

Deconcentration in Kenya Since the Beginning of Multi-Party Elections

Mai Hassan – Dissertation Project


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Motivation

Beginning in the early 1990s, **almost half** of all sub-Saharan African countries have increased the number of their **sub-national administrative units** since they began holding multi-party elections. I follow Boone (2003) and others and define this type of decentralization as **deconcentration**, or the **spatial expansion of the national state apparatus**. These recent state-building efforts have real consequences – deconcentration implies an increase in the number of central-government offices and centrally-appointed state bureaucrats throughout the country, as well as an increase in central government administrative and development expenditures.

Building off this observation, I extend the logic of competitive authoritarianism and examine the effect of multi-party elections on how incumbent rulers change the structure of the state to help them secure their rule. My dissertation **develops a theory of administrative unit creation** based on my year of field research in Kenya. I then **test my argument on a time-series data-set of sub-Saharan African countries**

since 1990 to examine the effect of an incumbent president running has on deconcentration of the state. While not shown here, I find preliminary support my theory derived from Kenya explains the continent's recent state-building efforts.



Unit Creation and Executive Orders

Unit creation benefits a population by **creating local jobs and channeling central government resources to the area**. Especially when the boundaries of the new unit coincide with the territorial homeland for an ethnic group, this gives the group **self-determination** and limits the amount of administrative discrimination they face by majority ethnic groups. Administrative unit creation often times **falls directly under the executive branch**, or the very least, can be manipulated by a strong executive.

Kenya


To answer this question, I examine Kenya. Since the beginning of multi-party democracy in 1992, the number of Kenyan districts, the primary locus for development, **has jumped from 40 to 286 today**, and the number of local-level locations **has exploded five-fold**. By tracing where districts were carved, and when they were declared I develop a theory of patronage-led unit-creation. My dissertation also explains

Here I include the number of Kenyan districts over time. The vertical lines are election years. The green lines are when an incumbent was standing for office. The teal line represents the 2002 election in which no incumbent was running.

Unit Creation as Patronage

I contend that President Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002) **after democratization** in 1992 and President Emilio Mwai Kibaki (2002-present) have deconcentrated the state and created more administrative districts not as a concerted state building effort, but have instead created administrative units as patronage to co-opt votes for themselves. Both presidents have used ethnic voting patterns to create districts **within swing areas among ethnic groups whose support they needed**.

If we only look at the before and after maps, we don't see much variation across the country – all areas **eventually** received more districts. However, these presidents have largely different support bases. By parsing out when districts were created, we key in on significant temporal variation and capitalize on variation in unit creation by each president.



Methodology

I code my dependent variable of district creation a few ways. I gather administrative officer returns bi-annually to determine **when** new districts were created. Using location names from these records and census information, I will use GIS to draw the boundaries of the newly created units. I also gather newspaper clippings and Kenya Law Gazette notices of announcements to double-check my coding.

To code levels presidential support, I rely on constituency level electoral results for the presidential election (Kenya does not have polling station level electoral results for before 2010). To determine if presidents created districts for ethnic minorities, I need a sub-district ethnicity dataset. Unfortunately, the Kenyan government will not release ethnicity information below the district level because of potential and realized ethnic-related violence. To get around this, I construct a dataset of the names and area of sub-location level appointed leaders from independence-1992. This gives me a dataset of around 1000 names. I then have between 5-8 Kenyans from each province (8 provinces total) determine the ethnicity of leaders from their province. I will next create a map of ethnic leaders. I also corroborate this with ethnographic maps of ethnic homelands.

Testing the Theory Beyond Kenya

I test my theory within sub-Saharan Africa. I am currently collecting data on countries that have created new administrative units at either the first- or second-highest tier of government. I will test whether or not an executive was facing reelection in the 18-24 months after the unit creation.

Extensions and Future Research

- Effect of these new units on development? service delivery?
- Effect of this bureaucratic bloat on bureaucratic efficiency? competence?
- Discernible differences in **who** the state posts?