the low level of political institutionalization in most modernizing countries produce a correlation between social frustration and political instability. One analysis identified 26 countries with a low ratio of want formation to want satisfaction and hence low “systemic frustration” and 36 countries with a high ratio and hence high “systemic frustration.” Of the 26 satisfied societies, only six (Argentina, Belgium, France, Lebanon, Morocco, and the Union of South Africa) had high degrees of political instability. Of the 36 dissatisfied countries, only two (Philippines, Tunisia) had high levels of political stability. The overall correlation between frustration and instability was .50. The differences in Communist voting strength in Indian states can also in part be explained by the ratios between social mobilization and economic well-being in these states. Similarly, in Latin America, constitutional stability has been shown to be a function of economic development and politi-
cal participation. Sharp increases in participation produce instability unless they are accompanied by corresponding shifts in the level of economic well-being.  

Political instability in modernizing countries is thus in large part a function of the gap between aspirations and expectations produced by the escalation of aspirations which particularly occurs in the early phases of modernization. In some instances, a similar gap with similar results may be produced by the decline in expectations. Revolutions often occur when a period of sustained economic growth is followed by a sharp economic downturn. Such downturns apparently occurred in France in 1788–89, in England in 1687–88, in America in 1774–75, before Dorr’s rebellion in 1842, in Russia (as a result of the war) in 1915–17, in Egypt in 1952, and in Cuba in 1952–53 (when Castro launched his first attack on Batista). In addition, in Latin America coups d’etat occur more frequently during years when economic conditions worsen than in those years marked by increases in real per capita incomes.

Inequality and Instability. “In all these cases,” Aristotle observed of political change in Greece, “the cause of sedition is always to be found in inequality.” Political inequality is, by definition, almost an inherent aspect of political instability. What about economic inequality? The paucity of data on the distribution of income and wealth makes it difficult to test the proposition that economic inequality is associated with political instability. For eighteen countries a correlation of .34 was found between the Gini index of inequality in income before taxes and deaths from political violence; for twelve countries the correlation of income inequality after taxes and political violence was .36. More substantial evidence exists, however, to link inequalities in land ownership to political instability. In a study of 47 countries, Russett found a correlation of .46 between a Gini index of inequality in land ownership and deaths from domestic group violence. Lower correlations existed between unequal land ownership and frequency of violent incidents. The relationship of the concentration of land ownership to violence was, however, greatly strengthened when the percentage of the population engaged in agriculture was also taken into account. In highly agricultural countries, presumably the social-economic mobility opportunities for those in agriculture are less and hence inequality in land ownership should be more directly related to violence. This is, indeed, the case, and the correlation of inequality in land ownership with violent deaths was found to be about .70 in agricultural countries.

Modernization affects economic inequality and thus political instability in two ways. First, wealth and income are normally more unevenly distributed in poor countries than in economically developed countries. In a traditional society this inequality is accepted as part of the natural pattern of life. Social mobilization, however, increases awareness of the inequality and presumably resentment of it. The influx of new ideas calls into question the legitimacy of the old distribution and suggests the feasibility and the desirability of a more equitable distribution of income. The obvious way of achieving a rapid change in income distribution is through government. Those who command the income, however, usually also command the government. Hence social mobilization turns the traditional economic inequality into a stimulus to rebellion.

Secondly, in the long run, economic development produces a more equitable distribution of income than existed in the traditional society. In the short run, however, the immediate impact of economic growth is often to exacerbate income inequalities. The gains of rapid economic growth are often concentrated in a few groups while the losses are diffused among many; as a result, the number of people getting poorer in the society may actually increase. Rapid growth often involves inflation; in inflation prices typically rise faster than wages with consequent tendencies toward a more unequal distribution of wealth. The impact of Western legal systems in non-Western societies often encourages the replacement of communal forms of land ownership with private ownership.
and thus tends to produce greater inequalities in land ownership than existed in the traditional society. In addition, in less developed societies the distribution of income in the more modern, non-agricultural sector is typically more unequal than it is in the agricultural. In rural India in 1950, for instance, five per cent of the families received 28.9 per cent of the income; but in urban India five per cent of the families received 61.5 per cent of the income. Since the overall distribution of income is more equal in the less agricultural, developed nations, the distribution of income within the nonagricultural sector of an underdeveloped country is much more unequal than it is in the same sector in a developed country.

In particular modernizing countries the impact of economic growth on economic inequality may become quite noticeable. The twenty years before the revolution in Mexico witnessed a tremendous growth in economic inequalities, particularly in land ownership. In the 1950s the gap between wealth and poverty in Mexico and in Latin America generally was again tending to increase. The gap between high and low incomes in the Philippines was also reported to have increased significantly during the 1950s. Similarly, Pakistan's rapid economic growth in the late 1950s and early 1960s gave rise to "tremendous disparities in income" and tended to produce "relative stagnation at the bottom of the social pyramid." In African countries independence brought to the few who assumed power frequent opportunities to amass immense wealth at a time when the standard of living for the bulk of their populations remained stationary or even declined. The earlier independence came in the evolution of a colonial society, the greater the economic—and political—inequality which independence fastened on that society.

Economic development increases economic inequality at the same time that social mobilization decreases the legitimacy of that inequality. Both aspects of modernization combine to produce political instability.

Modernization and Corruption

Corruption is behavior of public officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private ends. Corruption obviously exists in all societies, but it is also obviously more common in some societies than in others and more common at some times in the evolution of a society than at other times. Impressionistic evidence suggests that its extent correlates reasonably well with rapid social and economic modernization. Political life in eighteenth-century America and in twentieth-century America, it would appear, was less corrupt than in nineteenth-century America. So also political life in seventeenth-century Britain and in late nineteenth-century Britain was, it would appear, less corrupt than it was in eighteenth-century Britain. Is it merely coincidence that this high point of corruption in English and American public life coincided with the impact of the industrial revolution, the development of new sources of wealth and power, and the appearance of new classes making new demands on government? In both periods political institutions suffered strain and some measure of decay. Corruption is, of course, one measure of the absence of effective political institutionalization. Public officials lack autonomy and coherence, and subordinate their institutional roles to exogenous demands. Corruption may be more prevalent in some cultures than in others but in most cultures it seems to be most prevalent during the most intense phases of modernization. The differences in the level of corruption which may exist between the modernized and politically developed societies of the Atlantic world and those of Latin America, Africa, and Asia in large part reflect their differences in political modernization and political development. When the leaders of military juntas and revolutionary movements condemn the "corruption" in their societies, they are, in effect, condemning the backwardness of their societies.

Why does modernization breed corruption? Three connections stand out. First, modernization involves a change in the basic values of the society. In particular it means the gradual acceptance by groups within the society of universalistic and achievement-based norms, the emergence of loyalties and identifications of indi-
individuals and groups with the nation-state, and the spread of the assumption that citizens have equal rights against the state and equal obligations to the state. These norms usually, of course, are first accepted by students, military officers, and others who have been exposed to them abroad. Such groups then begin to judge their own society by these new and alien norms. Behavior which was acceptable and legitimate according to traditional norms becomes unacceptable and corrupt when viewed through modern eyes. Corruption in a modernizing society is thus in part not so much the result of the deviance of behavior from accepted norms as it is the deviance of norms from the established patterns of behavior. New standards and criteria of what is right and wrong lead to a condemnation of at least some traditional behavior patterns as corrupt. "What Britons saw as corrupt and Hausa as oppressive," one scholar has noted of northern Nigeria, "Fulani might regard as both necessary and traditional." The calling into question of old standards, moreover, tends to undermine the legitimacy of all standards. The conflict between modern and traditional norms opens opportunities for individuals to act in ways justified by neither.

Corruption requires some recognition of the difference between public role and private interest. If the culture of the society does not distinguish between the king's role as a private person and the king's role as king, it is impossible to accuse the king of corruption in the use of public monies. The distinction between the private purse and public expenditures only gradually evolved in Western Europe at the beginning of the modern period. Some notion of this distinction, however, is necessary to reach any conclusion as to whether the actions of the king are proper or corrupt. Similarly, according to traditional codes in many societies, an official had the responsibility and obligation to provide rewards and employment to members of his family. No distinction existed between obligation to the state and obligation to the family. Only when such a distinction becomes accepted by dominant groups within the society does it become possible to define such behavior as nepotism and hence corruption. Indeed, the introduction of achievement standards may stimulate greater family identification and more felt need to protect family interests against the threat posed by


Modernization also contributes to corruption by creating new sources of wealth and power, the relation of which to politics is undefined by the dominant traditional norms of the society and on which the modern norms are not yet accepted by the dominant groups within the society. Corruption in this sense is a direct product of the rise of new groups with new resources and the efforts of these groups to make themselves effective within the political sphere. Corruption may be the means of assimilating new groups into the political system by irregular means because the system has been unable to adapt sufficiently fast to provide legitimate and acceptable means for this purpose. In Africa, corruption threw "a bridge between those who hold political power and those who control wealth, enabling the two classes, markedly apart during the initial stages of African nationalist governments, to assimilate each other." The new millionaires buy themselves seats in the Senate or the House of Lords and thereby become participants in the political system rather than alienated opponents of it, which might have been the case if this opportunity to corrupt the system were denied them. So also recently enfranchised masses or recently arrived immigrants use their new power of the ballot to buy themselves jobs and favors from the local political machine. There is thus the corruption of the poor and the corruption of the rich. The one trades political power for money, the other money for political power. But in both cases something public (a vote or an office or decision) is sold for private gain.

Modernization, thirdly, encourages corruption by the changes it produces on the output side of the political system. Modernization, particularly among the later modernizing countries, involves the expansion of governmental authority and the multiplication of the activities subjected to governmental regulation. In Northern Nigeria, "oppression and corruption tended to increase among the Hausa with political centralization and the increase of governmental tasks." All laws, as McMullan has pointed out, put some group at a disadvantage, and this group consequently becomes a
potential source of corruption. The multiplication of laws thus multiplies the possibilities of corruption. The extent to which this possibility is realized in practice depends in large part upon the extent to which the laws have the general support of the population, the ease with which the law can be broken without detection, and the profit to be made by breaking it. Laws affecting trade, customs, taxes plus those regulating popular and profitable activities such as gambling, prostitution, and liquor, consequently become major incentives to corruption. Hence in a society where corruption is widespread the passage of strict laws against corruption serves only to multiply the opportunities for corruption.

The initial adherence to modern values by a group in a transitional country often takes an extreme form. The ideals of honesty, probity, universalism, and merit often become so overriding that individuals and groups come to condemn as corrupt in their own society practices which are accepted as normal and even legitimate in more modern societies. The initial exposure to modernism tends to give rise to unreasonable puritanical standards even as it did among the Puritans themselves. This escalation in values leads to a denial and rejection of the bargaining and compromise essential to politics and promotes the identification of politics with corruption. To the modernizing zealot a politician’s promise to build irrigation ditches for farmers in a village if he is elected seems to be just as corrupt as an offer to pay each villager for his vote before the election. Modernizing elites are nationalistic and stress the overriding preeminence of the general welfare of society as a whole. Hence in a country like Brazil, “efforts by private interests to influence public policy are considered, as in Rousseau, inherently ‘corrupt.’” By the same token government action which is fashioned in deference to particular claims and pressures from society is considered “demagogy.” In a society like Brazil the modernizing elements condemn as corrupt ambassadorial appointments to reward friends or to appease critics and the establishment of government projects in return for interest group support. In the extreme case the antagonism to corruption may take the form of the intense fanatical puritanism characteristic of most revolutionary and some military regimes in at least their early phases.

Paradoxically, this fanatical anticorruption mentality has ultimate effects similar to those of corruption itself. Both challenge the autonomy of politics: one substituting private goals for public ones and the other replacing political values with technical ones. The escalation of standards in a modernizing society and the concomitant devaluation and rejection of politics represent the victory of the values of modernity over the needs of society.

Reducing corruption in a society thus often involves both a scaling down of the norms thought appropriate for the behavior of public officials and at the same time changes in the general behavior of such officials in the direction of those norms. The result is a greater congruence between prevalent norms and prevalent behavior at the price of some inconsistency in both. Some behavior comes to be accepted as a normal part of the process of politics, as “honest” rather than “dishonest graft,” while other, similar behavior comes to be generally condemned and generally avoided. Both England and the United States went through this process: at one point the former accepted the sale of peerages but not of ambassadorships, while the latter accepted the sale of ambassadorships but not of judgeships. “The result in the U.S.A.,” as one observer has noted, “is a patchwork: the scope of political patronage has been greatly reduced and the cash bribery of higher public servants largely eliminated. At the same time, large areas of public life have so far remained more or less immune to reform, and practices that in one sphere would be regarded as corrupt are almost taken for granted in another.”

The development within a society of the ability to make this discrimination is a sign of its movement from modernization to modernity.

The functions, as well as the causes, of corruption are similar to those of violence. Both are encouraged by modernization; both are symptomatic of the weakness of political institutions; both are characteristic of what we shall subsequently call praetorian societies; both are means by which individuals and groups relate themselves to the political system and, indeed, participate in the system in ways which violate the mores of the system. Hence the society which has a high capacity for corruption also has a high capacity for violence. In some measure, one form of deviant behavior may substitute for the other, but, more often, different social
forces simultaneously exploit their differing capacities for each. The prevalence of violence, however, does pose a greater threat to the functioning of the system than the prevalence of corruption. In the absence of agreement on public purposes, corruption substitutes agreement on private goals, while violence substitutes conflict over public or private ends. Both corruption and violence are illegitimate means of making demands upon the system, but corruption is also an illegitimate means of satisfying those demands. Violence is more often a symbolic gesture of protest which goes unrequited and is not designed to be requited. It is a symptom of more extreme alienation. He who corrupts a system's police officers is more likely to identify with the system than he who storms the system's police stations.

Like machine politics or clientalistic politics in general, corruption provides immediate, specific, and concrete benefits to groups which might otherwise be thoroughly alienated from society. Corruption may thus be functional to the maintenance of a political system in the same way that reform is. Corruption itself may be a substitute for reform and both corruption and reform may be substitutes for revolution. Corruption serves to reduce group pressures for policy changes, just as reform serves to reduce class pressures for structural changes. In Brazil, for instance, governmental loans to trade association leaders have caused them to give up "their associations' broader claims. Such betrayals have been an important factor in reducing class and trade association pressure upon the government." 86

The degree of corruption which modernization produces in a society is, of course, a function of the nature of the traditional society as well as of the nature of the modernizing process. The presence of several competing value systems or cultures in a traditional society will, in itself, encourage corruption in that society. Given a relatively homogeneous culture, however, the amount of corruption likely to develop during modernization would appear to be inversely related to the degree of social stratification in the traditional society. A highly articulated class or caste structure means a highly developed system of norms regulating behavior between individuals of different status. These norms are enforced both by the individual's socialization into his own group and by the expectations and potential sanctions of other groups. In such a society fail-

ure to follow the relevant norms in intergroup relations may lead to intense personal disorganization and unhappiness.

Corruption, consequently, should be less extensive in the modernization of feudal societies than it is in the modernization of centralized bureaucratic societies. It should have been less in Japan than in China and it should have been less in Hindu cultures than in Islamic ones. Impressionistic evidence suggests that these may well be the case. For Western societies, one comparative analysis shows that Australia and Great Britain have "fairly high levels of class voting" compared to the United States and Canada. Political corruption, however, appears to have been more extensive in the latter two countries than in the former, with Quebec perhaps being the most corrupt area in any of the four countries. Consequently, "the more class-polarized countries also seem to have less political corruption." 87 Similarly, in the "mulatto" countries (Panama, Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil, Dominican Republic, and Haiti) of Latin America, "there appears to be greater social equality and much less rigidity in the social structure" than in the Indian (Mexico, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, Bolivia) or mestizo (Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay) countries. Correspondingly, however, the relative "absence of an entrenched upper class means also the relative absence of a governing class ethic, with its sense of noblesse oblige" and hence "there seems little doubt that it is countries in this socio-racial category in which political graft reaches its most flagrant heights." Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela, Batista in Cuba, and Trujillo in the Dominican Republic all came from non-upper-class backgrounds and all became multimillionaires in office. So also, "Brazili and Panama are notorious for more 'democratic,' more widely-distributed, graft-taking." 88 The prevalence of corruption in the African states may well be related to the general absence of rigid class divisions. "The rapid mobility from poverty to wealth and from one occupation to another," one observer has noted of Africa, "has prevented the development of class phenomena, that is, of hereditary status or class consciousness." 89 The same mobility, however, multiplies the opportunities for and the

86. Left, p. 157.
88. Needler, Political Development in Latin America, Chap. 6, pp. 15-16.
attractions of corruption. Similarly, the Philippines and Thailand, both of which have had reasonably fluid and open societies with relatively high degrees of social mobility, have been characterized by frequent reports of widespread political corruption.

In most forms corruption involves an exchange of political action for economic wealth. The particular forms that will be prevalent in a society depend upon the ease of access to one as against the other. In a society with multiple opportunities for the accumulation of wealth and few positions of political power, the dominant pattern will be the use of the former to achieve the latter. In the United States, wealth has more commonly been a road to political influence than political office has been a road to wealth. The rules against using public office to obtain private profit are much stricter and more generally obeyed than those against using private wealth to obtain public office. That striking and yet common phenomenon of American politics, the cabinet minister or presidential assistant who feels forced to quit office in order to provide for his family, would be viewed with amazement and incredulity in most parts of the world. In modernizing countries, the reverse situation is usually the case. The opportunities for the accumulation of wealth through private activity are limited by traditional norms, the monopoly of economic roles by ethnic minorities, or the domination of the economy by foreign companies and investors. In such a society, politics becomes the road to wealth, and those enterprising ambitions and talents which cannot find what they want in business may yet do so in politics. It is, in many modernizing countries, easier for an able and ambitious young man to become a cabinet minister by way of politics than to become a millionaire by way of business. Consequently, contrary to American practice, modernizing countries may accept as normal widespread use of public office to obtain private wealth while at the same time taking a stricter view of the use of private wealth to obtain public office. Corruption, like violence, results when the absence of mobility opportunities outside politics, combined with weak and inflexible political institutions, channels energies into politically deviant behavior.

The prevalence of foreign business in a country in particular tends to promote corruption both because the foreigners have less scruples in violating the norms of the society and because their control of important avenues to economic well-being forces poten-

tial native entrepreneurs to attempt to make their fortunes through politics. Taylor’s description of the Philippines undoubtedly has widespread application among modernizing countries: “Politics is a major industry for the Filipinos; it is a way of life. Politics is the main route to power, which, in turn, is the main route to wealth. . . . More money can be made in a shorter time with the aid of political influence than by any other means.” 90

The use of political office as a way to wealth implies a subordination of political values and institutions to economic ones. The principal purpose of politics becomes not the achievement of public goals but the promotion of individual interests.

In all societies the scale of corruption (i.e., the average value of the private goods and public services involved in a corrupt exchange) increases as one goes up the bureaucratic hierarchy or political ladder. The incidence of corruption (i.e., the frequency with which a given population group engages in corrupt acts) on a given level in the political or bureaucratic structure, however, may vary significantly from one society to another. In most political systems, the incidence of corruption is high at the lower levels of bureaucratic and political authority. In some societies, the incidence of corruption seems to remain constant or to increase as one goes up the political hierarchy. In terms of frequency as well as scale, national legislators are more corrupt than local officials; high level bureaucrats are more corrupt than low level ones; cabinet ministers are the most corrupt of all; and the president or top leader the most corrupt among them. In such societies the top leader—the Nkrumah, Sarit, San Martín, Pérez Jiménez, Trujillo—may make off with tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars. In such a system corruption tends to accentuate already existing inequalities. Those who gain access to the most political power also have the more frequent opportunities to gain access to the most wealth. Such a pattern of top-heavy corruption means a very low level of political institutionalization, since the top political institutions in the society which should be most independent of outside influences are in fact most susceptible to such influences. This pattern of corruption is not necessarily incompatible with political stability so long as the avenues of upward mobility through the political machine or the bureaucracy remain open. If, however,

the younger generation of politicians sees itself indefinitely excluded from sharing in the gains of the older leaders, or if the colonels in the army see little hope of promotion and the chance to share in the opportunities open only to generals, the system becomes liable to violent overthrow. In such a society both political corruption and political stability depend upon vertical mobility.

The expectation of more corruption at the top is reversed in other societies. In these societies the incidence of corrupt behavior increases as one goes down the political or bureaucratic hierarchy. Low-level bureaucratic officials are more likely to be corrupt than high-level ones; state and local officials are more likely to be corrupt than national ones; the top national leadership and the national cabinet are comparatively free from corruption, while the town council and local offices are deeply involved in it. Scale and incidence of corruption are inversely related. This pattern would seem to be generally true for highly modern societies, such as the United States, and also for at least some modernizing societies, such as India. It is also probably the dominant pattern in communist states. The crucial factor in this type of society is the existence of fairly strong national political institutions which socialize rising political leaders into a code of values stressing the public responsibilities of the political leadership. National political institutions are reasonably autonomous and differentiated, while lower-level and local political individuals and organizations are more closely involved with other social forces and groups. This pattern of corruption may directly enhance the stability of the political system. The top leaders of the society remain true to the stated norms of the political culture and accept political power and moral virtue as substitutes for economic gain. Low-level officials, in turn, are compensated for their lack of political standing by their greater opportunity to engage in corruption. Their envy of the power of their leaders is tempered by the solace of their own petty graft.

Just as the corruption produced by the expansion of political participation helps to integrate new groups into the political system, so also the corruption produced by the expansion of governmental regulation may help stimulate economic development. Corruption may be one way of surmounting traditional laws or bureaucratic regulations which hamper economic expansion. In the United States during the 1870s and 1880s corruption of state legislatures and city councils by railroad, utility, and industrial corporations undoubtedly speeded the growth of the American economy. "Many economic activities would be paralyzed," Weiner observes of India, "were it not for the flexibility which bakshish contributes to the complex, rigid, administrative system." 81 In somewhat similar fashion, during the Kubitschek era in Brazil a high rate of economic development apparently corresponded with a high rate of parliamentary corruption, as industrializing entrepreneurs bought protection and assistance from conservative rural legislators. It has even been suggested that one result of governmental efforts to reduce corruption in societies such as Egypt is to produce additional obstacles to economic development. In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, overcentralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, overcentralized, honest bureaucracy. A society which is relatively uncorrupt—a traditional society for instance where traditional norms are still powerful—may find a certain amount of corruption a welcome lubricant easing the path to modernization. A developed traditional society may be improved—or at least modernized—by a little corruption; a society in which corruption is already pervasive, however, is unlikely to be improved by more corruption.

Corruption naturally tends to weaken or to perpetuate the weakness of the government bureaucracy. In this respect, it is incompatible with political development. At times, however, some forms of corruption can contribute to political development by helping to strengthen political parties. "The corruption of one government," Harrington said, "... is the generation of another." 92 Similarly, the corruption of one governmental organ may help the institutionalization of another. In most modernizing countries, the bureaucracy is overdeveloped in comparison with the institutions responsible for aggregating interests and handling the input side of the political system. Insofar as the governmental bureaucracy is corrupted in the interests of the political parties, political development may be helped rather than hindered. Party

patronage is only a mild form of corruption, if indeed it deserves to be called that at all. For an official to award a public office in return for a payment to the official is clearly to place private interest over public interest. For an official to award a public office in return for a contribution of work or money to a party organization is to subordinate one public interest to another, more needy, public interest.

Historically strong party organizations have been built either by revolution from below or by patronage from above. The nineteenth-century experience of England and the United States is one long lesson in the use of public funds and public office to build party organization. The repetition of this pattern in the modernizing countries of today has contributed directly to the building of some of the most effective political parties and most stable political systems. In the later modernizing countries the sources of private wealth are too few and too small to make a major contribution to party building. Just as government in these countries has to play a more important role in economic development than it did in England and the United States, so also it must play a more important role in political development. In the 1920s and the 1930s, Ataturk used the resources of the Turkish government to foster the development of the Republican Peoples Party. After its creation in 1929 the Mexican Revolutionary Party similarly benefited from governmental corruption and patronage. The formation of the Democratic Republican Party in Korea in the early 1960s was directly helped by the use of governmental monies and governmental personnel. In Israel and India, governmental patronage has been a major source of strength for Mapai and Congress. The corruption in West Africa derived in part from the needs of the political parties. And, of course, in the most obvious and blatant case of all, communist parties, once they acquire power, directly subordinate governmental bureaucracies and governmental resources to their own purposes.

The rationale for corrupting the bureaucracy on behalf of the parties does not derive simply from a preference for one organization as against another. Corruption is, as we have seen, a product of modernization and particularly of the expansion of political consciousness and political participation. The reduction of corruption in the long run requires the organization and structuring of that participation. Political parties are the principal institution of modern politics which can perform this function. Corruption thrives on disorganization, the absence of stable relationships among groups and of recognized patterns of authority. The development of political organizations which exercise effective authority and which give rise to organized group interests—the "machine," the "organization," the "party"—transcending those of individual and social groups reduces the opportunity for corruption. Corruption varies inversely with political organization, and to the extent that corruption builds parties, it undermines the conditions of its own existence.

Corruption is most prevalent in states which lack effective political parties, in societies where the interests of the individual, the family, the clique, or the clan predominate. In a modernizing polity the weaker and less accepted the political parties, the greater the likelihood of corruption. In countries like Thailand and Iran where parties have had a semilegality at best, corruption on behalf of individual and family interests has been widespread. In the Philippines where political parties are notoriously weak, corruption has again been widely prevalent. In Brazil, also, the weakness of political parties has been reflected in a "clientelistic" pattern of politics in which corruption has been a major factor. In contrast, it would seem that the incidence of corruption in those countries where governmental resources have been diverted or "corrupted" for party-building is on the whole less than it is where parties have remained weak. The historical experience of the West also reflects this pattern. The parties which at first are the leeches on the bureaucracy in the end become the bark protecting it from more destructive locusts of clique and family. Partisanship and corruption, as Henry Jones Ford argued, "are really antagonistic principles. Partisanship tends to establish a connection based upon an avowed public obligation, while corruption consults private and individual interests which secrete themselves from view and avoid accountability of any kind. The weakness of party organization is the opportunity of corruption."
The City-Country Gap: Urban Breakthrough and Green Uprising

One crucial political result of modernization is the gap it produces between countryside and city. This gap is, indeed, a preeminent political characteristic of societies undergoing rapid social and economic change. It is the primary source of political instability in such societies and a principal, if not the principal, obstacle to national integration. Modernization is, in large part, measured by the growth of the city. The city becomes the locus of new economic activities, new social classes, new culture and education, which make it fundamentally different from the more tradition-bound countryside. At the same time modernization may also impose new demands on the countryside which intensify its hostility toward the city. The city dweller's feelings of intellectual superiority to and contempt for the backward peasant are matched by the country dweller's feelings of moral superiority to and yet envy of the city slicker. The city and the countryside become different nations, different ways of life.

Historically, the emigration of the peasant from village cottage to city slum was a decisive and irreversible change. In the later modernizing countries, however, the very process of modernization itself has made the move less decisive and has reduced the gap between city and countryside. The radio brings the language and the hopes of the city to the village; the bus brings the language and the beliefs of the village to the city. City cousins and country cousins are more often in contact with each other. The modern infrastructure of modernization has thus narrowed the rural-urban gap, but it has not eliminated it. The differences are still fundamental. The standard of living in the city is often four or five times that of the countryside. Most of those in the city are literate; a substantial majority of those in the countryside are illiterate. The economic activities and opportunities in the city are almost infinitely more varied than those in the countryside. The culture of the city is open, modern, secular; that of the countryside remains closed, traditional, and religious. The difference between the city and the countryside is the difference between the most modern and the most traditional parts of society. A fundamental problem of politics in a modernizing society is the development of the means for bridging this gap and re-creating through political means the social unity which modernization has destroyed.

The expansion of political participation is reflected in the changing relationship between city and countryside and their changing patterns of political instability and stability. In a typical traditional phase, the countryside dominates the city both politically and socially, and in the countryside a small aristocratic group of landowners dominates a large passive peasant mass. Outside the village the level of political participation is low. It is limited to aristocrats, landowners, high bureaucratic officials, ecclesiastics, and high-ranking military officers. All these are drawn from the same small ruling elite, and the distinctions among the various roles and functions are still relatively primitive. Except in centralized bureaucratic empires, the city plays a minor or secondary role in most traditional societies. It may well be the seat of government, but the government itself requires few professional officials and is dominated by the rural elite whose wealth and power is based upon their control of land. In such a society, the countryside is preeminent and both city and countryside are stable.

Modernization changes the nature of the city and the balance between city and countryside. Economic activities multiply in the city and lead to the emergence of new social groups and to the development of a new social consciousness by old social groups. New ideas and new techniques imported from outside the society make their appearance in the city. In many cases, particularly where the traditional bureaucracy is fairly well developed, the first groups within the traditional society to be exposed to modernity are the military and civilian bureaucrats. In due course, students, intellectuals, merchants, doctors, bankers, artisans, entrepreneurs, teachers, lawyers, and engineers emerge on the scene. These groups develop feelings of political efficacy and demand some form of participation in the political system. The urban middle class, in short, makes its appearance in politics and makes the city the source of unrest and opposition to the political and social system which is still dominated by the country.

Eventually the urban elements assert themselves and overthrow the ruling rural elite, thereby marking the end of the traditional political system. This urban breakthrough is usually accompanied by violence, and at this point the politics of the society becomes
highly unstable. The city is still but a small growth in society as a whole, but the groups within the city are able to employ their superior skills, location, and concentration to dominate the politics of the society at the national level. In the absence of effective political institutions, politics becomes a city game fought out among the elements of the emerging urban middle class. The community is divided by a fundamental gap; the society is still rural but its politics have become urban. The city is becoming the dominant source of political power, but the middle-class groups in the city are committed to opposition first to the rural elite which they have dislodged but then also to each other. The sources of instability in a modernizing society are seldom in its poorest or most backward areas; they are almost always in the most advanced sectors of the society. As politics becomes more and more urban, it becomes less and less stable.

At this point the re-creation of political stability requires an alliance between some urban groups and the masses of the population in the countryside. A crucial turning point in the expansion of political participation in a modernizing society is the inauguration of the rural masses into national politics. This rural mobilization or "Green Uprising" is far more important politically for the later modernizing countries than it was for most early modernizers. In the latter, urbanization and industrialization usually reached high levels before the bulk of the rural population became available for political mobilization. The rural population was less important numerically when it became more involved politically. The one major exception was the United States. In eighteenth-century America, the war of independence, the norms of equality and democracy, the relatively high levels of literacy and education, and the relatively widespread distribution of land ownership (outside the south) combined to produce extensive agrarian political participation before the rise of the city. Somewhat similarly, in later modernizing countries the telescoping of modernization tends to spread political consciousness and the possibility of political action through the countryside at a time when urban development and industrialization are still at relatively low levels. In these countries, consequently, the key to political stability is the extent to which the rural masses are mobilized into politics within the existing political system rather than against the system.

The timing, the method, and the auspices of the Green Uprising thus decisively influence the subsequent political evolution of the society. The uprising may occur rapidly or it may occur slowly and proceed through several stages. It usually takes one of four forms. In a colonial society, the Green Uprising may occur under the auspices of the nationalist intellectuals who, as in India and Tunisia, mobilize peasant groups into politics within the framework of the nationalist movement to support them in their struggles with the imperial power. Once independence is achieved, however, the problem for the nationalist leaders is to organize and sustain this rural participation and support. If the nationalist party fails to do this, some other group of urban leaders opposed to it or opposed to the political system of which it is a part may move to win the support of the peasants. In a competitive party system, the Green Uprising often takes the form of one segment of the urban elite developing an appeal to or making an alliance with the crucial rural voters and mobilizing them into politics so as to overwhelm at the polls the more narrowly urban-based parties. The victories of Jefferson and Jackson over the Adamses had their twentieth-century counterparts in Turkey, Ceylon, Burma, Senegal, the Sudan, and other modernizing countries. Thirdly, the Green Uprising may take place, in part at least, under military leadership, if as in South Korea and perhaps Egypt a rural-oriented military junta comes to power and then attempts to develop a broad power base in the countryside to overwhelm and contain its urban opponents. Finally, if no group within the political system takes the lead in mobilizing the peasants into politics, some group of urban intellectuals may mobilize and organize them into politics against the political system. This results in revolution.

Each form of the Green Uprising involves the mobilization of the peasants for political combat. If there is no combat, there is no mobilization. The crucial differences involve the target of the uprising and the framework in which it occurs. In the nationalist case, the target is the imperial power and the mobilization takes place within the framework of a nationalist movement which replaces the imperial power as the source of legitimacy in the political system. In the competitive case, the target is the ruling party

95. See Chap. 4 for a more detailed analysis of breakthrough coups and the politics of radical praetorianism.
and the mobilization takes place within the framework of the political system but not within the framework of the ruling party. In the military case, the target is usually the former ruling oligarchy and the mobilization is part of the effort by the military leaders to construct a new political framework. In the revolutionary case, the target is the existing political system and its leadership and the mobilization takes place through an opposition political party whose leadership is dedicated to replacing the existing political system.

The instability of the city—the instability of coups, riots, and demonstrations—is, in some measure, an inescapable characteristic of modernization. The extent to which this instability manifests itself depends upon the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the political institutions of the society. Urban instability is thus minor but universal. Rural instability, on the other hand, is major but avoidable. If urban elites identified with the political system fail to lead the Green Uprising, the way is opened for an opposition group to come to power through revolution with the support of the peasants and to create a new institutional framework in the form of a single party to bridge the gap between country and city.

If urban elites identified with the political system are, however, able to bring the peasants into politics on their side, they are able to surround and to contain the instability of the city. The rural strength of the regime enables it to survive the hostility of the city in the early phases of modernization. The price of rural support, however, is the modification or abandonment by the regime of many of its Western or modern values and practices. Thus, paradoxically, the Green Uprising has either a highly traditionalizing impact on the political system or a profoundly revolutionary one.

If revolution is avoided, in due course the urban middle class changes significantly; it becomes more conservative as it becomes larger. The urban working class also begins to participate in politics, but it is usually either too weak to challenge the middle class or too conservative to want to do so. Thus, as urbanization proceeds, the city comes to play a more effective role in the politics of the country, and the city itself becomes more conservative. The political system and the government come to depend more upon the support of the city than upon that of the countryside. Indeed, it now becomes the turn of the countryside to react against the prospect of domination by the city. This reaction often takes the
form of rural protest movements of a fundamentalist character, which vainly attempt to undermine the power of the city and to stop the spread of urban culture. When these opposition movements are stalemated or defeated, modernization, in its political sense, has reached modernity. Both city and countryside again become stable, but the dominant power now rests with the former rather than with the latter. The society which was once unified by a rural traditional culture is now unified by a modern urban one.

Whether a society evolves through a more or a less revolutionary path thus depends upon the choices made by its leaders and their urban opponents after the city asserts its role in the political system. At this point either the leaders of the system mobilize the peasantry into politics as a stabilizing force to contain urban disorder or the opposition mobilizes them into politics as a revolutionary force to join in the violent destruction of the existing political and social order. A society, in these terms, vulnerable to revolution only when the opposition of the middle class to the political system coincides with the opposition of the peasants. Once the middle class becomes conservative, rural rebellion is still possible, but revolution is not.

**Political Stability: Civic and Praetorian Polities**

Political systems can thus be distinguished by their levels of political institutionalization and their levels of political participation. In both cases the differences are obviously differences in degree: no clear-cut line separates the highly institutionalized polity from the disorganized polity; so also no clear-cut line exists between one level of political participation and another. To analyze the changes in both dimensions, however, it is necessary to identify different categories of systems, recognizing full well that rarely will any actual political system in fact fit into any specific theoretically defined pigeonhole. In terms of institutionalization, it is perhaps enough to distinguish those systems which have achieved a high degree of political institutionalization from those which have achieved only a low degree. In terms of participation, it seems desirable to identify three levels: at the lowest level, participation is restricted to a small traditional aristocratic or bureaucratic elite; at the medium level, the middle classes have entered into politics; and in a highly participant polity, elite, middle class, and the populace at large all share in political activity.

It would be convenient to leave the matter there, but things are not quite so simple. The stability of any given polity depends upon the relationship between the level of political participation and the level of political institutionalization. The level of political institutionalization in a society with a low level of political participation may be much lower than it is in a society with a much higher level of participation, and yet the society with lower levels of both may be more stable than the society having a higher level of institutionalization and a still higher level of participation. Political stability, as we have argued, depends upon the ratio of institutionalization to participation. As political participation increases, the complexity, autonomy, adaptability, and coherence of the society's political institutions must also increase if political stability is to be maintained.

Modern polities are, in some measure, distinguished from traditional polities by their level of political participation. Developed polities are, in some measure, distinguished from underdeveloped
ones by their level of political institutionalization. To these distin­
tions must now be added a third: the distinction between those polities where political participation is high relative to polit­
ical institutionalization and those where institutionalization is high relative to participation. Political systems with low levels of institutionalization and high levels of participation are systems where social forces using their own methods act directly in the polit­
ical sphere. For reasons elaborated below, such political systems are appropriately called praetorian polities. Conversely, political systems with a high ratio of institutionalization to participation may be termed civic polities. One society may thus have more highly developed political institutions than another and yet may also be more praetorian in character because of its still higher level of political participation.

Civic or praetorian societies may thus exist at various levels of political participation. The combination of the classification of societies according to their level of political participation, on the one hand, and their ratio of institutionalization to participation, on the other, produces, of course, a typology of six kinds of political systems, which are identified in Table 1.6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Participation</th>
<th>Ratio of Institutionalization to Participation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOW: PRAETORIAN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low: traditional</td>
<td>Organic (Ethiopia), Oligarchical (Paraguay)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium: transitional</td>
<td>Whig (Chile), Radical (Egypt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High: modern</td>
<td>Participant (Soviet Union), Mass (Argentina)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH: CIVIC</td>
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This typology may strike a familiar note to the historian of political ideas. Starting with a different set of categories but with similar concern for the conditions of political stability, our analysis has led to a typology of political systems strikingly similar to that of the classics. The ancient theorists divided political systems in two ways: according to the number of rulers and according to the nature of the rule. Their division of systems into those ruled by the one, the few, and the many corresponds in a rough sense to the distinctions made here, and by other modern political analysts, according to levels of political participation. The distinction between civic and praetorian polities corresponds roughly to the difference postulated by Plato, Aristotle, and other classical writers.

As the Greeks recognized, the "right" constitutions might take a variety of forms, even as today the political systems of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union differ significantly from each other. The societies with perverted constitutions, in contrast, were societies which lacked law, authority, cohesion, discipline, and consensus, where private interests dominated public ones, where there was an absence of civic obligation and civic duty, where, again, political institutions were weak and social forces strong. Plato's degenerate states were ruled by various forms of appetite: by force, wealth, numbers, and charisma. They were manifestations of what Machiavelli called the corrupt state, dominated, in the words of one commentator, by "all sorts of license and violence, great inequalities of wealth and power, the destruction of peace and justice, the growth of disorderly ambition, dishonor, lawlessness, dishonesty, and contempt for religion." Modern equivalents of the classical corrupt society are Korn­

hauser's theory of the mass society, where, in the absence of institutions, elites are accessible to masses and masses are available for mobilization by the elites, and Rapoport's concept of the praeto­

rian state, where "private ambitions are rarely restrained by a sense of public authority; [and] the role of power (i.e. wealth and force) is maximized." It is virtually impossible to classify such states in terms of their form of government. We can have little doubt that the United States is a constitutional democracy and the Soviet Union a com­
munist dictatorship. But what is the political system of Indonesia, of the Dominican Republic, South Vietnam, Burma, Nigeria, Ecuador, Argentina, Syria? These countries have held elections,

96. Aristotle, Politics, p. 112; italics in original.
97. Sabine, p. 343.
98. Kornhauser, passim; David C. Rapoport, "Praetorianism: Government Without Consensus" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1960); and Rapoport, in Huntington, ed., Changing Patterns, p. 73, where the quota­
tion occurs.
but they are clearly not democracies in the sense in which Denmark or New Zealand is a democracy. They have had authoritarian rulers, but they are not effective dictatorships like the communist states. At other times they have been dominated by highly personalistic, charismatic rulers or by military juntas. They are unclassifiable in terms of any particular governmental form because their distinguishing characteristic is the fragility and fleetingness of all forms of authority. Charismatic leader, military junta, parliamentary regime, populist dictator follow each other in seemingly unpredictable and bewildering array. The patterns of political participation are neither stable nor institutionalized; they may oscillate violently between one form and another. As Plato and Aristotle pointed out long ago, corrupt or praetorian societies often swing back and forth between despotism and mob-rule. "Where the pre-established political authority is highly autocratic," says Kornhauser, "rapid and violent displacement of that authority by a democratic regime is highly favorable to the emergence of extremist mass movements that tend to transform the new democracy in antidemocratic directions." Rapoport finds in Gibbon an apt summary of the constitutional rhythms of the praetorian state which "floats between the extremes of absolute monarchy and wild democracy." Such instability is the hallmark of a society lacking political community and where participation in politics has outrun the institutionalization of politics.99

Civic polities, in contrast, have recognizable and stable patterns of institutional authority appropriate for their level of political participation. In traditional polities, these structures normally take the form of either a centralized bureaucratic empire or of a complex feudal monarchy, or some combination of these two. At the Whig level of middle-class participation, the dominant political institutions are normally parliamentary assemblies with members chosen through some limited form of elections. In the fully participant, modern polity, political parties supplement or replace the traditional political structures as the key institutions for organizing mass involvement in politics. At all levels of participation, however, political institutions are sufficiently strong to provide the basis of a legitimate political order and a working political community. The institutions impose political socialization as the price of political participation. In a praetorian society groups become mobilized into politics without becoming socialized by politics. The distinguishing characteristic of a highly institutionalized polity, in contrast, is the price it places on power. In a civic polity, the price of authority involves limitations on the resources that may be employed in politics, the procedures through which power may be acquired, and the attitudes that power wielders may hold. If the society is modern and complex, with a large number of social forces, individuals from any one of the social forces may have to make extensive changes in their behavior, values, and attitudes in the process of acquiring power through the political institutions of the society. They may well have to unlearn much which they have learned from family, ethnic group, and social class, and adapt to an entirely new code of behavior.

The development of a civic polity may have some relation to the stage of modernization and of political participation, but it is not directly dependent upon it. By the mid-twentieth century many of the more advanced Latin American nations had achieved comparatively high indices of literacy, per capita national income, and urbanization. In the mid-1950s, for instance, Argentina was economically and socially a highly developed country. Almost half the population lived in cities of over 20,000 people; 86 per cent of the people were literate; 75 per cent were engaged in nonagricultural employment; the per capita gross national product was over $500. Argentine politics, however, remained notably underdeveloped. "The public good," Sarmiento had said in the 1850s, "is a meaningless word—there is no 'public.' " A hundred years later the failure to develop effective political institutions meant the continued absence of public community. As one observer noted,

The hard surface of military rule or the mottled aspect of Machiavellian balancing and intriguing have been the two masks of Argentine politics since 1930. The masks, most unhappily, do not disguise reality—they are the reality of Argentina's situation of weak government, a debility stemming from several fundamental causes. . . . The state is not firmly established as the ultimate arbiter of Argentine public life.

The other institutions competing for men's loyalties permit a high degree of protection from the dictates of the state. So long as a country like Argentina retained a politics of coup and counter-coup and a feeble state surrounded by massive social forces, it remained politically underdeveloped no matter how urbane, prosperous, and educated its citizenry.

In reverse fashion, a country may be politically highly developed with modern political institutions while still very backward in terms of modernization. India, for instance, was typically held to be the epitome of the underdeveloped society. Judged by the usual criteria of modernization, it was at the bottom of the ladder during the 1950s: per capita GNP of $72, 80 per cent illiterate, over 80 per cent of the population in rural areas, 70 per cent of the work force in agriculture, fourteen major languages, deep caste and religious differences. Yet in terms of political institutionalization, India was far from backward. Indeed, it ranked high not only in comparison with other modernizing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but also in comparison with many much more modern European countries. A well developed political system has strong and distinct institutions to perform both the "input" and the "output" functions of politics. India entered independence with not only two organizations, but two highly developed—adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent—institutions ready to assume primary responsibility for these functions. The Congress Party, founded in 1885, was one of the oldest and best organized political parties in the world; the Indian Civil Service, dating from the early nineteenth century, was appropriately hailed as "one of the greatest administrative systems of all time." The stable, effective, and democratic government of India during its first twenty years of independence rested far more on this institutional inheritance than it did on the charisma of Nehru. In addition, the relatively slow pace of modernization and social mobilization in India did not create demands and strains which the party and the bureaucracy were unable to handle. So long as these two organizations maintained their institutional strength, it was ridiculous to think of India as politically underdeveloped no matter how low its per capita income or how high its illiteracy rate.

Almost no other country attaining independence after World War II was institutionally as well prepared as India for self-government. In countries like Pakistan and the Sudan, institutional evolution was unbalanced: the civil and military bureaucracies were more highly developed than the political parties, and the military had strong incentives to move into the institutional vacuum on the input side of the political system and to attempt to perform interest aggregation functions. This pattern, of course, has also been common in Latin America. In countries like Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru, and Argentina, John J. Johnson pointed out, the military was "the country's best organized institution and is thus in a better position to give objective expression to the national will" than were parties or interest groups. In a very different category was a country like North Vietnam, which fought its way into independence with a highly disciplined political organization but which was distinctly weak on the administrative side. The Latin American parallel here would be Mexico, where, as Johnson put it, "not the armed forces but the PRI [Partido Revolucionario Institucional] is the best organized institution, and the party rather than the armed forces has been the unifying force at the national level." In yet a fourth category were those unfortunate states, such as the Congo, which were born with neither political nor administrative institutions. Many of these new states deficient at independence in one or both types of institutions were also confronted by high rates of social mobilization and rapidly increasing demands on the political system.

If a society is to maintain a high level of community, the expansion of political participation must be accompanied by the development of stronger, more complex, and more autonomous political institutions. The effect of the expansion of political participa-

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100. Sarmiento, Facundo (New York, Appleton, 1868), p. 35; Silvert, pp. 359-59.
102. Johnson, Military and Society, p. 143.
The extent to which a society undergoes complete political decomposition during the modernization process depends in large part on the nature of its traditional political institutions. If these are weak or nonexistent, or if they are destroyed by colonialism or other means, the society usually evolves directly from traditional praetorianism to an even more praetorian transitional phase with extensive urban middle-class participation in politics. If a society has a reasonably highly developed and autonomous bureaucratic structure in its traditional phase, it will face acute problems in adapting to broader political participation because of the nature of the structure. Paradoxically, those traditional systems which seem most "modern" in their structural differentiation and rationalization of authority often also have more difficulties in adapting to broader political participation than traditional political systems which are less rationalized and differentiated but institutionally more complex and pluralistic. Highly centralized bureaucratic monarchies like those of China and France seem more modern than more pluralistic feudal systems such as those of England and Japan. Yet the latter prove to be more adaptable than the former. 106 In these instances, the struggle between oligarchy and middle class tends to become muted, and the political institutions of the society prove to be sufficiently adaptable to absorb into the political system the new middle-class groups.

Societies which have high levels of middle-class political participation have strong tendencies toward instability because of the nature of the middle class and the dominance of politics by the city at the expense of the country. It is in this middle-class phase of expansion that politics is most likely to assume a praetorian cast and to become, in Macaulay's phrase, "all sail and no anchor." 106 In such a society the political system has lost its rural anchor and is tossed about in rough seas under a full head of urban sail. The strain on political institutions, even highly developed institutions,
is great, and in most societies the traditional institutions inherited from the past disintegrate or collapse.

If the traditional political institutions do adapt to middle-class political participation or if, in a previously praetorian society, new political institutions are created to stabilize politics at the middle-class level, in due course these institutions face the problem of adapting to the expansion of participation to the urban working class and the rural peasantry. If the existing political institutions of the middle-class polity are capable of adjustment, the transition is made to a fully participant, highly institutionalized modern polity. If these institutions are incapable of adapting themselves to mass participation or if in the society a situation of radical praetorianism prevails, the society then moves in the direction of mass praetorianism in which the dominant social forces become the large-scale movements characteristic of a highly modern and mobilized society.

Both the mass society and the participant society have high levels of political participation. They differ in the institutionalization of their political organizations and procedures. In the mass society political participation is unstructured, inconstant, anomic, and variegated. Each social force attempts to secure its objectives through the resources and tactics in which it is strongest. Apathy and indignation succeed each other: the twin children of the absence of authoritative political symbols and institutions. The distinctive form of political participation is the mass movement combining violent and nonviolent, legal and illegal, coercive and persuasive actions. Mass society lacks organized structures which can relate the political desires and activities of the populace to the goals and decisions of their leaders. As a result, a direct relationship exists between leaders and masses; in Kornhauser's terms, the masses are available for mobilization by the leaders and the leaders are accessible to influence by the masses. In the participant polity, on the other hand, a high level of popular involvement is organized and structured through political institutions. Each social force must transform its sources of power and forms of action—be they numbers, wealth, knowledge, or potential for violence—into those which are legitimate in and institutionalized in the political system. The structure of a participant polity may assume a variety of forms, and power may be dispersed or concentrated. In all cases, however, participation is broad and is organized and structured into legitimate channels. Popular participation in politics does not necessarily mean popular control of government. Constitutional democracies and communist dictatorships are both participant polities.

The modern polity thus differs from the traditional polity in the scope of the political consciousness and political involvement of its population. The modern, developed polity differs from the traditional, developed polity in the nature of its political institutions. The institutions of the traditional polity need only structure the participation of a small segment of society. The institutions of a modern polity must organize the participation of the mass of the population. The crucial institutional distinction between the two is thus in the organizations for structuring mass participation in politics. The distinctive institution of the modern polity, consequently, is the political party. The other institutions which exist in modern political systems are adaptations of or carry-overs from traditional political systems. Bureaucracies are not distinctly modern. The bureaucracies which existed in the Chinese, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, and other historic empires often had high degrees of structural differentiation, elaborate systems for recruitment and promotion according to merit and achievement, and carefully worked out procedures and regulations governing their actions. Nor are assemblies and parliaments unique to the modern polity: assemblies existed in the ancient city-states, and parliaments and other meetings of the estates were common phenomena in medieval Europe, most of which were destroyed during the process of modernization. Elections are also found in nonmodern polities: elective chiefs are common in tribal societies; the strategoi and other magistrates were elected in Athens, the tribunes and consuls in ancient Rome. The idea and practice of constitutionalism are similarly ancient. Constitutions, laws, and courts all existed in highly developed forms long before the appearance of the modern state. So also did cabinets and executive councils. The only potential rival to the party as the distinctive institution of the modern polity is federalism. The more widespread existence of federal institutions among modern states than among traditional ones reflects the same factor which accounts for the development of parties: the extension of the scope of the polity in terms of popula-

institutions legitimate in terms of popular sovereignty, but they are not themselves a source of legitimacy. Their own legitimacy derives from the contributions they make to the political system.

Where traditional political institutions collapse or are weak or nonexistent, the role of the party is entirely different from what it is in those polities with institutional continuity. In such situations, strong party organization is the only long-run alternative to the instability of a corrupt or praetorian or mass society. The party is not just a supplementary organization; it is instead the source of legitimacy and authority. In the absence of traditional sources of legitimacy, legitimacy is sought in ideology, charisma, popular sovereignty. To be lasting, each of these principles of legitimacy must be embodied in a party. Instead of the party reflecting the state, the state becomes the creation of the party and the instrument of the party. The actions of government are legitimate to the extent that they reflect the will of the party. The party is the source of legitimacy because it is the institutional embodiment of national sovereignty, the popular will, or the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Where traditional political institutions are weak or nonexistent, the prerequisite of stability is at least one highly institutionalized political party. States with one such party are markedly more stable than states which lack such a party. States with no parties or many weak parties are the least stable. Where traditional political institutions are smashed by revolution, post-revolutionary order depends on the emergence of one strong party: witness the otherwise very different histories of the Chinese, Mexican, Russian, and Turkish revolutions. Where new states emerge from colonialism with little or no inheritance of political institutions, the stability of the polity depends directly on the strength of the party.

The political party is the distinctive organization of modern politics, but in another sense it is not an entirely modern institution. The function of the party is to organize participation, to aggregate interests, to serve as the link between social forces and the government. In performing these functions, the party necessarily reflects the logic of politics, not the logic of efficiency. A bureaucracy with its differentiated structure and merit system is, by the latter logic, a more modern institution than a political party which operates on patronage, influence, and compromise. Conse-

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sequently, the promoters of modernization, like the defenders of tradition, often reject and denigrate political parties. They attempt to modernize their society politically without establishing the institution that will make their society politically stable. They pursue modernity at the expense of politics and in the process fail to achieve the one because of their neglect of the other.

2. Political Modernization: America vs. Europe

THREE PATTERNS OF MODERNIZATION

Political modernization involves the rationalization of authority, the differentiation of structures, and the expansion of political participation. In the West, political modernization was spread over many centuries. The sequence and extent of its three components varied significantly in different areas of Europe and North America. Most obviously, the expansion of political participation occurred earlier and far more extensively in America than in Europe. In the eighteenth century political participation in the English colonies, in terms of the suffrage, was already widespread by English standards, not to mention Continental ones. The American Revolution removed the English Crown from the American scene and with it the only possible alternative source of legitimacy to popular sovereignty. The Revolution, as Robert Palmer stresses, made history by establishing the people as the constituent power. All governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. Given this principle, little ground existed on which to limit the suffrage. If the people could directly establish a system of government, they certainly could participate in the system so established.

As a result the franchise and other forms of popular participation in government were rapidly expanded with independence. The property qualifications for voting, which in many states did not disenfranchise large numbers of people in any event, were changed first to taxing requirements and then abolished altogether. The new states admitted to the union generally came in with no economic restrictions on suffrage. By the 1830s universal white male suffrage was the norm in America. In Europe, in con-
4. Praetorianism and Political Decay

The Sources of Praetorianism

Few aspects of political modernization are more striking or common than the intervention of the military in politics. Junta and coups, military revolts and military regimes have been continuing phenomena in Latin American societies; they have been almost as prevalent in the Middle East. In the late 1950s and early 1960s many societies in southern and southeast Asia also came under military rule. In the mid 1960s the rash of military coups in Ghana, Dahomey, the Leopoldville Congo, the Central African Republic, Upper Volta, and Nigeria, added to those which had taken place earlier in Algeria, Togo, the Sudan, and the Brazzaville Congo, conclusively exposed the futility of the hopes and the arguments that Africa would somehow avoid the praetorian experience of Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Military interventions apparently are an inseparable part of political modernization whatever the continent and whatever the country. They pose two problems for analysis. First, what are the causes of military intervention in the politics of modernizing countries? Second, what are the consequences of intervention for modernization and for political development?

Their very prevalence suggests that many of the commonly advanced causes for their existence lack persuasiveness. It has, for instance, been argued that American military assistance is a significant factor increasing the proclivities of armies to involve themselves in politics. Such assistance, it is said, encourages the political independence of the army and gives it extra power, extra leverage, and more motivation to take action against civilian political leaders. In some circumstances this argument may have a certain partial validity. By enlarging and strengthening the military forces, military aid programs may help to aggravate the lack of balance between the input and output institutions of the political system. As the sole or principal cause of military interventions, however, military aid cannot be held guilty. Most countries which experienced military coups after receiving American military assistance experienced them equally often before they became the beneficiaries of Pentagon largesse. No convincing evidence exists of a correlation between the American military aid and military involvement in politics. And, it must be pointed out, the opposite hypothesis also is not true: the hopes of many people that the propensity of foreign military to intervene would be reduced by courses at Leavenworth, indoctrination in Anglo-American doctrines of civilian supremacy, and association with professionalized American military officers have also turned to naught. Armies which have received American, Soviet, British, and French military assistance and no military assistance have all intervened in politics. So also, armies which have received American, Soviet, British, French, and no military assistance have refrained from political intervention. Military aid and military training are by themselves politically sterile: they neither encourage nor reduce the tendencies of military officers to play a political role.1

It is equally fallacious to attempt to explain military interventions in politics primarily by reference to the internal structure of the military or the social background of the officers doing the intervening. Morris Janowitz, for instance, looks for the causes of military intervention in politics in the “characteristics of the military establishment” of the country and attempts to relate the propensity and ability of military officers to intervene in politics to their “ethos of public service,” their skill structure, “which combines managerial ability with a heroic posture,” their middle-class and lower middle-class social origins, and their internal cohesion.2 Some evidence supports these connections, but other evidence does not. Some military men in politics have been apparently motivated by high ideals of public service; others have even more obviously been motivated by private gain. Officers with a variety of skills—managerial, charismatic, technical, and political—have all


intervened in politics—and refrained from such intervention. So also, officers drawn from all social classes have led coups at one time or another. Nor are military forces which are internally cohesive any more likely to intervene in politics than those which are less united: to the contrary, political intervention and military factionalism are so closely related it is almost impossible to trace casual relationships between the one and the other. The effort to answer the question, “What characteristics of the military establishment of a new nation facilitate its involvement in domestic politics?” is misdirected because the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of the society.

Military explanations do not explain military interventions. The reason for this is simply that military interventions are only one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon in underdeveloped societies: the general politicization of social forces and institutions. In such societies, politics lacks autonomy, complexity, coherence, and adaptability. All sorts of social forces and groups become directly engaged in general politics. Countries which have political armies also have political clergies, political universities, political bureaucracies, political labor unions, and political corporations. Society as a whole is out-of-joint, not just the military. All these specialized groups tend to become involved in politics dealing with general political issues: not just issues which affect their own particular institutional interest or groups, but issues which affect society as a whole. In every society, military men engage in politics to promote higher pay and larger military forces, even in political systems such as those of the United States and the Soviet Union, which have almost impeccable systems of civilian control. In underdeveloped societies the military are concerned not only with pay and promotion, although they are concerned with that, but also with the distribution of power and status throughout the political system. Their goals are general and diffuse as well as limited and concrete. So also with other social groups. Colonels and generals, students and professors, Moslem ulema and Buddhist monks, all become directly involved in politics as a whole.

Corruption in a limited sense refers to the intervention of wealth in the political sphere. Praetorianism in a limited sense refers to the intervention of the military in politics, and clericalism to the participation of religious leaders. As yet no good word describes extensive student participation in politics. All these terms, however, refer to different aspects of the same phenomenon, the politicization of social forces. Here, for the sake of brevity, the phrase “praetorian society” is used to refer to such a politicized society with the understanding that this refers to the participation not only of the military but of other social forces as well.

Scholarly analyses of social institutions in modernizing countries invariably stress the high degree of politicization of the institution with which they are concerned. Studies of the military in modernizing countries naturally focus on its active political role which distinguishes it from the military in more advanced societies. Studies of labor unions highlight “political unionism” as the distinguishing feature of labor movements in modernizing societies. Studies of universities in modernizing countries stress the active political involvement of faculty and students. Studies of religious organizations stress the extent to which the separation of church and state remains a distant goal. Each group of authors looks at a particular social group in modernizing countries, more or less in isolation from other social groups, and implicitly or explicitly emphasizes its extensive involvement in politics. Clearly, such involvement is not peculiar to the military or to any other social group but rather is pervasive throughout the society. The same
causes which produce military interventions in politics are also re-
 sponsible for the political involvements of labor unions, business-
 men, students, and clergy. These causes lie not in the nature of the
group but in the structure of society. In particular they lie in the
absence or weakness of effective political institutions in the soci-
yty.
In all societies specialized social groups engage in politics. What
makes such groups seem more "politicized" in a praetorian society
is the absence of effective political institutions capable of mediat-
ing, refining, and moderating group political action. In a praeto-
rian system social forces confront each other nakedly; no political
institutions, no corps of professional political leaders are recog-
nized or accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate
group conflict. Equally important, no agreement exists among the
groups as to the legitimate and authoritative methods for resolving
conflicts. In an institutionalized polity most political actors agree
on the procedures to be used for the resolution of political dis-
putes, that is, for the allocation of office and the determination of
policy. Office may be assigned through election, heredity, exami-
nation, lot, or some combination of these and other means. Policy
issues may be resolved by hierarchical processes, by petitions, hear-
ings, and appeals, by majority votes, by consultation and consensus
or through yet other means. But, in any event, general agreement
exists as to what those means are, and the groups participating in
the political game recognize their obligation to employ those
means. This is true of both Western constitutional democracies
and communist dictatorships. In a praetorian society, however, not
only are the actors varied, but so also are the methods used to de-
cide upon office and policy. Each group employs means which re-
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ments that among cliques; in mass praetorian social classes and social movements dominate the scene. The increase in the size, strength, and diversity of social forces makes the tension and conflict among them less and less tolerable. In an institutionalized society the participation of new groups in the political system reduces tensions; through participation, new groups are assimilated into the political order: as, for instance, the classic case of the extension of the suffrage in Great Britain. In praetorian societies, however, the participation of new groups exacerbates rather than reduces tensions. It multiplies the resources and methods employed in political action and thus contributes to the disintegration of the polity. New groups are mobilized but not assimilated.

The expansion of political participation in Great Britain made Disraeli’s two nations into one. The expansion of participation in Argentina made the same two nations into mortal enemies.

The stability of a civic polity thus varies directly with the scope of political participation; the stability of a praetorian society varies inversely with the scope of political participation. Its durability declines as participation rises. Praetorian oligarchies may last centuries; middle-class systems, decades; mass praetorian systems usually only a few years. Either the mass praetorian system is transformed through the conquest of power by a totalitarian party, as in Weimar Germany, or the more traditional elites attempt to reduce the level of participation through authoritarian means, as in Argentina. In a society without effective political institutions and unable to develop them, the end result of social and economic modernization is political chaos.

Oligarchical to Radical Praetorianism: Breakthrough Coups and the Soldier as Reformer

Oligarchical praetorianism dominated nineteenth-century Latin America. The imperial rule of both Spain and Portugal did not encourage the development of autonomous local political institutions. The war of independence produced an institutional vacuum—in Morse’s phrase it “decapitated” the state—which the creoles attempted to fill by copying the constitutional arrangements of the United States and republican France. Inevitably these could not take root in a society which remained highly oligarchical and feudal. This left Latin America with entrenched social forces and weak and ineffective political institutions incapable of modernizing society. The result was a pattern of corporate or syndicalist politics which in most countries persisted through the expansions of political participation. Even in the twentieth century oligarchical praetorianism still existed in the countries of the Caribbean, Central America, and the Andes, and in Paraguay. It was also a common phenomenon in the Middle East. There the disintegration of Ottoman authority and its only partial or indirect replacement by British or French rule created a vacuum of legitimacy and an absence of effective political institutions.

In oligarchical praetorianism the dominant social forces are the great landowners, the leading clergy, and the wielders of the sword. Social institutions are still relatively undifferentiated, and the members of the ruling class easily and frequently combine political, military, religious, social, and economic leadership roles. The most active groups in politics are still basically rural in nature. Families, cliques, and tribes struggle unrelentingly with each other for power, wealth, and status. Politics assumes an individualistic Hobbesian pattern. No consensus exists on the means of resolving disputes; few, if any, political organizations or institutions exist.

Almost all praetorian oligarchies eventually evolve into radical praetorian systems. Not all radical praetorian systems, however, have been praetorian oligarchies. Some evolve from centralized traditional monarchies. Such political systems ordinarily have a high degree of legitimacy and effectiveness so long as political participation is limited. Their political institutions, however, remain rigid and fragile in the face of social change. They are unable to adapt to the emergence of middle-class groups into politics. The appearance of such groups leads to the overthrow or breakdown of the traditional monarchical system of rule and heralds the movement of the society into a praetorian phase. The society evolves from a civic traditional order to a radical praetorian one. Institutional decay and civic disorder are the prices of the expansion of political participation.

A third source of radical praetorianism is Western colonialism. In Africa, the Middle East, and southern Asia it weakened and often completely destroyed indigenous political institutions. Even where it took the form of “indirect rule,” it undermined the tradi-
tional sources of legitimacy since the authority of the native rulers was clearly dependent on the power of the imperialist state. Opposition to colonialism usually developed among the offspring of the native elite or sub-elite groups, who developed an intense commitment to modern values and were essentially middle-class in outlook, occupation, and function. Since the imperial powers were, in most cases, clearly superior militarily, the drive for independence was ideological and political in character. The intelligentsia educated in London and Paris identified themselves with national independence and popular government and attempted to develop the mass organizations to make these a reality. So long as it maintained its rule, however, the colonial power often obstructed the creation of political organizations and it then often ended its rule precipitously. The combination of colonial opposition to political organization plus colonial haste to provide national independence granted indigenous elites the latter before they had constructed the former. Even where substantial mass involvement had occurred during the years of the independence struggle, this frequently rested on very low levels of social mobilization. It was, in this sense, a somewhat artificial phenomenon and could not be organized on a permanent basis.

In either event, independence frequently left a small, modernized, intellectual elite confronting a large, amorphous, unmobilized, still highly traditional society. Africa in the 1960s was not too dissimilar from Latin America in the 1820s. In the latter case the creoles attempted to impose republican institutions inappropriate for their society; in the former case the elite attempted to impose mass institutions also inappropriate for the society. In each instance, political authority decayed and the institutions withered: the Latin American constitutions became pieces of paper; the African one-party state became a no-party state. The institutional void was filled by violence and military rule. In Latin America the low level of modernization meant a fairly sustained period of oligarchical praetorianism. In Africa the less stratified character of society and the difference in historical timing produced radical praetorianism. The "breakthrough" to middle-class political participation was thus led by the civilian nationalist intelligentsia, who were then dislodged by middle-class military officers because they lacked the continuing mobilized political support and organized political strength to fill the vacuum of authority and legitimacy left by the departing colonial rulers.

In the shift from absolute monarchy or praetorian oligarchy to radical praetorianism, in contrast, the military play a key role. The middle class makes its debut on the political scene not in the frock of the merchant but in the epaulettes of the colonel. In the praetorian oligarchy, the struggle for power frequently involves coups d'etat, but these are simply "palace revolutions" in which one member of the oligarchy replaces another. The top leadership is changed but no significant changes are made in the scope of governmental authority or the scope of political participation. Military institutions and rules lack autonomous existence. The dominant figure in an oligarchical society may well be a "general" but he is usually also a landowner, an entrepreneur, and a highly personalistic leader who, in the fashion of a Somoza or Trujillo, does not distinguish among his various roles. He, in fact, uses all the political tactics—bribery, force, cajolery, threat, popular appeal—which in a more complex praetorian society become the distinctive tactics of particular groups. The participation of the military or of military groups as collectivities in politics comes only with that differentiation of the officer corps as a semi-autonomous institution which goes with the rise of the middle class.

In due course the officer corps begins to acquire a distinctive character and esprit; its recruits are drawn more and more frequently from modest social backgrounds; its members receive unusual educational opportunities at home and abroad; the officers become receptive to foreign ideas of nationalism and progress; they develop distinctive managerial and technical skills rare elsewhere in society. Together with civilian university students, particularly those who have studied abroad, the officers are the most modern and progressive group in the society. The middle-class officers, often closely allied to such civilian groups as school teachers, civil servants, and technicians, become more and more disgusted with the corruption, incompetence, and passivity of the ruling oligarchy. In due course the officers and their civilian allies form themselves into cliques and secret societies to discuss the future of their nation and to plot the overthrow of its rulers. At some point this conspiracy revolts and overthrows the oligarchy. This coup differs from the governmental coups of the oligarchical era because its leadership normally comes from middle-ranking rather than high-ranking officers; the officers are united more by loyalty to a common purpose than as the personal following of a single leader; they normally have a program of social and eco-
nomic reform and national development; and often a quantum jump occurs in the amount of violence accompanying the coup.

This change marks the shift from the oligarchical pattern of governmental coups or palace revolutions to the radical, middle-class pattern of reform coups. Iraq, for instance, was firmly in the grip of oligarchical praetorianism from its independence in 1932 until 1958, its politics a politics of coup and counter-coup within the dominant military elite. The overthrow of Nuri-es-Said in 1958 did not break the prevailing pattern of praetorian politics. It did, however, mark a qualitative change in the nature of politics and the bases of legitimacy as the monarchy ended and new slogans and programs of the revolution and national development were promulgated. It also marked a significant quantitative expansion in the scope of political participation as middle-ranking and middle-class officers seized power and as the way was opened for the entry into politics of the bureaucratic and professional classes.

The overthrow of the parliamentary regime in Syria in 1949 by the military involved a similar expansion of participation from a relatively small elite group to essentially middle-class elements.

The shift from a traditional ruling monarchy to middle-class praetorianism is also mediated by the military. The military is typically the most modern and cohesive force in the bureaucracy of a centralized monarchy, and the monarchy typically falls victim to those it has strengthened to serve its ends. Unlike the shift from praetorian oligarchy, however, the coup which brings the middle-class military to power in a traditional monarchy is a break with previous practice and a bloody innovation in political techniques. It snaps the thread of legitimacy and ends what had previously been peaceful (if policeful) rule. Thus, the military overthrow of the Brazilian monarchy in 1889 dramatized the shift of power from the sugar planters of the northeast to the coffee and commercial elements of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The Thai “Revolution of 1932” against the absolute monarchy involved the assertion of the power of essentially middle-class bureaucratic, military elements against the traditional ruling cliques associated with the court and the royal family. The coup in Egypt in 1952 similarly brought middle-class military men into power, although in this case the monarchy which was overthrown did not possess much legitimacy or authority.

In these early stages of political modernization, the military officers play a highly modernizing and progressive role. They challenge the oligarchy, and they promote social and economic reform, national integration, and, in some measure, the extension of political participation. They assail waste, backwardness, and corruption, and they introduce into the society highly middle-class ideas of efficiency, honesty, and national loyalty. Like the Protestant entrepreneurs of western Europe, the soldier reformers in non-Western societies embody and promote a puritanism which, while not perhaps as extreme as that of the radical revolutionaries, is nonetheless a distinctive innovation in their societies. Military leaders and military groups played this innovating role in the larger and more complex societies in Latin America in the late nineteenth century. In Brazil, Mexico, and other countries military officers and their civilian allies adopted positivism as their philosophy of development.

In the twentieth century the professionalization of the officer corps produced a still greater commitment to modernization and to national development and also transformed the typical expression of military participation in politics from the individualistic leader to the collective junta. In Chile and Brazil in the 1920s middle-class military groups pushed radical programs of social reform. During and after World War II similar programs were espoused by military officers in other Latin American countries such as Bolivia, Guatemala, Venezuela, El Salvador, Peru, and Ecuador, where traditional conservatism and oligarchy still remained strong. In the Middle East after World War II the soldiers played a similar role, modernizing middle-class military men seizing power in Syria in 1949, in Egypt in 1952, and in Iraq in 1958. The military takeovers in Pakistan and Burma in 1958 fell into a somewhat similar pattern although the differences in social background between the ousted political elites and the incoming military leaders were less than in the Middle East.

The emergence of radical praetorianism is a long and compli-
cated process. It usually involves a progression of coups and other changes as different groups struggle up over each other's backs into positions of political power. The initial overthrow of the traditional political institution or break with the oligarchical pattern of politics is also usually a more complex event than it may appear simply on the surface. The actual coup itself is often preceded by years of discussion and preparation. The Thai Promoters of 1932 grew out of the organized discussions of civilian students and younger military officers in Paris in the 1920s. In Egypt the cadets at the military college organized discussions on "The Social and Political Unrest in Egypt" in 1938. The 1940s saw a succession of nationalist cliques and groups forming and reforming in the military establishment. In 1949 the Free Officers Group was formally organized; three years later it seized power. Often the middle-class officers make one or more unsuccessful efforts to seize power before they are able to topple the regime. These "anticipatory coups" are part of the process of sounding out sources of support and opposition, testing the strength of the ruling monarchy or oligarchy. The suppression of these efforts by the groups in power and the execution or exile of the perpetrators of the abortive coups serve the short-term interest of the regime by eliminating some elements of the "counterelite" but weaken the regime in the long run by producing greater coherence, caution, and sophistication in the remaining elements of the counterelite.

The pattern of politics in the displacement of the traditional or oligarchical rule by military coup d'etat resembles in more restrained and limited fashion the familiar Brinton model of revolution. In the construction of the coalition of military and civilian elements to carry out the coup it is usually necessary to stress those objectives which have the broadest appeal and to place at the head of the coup group a moderate, conciliatory military leader who is able to acquire the confidence of all the groups participating in the coup and also has more ties than other members of those groups with the old regime. The collapse of the old regime is thus followed by the apparent accession to power of the moderates. Soon, however, issues intensify, divisions develop among the various participants in the coup, and in due course the more radical Jacobin elements attempt to seize power from the moderates in a consolidating coup. The consolidating coup puts the final seal on the fate of the old regime; with it the new middle-class elements establish their dominance on the political scene.

This complex pattern of anticipatory, breakthrough, and consolidating coups has characterized most of the shifts from traditional or oligarchical to middle-class praetorian regimes. In Egypt the Free Officers Group scheduled a coup for March 1952, but this was postponed. As political restiveness increased, however, the Free Officers were prompted to seize power in July. During the next eighteen months the coup moved through its consolidating phases: the Communist, Wafd, and Moslem Brethren opposition groups were successively eliminated, and in April 1954 Naguib, the popular moderate leader behind whom the more conservative elements attempted to rally, was displaced by the more radical Nasser.

The overthrow of the Thai absolute monarchy followed somewhat similar lines. Thailand's first coup occurred in June 1932, when a group of civil and military individuals seized power, imprisoned the royal family, and persuaded the king to accept a limited monarchy. A fairly conservative civilian, Phya Mano, was made premier. In the spring of 1933 a crisis developed when he rejected the economic plan which had been drawn up by the civilian intellectual leader of the coup, Pridi. The military leaders resigned from the cabinet and then took action against the government. "A second, equally bloodless and successful coup was carried out—this time directed against Phya Mano and his followers, who were accused of favouring a complete Royalist comeback." This second coup completed the work of the first.

After the first coup the Promoters had either been very modest or had cunningly played for time, for instead of pushing their people forward and filling the ranks of the old civil service, they had proclaimed that their lack of experience made it necessary to retain some of the old Royalists in their administrative jobs. The second coup saw this tactical mistake corrected: this time the Promoters replaced all officials of the


11. Here and in occasional spots in the next few pages I have drawn on my "Patterns of Violence in World Politics," in Huntington, ed., Changing Patterns, pp. 32-40.
old regime and put in their own men, however inexperienced they might be.12

Similar words have been used to describe the relationship between the March 1949 coup in Syria of Colonel Husni Za'im, which initiated the conquest of power by the new middle class in Syria by overthrowing the government of President al-Quwwatli, and the August 1949 coup of Colonel Sami Hinnawi, which ousted Za'im:

"Young army officers, many of them made aware by wartime train-

ing in the United States of Guatemala's need for reforms, now had their long-awaited opportunity. Together with the ladino (mixed blood), middle-class professional men and intellectuals of the capital, they plotted the overthrow of the generals." 16 In October 1944 a consolidating coup overthrow Ponce and eventually brought to power the radical administration of Arevalo.

In El Salvador the pattern varied somewhat in that the first step in breaking the power of Los Catorce Grandes (the fourteen families who supposedly controlled the country) came in the form of a general strike in April 1944 against the thirteen-year-old dictatorship of General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez. The strike was "a relatively spontaneous undertaking on the part of the middle class of the city of San Salvador." It resulted in the replacement of Martinez by a civilian moderate, Castañeda Castro. Four years later in the "Revolution of 1948" a group of junior officers ousted him from power and inaugurated a new government designed to carry out "a controlled revolution." These officers resembled those who led comparable movements in the Middle East.

The group of army officers who have controlled Salvadorean politics since 1948 share significant characteristics. Almost all come from the ranks of major and lieutenant colonel, that middle range of the officer corps where promotions come slowly and political activity appears as a promising alternative to the frustrations of immobility in the military hierarchy.

Perhaps even more significantly, these younger officers differ greatly in attitude from the older military caste which they displaced. Many of them claim lower-middle- or middle-class origins. By virtue of place of residence, education, social contacts, economic status and aspiration, and social attitudes, they identify more closely with the emergent middle class than with the economic elites. Most have spent some time in military colleges in the United States and have experienced close contact with American military missions.17

In the more complex societies of Latin America political institutions were more highly developed and the shift from conserva-

tive, traditional regimes to reformist middle-class governments occurred earlier historically and involved cooperation between military clubs and political parties. In Argentina, the Unión Cívica, a middle-class reform party, was organized in 1889. The next year the Liga Militar was founded by a group of progressive officers who cooperated with civilian allies in organizing unsuccessful revolts against the conservative regime in 1890, 1893, and 1905. These anticipatory coups suggested that in due course the middle-class military reformers would come to power through a successful coup. This, however, proved unnecessary: Argentina was, at that point, only partially praetorian, and the radical civilian ally of the military, the Unión Cívica Radical, won control of the government through peaceful elections in 1916.

In Chile the political parties were even more highly developed, the ruling oligarchy more open to civilian middle-class penetration, and the army more highly professionalized. As a result, military intervention played only a supplementary role in the transition to a middle-class regime. The principal impetus for reform came from the Liberal Alliance, whose leader, Arturo Alessandri Palma, was elected president in 1920 "when oligarchical domination collapsed." When Congress blocked Alessandri’s reform program, the military intervened in politics in September 1924 and induced Congress to grant its approval. Alessandri resigned and was replaced by a Junta de Gobierno of high-ranking generals. The generals were moderate, however, and made plans to return power to more conservative civilians. As a result, in January 1925 the younger officers who had been organized in a highly reformist Junta Militar revolted and carried out a consolidating coup, which brought to power Lt. Colonel Carlos Ibañez. His reformist and repressive dictatorship collapsed in 1931 and was briefly succeeded by another military junta which proclaimed a "Socialist Republic." 20

Radical Praetorianism: Social Forces and Political Techniques

In the mid-twentieth century oligarchical praetorianism could still be found in some of the more backward Latin American and Middle Eastern societies. At the other extreme, mass praetorianism appeared in Argentina in the form of Peronism, but lay in the future for most modernizing countries. Most praetorian societies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America were in the middle stages in the expansion of political participation. The social roots of radical praetorianism lie in the gap between city and country. The former supplies the latter as the principal locus of political action and becomes the continuing source of political instability. The "stronger influence" of the city in the political life of the country leads, as Harrington predicted, to greater political turbulence. In a radical praetorian society the city cannot furnish the basis for governmental stability. The extent of the instability depends upon the extent to which the government is able and willing to use the countryside to contain and to pacify the city. If the government can build a bridge to the countryside, if it can mobilize support from the rural areas, it can contain and ride out the instabilities of the city. If the countryside is passive and indifferent, if rural elite and rural masses are both excluded from politics, then the government is caught in an urban prison of instability and functions at the whim of the city mob, the capital garrison, and the central university’s students. If, however, the countryside turns against the political system, if the rural masses are mobilized against the existing order, then the government faces not instability but revolution and fundamental change. The distinctive characteristic of radical praetorianism is urban instability. The stability of that instability depends upon the exclusion of the countryside from politics.

The revolt by more progressive, Western, or radical military officers which overthrows the traditional political institutions or oligarchical rule clears the way for the entry of other middle-class elements into politics. A fairly long interval may, however, separate the military overthrow of monarchy or oligarchy and the appearance of other middle-class groups on the political scene. During this initial phase of radical praetorianism, politics typically involves continuing intrigue and conflict among loosely structured groups which are primarily military in composition. Such, for instance, was the case in Turkey between 1908 and 1922 and in Thailand for three decades after the “Revolution of 1932.” Such was also the case in many Latin American countries following breakthrough coups. Cliques of colonels and generals then strug-

gle with each other for control, but no clique is able to establish an effective base of authority because no clique is willing to extend its appeal (and its power) beyond the ranks of the army and mobilize other social forces to its side. Once the traditional sources of legitimacy are discredited, however, other middle class groups in due course supplement the military on the political scene and strive to participate in politics in their own distinctive ways. Among these are the professional and literary intelligentsia, merchants and industrialists, lawyers and engineers. The two most active social forces in a praetorian system at its middle level of development are, typically, the intelligentsia and especially the students, on the one hand, and the military, on the other. A high correlation exists between student participation in politics and military participation in politics. Both are distinctive characteristics of the radical praetorian society.

In the radical praetorian society the diversification of the political participants causes the techniques of political action to vary markedly from one group to another. The participant groups in the political system are much more politically specialized than they are in a more highly developed and integrated political system. At the same time, however, these groups are less functionally specialized and differentiated than they are in a more developed system. The university, for instance, typically has a part-time faculty and a part-time student body. It often possesses little corporate identity and its primary functions of teaching and research may be less developed and carry less prestige than the other social and political functions which it performs. Respect for learning and academic values may be low; students may expect to make their way by relying on social status or sheer bribery; professors may well be appointed on nonacademic grounds. Academic values and procedures, in short, have often achieved only a low level of institutionalization. As an academic institution with a particular function to perform in society, the university may have little institutional autonomy.

This absence of functional autonomy, however, is often combined with a very high degree of political autonomy. In many countries in Asia and Latin America, for instance, the university is recognized as beyond the appropriate scope of action on the part of the police. Activities which would be illegal and promptly prohibited outside the campus are tolerated when carried on within the university. "In Czarist Russia," as Lipset has noted, "university autonomy operated at times to allow the adult sections of illegal revolutionary groups to hold meetings in university precincts, without interference by the police. In Venezuela, in recent years, terrorists have exploited this tradition of university autonomy by using the university precincts as a sanctuary from the police." 22 The political autonomy of the university is, in part, the heritage of the corporate autonomy of the university and other guilds from the Middle Ages. The autonomy of the students is, in part, the product of their traditional recruitment from the upper classes. The "sons of the establishment" have more freedom to undermine the establishment than those not so well connected. "Should we turn the machine guns on them?" asked one Iranian police officer in the midst of a major student demonstration against the regime. "We cannot do that. After all they are our children." 23 The legacies of tradition in the form of corporate privileges and social status give the university and its members a political base in modernizing societies which is absent in modern societies.

The combination of functional subordination and political autonomy characteristic of the university is also, of course, even more marked in the armed forces in a praetorian society. Military professionalism is weak; military values, like academic values, are subordinated to other considerations. Social, political, economic factors intrude into the military sphere. At the same time, elaborate efforts are made to defend the political autonomy of the armed forces. The armed forces are assumed to be outside the direct authority of civilian political leaders; their budgets are typically fixed by constitution or custom; they exercise close to exclusive control over their own internal activities; and the cabinet members in charge of them are drawn from their ranks. The army, like the university, exchanges functional autonomy for political influence. The political authorities who are unable to make their writ run in the university are unlikely to be able to make it run in the army.

The prevalent forms of political action in a radical praetorian


society—bribery, strikes, demonstrations, coups—are all ways of bringing pressure upon authority rather than ways of exercising authority. They are not forms of state action or of action by primarily political bodies, but rather forms of action by bodies whose primary functions are, in theory, nonpolitical. Hence the involvement of these groups in politics varies greatly from time to time. In a highly institutionalized political system the participation of groups in politics varies with the cycle of elections and conventions and with the rise and fall of issues. The efforts by one group of political actors to win an election or to pass legislation provoke similar action by opposing groups. As a result, participation escalates; but it normally assumes similar forms and is expressed through similar institutional channels. In a praetorian society the participation of social groups in politics also tends to rise and fall simultaneously. Political action by one group, however, provokes a different form of political action by another group. These, in turn, may arouse yet a third to still other types of political behavior. Conflict intensifies and its methods diversify, producing a major political crisis which can be relieved only by a decline in political action on the part of all groups. Political activity contributes to the stability of a modern institutionalized polity, but to the instability of a praetorian society.

The "ultimate" means of bringing pressure on those in authority is to remove them from their positions of authority. The most direct means of accomplishing this end in a praetorian system is the military coup d'etat. While all social groups engage in their own forms of direct action, clearly the military form is the most dramatic and the most effective. It is, however, usually a reaction to or a product of other types of political action by other groups. In the radical praetorian society, military intervention in politics is not an isolated deviation from a normal peaceful pattern of politics. It is simply one strand in a complex pattern of direct action techniques employed by a variety of conflicting middle-class groups. In such a society, the absence of accepted institutional channels for the articulation of interests means that claims on government are advanced "by the mechanisms of civilian violence and military intervention." Resort to direct action by all social forces is not a deviation from the system's norm, rather "the persistent use of violence is the system, or at least a very large part of it." 24

In a radical praetorian system, riots and demonstrations are a common form of political action by students and related middle-class groups. Typically, such actions bring about the downfall of the government only where they polarize the situation in such a way as to compel the military to oppose the government. In Colombia in 1957, for instance, student riots led to a general strike aimed at preventing the formal reelection and hence continuation in power of the dictator Rojas Pinilla. The military initially refused to move against Rojas, but in due course the escalation of violence induced first the church and then the army to rally to the side of the students. When this happened, Rojas was finished. In Korea in 1960 student demonstrations against the elections led to clashes in which reportedly 186 students were killed. The action by the students compelled other social forces to turn against the Syngman Rhee regime. First the United States condemned the actions of the government; then the military announced that they would remain neutral in the dispute. This withdrawal of military support brought about Rhee's downfall. In South Vietnam in 1963 the actions of the Buddhists and the students created a similar situation in which first the United States and then the military withdrew their support from the Diem government.

If the military, on the other hand, are strongly identified with the government or staunchly loyal to it, insurrectionary activities by students will not threaten the existence of the government. In 1961 and 1962, for instance, student riots in Teheran disrupted the peace, but the army remained loyal and the disorder was contained. In Caracas in the fall of 1960, student riots led to a military siege of the Central University. Here again soldier and labor groups remained loyal to the government. Similarly, in Burma student opposition to the military regime in 1962 produced another pitched battle between soldiers and students which ended with the student union building being leveled to the ground. Student demonstrations and riots thus have some, but limited, capacity to induce or to compel a government to make substantive concessions. Their power stems primarily from their ability to polarize a situation and to compel other social groups to support or to oppose the government.

In a praetorian system the expansion of political participation

means the diversification of political techniques. The broadening of participation to the urban working class multiplies the types of demonstrations that are possible and introduces the strike as a major form of direct political action. In some measure, of course, political participation by labor marks the beginning of the movement of a praetorian society from its radical to its mass phase. Economically and socially, however, organized labor in a modernizing society is not entirely a lower-class movement. Those who are organized usually comprise the economic elite of the industrial labor force, and the strongest unions are often in middle-class, white-collar occupations. While the preeminent tactic of the students is the mass demonstration and riot, the distinctive tactic of labor is, of course, the strike, particularly the general strike. The ability of labor to take such action, like the ability of the military to carry through a coup, depends in part on its unity. If a reasonable degree of unity exists, the success of the political action depends upon the extent to which it precipitates coordinate or parallel action by other groups, most importantly the military. Four patterns of relationship exist.

1. Labor vs. government and military. In this case labor political action almost invariably fails to achieve its objective. A general strike, if it is called, is broken by the combined and cooperative action of government, police, and military. In such circumstances, indeed, the strike is often testimony to the weakness of labor (Peru, 1962; Chile, 1966).

2. Labor plus military vs. government. In this circumstance, the general strike performs the same function as the student riot. It polarizes the situation, and if the army already has grounds for opposing the government it may seize the opportunity so presented to engage in parallel or cooperative action with labor to bring down the government. The pattern, however, is relatively rare (Haiti, 1946; Venezuela, 1958).

3. Labor plus government vs. military. This situation most frequently arises when the military initiate direct action to overthrow a government which has labor support. Labor then rallies to the government by declaring a general strike to undermine the military coup. This was the pattern in Germany in the Kapp Putsch; it was also the pattern in Mexico in 1923 when labor backed Obregón against the efforts by the military rebels to overthrow him. A comparable situation occurred in Guatemala in 1949 when a military group rebelled against President Arévalo and labor came to his support by calling a general strike and by providing volunteers whom loyalist military units supplied with arms. In general, the success of the coalition of labor and government versus the military depends upon the existence of some disunity among the latter.

4. Labor vs. government vs. military. In this situation labor brings pressure on the government by threatening to strike and to promote civil disorder which, in turn, is likely to induce the military to overthrow the government in order to clamp down on labor and restore order. The government is thus confronted with the alternatives of changing its policies or losing office. This pattern of "democracy by violence" is prevalent in Peruvian politics. Numerous instances can be found in the politics of other Latin American states. In 1964, for instance, the strikes of the Bolivian tin miners against Paz Estenssoro's government produced civil turbulence and disorder which prompted the army to overthrow Paz. The military leaders had no particular sympathy for the workers; in a few months they too were engaged in a struggle against the miners. But the weakening of authority and the inability of the civilians to deal with the disorder had created an opportunity for the military to promote themselves into positions of political power. In Ecuador a similar pattern was thrice repeated with Velasco Ibarra: elected president, he would disenchant his followers; "his erstwhile partisans, particularly students and workers, would begin demonstrations against his government; law and order would begin to break down; and the armed forces would find it necessary to remove him." 25 In this pattern of conflict, praetorianism feeds on itself: the probability of direct action by the military encourages direct action by labor and students. The power of one social group reinforces that of another at the expense of political authority. 26


26. The vicious circle of direct action in a praetorian society is graphically illustrated by Abraham F. Lowenthal's description of Dominican politics: "There is one final aspect of the Dominican Republic's political instability on which I would like to focus: the very direct, virtually naked confrontation of social forces. The tactics employed by each group since 1961 have tended toward increasingly unrefined and undisguised displays of power, directed more often at replacing the government.
In a radical praetorian society military intervention is thus usually a response to the escalation of social conflict by several groups and parties coupled with the decline in the effectiveness and legitimacy of whatever political institutions may exist. Military intervention then serves to halt the rapid mobilization of social forces into politics and into the streets (in a praetorian society the two are identical), and, by removing the target and the immediate stimulus of the escalation, to defuse the explosive political situation. Military intervention, in short, often marks the end of a sequence of violence in politics. It is, in this sense, significantly different from the tactics employed by other social groups. Although riots, strikes, and demonstrations may directly or indirectly compel a government to modify its policies, by themselves they cannot change the wielders of governmental power. The military coup, however, is a form of direct action which changes the government in power, not just its policies. Paradoxically, the military establishment has no readily available means of direct action to achieve limited policy objectives. It can, of course, threaten a government with a coup unless the government changes its policies, but it cannot pressure the government to change its policies by carrying out a coup. In achieving this goal, civilian social forces and even the enlisted men of the armed services (who can strike or mutiny) have more suitable forms of action than the officers. The latter are, in effect, restricted to the use or threat of the use of a weapon of last resort.

The nature of the political tactics employed by the military reflects their organizational coherence and the fact that while other social forces can pressure the government, the military can replace the government. Monks and priests can demonstrate, students riot, and workers strike, but no one of these groups has, except in most unusual circumstances, demonstrated any capacity to govern. "The most serious element of chaos," one scholar has observed of Korea immediately following the overthrow of Syngman Rhee in 1960, "... was the fact that the student and urban forces that had initiated the action had neither the organization nor the program needed to restore social order, and the surviving political forces of the country had not been closely allied with them in the overthrow." 27 The military, in contrast, do possess some capacity for generating at least transitory order in a radical praetorian society. The coup is the extreme exercise of direct action against political authority, but it is also the means of ending other types of action against that authority and potentially the means of reconstituting political authority. In a situation of escalating conflict the military coup thus has the immediate effect of reducing the level of participation, inducing the withdrawal from the streets of the competing social forces, and producing a feeling of relief and harmony. Following the March 1962 coup in Burma, for instance, "If

anything, there was a feeling of relief; at least, the slide downward would be stopped." 28 Similar feelings coupled with the relaxation of the intensity of conflict follow most coups which displace civilian governments in a radical praetorian society. The competitive escalation of political violence is followed by a rapid if temporary demobilization of groups from politics, as they retire from the barricades to wait upon the course of events.

The distinguishing characteristics of the coup d'état as a political technique are that: (a) it is the effort by a political coalition illegally to replace the existing governmental leaders by violence or the threat of violence; (b) the violence employed is usually small; (c) the number of people involved is small; (d) the participants already possess institutional bases of power within the political system. Clearly a coup can succeed only (a) if the total number of participants in the political system is small, or (b) if the number of participants is large and a substantial proportion of them endorse the coup. This latter condition is rarely met; for if the number of participants is large, it will be virtually impossible to construct an effective coalition of them to support the coup. In the absence of such a coalition, the coup will either be defeated by the opposition of the other groups, as in the Kapp putsch, or it will lead to full-scale civil war, as did the uprising of the Spanish Army in 1936.

The coup which brings the military to power in a mature radical praetorian system is a political as well as a military action. It is the product of a coalition of cliques and groups, usually including both military and civilian elements, who in most cases have been preparing for it for a considerable length of time. In this period of preparation various groups of political actors have been sounded and their support assured or their opposition neutralized. If the coup comes as a result of a series of civil disorders perpetrated by intelligentsia, labor, or other civilian groups, the activities foreshadowing it have been clearly visible to all. Even where a coup is not preceded by overt violence and disorder, its appearance is almost invariably signaled in advance by shifts of political loyalties and indications of changed allegiances and alliances.

The colonel who plans a coup, if he is wise, prepares the way in much the same manner that the majority leader of the U.S. Senate


prepares for a roll-call vote on a crucial bill: he trades on past favors, promises future benefits, appeals to patriotism and loyalty, attempts to distract and to divide the opposition, and when the chips are down, makes doubly sure that all his supporters are mobilized and ready to act. It is precisely this careful preparation—this painstaking construction of a political majority—which makes the coup painless and bloodless. The actual seizure of power itself may be the action of only a small group of men, but normally the support of a fairly large proportion of the total number of political actors in the society is achieved before the coup is launched. In the most successful coup, indeed, the targets offer no resistance whatsoever: they know they are beaten when the coup is announced; quietly and quickly they head for the airport. The seizure of power, in this sense, represents the end of a political struggle and the recording of its results, just as takes place on election day in a democratic country.

RADICAL TO MASS PRAETORIANISM: VETO COUPS AND THE SOLDIER AS GUARDIAN

In the 1960s scholars spent much ink and time debating whether the military play basically a progressive or a conservative role in modernization. Most seemed to agree that in the Middle East the military were typically the proponents of change; the army, as Halpern said, is "the vanguard of nationalism and social reform"; it is the most cohesive and disciplined element in "the new middle class" whose impact on society is predominantly revolutionary. With respect to Latin America, however, no such consensus existed; proponents of both the progressive and the conservative views made impressive cases out of fact, logic, and statistics.29

Both cases were right. Latin America is simply more varied than the Middle East. Except for Turkey, virtually all Middle Eastern

praetorian or semi-praetorian societies were still in the process after World War II of expanding political participation from the oligarchy to the middle class. Military officers are drawn from middle-class backgrounds and perform middle-class functions in a professionalized, bureaucratic environment. Where the basic issues of politics involve the displacement of the oligarchy and the accession to power of the middle class, the military necessarily are on the side of reform. This was also true in Latin America. In the more advanced Latin American societies—Argentina, Chile, Brazil—the military played a reforming role in the early part of the twentieth century. During and after World War II military officers led or cooperated in middle-class reform movements in Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Venezuela. In the early 1960s they became the center of a strong middle-class reform movement in Peru and played a progressive role in Ecuador. In Brazil and Argentina in the 1950s, however, and then in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Honduras in the 1960s, the military began to play a more conservative role. This role was distinctly a function of the mobilization of the lower classes into politics.

The frequency of military coups in Latin America, José Nun has shown, has no relation to the size of the middle class. Praetorian politics exists at all stages of social mobilization and the expansion of political participation. The impact and significance of military intervention in politics, however, does vary with the size of the middle class. In Latin America in the 1950s, in those countries where the middle and upper classes were very small, less than 8 per cent of the total population (Nicaragua, Honduras, Dominican Republic, and Haiti), politics was still in the personalistic, oligarchical style, and the middle-class military reformer had yet to appear on the scene. In those societies where the middle class was larger, between 8 and 15 per cent of the total population, the dominant groups in the military typically played a more modernizing and reforming role in the 1930s and 1940s. These societies included Guatemala, Bolivia, El Salvador, Ecuador, and Peru. Panama and Paraguay, with upper and middle classes in 1950 estimated at 15 and 14 per cent respectively, were in some respects deviants from this pattern. Among those larger and more complex societies, where the middle class constituted 15 to 36 per cent of the total population, the military either abstained from politics and were primarily a professional force (Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Mexico) or they intervened in politics to play an increasingly conservative political role (Argentina, Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil).

As society changes, so does the role of the military. In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the middle-class world he is a participant and arbiter; as the mass society looms on the horizon he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order: Thus, paradoxically but understandably, the more backward a society is, the more progressive the role of its military; the more advanced a society becomes, the more conservative and reactionary becomes the role of its military. In 1890 Argentine officers founded the Logia Militar to promote reform. Thirty years later they founded the Logia San Martin, which opposed reform and incubated the 1930 coup designed by its promoters to restore the "stable constitutional democracy" which was being subverted by the "massocracy" of President Yrigoyen. So also, in Turkey, the Young Turks in 1908 and the Kemalists in the 1920s played highly progressive reforming roles similar to those which the military after World War II assumed in other Middle Eastern countries. By that time in Turkey, however, the military were intervening in politics to curb the rise to power of a new business class supported by the peasants. The soldiers had not changed; they still supported the reforms of the Kemalist era. But they were now unwilling to admit to power social classes which might make changes in those reforms.

The extent to which military institutions and individuals become politicized is a function of the weakness of civilian political organizations and the inability of civilian political leaders to deal with the principal policy problems facing the country. The extent to which a politicized officer corps plays a conservative or a reform


role in politics is a function of the expansion of political participation in the society.

The instability and coups associated with the emergence of the middle class are due to changes in the nature of the military; those associated with the emergence of the lower class are due to changes in the nature of the society. In the former case, the military are modernized and develop concepts of efficiency, honesty, and nationalism which alienate them from the existing order. They intervene in politics to bring society abreast of the military. They are the advance guard of the middle class and spearhead its breakthrough into the political arena. They promote social and economic reform, national integration, and, in some measure, the extension of political participation. Once middle-class urban groups become the dominant elements in politics, the military assume an arbitral or stabilizing role.

If a society is able to move from middle class to mass participation with fairly well-developed political institutions (such as, in Latin America, Chile, Uruguay, and Mexico), the military assume a nonpolitical, specialized, professional role characteristic of systems with "objective" civilian control. Chile, Uruguay, and Mexico were, indeed, the only Latin American countries in which there were no military coups d'état during the two decades after World War II. If, however, a society moves into the phase of mass participation without developing effective political institutions, the military become engaged in a conservative effort to protect the existing system against the incursions of the lower classes, particularly the urban lower classes. They become the guardians of the existing middle-class order. They are thus, in a sense, the doorkeepers in the expansion of political participation in a praetorian society: their historical role is to open the door to the middle class and to close it on the lower class. The radical phase of a praetorian society begins with a bright, modernizing military coup toppling the oligarchy and heralding the emergence of enlightenment into politics. It ends in a succession of frustrating and unwholesome rearguard efforts to block the lower classes from scaling the heights of political power.

Military interventions of this "veto" variety thus directly reflect the clamor of the urban masses and the proliferation of politicians demagogically soliciting their votes that brought the military back into politics in 1950. In 1954 the military turned against Vargas when he moved Peron-like "to bring about a rapid resurgence of popular support for the government, with reckless promises to the workers." More specifically, veto interventions usually occur under two sets of circumstances. One is the actual or prospective victory at the polls of a party or movement which the military oppose and which represents groups which the military wish to exclude from political power. Five of the seven military coups that took place in Latin America between 1962 and 1964 had this as their objective. In Argentina in March 1962 the military intervened to remove President Frondizi from office and cancel the results of the elections in which the Peronistas won 35 per cent of the vote and elected ten of fourteen provincial governors and almost one fourth of the Chamber of Deputies. In Peru in July 1962 the military took over after an election to prevent Haya de la Torre of the Apristas or former General Manuel Odria from becoming president. In Guatemala in March 1963 the military coup was aimed at forestalling the possible election of the radical Juan Arévalo to the presidency. In Ecuador in July 1963 the military removed President Arosemena from office in part to insure against the return to power of Velasco Ibarra, whom they had removed from office in November 1961. In Honduras in October 1963 the military again intervened to prevent the election of populist reformer Rodas Alvarado as President. The increasingly conservative role of the military in Latin America in vetoing the accession to power of popular, lower-class, or reform movements was reflected in the increasing extent to which military coups were associated with elections. Only 12 per cent of the coups in Latin America between 1935 and 1944 occurred during the twelve months before a scheduled election or the four months immediately after an election. From 1945 to 1954 this proportion rose to 32 per cent, and between 1955 and 1964 some 56 per cent of the coups occurred near election time.

Veto coups also occur when a government in power begins to

53. Lieuwen, Generals vs. Presidents, pp. 10 ff., 45-50.
promote radical policies or to develop an appeal to groups whom the military wishes to exclude from power. This was the case in Peru in 1948, in the Dominican Republic in 1963, in Brazil in 1964, and, in a somewhat different context, in Turkey in 1960, and in Indonesia in 1965. In all these cases of both types the dominant group in the armed forces was opposed to a party or movement with substantial popular appeal—Apristas, Peronistas, Communists, Democrats, or the like—and acted to oust this group from office or to prevent it from coming to power.

In the move from a traditional or oligarchical system to one in which the middle class plays a key role, the promotion of social and economic reform goes hand-in-hand with the expansion of political participation. In the shift from a radical to a mass society the relationship is not quite as clear-cut. Almost universally, a politicized officer corps will object to the incorporation of the urban lower classes into politics. The thrust of military intervention in these circumstances has a conservative effect: it prevents the broadening of political participation to more radical groups and thus slows up the process of social-economic reform. In Middle Eastern and Asian societies, however, the masses may well be more conservative than the middle-class nationalist elites which came to power with the ebb of Western colonialism. In these circumstances, military intervention to bar the rise of new groups to political power may have a net progressive effect on governmental policies. The promotion of social-economic reform, in short, conflicts with the expansion of political participation. The ouster of the Menderes government in Turkey in 1960, for instance, was an effort to curtail the participation in politics of leaders supported by the more traditional and conservative rural masses. In such societies, politics is, so to speak, upside down rather than right side up, with the defenders of the traditional order on the bottom rather than on the top.

Even in Latin America, where a highly articulated class structure makes for a high correlation between the expansion of participation and the promotion of reform, circumstances may develop in which the military act in favor of the latter but against the former. The failure of the military to play a reform role earlier in the history of Peru, for instance, was due in large part to the development of APRA as a middle-class and working-class reform movement and the historical incidents and accidents which alienated it from the military in the early 1930s. In effect, the middle-class groups were divided against themselves, which redounded to "the advantage of the upper-class groups, who consequently fomented and nursed the already existent division." The result was an "unnatural" perpetuation of oligarchical control in Peru until a new, non-Aprista civilian reform movement developed in the late 1950s. The military intervention in 1962, in a sense, telescoped the historical process. Insofar as it was designed to block the Apristas from coming to power, the intervention was the manifestation of a conservative, guardian role. Insofar as it brought into office first a reform-minded military junta and then a reform-minded civilian regime, it fell into the older, progressive pattern, its actions calling to mind the interventions of the Chilean military in the 1920s. In some respects, indeed, the pattern of events in 1962-63 followed the classical reform pattern. The coup of July 1962 brought to power a three-man military junta, which began to draw up programs for agrarian and social reform. The chief of the junta, General Pérez Godoy, however, was more conservative; he was, as Richard Patch suggested, "among the last of the old time generals" and he made plans for bringing back to power the conservative General Manuel Odrió. Early in 1963, consequently, a consolidating coup eased out Godoy and replaced him with General Nicolás Lindley López, who had been leader of the progressive military group centered about the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares. "The elimination of the junta chief, General Pérez Godoy," one analyst has written, "was an additional indicator of the consolidation of the reform-oriented officers."

The guardian role of the military is legitimated by an impressive rationale, which is persuasive to many armies and often persuasive to American opinion leaders. Military involvement in politics is intermittent and for limited purposes, and hence the military view themselves neither as the modernizers of society nor as the creators of a new political order but rather as the guardians and perhaps the purifiers of the existing order. The army, in the words of President (and Air Force general) Barrientos of Bolivia, should be the country's "tutelary institution . . . watching zealously
over the fulfilling of laws and the virtue of governments.” 37 Military intervention, consequently, is prompted by the corruption, stagnation, stalemate, anarchy, subversion of the established political system. Once these are eliminated, the military claim that they can then return the purified polity to the hands of the civilian leaders. Their job is simply to straighten out the mess and then to get out. Theirs is a temporary dictatorship—perhaps somewhat on the Roman model.

The ideology of guardianship varies little from country to country. It is most developed, naturally enough, in Latin America, where praetorianism and political participation are both widely prevalent. The army should intervene in politics, as one Argentine general put it, to deal with “the great disasters that can imperil our national stability and integrity, leaving aside the small disasters that any attempt to repair will only serve to separate us from our mission and hamper a clear perception of our duty.” Many Latin American constitutions implicitly or explicitly recognize the guardian function of the military. The Peruvian military, for instance, have justified their actions in barring the Apristas from power by a constitutional provision: “The purpose of the armed force is to assure the law of the Republic, compliance with the Constitution and laws, and the conservation of public order.” 38 The military in a sense assume constitutional functions analogous to those of the Supreme Court of the United States: they have a responsibility to preserve the political order and hence are drawn into politics at times of crisis or controversy to veto actions by the “political” branches of government which deviate from the essentials of that system. Yet they are also concerned about their own institutional integrity and hence divided among themselves into the military equivalents of “judicial activists” and “judicial self-restrainers.”

Perhaps the most extensive and explicit manifestation of the guardian role can be found in the outlook of the Brazilian army. At the time of the military overthrow of the empire, one military intellectual defended what he described as “the undeniable right of the armed forces to depose the legitimate powers . . . when the military feels that its honor requires this to be done, or judges it necessary and convenient for the good of the country.” 39 The guardian role was, in some measure, written into the 1946 constitution, which provided that the function of the armed forces was to “defend the fatherland and guarantee the constitutional powers, and law and order.” The prime responsibility of the army was thus to protect social peace and the Brazilian republican form of government. Consequently the army must be nonpolitical and above politics. If the army judges that the republic is in danger, that disorder is in prospect, it has the obligation to intervene and to restore the constitution. Once this is done, it then has the obligation to withdraw and to return power to the normal (conservative, middle-class) civilian leaders. “The military,” President Castello Branco said, “should be ready to act in concert, opportune, and in the face of inescapable necessity to assure a correct course in Brazil. The necessity and the opportunity would correspond not simply to a desire to be tutors to the nation, but to the recognition of a situation requiring emergency action at the service of the nation.” This doctrine, once labeled “supermission,” is perhaps more appropriately described as “civism.” It is reflected in the army’s suspicion of personalism and of a strong, popular, directly elected chief executive with a mass following, a Getulio, a Janio, a Jango, or a Juscelino. “The Army wants no Peronism, no popular party that could be organized in such a way as to threaten the Army’s dominant position as interpreter and guardian of the national interest.” 40 Hence the army accepts such a popular leader only until he begins to organize his own mass following with which he can challenge the army’s role as arbiter of the national values.

The United States often encouraged the guardian concept. Frequently the United States was quite happy to have the military dislodge governments it disliked, then to reconcile this action with its democratic conscience by insisting that the military rulers at an early opportunity turn power over to a new—and presumably

safe—civilians government based on free elections. From the viewpoint of modernization and development, the second mistake simply compounded the first. For it is quite clear that while guardianship has the loftiest justifications and rationales, it also has the most debilitating and corrupting effect on the political system. Responsibility and power are divorced. Civilian leaders may have responsibility, but they know they do not have power and are not allowed to create power because their actions are subject to military veto. The military junta may exercise power, but they know that they will not have to be responsible for the consequences of their action, for they can always turn authority back to the civilians when the problems of governance become too much for them. One might think that a system of checks and balances would develop, with the civilians attempting to do their best in order to avoid military intervention, and the military attempting to do their best in order to escape from the traumas of politics. In actuality, however, this type of system seems to bring out the worst in both sides.

The extent to which the military are locked in a middle-class outlook suggests that expectations that the military will increasingly become a force for reform are likely to be unfounded. It has, for instance, been suggested that the future will see the emergence of a Latin American Nasserism, that is, “the assumption by Latin American armed forces of the same kind of modernizing and reforming responsibilities that the military have assumed in the Near East.” 41 Many Latin Americans, civilians as well as colonels, see a Nasserite solution as the most promising path toward social, economic, and political development. These hopes have little chance of realization. Most Latin American societies are beyond the possibilities of Nasserism. They are too complex, too highly articulated, too far advanced economically to be susceptible to salvation by military reform. As Latin America has modernized, the role of the military has become more conservative. Between 1935 and 1944, 50 per cent of the coups in Latin America had reformist objectives of changing the economic and social status quo; between 1945 and 1954, 25 per cent of the coups had these objectives; between 1955 and 1964, only 17 per cent did. 42 To say that the Brazil of the 1960s needed a Nasser was somewhat like saying that the Russia of the 1960s needed a Stolypin. The two types of leadership were simply irrelevant to the stage of development that these societies had reached. In the 1960s, an Iran or an Ethiopia could use a Stolypin, and in Latin America there was perhaps room for a Nasser in Haiti, Paraguay, Nicaragua, or even the Dominican Republic. But the rest of the continent was simply too highly developed for such an attractively simple panacea.

As society becomes more complex it becomes more difficult for military officers, first, to exercise power effectively and then to seize power successfully. As a reasonably small, socially homogeneous, and highly disciplined and coherent group, the dominant elements in the officer corps can act reasonably effectively as a leadership cadre in a society which is still relatively uncomplex and undifferentiated. As the praetorian society becomes more complex and differentiated, the number of social groups and forces multiplies and the problems of coordination and interest aggregation become increasingly complex. In the absence of effective central political institutions for the resolution of social conflicts, the military become simply one of several relatively insulated and autonomous social forces. Their capacity to elicit support and to induce cooperation declines. In addition, of course, military officers are not necessarily skilled in the esoteric arts of negotiation, compromise, and mass appeal which are required for political action in a complex society. A more simple society can be spurred, commanded, and led toward an objective. But where social differentiation is well advanced, the political leader must be a balancer and compromiser. The tendency of the military to choose a guardian role in the more complex societies in itself indicates some awareness of the difficulties of integrating social forces.

Not only does it become more difficult for a highly specialized group to exercise political leadership in a highly complex society, but the means by which the military can acquire power also begin to lose their effectiveness. By its very nature the utility of the coup as a technique of political action declines as the scope of political participation broadens. In an oligarchical society and in the early phases of a radical praetorian society, violence is limited because government is weak and politics small. The participants in politics are few in number and often constitute a relatively closely knit group. In Burma, for instance, military and political leaders were

41. Lieuwen, Generals vs. Presidents, p. 138. See pp. 136-41 for a good evaluation of the possibilities of and obstacles to Latin American Nasserism.
closely linked by marriage. As participation broadens, however, and society becomes more complex, coups become more difficult and more bloody. Eighty-one per cent of the coups in Latin America between 1935 and 1944 were essentially bloodless, without streetfighting and other popular participation. Between 1945 and 1954, however, 68 per cent were low in violence; and between 1955 and 1964, only 33 per cent were. The increasing violence of the coups was naturally accompanied by the increased use of other more extensive forms of violence by other social forces. As society becomes more complex, other groups develop their own means of countering military action. If an effort is made to overrule their interests, they may retaliate with their own forms of violence or coercion. General strikes, for instance, played major roles in the overthrow of the regime in Guatemala in 1944 and in Perón’s consolidating coup in Argentina in 1945. When numerous groups participate in politics, he who wishes to secure power needs a broader base than is normally responsible for the classic coup. Kapp could be stopped by a general strike, but not Hitler. Similarly, the tradition of the pronunciamiento in Spain was broken in 1936. The revolt of the army produced not a coup but a civil war as labor, radical, Catalan, and other groups came to the support of the government. In the more extreme of the veto coups workers’ militias were often created either to aid in the defense of power against elements of the regular army or to counterbalance the regular army before its seizure of power.

A succession of military coups thus eventually tends to undermine the possibility of coups. Changes in power and policy require either complex bargaining among a large number of groups or bloody civil war. As the scope of politics is broadened, violence becomes less frequent but more virulent. As Dankwart Rustow has pointed out:

A century or two ago, vezirs might be banished or executed, sultans deposed or murdered: yet the average craftsman, villager, or nomad would scarcely notice any change.

Today, by contrast, any political assassination or coup d’etat —at times even a mere election—tends to be accompanied by extensive police or even military action, by mass arrests and deportations, by the suspension of newspapers, and by political trials. Instability, once a mere ripple on the surface, now engulfs the entire society.

The democratization of government in a society in which violence is a key part of government also means the democratization of violence. The coup d’etat—the limited war of domestic violence—may be replaced by the revolutionary war or other violent insurrection involving numerous elements of society. Conceivably, the conservative elements may retreat gracefully before the demands of the emerging groups, thereby permitting processes of peaceful change to develop. If they do not, the decline in the role of the military in society and government may well be accompanied by an increase in the role of violence.

The seizure of power by the military in a coup designed to veto the expansion of political participation brings only temporary relief to the political system. The groups which participate in the coup are usually united only by their desire to stop or to reverse the tendencies which they consider subversive of political order. Once the military are in power, the coup coalition begins to split. It may fragment into many small cliques, each attempting to push its own ends. More frequently, it divides into two broad factions: the radicals and the moderates, the hard-liners and the soft-liners, the gorilas and the legalistas. The struggle between the moderates and the radicals may focus on a number of issues, but typically the key issue is the return of power to civilians. Invariably, the junta which comes to power in a veto coup promises a quick surrender of power and return to normal civilian rule. The hard-liners argue, however, that the military must stay in power to bar permanently the civilian groups which they ousted from power and to impose structural reforms on the political system. The hard-liners are usually etatist in economics and authoritarian in politics. The moderates, on the other hand, usually view the aims of the coup as more limited. Once the objectionable political leaders have been removed from the scene and a few political and administrative changes introduced, they feel that they have done their job, and
they are ready to retire to the political sidelines. As in the break­through coups which mark the rise of the middle class to political action, the moderates in the veto coups usually come to power first. They are moderate, however, not because they are willing to comprom­mise with the existing oligarchy but because they may be willing to compromise with the emerging mass movements. The radicals, on the other hand, resist the expansion of political participation. In the breakthrough coup, the radical does not compromise with the oligarchy; in the veto coup the radical does not compromise with the masses. One hastens history; the other resists it.

The division between moderates and radicals means that veto coups, like breakthrough coups, often come in pairs, the initial coup followed by a consolidating coup in which the hard-liners attempt to overthrow the moderates and to prevent the return of power to the civilians. In this case, however, the consolidating coup is less likely to be successful than it was in the expansion of political participation to the middle class. In Argentina in 1958 and again in 1962, for instance, the military moderates who wished to return power to civilians were able to suppress efforts by the gorilas to prevent this transfer. In Turkey in 1960 and 1961 General Gursel was also able to defeat attempted consolidating coups by radical colonels. In Korea after the 1961 military coup a similar struggle developed between those senior leaders more willing to return power to civilians or to civilianize military rule and those younger colonels who insisted that the military would have to retain power for a long period of time to purify the Korean political system. In the fall of 1962 General Pak indicated that he was willing to civilianize his rule and that he would run for the presidency in open elections. In the winter of 1963, members of the military junta protested against this action. In due course, however, the moderates won out and the elections were held in the late fall of 1963. In the struggle which followed the March 1962 coup in Burma, on the other hand, the moderates lost, and their chief spokesman, Brigadier Aung Gyi, was fired from the government in February 1963 for advocating a return to civilian rule.

The basic dilemma in the guardian role involves the two assumptions that the army is above politics and that the army should intervene in politics to prevent changes in the political system. The guardian role of the military is based on the premise that the causes of military intervention arise from temporary and extraor-
dinary disruptions of the political system. In fact, however, the causes are endemic to the political system and are the unavoidable consequence of the modernization of society. They cannot be removed simply by eliminating people. In addition, once the army does block the conquest of power by another social group, institutional and personal self-interest combine to make the officers deathly fearful of the retaliation which may be visited upon them if they ever withhold their veto. Hence the incentives to intervene escalate, and the army becomes irreversibly committed to insuring that the once-proscribed group never acquires office.

The army which intervenes with a veto coup confronts the choice that faced the Brazilian military after their coup in April 1964. The “Brazilian army,” as Tyson wrote at the time, “must choose to be further drawn into Brazilian politics, with the consequent divisions-of-opinion that will shatter the unity of the army, or it must allow other and new groups to organize for effective political action, thus surrendering its monopoly-of-power and position as ultimate arbiter.” More precisely, an army which intervenes in this manner can choose among four courses of action, in terms of whether it retains power or returns it to civilians and whether it acquiesces in or resists the expansion of political participation. Each option, however, imposes costs on the military and on the political system.

1. Return and Restrict (The Aramburu Option). The military can return power to civilians after a brief rule and a purge of govern­mental officials but continue to restrict the rise of new groups to political power. Almost invariably, however, the need to intervene recurs. In 1955, for instance, the Argentine military threw out Perón. After a struggle the soft-liners, under General P. Aramburu, defeated the hard-liners, and power was returned to civilians. Elections were held and a moderate, Frondizi, was elected President. In subsequent elections (1962) the Peronistas demonstrated that they still had the support of one third of the Argentine electorate. For this reason, Frondizi felt compelled to compromise and to attempt some forms of cooperation with them. For this reason, also, the military felt compelled to intervene again and to throw Frondizi out. New elections were held, the Peronistas were effectively barred from participation, and the centrists won with 26 per cent of the total vote, electing Arturo Illia as Presi-
dent. The Peronistas, however, remained strong, the military remained adamant against their participation in power, and hence the political system remained in a praetorian state with the military an active veto-wielding group on the sidelines perpetually ready to intervene. When Illia’s rule faltered in 1966, their re-entry into politics was inevitable. The situation was comparable to that in Peru between 1951 and 1963, when the Army intervened three times to prevent the APRA from coming to power. When a situation like this develops, it is clear that guardianship becomes self-defeating. The military in effect abandon their claim to be outside, impartial guarantors of the political order. Instead they become active participants and contestants on the political scene, employing their superior organization and the threat of force to counterbalance the mass appeal and voting strength of other groups.

Another example of the limitations of this pattern is afforded by Burma. In 1958, when the ruling AFPFL party split, General Ne Win came to power, replacing the government of Premier U Nu. Ne Win made it clear, however, that he intended to return power to the civilians, and he made every effort to minimize the changes which his military regime made in the political system. In 1960 he did surrender power; elections were held, contested by two parties, and U Nu was voted back into office. Reluctantly but honestly, Ne Win returned power to U Nu. Two years later, however, conditions had deteriorated to the point where General Ne Win again felt compelled to intervene and to oust U Nu. This time Ne Win intervened for good. U Nu and his associates were jailed, and Ne Win made it clear that he intended to stay in power.

2. Return and Expand (The Gursel Option). The military leaders can return power to civilians and permit the social groups which they had previously blocked to come to power under new conditions and usually with new leadership. After the 1960 coup in which the Turkish Army threw out the Menderes government, the military executed a number of its former leaders, but General Gursel also insisted on turning power back to the civilians. Elections were held in 1961. The major contestants were the Peoples Party, which the military favored, and the Justice Party, which appealed to the same groups that had previously backed Menderes. No party won a majority, but General Gursel was elected president, and the Peoples Party formed a weak coalition government.

It was clear, however, that the dominant voting groups in Turkey favored the Justice Party, and the key questions were whether the Justice Party would be moderate enough not to antagonize the military and provoke another intervention, and whether the military would be broadminded enough to permit the Justice Party to come to power through peaceful elections. Neither of these conditions had been met in Argentina in the relations between the Peronistas and the Argentine military. In Turkey, however, compromise and moderation prevailed. Efforts by military radicals to stage a second coup were squelched by the government with the support of the senior military commanders, and in the 1965 elections the Justice Party won a clear majority in Parliament and formed a government. The military acquiesced in the acquisition of power by this coalition of businessmen and peasants which previously they had barred from power when it was under the leadership of Menderes. Presumably the Turkish military will remain on the political sidelines until a new crisis of political participation develops, perhaps when the urban working class bids for a share in power. In Venezuela in 1958 and in Guatemala in 1966 the military also acquiesced in the assumption of office by social groups and political tendencies which they had previously opposed. In all such cases, the civilian leaders who assume power come to terms with and accept at least some conditions specified by the military, not the least of which is that they abjure retaliation for any actions the military may have taken when they held office.

3. Retain and Restrict (The Castello Branco Option). The military can retain power and continue to resist the expansion of political participation. In this case, despite whatever intentions they may have to the contrary, they are inevitably driven to more and more repressive measures. This was the course assumed by the Brazilian military after the coup of April 1964 which ousted the Goulart government. The coup brought to power a military regime with the support of business and technocratic elements. The state elections in Brazil in 1965, however, indicated clearly that the voting public was on the side of the opposition. These elections prompted the hard-liners in the military to demand the cancellation of the results of the elections—just as the Argentine military had done in 1962 and just as the younger Turkish military officers tried to do in 1961. In Turkey, General Gursel squelched the hard-liners’ attempted coup. For several weeks in Brazil it
looked as if this scenario might be repeated. The hard-liners were expected to attempt to oust the moderate president, General Castello Branco, and to impose a more authoritarian rule to bar the opposition from political power. Many also expected that Castello Branco would be able to rally moderate opinion and defeat the hard-liners’ coup. Instead of leading the successful resistance to a coup, however, Castello Branco decided to lead the coup itself, which he did by suspending parliament, abolishing political parties, and imposing new restraints on political activity and freedom of speech. Whatever the reasons for his action, its effect was to reduce the possibility that Brazil would be able to follow the Turkish pattern and work out a compromise which would permit a sanitized opposition to come to power peacefully. The situation was instead further polarized, and the Brazilian military, who had prided themselves in the past on the extent to which they adhered to a rigorous nonpolitical, guardian role, now found themselves in a situation where they could not surrender power except to groups which were completely anathema to them. To eliminate the possibility of a popular appeal to the masses, the presidential election of 1966 was made indirect and by the old congress from which the military had eliminated many opposition elements. No opposition candidate ran against the military candidate, General Costa e Silva. In the subsequent elections for a new congress many restrictions and restraints were imposed on the opposition candidates.

4. *Retain and Expand (The Perón Option)*. The military can retain power and permit or, indeed, capitalize upon the expansion of political participation. This, of course, was the path followed by Perón and, in lesser measure, Rojas Pinilla in Colombia. In these instances, the officers come to power through a coup which deviates from the veto pattern and then alter their political base by bringing new groups into politics as their supporters. The price of this action is usually twofold. It alienates the military leader from his original source of support in the army and hence increases his vulnerability to a conservative military coup. It also tends to intensify the antagonism between the conservative middle class and the radical masses. In a sense, also, it reverses the pattern of the oligarchical praetorian society in which a poor, populist demagogue typically deserted his mass following in order to be accepted by the elite. Here a middle-class leader deserts his class in order to win a mass following. The military commander attempts to become a populist dictator. In the end, however, he fails in the same manner and for the same reasons as his civilian counterparts. Perón goes the way of Vargas; Rojas Pinilla suffers the fate of Haya de la Torre: their efforts vetoed by their former comrades-in-arms who remain faithful to the guardian role.

**Praetorianism to Civic Order:**

**The Soldier as Institution-BUILDER**

In simple societies a sense of community makes possible the development of political institutions. In more complicated societies a primary, if not the primary, function of political institutions is to make the community more of a community. The interaction between the political order and the social order is thus a dynamic and dialectical one: initially the latter plays the major role in shaping the former, subsequently the former plays the more important role in creating the latter. Praetorian societies, however, are caught in a vicious circle. In its simpler forms the praetorian society lacks community and this obstructs the development of political institutions. In its more complicated forms, the lack of effective political institutions obstructs the development of community. As a result, strong tendencies exist in a praetorian society encouraging it to remain in that condition. Attitudes and behavior patterns, once developed, tend to remain and to repeat themselves. Praetorian politics becomes embedded in the culture of the society.

Praetorianism has thus tended to be more endemic in certain cultures (e.g. Spanish, Arabic) than in others and to persist in these cultures through the expansion of political participation and the emergence of a more complex modern social structure. The sources of the Latin American praetorianism lay in the absence of any inheritance of political institutions from the colonial period and then in the effort to introduce into the highly oligarchical society of early nineteenth-century Latin America the middle-class republican institutions of France and the United States. The sources of the praetorianism in the Arab world lay in the collapse of the Arab states under the Ottoman conquest, the long period of Ottoman domination, which from a high level of institutional development degenerated into a weak, alien rule, losing its legitimacy with the emergence of Arab nationalism, and then the sub-
circumstances is it possible to move from a society of politicized so-

The historical experiences encouraged in the Arab culture a continuing political weakness comparable to that found in Latin America. Distrust and hatred among individuals and groups produced a continuing low level of political institutionalization. When such conditions exist in a culture, the question necessarily arises: How can they be remedied? Under what circumstances is it possible to move from a society of politicized social forces to one in which there is legitimacy and authority? Where in such a society is there a fulcrum which can be used to move the society out of that condition? Who or what can create the common interests and the integrating institutions necessary to transform a praetorian society into a civic polity?

These questions have no obvious answers. Two generalizations, however, can perhaps be made about the movement of societies from praetorian disunity to civic order. First, the earlier this development takes place in the process of modernization and the expansion of political participation, the lower the costs it imposes on society. Conversely, the more complex the society the more difficult it becomes to create integrating political institutions. Second, at each stage in the broadening of political participation the opportunities for fruitful political action rest with different social groups and different types of political leaders. For societies in the radical praetorian phase, the leadership in the creation of durable political institutions obviously must come from middle-class social forces and must appeal to such forces. Some have argued that heroic charismatic leadership may be able to perform this role. Where traditional political institutions are weak, or collapse, or are overthrown, authority frequently comes to rest with such charismatic leaders who attempt to bridge the gap between tradition and modernity by a highly personal appeal. To the extent that these leaders are able to concentrate power in themselves, it might be supposed that they would be in a position to push institutional development and to perform the role of “Great Legislator” or “Founding Father.” The reform of corrupt states or the creation of new ones, Machiavelli argued, must be the work of one man alone. A conflict exists, however, between the interests of the individual and the interests of institutionalization. Institutionalization of power means the limitation of power which the charismatic leader might otherwise wield personally and arbitrarily. The

would-be institution-builder needs personal power to create institutions, but he cannot create institutions without relinquishing personal power. Institutional authority is the opposite of charismatic authority, and charismatic leaders defeat themselves if they attempt to create stable institutions of public order.

Conceivably in a radical praetorian society integrating political institutions could be the outgrowth of political organizations which originally represent narrow ethnic or economic groups but which broaden their appeal beyond the original social force responsible for their existence. The political dynamics of a praetorian society, however, militate against this. The nature of the conflict encourages political organizations to become more narrowly specialized and limited, more devoted to their own particular interests, and more reliant upon their own distinctive means of political action. The immediate rewards go to those who act aggressively in their own interests rather than to those who attempt to aggregate a number of interests.

In theory, consequently, the more effective leadership in institution-building should come from groups which are not so directly identified with particular ethnic or economic strata. In some measure, students, religious leaders, and soldiers may fall into this category. The record suggests, however, that neither students nor religious groups play a constructive role in the development of political institutions. By their very nature, students are against the existing order, and they are generally incapable of constituting authority or establishing principles of legitimacy. There are numerous cases of student and religious demonstrations, riots, and revolts, but none of student governments and few of religious ones.

The military, on the other hand, may possess a greater capacity for generating order in a radical praetorian society. There are military coups, but there are also military governments and political parties which have come out of the womb of the army. The military can be cohesive, bureaucratized, and disciplined. Colonels can run a government; students and monks cannot. The effectiveness of military intervention stems at least as much from the organizational characteristics of the military as from its control of or use of violence. The correlation between violence in politics and the military in politics is spotty at best. Most coups in most areas of the world involve only a handful of deaths. A student riot or a general strike or a religious demonstration or an ethnic protest usually
produces far more casualties than a military coup. It is thus their superior organizational capacities that make intervention by the military more dramatic, more dangerous, and yet also potentially more productive than intervention by other social forces. Unlike student intervention, military intervention, which many people consider to be the source of the evil in a praetorian society, may also be the source of the cure.

The ability of the military to play this developmental role or even to play a modernizing role depends upon the combination of social forces in the society. The influence of the military in a praetorian society changes with the level of participation. In the oligarchical phase, little distinction usually exists between military and civilian leaders, and the political scene is dominated by generals or at least individuals bearing the title of general. By the time a society has moved into the radical middle-class phase, the officer corps has usually become more sharply delineated as an institution; influence is shared between military and other social forces; and a limited degree of political institutionalization may take place within the framework of a narrowly defined and non-expansible political system. Military intervention is frequently intermittent, with an alternation of military juntas and civilian ones and with the gradual emergence of more powerful, countervailing, civilian groups. Finally, in the mass praetorian phase, the influence of the military is circumscribed by the emergence of large, popular movements. Consequently, the opportunities for the creation of political institutions under military auspices are greatest in the early phases of a radical praetorian society.

For a society to escape from praetorianism requires both the coalescence of urban and rural interests and the creation of new political institutions. The distinctive social aspect of radical praetorianism is the divorce of the city from the countryside: politics is combat among middle-class urban groups, no one of which has reason to promote social consensus or political order. The social precondition for the establishment of stability is the reappearance in politics of the social forces dominant in the countryside. The intelligentsia has the brains; the military have the guns; but the peasants have the numbers, and the votes. Political stability requires a coalition between at least two of these social forces. Given the hostility which usually develops between the two most politically articulate elements of the middle class, a coalition of brains and guns against numbers is rare indeed. If it does come into existence, as in Turkey during the Ataturk period, it provides only a temporary and fragile stability; eventually it is overwhelmed by the entry of the rural masses into politics. A coalition between the intelligentsia and the peasants, in contrast, usually involves revolution: the destruction of the existing system as a prerequisite to the creation of a new, more stable one. The third route to stable government is by the coalescence of guns and numbers against brains. It is this possibility which offers the military in a radical praetorian society the opportunity to move their society from praetorianism to civic order.

The ability of the military to develop stable political institutions depends first upon their ability to identify their rule with the masses of the peasantry and to mobilize the peasantry into politics on their side. In many instances this is precisely what modernizing military rulers who have come to power in the early stages of radical praetorianism have attempted to do. Often the officers themselves are drawn from the rural classes or have connections with the countryside. In the late 1940s, for instance, most of the Korean officers "came from modest rural or small-town backgrounds."

In the early 1960s the military rulers of Korea were young men between the ages of 35 and 45 who come from rural backgrounds and who, in many cases, have known poverty at close range. It is natural for these men to have a rural orientation—to feel an empathy with the farmer. Such men must always regard urbanism with a certain ambivalence. Has it not bred the kind of immorality, corruption and basic selfishness characteristic of Korean politics—indeed, Korean life—in recent years? Yet they recognize that the economic realities of Korea demand more urbanism, not less. Industrialization is the key to this labor-surplus society, as the junta well knows.

The leaders of the Egyptian coup in 1952 had similar backgrounds. "The army was solidly Egyptian and rural; its officers were of the rural middle class." The officer corps, Naguib affirmed,
“was largely composed of the sons of civil servants and soldiers and the grandsons of peasants.” 50 In Burma, compared to the westernized political elite of the AFPFL, the military leaders were “tied more closely to the agrarian Buddhist Burmans.” 51 Their rural social background often leads military regimes to give high priority to policies which benefit the more numerous elements in the countryside. In Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, Korea, Pakistan, governments born of military coups pushed land reform measures. In Burma and elsewhere military governments gave budget priority to agricultural rather than to urban programs. A substantial appeal to the most numerous and powerful elements in the countryside is the sine qua non for the stability of any government in a modernizing country, and that is as true for a military government as for any other. A military regime which is not able to mobilize such support, whose backers come only from the barracks and the city, lacks the social base upon which to build effective political institutions.

The support of rural elements is, however, only a precondition to the development of political institutions by a military regime. Initially, the legitimacy of a modernizing military regime comes from the promise it offers for the future. But eventually this declines as a source of legitimacy. If the regime does not develop a political structure which institutionalizes some principle of legitimacy, the result can only be a military oligarchy in which power is passed among the oligarchs by means of coups d’etat, and which also stands in danger of revolutionary overthrow by new social forces which it does not possess the institutional mechanisms for assimilating. Egypt and Burma may maintain an image of social change and modernization for some while, but unless they create new institutional structures, Thailand is their future. There too a modernizing military junta seized power in 1932 and embarked on a program of sweeping change. In due course, however, it ran out of steam and settled down into a comfortable bureaucratic oligarchy.

Unlike a charismatic leader or the leaders of a particular social force, the military leaders do not face an insoluble dilemma in the development of political institutions. As a group, the military junta can retain power at the same time that they institutionalize it. There is no necessary conflict between their personal interests and those of political institutionalization. They can, in a sense, convert military intervention in politics into military participation in politics. Military intervention violates whatever rules of the game may exist and undermines the integrity of the political order and the basis of legitimacy. Military participation means playing the political game in order to create new political institutions. The initial intervention may be illegitimate, but it acquires legitimacy when it is converted into participation and the assumption of responsibility for the creation of new political institutions which will make impossible and unnecessary future interventions by both the military and other social forces. Intermittent military intervention to stop politics or to suspend politics is the essence of praetorianism. Sustained military participation in politics may lead a society away from praetorianism.

The principal obstacle to the military’s playing this role in radical praetorian societies comes not from objective social and political conditions but from the subjective attitudes of the military toward politics and toward themselves. The problem is military opposition to politics. Military leaders can easily envision themselves in a guardian role; they can also picture themselves as the far-seeing impartial promoters of social and economic reform in their societies. But, with rare exceptions, they shrink from assuming the role of political organizer. In particular, they condemn political parties. They try to rule the state without parties, and they thereby cut off the one major way in which they could hope to move their countries out of their praetorian condition. Parties, Ayub Khan said in phrases which echo George Washington, “divide and confuse the people” and open them “to exploitation by unscrupulous demagogues.” The legislature, he said, should “consist of men of high character and wisdom belonging to no party.” 52  “Parties,” Nasser declared, “are divisive elements, a foreign implantation, an instrument of the imperialists” which would seek “to divide us and create differences between us.” 53 So also,
General Ne Win describes how after seizing power in 1958 two political leaders came to him and asked him to form and to lead a new national party, but, he says:

I sent them away. What would be the use of forming another party? I had to stay outside politics to make sure the next elections would be fair. In Burma a political party can't win an election without being corrupt. If I had accepted the offer to form a political party of my own I would have had to become corrupt myself, and I'm not prepared to do this.\(^{54}\)

Ne Win's statement is an excellent example of how the military wish to eat their cake and have it too. Politics, parties, and elections are corrupt; the military must intervene to clean them up. But they must not dirty themselves and become corrupt themselves by participating in party politics. The first action by either a reform or a guardian junta after it has seized power is usually to abolish all existing political parties. “Now there are no political parties,” General Rawson proclaimed the day after his coup in 1943, “but only Argentines.” The attitude is almost universal. “Politics (outside the service) is ‘dissension,'” observes Lyle McAllister in summarizing the outlook of the Latin American military; “political parties are ‘factions'; politicians are ‘scheming' or ‘corrupt'; the expression of public opinion is ‘insubordination.'”\(^{55}\) Even more so than other groups in society, military officers tend to see parties as the agents of disunity rather than as mechanisms for consensus-building. Their goal is community without politics, consensus by command. By criticizing and downgrading the role of politics the military prevent society from achieving the community which it needs and they value.

The military leaders are thus caught in a conflict between their own subjective preferences and values and the objective institutional needs of their society. These needs are normally threefold. First, political institutions are needed which reflect the existing distribution of power but which at the same time are able to attract and to assimilate new social forces as they emerge and thus to establish an existence independent of those forces which initially gave them birth. In practice, this means that the institutions must reflect the interests of the military groups which have come to power and yet also possess the capacity eventually to transcend the interests of those groups. Secondly, in states where the military come to power the bureaucratic, output agencies of the political system are often highly developed, in contrast to the chaos and disorganization which prevails among the input agencies presumed to perform the functions of interest articulation and aggregation. Bureaucratic agencies, chief among which are the military, assume political as well as administrative responsibilities. Consequently, political institutions are needed which can redress this balance, divorce political functions from bureaucratic agencies, and limit the latter to their own specialized tasks. Finally, political institutions are needed capable of regulating succession and providing for the transfer of power from one leader or group of leaders to another without recourse to direct action in the form of coups, revolts, or other bloodshed.

In modern, developed polities, these three functions are largely performed by the political party system. Their distaste for politics in general and for parties in particular, however, makes it difficult for military leaders to produce political institutions capable of performing these functions. In effect, they attempt to escape from politics, to sublimate politics, to assume that the problems of political conflict and consensus will be solved automatically if other more manageable problems are resolved. In some instances military leaders have taken the lead in creating political parties. But more generally their tendency is to attempt to fill the vacuum of political institutions by the creation of nonpolitical or at least nonpartisan organizations such as national associations and conciliar hierarchies. In each case, however, the inability of these organizations to perform the needed political functions has driven their military creators toward the acceptance of what in effect is some form of political party organization.

The appeal of a national association to the military lies in the universality of its membership and in its presumed utility as a means of mobilizing and organizing the population to achieve the goals of national development which they assume to be shared by all. Theirs is a “non-political model of nation-building” which fails to recognize the conflicts of interests and values inherent in any society, but particularly prevalent in one undergoing rapid social change, and which consequently makes no provision for medi-


\(^{55}\) McAllister, p. 152.
ating conflict and reconciling interests. During their tenure in power between 1958 and 1960, for instance, the Burmese military organized a National Solidarity Association as a nonpartisan organization to promote political participation and to prevent corruption and apathy. The NSA failed to reflect either the distribution of power in the Burmese political system or the level of mass participation in that system. As a result it could neither become an institutional counterweight to the bureaucracy nor provide a framework for regulating the transfer of power.

These deficiencies led the Burmese military leaders to alter their hostility toward party organization and to follow a somewhat different path of political institution-building when they took power again in 1962. Instead of a mass organization they created what was described as a cadre party, the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSP), designed to perform “such basic party functions as recruiting nucleus personnel called cadres, and training and testing them by assigning them duties, etc.” In the words of one observer, this cadre party provided for “individual membership, a very tight code of discipline including provisions relating to factionalism, conflicts of interest, individual income, gifts, secrets, and disciplinary action, demands upon members for acquiring knowledge, self-criticism and acceptance of the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism.’”

It was designed to be based on democratic centralism and to be the vanguard of an eventual mass party.

A similar pattern of evolution occurred in Egypt. The Free Officers coup in July 1952 was a typical military reform movement. During the two years after the coup its leaders, organized into the Revolutionary Command Council, systematically moved to eliminate competing sources of legitimacy and popular appeal. The king was sent into exile immediately and the monarchy abolished a year later. The three political parties which could have challenged the power of the officers—the Wafd, the Communists, and the Moslem Brethren—were legally abolished, their leaders prosecuted and imprisoned. In the spring of 1954 the victory of Nasser over Naguib among the Free Officers signaled the definitive rejection of parliamentary institutions. By the end of 1954 all the principal sources of political legitimacy and political institutions which antedated the coup had been destroyed or discredited. The political slate, in effect, had been wiped clean. The problem now was: What sort of political institutions, if any, could be created to replace them?

In 1956 a new constitution was put into effect which provided for a popularly elected national assembly. This assembly, which was elected in 1957, and the second assembly, elected in 1964, at times criticized governmental programs and secured some modifications in them. The locus of power, however, remained the military leaders of the government and particularly Nasser, who was regularly elected and reelected president with 99 per cent of the votes. Clearly the formal governmental structure was unlikely by itself to provide the mechanism for legitimizing authority and organizing popular participation. The more serious efforts to create political organizations to fill the institutional gap revolved about the efforts of the military leaders successively to create three national associations. The first, the Liberation Rally, was organized in January 1953, before the consolidation of power by the Free Officers. “The Liberation Rally,” Nasser said, “is not a political party. It is a means to organize popular strength for the reconstruction of a society on a sound new basis.” It did, however, perform some of the functions of a political party. It served as a way for the military to mobilize and to organize popular support in its struggles with other political groups, particularly the Moslem Brethren, and to penetrate and to secure control of other mass organizations such as unions and student groups. It performed these functions reasonably well. The consolidation of power by the RCC in 1954, however, deprived the Liberation Rally of its reason for existence and at the same time promoted the tremendous expansion of its membership. It eventually came to have several million members, and, as a result, declined in effectiveness.

The new constitution of 1956 directed that “The People of Egypt shall form a National Union to accomplish the aims of the Revolution and to encourage all means to give the nation a solid foundation in the political, social, and economic realms.” The

Union was organized in the spring of 1957 and replaced the Liberation Rally as the means by which the regime attempted to organize mass support. The broadest possible membership was desired: the National Union, Nasser said, “is the whole nation.” It, too, soon acquired several million members and became too large and amorphous to be effective. In 1962, after the break with Syria, an effort was made to create yet a new organization, the Arab Socialist Union, to mobilize and organize the populace.

Significantly, the ASU was originally designed to avoid some of the weaknesses of the Liberation Rally and the National Union. Like the Burmese military, the Egyptian leaders shifted the emphasis, at least in theory, from a mass organization to an elite or cadre organization, with a division between active and inactive membership, and with its membership originally limited to ten per cent of the population. In due course, however, the ASU also mushroomed in size and after two years was said to have 5,000,000 members. In 1964 Nasser reportedly attempted to supplement the ASU with yet another group, which would have only 4,000 members, and which would function as the “Government Party” within the ASU. The new organization was designed by Nasser “to enforce a peaceful transfer of power and a continuation of his policies if anything happens to him.”

In Burma and Egypt the military thus first attempted to create mass national associations which would include everyone and then, when these failed, redirected their efforts toward the establishment of what was officially in Burma and unofficially in Egypt a cadre party with more limited and restricted membership. The original intention of the military leaders reflects their desire to avoid politics. Other societies, as one commentator has put it, attempt to incorporate group interests and group struggles as part of the legitimating process and the good life, whereas the Egyptian vision pictures an organization that produces efficiently and dispenses fairly to individuals qua individuals.” The union of all presupposes the unity of all. It is, however, precisely the purpose of political organization to promote this goal. Neither the Burmese nor the Egyptian organizations were able to perform the functions required of political institutions. They included everyone while power remained concentrated in a few. They neither reflected the structure of social forces nor served as vehicles through which the dominant social force could extend, moderate, and legitimize its power.

Instead of starting with a group which did exist—the national junta—and attempting to organize and to institutionalize it, the Burmese and Egyptian leaders started with a group which did not exist—the national community—and attempted to organize it. They tried to breathe life into organizations not rooted in any cohesive social force. An institution is an organization which is valued for its own sake by its members and others. An organization to which everyone can belong or must belong is less likely to become an institution than one in which membership is a scarce resource. “If everyone is in the party,” as Halpern asks, “why should anyone bother to be in it?” In both Burma and Egypt the leading officers in the coup group constituted themselves into a body—the Revolutionary Council in Burma, the Revolutionary Command Council in Egypt—for the direction of government. Such bodies could have become the central organ of a new governmental structure. In Egypt the Free Officers were, as Vatikiotis says, “a political group approaching the proportions of a party.” The Free Officers, however, refused to recognize themselves for what they were, an embryonic political party, and hence denied themselves the opportunity to institutionalize their role. Instead of making the Revolutionary Command Council into the central organ of a new political structure, they disbanded it in 1956 when the new constitution was inaugurated and Nasser was elected president on the assumption that documents and plebiscites create institutions.

As a result, no organization was created in Egypt to facilitate changes in the social composition of the new ruling elite. Nasser, it is said, was anxious to replace the army as a source of top leadership in the government “by a closer alliance with civilian groups among the professional and intellectual classes.” The problem was to bring in new elements without disaffecting the original and

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60. Vatikiotis, p. 139.
65. Vatikiotis, p. 72.
66. Ibid., p. 225.
most important sources of support in the army. A party organization is one means of performing this function: it provides a common focus of loyalty and identification for military and civilian and hence a means for distinguishing among individuals on grounds other than their civilian or military background. Instead of building from the core outward, however, the military attempted to organize everyone all at once by building from the periphery inward. "The idea of weaving from the outer edge inward, a spider's web of committees reaching to Cairo at the center could be attractive and even useful," commented The Economist on the National Union. "The trouble in the UAR is that little gets done, and even less is understood by the people concerned. Thus the villages, called upon to vote, voted for the same families who have always been dominant, and the web breaks off long before it reaches the center." 67

In Pakistan the construction of a nonpartisan political web was attempted through other means. Pre-1958 Pakistan, like pre-1952 Egypt, was ostensibly governed through a narrowly based parliamentary regime, the participants in which represented a small number of oligarchical and intellectual groups. The principal locus of power, however, was the bureaucracy. The brief phase of popular or party government in Pakistan really came to an end in April 1953, when the Governor General successfully dismissed a prime minister who up to that point possessed the backing of a sizable majority in the National Assembly. In effect, this coup created a system of co-government by bureaucrats and politicians, and the subsequent coup of October 1958 simply transferred the leadership from inefficient civilian bureaucrats to efficient military ones. Unlike Nasser, however, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan fully appreciated the importance of political institutions and had very carefully worked out ideas of the type of institutional structure which would be appropriate for Pakistan. He had formulated these ideas in a memorandum on the "Present and Future Problems of Pakistan," written while he was defense minister of Pakistan in October 1954, four years before he took over control of the government. 68 The new institutions created in Pakistan after 1958 were in large part the result of conscious political planning. More than any other political leader in a modernizing country after World War II, Ayub Khan came close to filling the role of a Solon or Lycurgus or "Great Legislator" on the Platonic or Rousseauian model. The new political institutions of Pakistan were created in three steps, two of which were planned by Ayub Khan and one of which was forced upon him by the necessities of political modernization. The two planned phases were in effect designed to provide for the concentration of power, on the one hand, and for the tempered expansion of power, on the other.

The Basic Democracies were the principal institutional means providing for popular participation. They were created a year after the military coup as an effort to produce a system of democratic institutions which would, in Ayub Khan's words, "be simple to understand, easy to work and cheap to run; put to the voter such questions as the voter can understand without external promptings; ensure the effective participation of all citizens to their full intellectual capacity; produce reasonably strong and stable governments." 69 A hierarchy of councils was established. At the base the Union Councils averaged ten members each with one member for every one thousand population elected by universal suffrage. Above these were Thana or Tehsil Councils composed of the chairmen of the Union Councils plus an equal number of appointed official members. Above them were the District Councils, also one half civil servants and one half Basic Democrats appointed by the Divisional Commissioner. Above these were the Divisional Councils with membership similar to the District Councils. The functions of these bodies were primarily in economic and social development, local government, administrative coordination, and elections.

Elections to the Union Councils were held in December 1959 and January 1960, with about 50 per cent of the eligible voters participating. The almost 80,000 Basic Democrats selected constituted a corps and a core of political activists for the political system. The majority of them were new to politics, and given the nature of the political structure they were relatively evenly distributed about the country in terms of population. Most of the Basic Democrats were literate and reasonably well-to-do. Over 50,000 of

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them, however, were employed in agriculture.⁷⁰ Before 1959 Pakistan politics was almost exclusively urban politics.

Public opinion in Pakistan is to be found in the urban middle class, the landowners and some of the religious leaders. This is a small and unstable base on which to found a durable and efficient state. . . . For the most part political activity has been confined to the very small group of active politicians based on the urban areas. The common man, especially in rural districts, has been unaware of or indifferent to the maneuvers that were taking place at the provincial or national capitals. Ordinary people have not become accustomed to regarding themselves as voters.⁷¹

The Basic Democracies, however, brought politics to the rural areas and created a class of rural political activists with a role to play in both local and national politics. For the first time political activity was dispersed outward from the cities and spread over the countryside. Political participation was thus broadened, a new source of support created for the government, and a major step made toward creating the institutional link between government and countryside which is the prerequisite of political stability in a modernizing country.

The corps of Basic Democrats in a sense competed with the two other social groups which had been active in Pakistani politics. On the one hand, since its locus was in the countryside, it was divorced from and had interests opposed to the middle-class intellectuals of the cities. “The entire intelligentsia,” one Pakistani minister warned the Basic Democrats, “is against you.”⁷² On the other hand, the structure of the Basic Democracies insured a continuing struggle between bureaucratic and popular interests. Their purpose was, in Ayub Khan’s words, to insure that “every village and every inhabitant in every village . . . would become an equal partner with the Administration in conducting the affairs of the state.”⁷³ Instead of creating a completely autonomous political structure apart from the administrative structure, the effort was instead to bring into existence an amalgamated structure combining bureaucratic and popular elements, with the popular element stronger at the bottom of the structure and the official or bureaucratic element stronger at the top. Inevitably this gave rise to friction between civil servants and elected leaders. The struggle between these two elements, however, was carried on within a single institutional framework and thus tended to strengthen that framework and to identify both officials and representatives with it. Both the expression of popular grievances against the bureaucracy and the bureaucratic implementation of governmental policies were channeled through the Basic Democracies structure.

Politically the Basic Democracies thus: (a) involved in the political system a new class of local political leaders throughout the country; (b) provided an institutional link between the government and the rural populace upon whose support stability depended; (c) created a popular counterweight to the dominance of bureaucratic officialdom; and (d) provided a structure through which subsequent broadening of political participation could be channeled. The Basic Democracies thus were a means of laying the framework for the expansion of the power of the political system.

The other major institutional innovation planned and implemented by Ayub Khan was primarily designed to provide for the effective concentration of power in government. This was achieved by the new constitution which was drawn up under Ayub Khan’s direction and which came into force in June 1962, ending the system of martial law which had previously legitimated the concentration of power in Ayub Khan’s hands. The constitution replaced the pre-1958 weak-parliament-cum-strong-bureaucracy system of rule with a strong presidential system. Although in places the constitution appeared to be modeled on the American system, in actuality the power of the executive was far greater than in the United States and even considerably greater than in the Fifth French Republic. The principal institutional curbs on the power of the president came from the judiciary rather than from the legislature, and in this respect the system approximated more the model of a Rechtsstaat than of a liberal democracy. The concentration of power in the presidency, however, did establish an institution which could exercise a more effective check on what had been the real center of power, the bureaucracy. The president was to be elected for a five-year term (renewable once) by an elec-

⁷⁰. Von Vorys, p. 201.
⁷³. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, 2, 55, quoted in von Vorys, p. 106.
toral college of the 80,000 Basic Democrats who, in turn, were of course elected by the people.

The Basic Democracies and the presidential constitution together provided Pakistan with a framework of political institutions. For Ayub Khan these were enough. In particular, he was, like Nasser, adamantly opposed to political parties, and parties were outlawed during the period of martial law from October 1958 to June 1962. Many leaders urged that provision be made for them in the new constitution. Ayub Khan, however, consistently rejected these demands, and the constitution banned parties unless the National Assembly decided to the contrary. As the constitution was about to go into effect and as opposition movements began to attack it, his associates made additional efforts to persuade him to accept parties as a necessary institution in a modern polity.

Political parties regulated by law, they argued, would provide an organizational framework for mass mobilization on behalf of the government. They might further aid such development by clearly demarcating the difference between those groups which were opposed to some government policies and others which advocated the repeal of the entire constitutional structure. Finally, political parties could fragment the leadership of the Opposition. 74

These arguments eventually persuaded Ayub Khan reluctantly to acquiesce in the legalization of political parties. Several were formed, including one by the supporters of the government. Because Ayub Khan wished to preserve a position for himself as the leader of the nation aloof from partisan activity, the party of his supporters was “a party behind the power rather than a party in power.” 75 In the course of the following year, the need to build support for the forthcoming presidential election compelled Ayub Khan slowly to abandon his aloof position and to identify himself with the party which identified itself with him. In May 1963 he formally joined the party and a short while later was elected its president. “I have failed to play this game in accordance with my rules,” he explained, “and so I have to play in accordance with their rules—and the rules demand that I belong to somebody; otherwise who is going to belong to me? So it is simple. It is an admission of defeat on my part.” 76 Political participation had forced him reluctantly to an unwilling but virtually complete acceptance of party.

The presidential election in the fall of 1964 accelerated the building of links between the parties which were being developed from the top down and the Basic Democracies structure, which was being developed from the bottom up. In the first phase of the election, the people elected the 80,000 Basic Democrats in part on the basis of local issues and their personal followings and in part on the basis of their identification with one of the two major presidential candidates. In the second phase, the candidates and their parties had to mobilize support from the Basic Democrats. The campaign thus provided the need and the incentive for national political leaders to reach down, appeal to, and establish alliances with the local leaders chosen as Basic Democrats. The unwanted political party supplied the indispensable institutional link between the centralization of power provided by the constitution and the expansion of power provided by the Basic Democracies.

In Burma and Egypt the efforts by military leaders to organize mass associations to institutionalize participation and to legitimize their power came to naught. In both cases the leaders had to redirect their efforts to what was in fact if not in name a cadre party. In Pakistan Ayub Khan’s institutional innovations required the reintroduction of political parties to make them operate effectively. In all three cases, the leaders resisted political parties but were eventually compelled either to accept them or to accept continued illegitimacy and instability. In other cases, military leaders have been more willing to organize political parties and to start the process of building modern political institutions which could create a basis of permanent political stability and authority.

Perhaps the most striking example of political institution-building by generals is Mexico, where at the end of the 1920s Calles and the other military leaders of the Revolution created

74. Ibid., pp. 256-57.
the National Revolutionary Party and in effect institutionalized the Revolution. The creation of this institution made it possible for the political system to assimilate a variety of new social forces, labor and agrarian, which rose to prominence under Cárdenas in the 1930s. It also created a political institution which was able to maintain the integrity of the political sphere against disruptive social forces. During the nineteenth century Mexico had the worst record of military interventions in politics of any Latin American country. After the 1930s, its military stayed out of politics, and Mexico became one of the few Latin American countries possessing some form of institutional immunity to military coups d'état.

The achievement of the Mexican military was exceptional in that it was the outcome of a full-scale revolution, albeit a revolution led by middle-class generals rather than middle-class intellectuals. That achievement was, however, duplicated by Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish generals without benefit of a complete social revolution. From the very start of his political activities Kemal was sensitive to the need to create a political institution capable of governing the Turkish state. In 1909, a year after the Young Turks had taken power, he argued for the complete separation of the military from politics: those military officers who wished to pursue political careers should resign from the army; those who wished to continue military careers should not meddle in politics. "As long as officers remain in the Party," he told one meeting of the Committee for Union and Progress, "we shall neither build a strong Party nor a strong Army . . . the Party receiving its strength from the Army will never appeal to the nation. Let us resolve here and now that all officers wishing to remain in the Party must resign from the Army. We must also adopt a law forbidding all officers having political affiliations." 77

The Young Turk leaders did not follow this advice.

A decade later it was Kemal's turn as the only Turkish military hero of World War I to determine the course of events at the close of the war. In July 1919, at the beginning of the nationalist struggle against the Ottoman sultans and the French, British, and Greek interveners in Turkey, Kemal resigned from the army and thereafter almost invariably appeared in public in mufti rather than uniform. His authority, he said, derived from his election as chairman of the Association for Defense of the Rights of Anatolia. In August 1923, when the independence of the Turkish state had been assured, this association was transformed into the Republican Peoples Party. It governed Turkey for the next 27 years. Kemal and many of his associates in founding the Turkish republic and the party were military officers. He insisted, however, that they all make a clear choice between military affairs and politics. "Commanders, while thinking of and carrying out the duties and requirements of the army," he declared, "must take care not to let political considerations influence their judgment. They must not forget that there are other officials whose duty it is to think of the political aspects. A soldier's duty cannot be performed with talk and politicking." 78

The Turkish Republican Peoples Party and the Mexican Revolutionary Institutional Party were both founded by political generals. Calles and Cárdenas were the dominant figures in the creation of one, Kemal the dominant figure in the creation of the other. In both cases, the bulk of the leadership of the party came from the ranks of the military. In both cases also, however, the party acquired an institutional existence apart from those groups who initially created it. In both parties (although more pronouncedly in Mexico than in Turkey) the military leaders were civilianized and civilian leaders in due course replaced military ones. Both parties, as well-organized political groupings, were able to establish an effective political counterweight to the military. In Mexico the top leadership of the party and of the country was transferred from military to civilian hands in 1946. By 1958 military men accounted for only seven of twenty-nine state governors and two of eighteen cabinet ministers. "Inside the ruling party and inside the government itself civilian professionals predominate," one expert observed in the early 1960s; "they are the real policy-makers. The army is under their control. On issues that do not concern the military establishment they can act without consulting the armed forces, and they can, and do at times, oppose it on military issues." 79

In Turkey a similar, although not quite as successful, process of

78. Quoted in Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," World Politics, 11 (July 1959), 546.
79. Lieuwen, Arms and Politics, p. 119.
civilianization also occurred through the mechanism of the ruling party. In 1924 the chief of staff was excluded from the cabinet. The number of former military officers in political positions gradually declined. In 1920, officers constituted 17 per cent of the Grand National Assembly; in 1943, 12.5 per cent; and in 1950 only 5 per cent. At the death of Mustafa Kemal in 1938, leadership was transferred to his associate İsmet İnönü, who like Kemal had come out of the army but who had functioned for two decades in civilian roles. In 1948 the first cabinet was formed which did not include any former military officers, and in 1950, of course, elections were held in which the opposition party peacefully acquired power. A decade later the efforts of the leadership of this party to suppress opposition provoked the Turkish military, in the name of the Kemalist tradition, to reenter politics and to establish a short-lived military regime, which in 1961 returned power to a freely elected civilian party regime.

In Turkey a centralized traditional monarchy ruled until 1908. At that time it was overthrown by a middle-class military coup which inaugurated a decade of praetorian politics brought to an end in the early 1920s when Mustafa Kemal stabilized his rule through the creation of an effective party organization. Mexico and Turkey are two noteworthy examples where parties came out of the womb of the army, political generals created a political party, and the political party put an end to political generals.

In the two decades after World War II the most notable effort by military men to duplicate the achievements of the Turkish and Mexican generals was made in Korea. For almost two years after he took power in South Korea in the summer of 1961, General Pak Chung Hee was under pressure by the United States to reestablish civilian rule and under pressure by the hard-liners in his own army to retain power and keep the civilians out. He attempted to resolve this dilemma by promising elections in 1963 and arranging in a Kemalist manner to shift the base of his power from the army to a political party. In contrast to the military leaders of Egypt and Pakistan, those of Korea accepted and provided for political parties in the new constitution which they drew up for their country. Far from discouraging or forbidding parties, the constitution gave them special stress. The 1962 constitution of Pakistan prohibited a candidate from identifying himself as "a member of, or as having the support of, political party or any similar organization." The 1962 constitution of Korea, in contrast, provided that each candidate "shall be recommended by the political party to which he belongs." In contrast to Ayub Khan's ideal of the high-minded, independent legislator divorced from organizational ties, the Korean constitution provided that a congressman would lose his seat "when he leaves or changes his party or when his party is dissolved."

In December 1962, Pak announced that he would run in the presidential elections scheduled for the following year. Throughout that year several members of the military junta had begun to divert funds from the national treasury to prepare for the organization of a party. Early in 1963, Pak's nephew-in-law, Brigadier General Kim Chung Pil, resigned as head of the Korean CIA and began to create a political organization, the Democratic Republican Party, to back General Pak. His intelligence work had given Kim ample opportunity to observe the organizational effectiveness of the Communist Party of North Korea, and he in part followed Leninist principles of organization in forming the Democratic Republican Party of South Korea. Kim took with him from the army some 1,200 bright and energetic officers plus allegedly substantial sums of government money. With these resources he was able to create a reasonably effective political organization. At the national level, he established a strong administrative secretariat originally supported by Korean CIA funds and staffed with able people drawn from the army, the universities, and the press. At the local level, he set up four-man secretariats in each election district and eight-man bureaus in each province, each designed to study intensely the political problems of its area, develop support, create organizations, and select candidates. The entire operation was marked by a highly professional approach.

Pak's announcement of his candidacy in December 1962 precipitated an immediate reaction from those members of the military junta who believed that the army should continue in power without attempting to legitimate its rule through elections. Pak dismissed four of his opposition in the junta and was almost immediately confronted by a full-scale revolt by its remaining members. "The entire Army is against you," he was told, and he was forced to send General Kim abroad and to announce in

February that he was withdrawing as a candidate. The following month the junta formally announced that there would be no elections in 1963 and that military rule would continue for four more years. These developments in turn precipitated strong protests from the United States government and from the civilian politicians who were looking forward to the opportunity to challenge the military. For six months Pak trod a delicate path between the threat of American sanctions if he canceled the elections and the threat of a military coup if he held them. Eventually, by September, the organization of the Democratic Republican Party had progressed to the point where the fears of the officers as to the possible results of an election were reduced and the activities of the opposition groups had progressed to a point where the cancellation of the elections would have produced widespread civil violence.

The presidential election in October 1963 was weighted on the side of the government, but it was also the fairest election in the history of Korea. General Pak received 45 per cent of the vote, his principal opponent 43 per cent. In the parliamentary elections the Democratic Republicans got 32 per cent of the popular vote but won 110 of the 175 seats because of the splintering of their opponents' votes. As was to be expected, the opposition parties swept the larger cities, while the governmental party received strong support from the rural areas. In three years, a military junta had transformed itself into a political institution. In three years, military intervention in politics with power based on the praetorian use of force had been converted into military participation in politics with authority based on popular support and legitimated by electoral competition. In the three years after it won control of the national government, General Pak's regime was able to carry out a number of reforms, the most notable of which was the consummation of a treaty normalizing Japanese-Korean relations and under which Japan would pay several hundred million dollars' reparation to Korea. The opposition to this treaty from the opposition parties and from the students was intense. Its ratification in August 1965 provoked widespread rioting and demonstrations; for a solid week 10,000 or more students protested in the streets of Seoul, demanding the overthrow of the government and the nullification of the treaty. Precisely such demonstrations, of course, had toppled Syngman Rhee's government in 1960. General Pak, however, could rely on the loyalty of the army and the support of the countryside. With the army isolated from politics, he now insisted that students be also: the government, he said, would take "all necessary measures" to bring to an end once and for all "the evil habit of students interfering with politics." A full scale combat division was brought into Seoul; Korea University was occupied; and scores of students were hauled off to jail. In the normal politics of a praetorian society, this would not be significant, but, in the long run, creation of a system of stable party government should reduce student as well as military involvement in politics. The rising prosperity which followed upon the political stability of the regime also tended to discourage blatant student interventions in politics.

The achievements of Ayub Khan in Pakistan, of Calles and Cárdenas in Mexico, of Kemal and İnönü in Turkey, of Pak and Kim in Korea, and of others such as Rivera in El Salvador, show that military leaders can be effective builders of political institutions. Experience suggests, however, that they can play this role most effectively in a society where social forces are not fully articulated. The tragedy of a country like Brazil in the 1960s was that it was, in a sense, too developed to have either a Nasser or an Atatürk, its society too complex and varied to be susceptible to leadership by a military regime. Any Brazilian military leader would have had to find some way of striking a balance between the regional, industrial, commercial, coffee-growing, labor, and other interests which share power in Brazil and whose cooperation was necessary for the conduct of government. Any government in Brazil has to come to terms, one way or another, with the São Paulo industrialists. Nasser did not have such a problem, and hence he could be Nasser; so also Atatürk dealt with a relatively small and homogeneous elite. Modernizing military regimes have come to power in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Bolivia. But for Brazil it may be too late for military modernization and too late also for the soldier as institution-builder. The complexity of social forces may preclude the construction of political institutions under middle-class military leadership.

In those countries which are less complex and less highly developed, the military may yet be able to play a constructive role, if they are willing to follow the Kemalist model. In many of these
countries, the military leaders are intelligent, energetic, progressive. They are less corrupt—in the narrow sense—and more identified with national goals and national development than most civilians. Their problem is more often subjective than objective. For they must recognize that guardianship serves only to corrupt further the society they wish to purify and that economic development without political institutionalization leads only to social stagnation. To move their society out of the praetorian cycle, they cannot stand above politics or attempt to stop politics. Instead they must make their way through politics.

At each level in the broadening of political participation certain options or possibilities for evolution may exist, which, if not acted upon, disappear quickly. At the oligarchical level of praetorianism, a viable, expandable party system depends upon the action of the aristocrats or oligarchs. If they take the initiative in the search for votes and the development of party organization, a country may well move out of its praetorian condition in that phase. If it does not, if middle-class groups begin to participate in a praetorian political milieu, the opportunity to act passes to the military. For them modernization is not enough, and guardianship is too little. What is required of the military leaders is a more positive effort to shape a new political order. In many societies the opportunity the military have for political creativity may be the last real chance for political institutionalization short of the totalitarian road. If the military fail to seize that opportunity, the broadening of participation transforms the society into a mass praetorian system. In such a system the opportunity to create political institutions passes from the military, the apostles of order, to those other middle-class leaders who are the apostles of revolution.

In such a society, however, revolution and order may well become allies. Cliques, blocs, and mass movements struggle directly with each other, each with its own weapons. Violence is democratized, politics demoralized, society at odds with itself. The ultimate product of degeneration is a peculiar reversal in political roles. The truly helpless society is not one threatened by revolution but one incapable of it. In the normal polity the conservative is devoted to stability and the preservation of order, while the radical threatens these with abrupt and violent change. But what meaning do concepts of conservatism and radicalism have in a completely chaotic society where order must be created through a positive act of political will? In such a society who then is the radical? Who is the conservative? Is not the only true conservative the revolutionary?