Constituents at the Gate: German and Dutch Parties and their Migrant Outreach Strategies

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Motivations:
The percentage of European electorates with a migration background, while still low in most places, is gradually increasing almost everywhere, and has been doing so longer and to a proportionally greater degree in many urban areas. The extent to which migrant-background voters are engaged by the political parties, however, seems to vary across time and across region. For example, campaign materials in alternate languages, so common in the American context, are increasingly being used by German parties while Dutch politicians, facing a similar-sized migrant population, have stepped away from these approaches after being pilloried for their early attempts. This paper examines the variation across cities and time in the amount of attention paid to immigrant-background voters by the parties. This project uses measures of campaign appeals and a number of elite interviews with party officials and volunteers in three European cities to attempt to trace and a number of elite interviews with party officials and volunteers in three European cities to attempt to trace the sources of variation across parties and across locales in the types—and to some degree, the success—of campaign outreach efforts to voters with a migration background.

Data:
Elite Interviews with Party Elected Officials, Administrators and Volunteers
*Snowball sampling methods
*Social democrats + 1 additional party per site
*~25 interviews per site
*Completed in Bremen, Rotterdam; partially completed in Dortmund

Campaign Posters
*1st pilot project completed, Dortmund, state elections, May 2012
*~500 GPS-tagged photos in 3 neighborhoods
*Can be sorted by topic, candidate image, evidence of vandalism, etc.
*2nd pilot project to be conducted, German Federal Elections, 2013
*Full sample to be run in 2013 in Dortmund, 2014 in Rotterdam; 2014-15 in Bremen

Theories:
1. The number of voters with a migration background has reached a large enough number that nearly all parties, in nearly all contexts, are having serious discussions among party members about how to reach out to voters with a migration background.

Where such campaign appeals are not made, this is due not to a lack of awareness of the issue, but either to deliberate non-engagement or, more commonly, uncertainty about how to make these appeals.

2. Where minorities are able to organize on a neighborhood or on a sectional basis, the incentive, the greater the incentive will be to directly engage this group.

The more that small groups can influence important voting outcomes, the more likely that voters with an immigration background will be engaged. In fact, the more decentralized that political decision-making is in a given context, the more likely that all parties will have a much easier time making such appeals and will have successfully done so

3. Candidates with an immigration background can be both subject and object of party strategy. The greater the control of the party of candidate selection and allocation of seats, the more they will be an object of strategy and the closer that party lists will reflect the party's strategic incentives.

There is an inherent endogeneity as to whether minority-origin candidates are the actors behind successful outreach strategies or whether their nomination is itself a successful outreach effort on the part of the party. But the general causal flow is in some sense mediated by how open and/or decentralized the party nomination process is.

Policy Questions:
If decentralization, open party lists and other such institutional arrangements are the primary measure of outreach to minorities—and via these, their participation—what effect do integration, education, and other individual-level efforts have on political participation? Even if these programs are merited on other grounds, is it false to assume that they will have a beneficial impact on political implication?

Can electoral reforms such as the Bremen “kumulieren und panaschieren” be justified on immigrant incorporation grounds alone?

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