# Information and Accountability for Public Services in Ghana

## A Field Experiment


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#### Methodology


- Objective: Test the 'accountability model' - Does improved information affect voting?
- Treatment: Information on the quality of local public services
- From government data
- Delivered through "iamaware" radio debates with MPs
- Assignment: 40 districts randomly selected from a stratified sample using matched pair randomization and coarsened exact matching on district covariates
- Compliance: 7.8% of respondents in treatment districts confirm exposure (i.e. heard the broadcast)
- Spillover to control: Rebroad-casting of information through

Accra meant 6.4% of respondents in control districts also confirm exposure

 But Content of information exposure is still distinct between treatment and control




## The First Panel Survey of African Voters(?)



- Conducted either side of the December 2012 General Election
- In 4 treatment and 4 control districts
- Attrition rate: 34%, of which:
- -74% due to migration or travel
- -11% could not be located
- 11% refused participation
- -3.4% sick or passed away
- Validating the Panel: 70% of respondents re-surveyed within 100m of the original survey location
- Response Consistency: Greater stability in sociodemographic responses than in political opinions

#### **Voters' Information**

- Estimating actual service indicators: Few, inaccurate responses
- Convergence: Impressive convergence to the true indicators. Convergence is faster in the treatment group
- **Balance:** Despite matching on district covariates, lack of balance in pretreatment information between treatment and control groups at individual level



### Absolute vs. Relative Updating

- Complex treatment: Treatment provides information on both absolute performance, and performance relative to other districts
- Interference: Plausible that politicians also mobilized data during the election
- Unmeasured variable: Updating will also depend on respondents' assessment of similarity between districts


Average change across Indicators Control Treatment
Absolute Indicators -9.99% +1.96%
Relative Indicators +10.96% -6.61%

• **Attribution:** Treated respondents do hold and their MP and the President more responsible

	<b>Treatment</b>	Control
MP	+1.10%	-3.50%
President	+3.40%	-2.90%
District Assembly	-1.50%	+3.50%
District Chief Executive	-2.00%	+3.70%

#### **Accountability Effects**

- **Hypotheses:** Mix of absolute and relative updating has ambiguous implications for voting responses
- Winner-Bias: Strong evidence of winner-bias in voting recall
- Treatment Effect: Of those who originally intended to vote for the incumbent:
- -52% of treated switched to a challenger
- -39% of control switched to a challenger



#### Parallel vs. Serial Motivations

- Existing Theory: Tsai et al (2013) suggest there are many barriers to translating information into political behavioural
- But: voting is simple and cheap may require only partial motivation
- For the sequential information-processing steps in Tsai et al (2013):
- In serial, 3.2% of the sample meet all conditions
- In parallel, 32% of the sample meet at least 6 of 9 conditions

