Qualitative research on multi-national work life has begun to illuminate how status hierarchies emerge and are maintained between workers more closely aligned with the dominant global business culture (e.g., Anglo-Americans) and those attempting to assimilate from other cultural backgrounds. In two studies, we compare the psychological experience of global and national job markets for university students from a rapidly globalizing emerging market. We recruited study participants from national universities in the Arab Gulf in which students are trained in English for work in global business markets. Negatively stereotyped as “lazy locals” in the Western-dominated global work culture, we find that male nationals feel more reticent to negotiate for career rewards (viz., compensation) in a global (versus local) business context (Study 1) and that they are more negatively evaluated by their peers for attempting to negotiate for higher pay in a global (vs. local) business context. Replicating U.S. studies, in the local business context we find that female (versus male) nationals feel more reticent to negotiate for higher pay (Study 1) and are more negatively evaluated when they do (Study 2). There were no gender differences in the propensity to negotiate or in the evaluation of negotiators in the global work context. In Study 2, mediation analyses support the proposition that, for male nationals in the global work culture, negotiating for higher compensation violates prescriptions of low-status behavior (viz., communality). Evaluators penalize female negotiators for a lack of communality, but also for perceived immodesty and materialism. We discuss implications for the study of global-local status hierarchies in multi-national employment contexts.
This article explores the implications of a negotiator setting high aspirations on the counterpart's assessments of the negotiator and future cooperation toward the negotiator. Participants were 134 undergraduates acting as buyers or sellers in a single-issue price negotiation. Buyers received instructions to set more or less ambitious aspirations. Buyers who set more ambitious aspirations achieved better economic outcomes. However, sellers paired with buyers setting more ambitious aspirations found their buyers to be less likeable, expressed less willingness to cooperate with them in the future, and behaved less generously toward them in a postnegotiation dictator game. The perceived likeability of the buyer explained why the sellers were less willing to cooperate in the future with buyers who had set more ambitious aspirations. This research contributes to the understanding of the downside of setting high aspirations in a competitive negotiation and provides implications on balancing one-time economic gain with future social loss.
Policy makers, academics, and media reports suggest that women could shrink the gender pay gap by negotiating more effectively for higher compensation. Yet women entering compensation negotiations face a dilemma: They have to weigh the benefits of negotiating against the social consequences of having negotiated. Research shows that women are penalized socially more than men for negotiating for higher pay. To address this dilemma, the authors test strategies to help women improve both their negotiation and social outcomes in compensation negotiations.
In Study 1, communicating concern for organizational relationships improved female negotiators’ social outcomes, and offering a legitimate account for compensation requests improved negotiation outcomes. However, neither strategy—alone or in combination—improved both women’s social and negotiation outcomes.
Study 2 tested two strategies devised to improve female negotiators’ social and negotiation outcomes by explaining why a compensation request is legitimate in relational terms. Results showed that, although adherence to the feminine stereotype is insufficient, using these “relational accounts” can improve women’s social and negotiation outcomes at the same time. Normative implications of conformity to gender stereotypes to reduce gender pay disparities are discussed.
Career stories of 50 female executives from major corporations and high-growth entrepreneurial ventures suggest two alternative accounts of how women legitimize their claims to top leadership positions: navigating and pioneering. In navigating accounts, the women legitimized their claims to top authority positions by following well institutionalized paths of career advancement (e.g., high performance in line jobs) and self-advocating with the gatekeepers of the social hierarchy (e.g., bosses, investors). In pioneering accounts, the women articulated a strategic vision and cultivated a community of support and followership around their strategic ideas and leadership. The career stories suggested that, when the women’s authority claims were not validated, they engaged in narrative identity work to revise their aspirations and legitimization strategies. Sometimes narrative identity work motivated women to shift from one type of account to another, particularly from navigating to pioneering. Based on inductive analyses of these 50 career stories, I propose a process model of how women legitimize their claims to top leadership positions by recursively resetting career accounts as authority claims succeed or fail.
Research suggests that women are more likely than men to pass over opportunities to negotiate for higher compensation. Studies from the laboratory, surveys, and field suggest that men are at least four times more likely than women to negotiate for compensation (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, 2007). When they do negotiate, women tend to claim smaller percentage increases than men on their initial salary offers (Brett & Stroh, 1997; Gerhart & Rynes, 1991; Stevens, Bavetta, & Gist, 1993). Aghast by women’s apparent lack of negotiating ability as well as the implications of this “gender negotiation gap” for the gender wage gap, both policy makers and professors have proposed additional training for women to raise their negotiating aspirations and effectiveness.
In this chapter, we argue that this apparent perceived bargaining deficiency on women’s part is actually a rational response to the differences in incentives and expectations that men and women face in compensation negotiations—one that is obscured by focusing solely on the immediate material payoffs from negotiation … We propose a two-period model in which employees make decisions about whether to negotiate for higher compensation in period one. Our purpose in creating a mathematical model is to be very concrete about the different effects that negotiating may have on a person’s utility and then to investigate how optimal decisions are affected by the gendered behavioral norms and expectations.
In the increasingly globalized context of the UAE, women’s leadership development programs have become high on the agenda of government, academic and private sector organizations. Accordingly, the UAE is an interesting location to examine the growth in women’s leadership development programs and to better understand their evolution, goals and impacts. These programs vary greatly in levels of impact, some providing models to follow and continue building upon and others offering a learning opportunity on what works and what doesn’t in the UAE particularly and the region more generally. With a roundtable discussion on women’s leadership development as a backdrop, which brought together experts from three key sectors (private, public, academic), this policy brief reevaluates women’s leadership development programs in the UAE. Through a diversity of perspectives, important questions regarding women’s leadership development are posed with the ultimate goal to present key recommendations to policy makers in the UAE about how to improve and strengthen such programs
We studied interactive effects of gender in negotiation dyads, theorizing that the degree and manner of a negotiator's persistence are functions of the gender composition of the dyad. Our findings challenge sex-stereotypic perspectives, showing that women persist more with male naysayers than with female naysayers but do so in a stereotypically low-status (more indirect than direct) manner. Women's adaptation of their persistence to naysayer gender appeared functional because increased persistence with male naysayers helped close a gender gap in performance, and female negotiators with high performance adjusted their manner of persistence more than those with low performance.
Bias in the evaluation of workplace misbehavior is hotly debated in courts and corporations, but it has received little empirical attention. Classic sociological literature suggests that deviance by lower-status actors will be evaluated more harshly than deviance by higher-status actors. However, more recent psychological literature suggests that discrimination in the evaluation of misbehavior may be moderated by the relative status of the evaluator because status influences both rule observance and attitudes toward social hierarchy. In Study 1, the psychological experience of higher status decreased rule observance and increased preferences for social hierarchy, as we theorized. In three subsequent experiments, we tested the hypothesis that higher-status evaluators would be more discriminating in their evaluations of workplace misbehavior, evaluating fellow higher-status deviants more leniently than lower-status deviants. Results supported the hypothesized interactive effect of evaluator status and target status on the evaluation of workplace deviance, when both achieved status characteristics (Studies 2a and 2b) and ascribed status characteristics (i.e., race and gender in Study 3) were manipulated.
The article discusses the risk involved in women negotiating compensation. Negotiating for higher compensation has been proved to have economic benefits, however, it is socially risky for women to negotiate increased compensation. Women who negotiate for higher pay go against sex stereotypes and are perceived as demanding. Women can avoid social risks by combining compensation negotiations with feminine displays of niceness. A study was conducted where study participants evaluated a female employee candidate both before and after she conducted compensation negotiations with different methods and it was found each negotiation method presented social risks.
Purpose: To evaluate whether there were differences in acquisition of research grant support between male and female faculty at eight Harvard medical School-affiliated institutions.
Methods: Data were obtained from the participating institutions on all research grant applications submitted by full-time faculty from 2001 though 2003. Data were analyzed by gender and faculty rank of applicant, source of support (federal and nonfederal), funding outcome, amount of funding requested, and amount of funding awarded.
Results: Data on 6319 grant applications submitted by 2840 faculty applicants were analyzed. Women represented 29% of investigators and submitted 26% of all grant requests. There were significant gender differences in the mean number of submissions per applicant (women 2.3, men 2.7), success rate (women 41%, men 45%), number of years requested (women 3.1, men 3.4), median annual amount requested (women $115,325, men $150,000), mean number of years awarded (women 2.9, men 3.2), and median annual amount awarded (women $98,094, men $125,000). After controlling for academic rank, grant success rates were not significantly different between women and men, although submission rates by women were significantly lower at the lowest faculty rank. Although there was no difference in the proportion of money awarded to money requested, women were awarded significantly less money than men at the ranks of instructor and associate professor. More men than women applied to the National Institutes of health, which awarded higher dollar amounts than other funding sources.
Conclusions: Gender disparity in grant funding is largely explained by gender disparities in academic rank. Controlling for rank, women and men were equally successful in acquiring grants. However, gender differences in rant application behavior at lower academic ranks also contribute to gender disparity in grant funding for medical science.
We propose taking a two-level-game perspective on gender in job negotiations. At Level One, candidates negotiate with employers. At Level Two, candidates negotiate with household members. In order to illuminate the interplay between these two levels, we review research from two separate bodies of literature. Research in psychology and organizational behavior on candidate–employer negotiations sheds light on the effects of gender on Level One negotiations. Research from economics and sociology on intrahousehold bargaining elucidates how negotiations over the allocation of domestic labor at Level Two influence labor force participation at Level One. In conclusion, we integrate practical implications from these two bodies of literature to propose a set of prescriptive suggestions for candidates to approach job negotiations as a two-level game and to minimize the disadvantageous effects of gender on job negotiation outcomes.
Gender has become one of the hottest areas of negotiation research and teaching in recent years. The topic has received increasing media attention, and negotiation students and executive education participants more frequently request that educators address the topic of gender dynamics at the bargaining table.
Our aim in presenting the collection of articles in this special issue of Negotiation Journal is to provide a resource for negotiation teachers, trainers, and practitioners interested in the latest developments in the study of gender in negotiation, and also to offer an introduction to the field for scholars and students interested in conducting research on the topic.
The collection includes review articles suitable for use in negotiations courses and training programs (see Hannah Riley Bowles and Kathleen McGinn on gender in job negotiations; Catherine Eckel, Angela de Oliveira, and Philip Grossman on gender and cooperation; and Muriel Niederle and Lise Vesterlunch on gender differences in competition). It also provides a sampling of empirical articles representative of the diverse methods in this area of research (see Rachel Croson, Melanie Marks, and Jessica Snyder's coordination experiment, and Fiona Greig's field study on negotiation and career advancement). Finally, the collection also introduces new areas of investigation with implications for gender in negotiation (see Tanya Rosenblat on the beauty premium in negotiation and Laura Kray and Connson Locke on flirtation).
Perhaps the most important development in the study of gender in negotiation in the past ten years has been the movement from studying gender as a "personality" variable to examining "gender in context." Male and female negotiators sometimes fulfill the sex stereotypic expectations that men will be more competitive bargainers and claim a greater portion of the pie than women, but people's gender is not a consistent predictor of their negotiating behavior or performance. As illustrated in the current collection of articles, what recent research has shown in that gender effects on negotiation are contingent on situational factors that make gender more or less relevant, salient, and influential. The articles in this collection also demonstrate that some of those situations in which gender effects do arise have important economic and career implications.
We have organized the articles in three sections around the following topics: defining the negotiation table, interacting at the negotiating table, and leaving the negotiating table.
The articles in the first section on Defining the Table highlight how relationships away from the bargaining table —often ignored in negotiation research —influence gender effects on negotiation at the bargaining table. For instance, Bowles and McGinn review research on gender in job negotiations and argue that gender effects on negotiations with employers cannot be understood in isolation from the effects of gender in household bargaining. They describe research findings on the situational factors that moderate gender effects on job negotiations, including the degree of ambiguity about what is available for negotiation, the salience of sex stereotypes about how men and women will and should behave in job negotiations, gender differences in pay expectations, and gender ideology with regard to the division of household labor.
In the same section, Croson, Marks, and Snyder present the results of a laboratory experiment in which they found that gender effects on group coordination varied depending on group members' outside relationships (i.e., belonging to a sorority/fraternity). For instance, they found that women's groups coordination improved when they belonged to a shared identity whereas men's worsened.
The articles in the second section on Interacting at the Table present research on how one's own gender and the gender of one's counterpart can influence negotiation-related behaviors, such as economic cooperation and the propensity to compete. Eckel, de Oliveira, and Grossman review the literature on how gender influences altruism and cooperation in bargaining-related decisions. The research that they review found that gender effects vary substantially and depend less reliably on the gender of the decision maker than on situational factors, such as whether the behavior is public or private (e.g., women seem to be more generous than men in public but not in private). These studies have indicated that gender differences in behavior are often a response to sex stereotypical expectations that cause women and men to feel that they must comply with some implicit norm (e.g., women are expected to care more about others and be more generous than men.)
Niederle and Vesterlund review the results of three experiments on gender and competition that indicated that women are more prone to compete in same-sex than in mixed-sex situations. In one of these studies, they found that a quota-type affirmative action intervention motivated women to compete, in part because they perceived themselves to be competing more with other women than with men.
Rosenblat presents a study from a new line of research on the "beauty premium" in negotiation. She found that the combined verbal and physical attractiveness of one's counterpart had a greater positive influence on women's than on men's generosity, and proposes new research directions for illuminating the effects of physical attractiveness and gender on negotiation.
Kray and Locke present the results of two studies on perceptions of flirtation in negotiation. They found that trained negotiators tend to dismiss the effectiveness of flirtation as a negotiation strategy but that study participants perceived more flirtatious negotiators to be more likable, if less authentic. They discuss directions for future research, including whether women are more likely to be perceived, for good or bad, as more flirtatious that men.
Our final section on Leaving the Table explores the implications of gender differences in the propensity to negotiate. We include one article in this section by Greig, which presents the results of her field study of the career consequences of gender differences in the propensity to negotiate. She conducted her study in a large financial institution by collecting behavioral measures of the propensity to negotiate. She then combined those behavioral data with additional survey data and human resources records to show that women's lower propensity to negotiate (as compared to men's) helped explain why women in this organization seemed to be riding a "slow elevator" when trying to advance up the ranks.
Take together, these articles give readers a sense of the diversity methodologies and paradigms that have been used to study gender in negotiation. Croson, Marks, Snyder, Eckel, de Oliveira, Grossman, Niederle, Vesterlund, and Rosenblat — all experimental economists — use highly controlled, abstract games with anonymous interactions. Bowles and McGinn present the results of research based on field surveys and interviews as well as psychological and economic experiences. As with Kray and Locke's second study, most of the psychological experiments reviewed by Bowles and McGinn invite study participants to engage in simulated real-life negotiation scenarios, such as salary discussions or business deals. The participants generally engage in face-to-face negotiations with one another or evaluate the behavior of videotaped negotiators. Greig combines different approaches, matching up survey, archival, and behavioral data to measure the impact off gender differences in negotiation on career advancement within an actual organization.
This collection provides a snapshot of a growing body of research, some of which is naturally more mature than others. Certain articles in the collection have clear prescriptive implications, while others offer additional exciting questions rather than conclusions. We hope that the insights of this work will be useful to negotiation practitioners, teachers, and students, and that the open questions will stir readers' curiosity and research ambitions. Perhaps, most importantly, we hope that this work will whet readers' appetites to talk and learn more about the complex and important implications of gender for negotiation.
The articles in this special issue were inspired by a series of conferences on gender in negotiation, jointly hosted by the Women and Public Policy Program at Harvard Kennedy School and the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. We thank the authors for their interesting contributions, the conference participants for their helpful comments and stimulating discussions, and the Provost's Fund for Interfaculty Collaboration at Harvard University and the Women's Leadership Board at Harvard Kennedy School for their generous support.
Four experiments show that gender differences in the propensity to initiate negotiations may be explained by differential treatment of men and women when they attempt to negotiate. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants evaluated written accounts of candidates who did or did not initiate negotiations for higher compensation. Evaluators penalized female candidates more than male candidates for initiating negotiations. In Experiment 3, participants evaluated videotapes of candidates who accepted compensation offers or initiated negotiations. Male evaluators penalized female candidates more than male candidates for initiating negotiations; female evaluators penalized all candidates for initiating negotiations. Perceptions of niceness and demandingness explained resistance to female negotiators. In Experiment 4, participants adopted the candidate’s perspective and assessed whether to initiate negotiations in same scenario used in Experiment 3. With male evaluators, women were less inclined than men to negotiate, and nervousness explained this effect. There was no gender difference when evaluator was female.
We tested the effectiveness of prepayment for advice and aligned incentives as mechanisms for enhancing trust in unfamiliar advisers in decision-making under uncertainty. Participants were low-income Zimbabweans who played two rounds of the Monty Hall three-door game. In round 1, participants who purchased advice were significantly more likely to follow advice for how to win the game than were participants who received free advice. In round 2, the apparent effectiveness of advisers’ suggestions in round 1 moderated participants’ propensity to follow advice. If the round 1 advice appeared wrong, the credibility enhancing benefits of prepayment diminished. If the advice appeared right, the benefits of prepayment maintained. Hypotheses with regard to the benefits of aligned incentives received only weak support.
Style isn't women's problem. The most recent research on gender in leadership indicates that while women tend to adopt different leadership styles than men, they are rated to be just as—if not more—effective on important leadership dimensions. Meta-analytic research shows that women tend to be relatively more democratic (as opposed to autocratic) leards than are their male peers (Eagly & Johnson, 1990). These statistical effects are enlivened by the testimonies of accomplished women who celebrate the development of what they claim is a distinctive voice for women leaders (Rosener, 1990). In a style that fits comfortable for them, women leaders have donned agilely the traditionally male leadership mantle. The popular press cheers that "women rule" as leaders (Sharpe, 2000), and the most recent meta-analytic research on gender and leadership supports their claim (Eagly, Johannesen, & van Engen, 2002, p. 36).
So, why—if both men and women have what it takes to be effective leaders-are women lagging so far behind men in the race to the top? We propose that the gender gap in leadership is not about leading per se, but rather about claiming positions of authority. Where the most significant gender differences in relation to leadership occur is in the claiming of authority—men claim and hold a greater number of leadership positions than do women—not in what men and women do once they achieve that authority.
In this chapter, we explore four dominant explanations for the gender gap in claiming authority: gender bias, lack of experience, lack of motivation, and familial responsibility. There is validity to each of these explanations but there are limitations as well. Each explanation suggests both barriers and opportunities. We argue that each potential barrier is surmountable through capitalizing on opportunities for negotiation. Drawing on recent developments in research on gender in negotiations, we propose an explanation for why the types of negotiations involved in claiming positions of authority are precisely those types of negotiations in which gender differences favoring males tend to emerge. We suggest future research to further explore the barriers and opportunities encountered by women negotiating to claim authority.
The authors propose 2 categories of situational moderators of gender in negotiation: situational ambiguity and gender triggers. Reducing the degree of situational ambiguity constrains the influence of gender on negotiation. Gender triggers prompt divergent behavioral responses as a function of gender. Field and lab studies (1 and 2) demonstrated that decreased ambiguity in the economic structure of a negotiation (structural ambiguity) reduces gender effects on negotiation performance. Study 3 showed that representation role (negotiating for self or other) functions as a gender trigger by producing a greater effect on female than male negotiation performance. Study 4 showed that decreased structural ambiguity constrains gender effects of representation role, suggesting that situational ambiguity and gender triggers work in interaction to moderate gender effects on negotiation performance.
The last few months have been trying for Maureen Park, the managing director of a small portfolio management firm. The firm's parent company, a large financial services concern, was performing below forecasts, and moral among Park's understaffed, overworked team of research analysts was low.
To make matters worse, Park's two best analysts both requested significant raises after their annual reviews. Both women expressed their belief that they were earning substantially less than analysts at comparable firms and probably less than lower—achieving members of their firm—including a male colleague who had been lured away from a competitor.
Park went to bat for her star performers, though management had instructed her to offer only cost-of-living raises. To her surprise, her superiors agreed to offer better incentives to both analysts. Reflecting on her triumph, Park realized with bitter irony that three of her seven direct reports would make more than she would in the coming year; she herself had accepted a small cost-of-living raise without question. If getting a raise was so easy, why hadn't she made a case for herself? Is it possible that her gender somehow influenced how Park negotiated for herself and others?
Businesspeople often ask us whether men or women are better negotiators. According to our research, gender is not a reliable predictor of negotiation performance; neither women nor men perform better or worse across all negotiations. However, certain types of negotiation can set the stage for differences in outcomes negotiated by men and by women, particularly when (1) the opportunities and limits of negotiation are unclear; and (2) situational cues in these ambiguous situations trigger different behaviors by men and women.
These differences can create huge inequities over time. Awareness of the factors that create gender-related advantages and disadvantages can help you mitigate their consequences-and promote a more egalitarian workplace.