Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

Defend or Repair? Explaining Responses to In-Group Moral Failure by Disentangling Feelings of Shame, Rejection, and Inferiority

Nicolay Gausel, Colin Wayne Leach, Vivian L. Vignoles, and Rupert Brown

Online First Publication, February 20, 2012. doi: 10.1037/a0027233

CITATION

Gausel, N., Leach, C. W., Vignoles, V. L., & Brown, R. (2012, February 20). Defend or Repair? Explaining Responses to In-Group Moral Failure by Disentangling Feelings of Shame, Rejection, and Inferiority. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1037/a0027233

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

© 2012 American Psychological Association
0022-3514/12/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0027233

Defend or Repair? Explaining Responses to In-Group Moral Failure by Disentangling Feelings of Shame, Rejection, and Inferiority

Nicolay Gausel
Østfold University College

Colin Wayne Leach
University of Connecticut

Vivian L. Vignoles and Rupert Brown
University of Sussex

Research on shame about in-group moral failure has yielded paradoxical results. In some studies, shame predicts self-defensive motivations to withdraw. In other studies, shame predicts pro-social motivations, such as restitution. We think that this paradox can be explained by disentangling the numerous appraisals and feelings subsumed under the label "shame." In 2 studies, we asked community samples of Norwegians about their in-group's discrimination against the Tater minority. Confirmatory factor analysis validated the measures of the appraisals and feelings used in Study 1 ($N = 206$) and Study 2 ($N = 173$). In both studies, an appraisal of the in-group as suffering a moral defect best predicted felt shame, whereas an appraisal of concern for condemnation of the in-group best predicted felt rejection. In both studies, felt rejection best predicted self-defensive motivation, whereas felt shame best predicted pro-social motivation. Implications for conceptualizing and studying shame are discussed.

Keywords: shame, rejection, inferiority, moral, condemnation

We all belong to in-groups that have experienced moral failure. Our country may corrupt, our church may condemn, and our company may connive. Because in-groups are an important part of the self-concept (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and in-group morality is central to positive self-evaluation (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007), individuals tend to respond strongly to in-group moral failure (for reviews, see Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Iyer & Leach, 2008). Social psychologists have become increasingly interested in individuals' appraisals and feelings about in-group moral failure partly because appraisals and feelings may help explain how people are motivated to act in response (for reviews, see Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002; Mackie & Smith, 2002).

It is not uncommon for individuals to feel shame about an in-group's moral failure because individuals can readily feel shame about the actions of others (see H. B. Lewis, 1971; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Scheff, 2000). Such shame is called *vergüenza ajena* in Spanish and *plaatsvervangende schaamte* in Dutch. In English, it has been called *vicarious* (Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005) or *group-based* (Iyer & Leach, 2008) *shame*. Individuals can feel shame at the bad behavior of close individuals (Lickel et al., 2005; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2000), family dishonor (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002), their peers' dishonesty (Leach et al., 2007), or their country's violence (e.g., Dresler-Hawke & Liu, 2006; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007).

Based in the prevailing view of shame in emotion theory and research (for reviews, see Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; Tangney & Fischer, 1995), shame at in-group failure is typically thought to motivate self-defensive withdrawal. Consistent with this, several studies have found shame about in-group moral failure to be associated with the motivation to avoid, hide, cover up, or withdraw (e.g., Iyer et al., 2007; Johns, Schmader, & Lickel, 2005; Lickel et al., 2005). However, several studies designed to examine the self-defensive implications of shame have (inadvertently) found shame about in-group moral failure to be associated with *pro-social* responses, such as the motivation to make reparation and to seek forgiveness (e.g., Brown & Čehajić, 2008; Brown, González, Zagefka, Manzi, & Čehajić, 2008; Manzi & González, 2007). Because shame is thought to be self-defensive in nature, its pro-social potential has been either ignored or left unexplained in previous work on shame about in-group moral failure.

We think that the inconsistent findings regarding shame about in-group moral failure may result from the rather broad conceptualization of shame in past work. As Gausel and Leach (2011) recently pointed out, different studies of shame have conceptualized the emotion as involving quite different combinations of

Nicolay Gausel, Faculty of Health and Social Sciences, Centre for Emotion Research, Østfold University College, Fredrikstad, Norway; Colin Wayne Leach, Department of Psychology, University of Connecticut; Vivian L. Vignoles and Rupert Brown, School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom.

As the first three authors contributed equally to this article, their names are listed in alphabetical order. This article benefited from comments provided by David Bourguignon, Aarti Iyer, Brian Lickel, Sven Zebel, and David A. Kenny. Valuable feedback was provided by the International Graduate College, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Germany, and the social psychology group at Université Catholique de Louvain. We thank Linda Jane and Astrid Bastiansen at the University of Oslo for early conversations and support.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Nicolay Gausel, Østfold University College, 1757 Halden, Norway. E-mail: nicolay.gausel@hiof.no

appraisal and feeling. Some previous work conceptualizes shame as a combination of the appraisal of *concern for condemnation* and an attendant *feeling of rejection*. Most previous work conceptualizes shame as a combination of the appraisal that the self *suffers a defect* and an attendant *feeling of inferiority*. However, no previous work has (conceptually or empirically) distinguished these two appraisals and two feelings or assessed their relation to the subjective feeling of shame (i.e., "I feel ashamed").

On the basis of Gausel and Leach's (2011) recent conceptual model of the experience of moral failure, we dissected the shame concept into the specific appraisals of the in-group (i.e., defect and condemnation) and feelings (of rejection, inferiority, and shame) about one's membership in the in-group that better specify the meaning that individuals give to an in-group moral failure. In a first empirical step, we used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to show that the two appraisals and three feelings typically combined in measures of shame could be empirically distinguished. We then used structural equation modeling (SEM) to examine the hypothesis that the feeling of shame is most linked to an appraisal that the in-group suffers a defect, whereas the feeling of rejection is most linked to an appraisal of concern for condemnation of the in-group. This structural model of appraisal–feeling combinations was used in Studies 1 and 2 to predict individuals' motivations regarding in-group moral failure. We expected the concern for condemnation of the in-group → felt rejection pathway to best predict the self-defensive motivation commonly expected of group-based shame. We expected the in-group defect → felt shame pathway to best predict the pro-social motivation sometimes associated with group-based shame. Thus, our structural model of specific appraisal–feeling combinations was designed to show that particular aspects of "shame" are pro-social in nature, whereas other aspects of "shame" are self-defensive.

Shame: Self-Defensive or Pro-Social?

In emotion theory and research, shame is widely thought to be linked to self-defensive motivation, such as wanting to cover up and to physically and psychologically avoid one's failure (for reviews, see Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). Supporting this view, Tangney, Miller, Flicker, and Barlow (1996) found individuals' chronic proneness to shame to have a small, but statistically significant, correlation with a disinclination to admit their faults. More generally, those asked to recall an episode of individual shame show a moderate tendency to report wanting to hide and disappear, as well as wanting to avoid others (e.g., Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, Fischer, & Zaalberg, 2008; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Schmader & Lickel, 2006; Tangney et al., 1996). Similarly, several studies have found that group-based shame predicts self-defensive motivation. In two illustrative studies, Lickel et al. (2005) found that individuals' reported shame (i.e., "ashamed," "disgraced," "humiliated," "embarrassed") about the moral failure of a close other or in-group correlated moderately with wanting distance from the group and from the precipitating event (see also Iyer et al., 2007; Johns et al., 2005).

Shame and Pro-Social Motivation

Likely because shame is generally assumed to be self-defensive in nature, little previous work has discussed the more positive motivations tied to shame. However, a close inspection of the literature shows a good deal of evidence that shame is linked to motivation for self-improvement and for social improvement (for a review, see Gausel & Leach, 2011). These findings are rarely acknowledged in discussions of shame. However, in four studies, Niedenthal, Tangney, and Gavanski (1994) asked participants how much they would change themselves or their behavior when experiencing a shame- or guilt-related event. Those who reported on a shame-related event reported wanting to change themselves more than wanting to change their behavior. In five studies, de Hooge, Zeelenberg, and Breugelmans (2010) found (induced or recalled) shame to be associated with moderate levels of the motivation to restore a positive self-evaluation after failure. Shame was also associated with wanting to achieve in the face of failure and a willingness to risk further failure by trying harder. In most of these studies, shame was linked more strongly to the motivation to restore self-evaluation than to protect it from further damage (by responding self-defensively).

People who recall an instance of individual shame report a variety of pro-social motivations, such as wanting to make restitution to those affected (for a review, see Gausel & Leach, 2011). For example, Miller and Tangney (1994) found that individuals reported wanting to apologize and to make things better when they felt shame. Roseman et al. (1994) found that those who recalled an experience of shame reported wanting to undo what had happened (see also Frijda et al., 1989), correct the mistake, apologize, and offer restitution to those affected. In this study, shame was as pro-social as guilt (see also Frijda et al., 1989). Tangney et al. (1996) found that those who recalled an instance of shame wanted to make amends ($M = 3.9$) almost as much as did those who recalled guilt ($M = 4.1$), and participants reported wishing that they had acted differently slightly more when they recalled an instance of shame ($M = 4.3$) rather than guilt ($M = 4.0$).

In another study, Schmader and Lickel (2006) asked participants to remember a time when they felt either shame or guilt. For events that participants had caused, they reported wanting to repair the damage slightly more when recalling shame ($M = 7.0$) than guilt ($M = 6.8$). Moreover, the degree of participants' reported shame was correlated with wanting to repair the situation ($r = .29$). Importantly, in several recent studies, de Hooge, Breugelmans, and Zeelenberg (2008) showed that inducing shame in individuals led to actual pro-social behavior. That is, either failing at a task or reliving an experience of shame led to greater cooperation in social dilemma games. Despite this extensive evidence, the positive potential of shame is typically ignored or treated as an unexplained anomaly in the literature (see also de Hooge et al., 2008; Ferguson, Brugman, White, & Eyre, 2007; Gausel & Leach, 2011).

As with individual shame, researchers have argued similarly that group-based shame should be associated with the self-defensive motivation to withdraw. Despite this, numerous studies have (inadvertently) found group-based shame to predict pro-social motivation (for a review, see Gausel & Leach, 2011). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, Serbian adolescents' shame about their in-group's ethnic violence predicted support for reparation to victims (Brown & Čehajić, 2008). In a study of U.S. university students' views of the then-current war in Iraq, Iyer et al. (2007, Study 1) found shame to correlate more strongly than guilt with support for efforts at compensation to Iraqis ($r = .55$ vs. $.39$) and confrontation of those responsible ($r = .46$ vs. $.22$). In several

studies of Chilean adolescents, support for reparations to indigenous people was moderately associated with both shame and guilt (Brown et al., 2008; see also Manzi & González, 2007). In another example, Dresler-Hawke and Liu (2006) asked more than 500 German university students about the shame they felt about the country's Nazi past. This shame was moderately correlated with a sense of responsibility for the past and for making restitution in the present. This consistent association between group-based shame and pro-social motivation challenges the prevailing view of shame as self-defensive in nature. However, without some theoretical explanation for why shame might be pro-social, findings such as this may continue to be ignored or treated as unexplained anomalies. Thus, the field is in need of a conceptual model that can explain how shame can be pro-social in some instances (and self-defensive in others).

Explaining the pro-social potential of shame. The prevailing view of shame cannot explain its pro-social potential because it conceptualizes (and sometimes measures) shame as inherently self-defensive (see Gausel & Leach, 2011). In the prevailing view, shame is thought to be closely linked to an appraisal that a failure highlights a profound defect in the self. This defect is thought to be profound because it is seen as unalterable, rendering self-improvement impossible (e.g., Tracy & Robins, 2006). Thus, shame is thought to be marked by a feeling of inferiority—a debilitating state of extreme self-criticism (see H. B. Lewis, 1971; for reviews, see Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). If a failure so clearly highlights a profound defect that makes one feel inferior, what else can one do but withdraw from the scene of the failure? Thus, it is the conceptualization of shame as a debilitating feeling of inferiority that leads to the expectation that shame promotes the self-defensive motivation to withdraw (see H. B. Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 1992; Tangney & Dearing, 2002).

The substantial evidence that shame is associated with motivation and effort at self-improvement and social improvement suggests that shame should not be conceptualized as a debilitating feeling of inferiority. This is one of the main reasons that Gausel and Leach (2011) recently offered a conceptual model of the experience of moral failure that took as its central aim a reconceptualization of shame. They acknowledged that the subjective feeling of shame is best conceptualized as being linked to an appraisal of a defect in the self. Thus, they conceptualized shame about moral failure as being defined by the particular appraisal–feeling combination of appraisal of (moral) defect → felt shame. However, Gausel and Leach argued that the appraisal that a specific moral failure highlights a defect in the self can be emotionally experienced in at least two distinct ways. One may feel shame or one may feel inferiority. They argued that the debilitating feeling of extreme self-criticism commonly conceptualized as shame is actually better thought of as a feeling of inferiority. Thus, felt shame and felt inferiority are conceptualized as two different dysphoric, self-critical feelings about failure.

When felt shame is distinguished from the more debilitating state of felt inferiority, felt shame need not be conceptualized as self-defensive in nature. Indeed, several psychological (Ferguson et al., 2007; Keltner & Harker, 1998) and sociological (see Ahmed, Harris, Braithwaite, & Braithwaite, 2001; Scheff, 2000) approaches view felt shame as an important signal to the self that one's moral defect should be redressed (for a review, see Gausel & Leach, 2011). The most obvious way to redress a specific moral defect is to make restitution to those adversely affected (Leach et al., 2002). Such restitution can redeem the self by reestablishing the self as a moral actor in social relations (Gausel & Leach, 2011; Leach et al., 2002). This is why we believe that felt shame about a specific moral failure should be tied to a feeling of *contrition*—the penitent expression of remorse to another party for having done wrong. Expressing contrition about a moral failure to a victim expresses (a) acknowledgment of the moral defect highlighted by the moral failure, (b) emotional suffering, and (c) a self-effacing request to the victim to recognize the above (e.g., Giner-Sorolla, Castano, Espinosa, & Brown, 2007; for a discussion, see Keltner & Harker, 1998). Thus, through contrition, those feeling shame can show that they are committed to redressing their defect and improving themselves morally (e.g., de Hooge et al., 2008; for discussions, see Ahmed et al., 2001; Scheff, 2000).

No previous research of which we are aware has examined whether shame about an in-group moral failure is especially linked to the appraisal that the in-group suffers a (moral) defect. Neither has previous research examined our hypothesis that such shame has pro-social potential because such shame is linked to the penitent self-criticism of contrition. Thus, in two studies we examine the pro-social potential of the appraisal–feeling combination of in-group defect → felt shame by examining it as a predictor of the motivation to make restitution for an egregious moral failure by the participants' national in-group.

Explaining Self-Defensive Motivation Regarding In-Group Moral Failure

Given the arguments above, how can we explain why shame is sometimes associated with self-defensive responses to in-group moral failure? We think that prevailing conceptualizations of the shame concept fail to distinguish the feeling of shame from the appraisal and feelings about failure that are most self-defensive in nature (see also Gausel & Leach, 2011). Thus, we distinguish between felt shame, felt rejection, and felt inferiority as well as the appraisals of concern for condemnation of the in-group and an in-group defect.

Concern for condemnation. Although there is general agreement that an appraisal of a defect in the self is central to shame, a number of theorists also view shame as based in the appraisal that one's failure will result in condemnation by others (for reviews, see Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; M. Lewis, 1992; Scheff, 2000). For instance, the influential theorist H. B. Lewis (1971, p. 39, emphasis added) argued that "shame is an experience in which a source in the field seems to scorn, despise, or ridicule the self [. . .] it is experiencing *condemnation* from the other or from the field." Although her emphasis of condemnation has not been featured in most contemporary discussions of her work, this was central to Lewis's explanation of why shame is linked to the self-defensive motivation to withdraw (see Gausel & Leach, 2011). However, no previous work of which we are aware has focused on the appraisal of concern for condemnation or examined its link to shame and related feelings. In fact, most recent studies of shame about in-group moral failure have measured (Brown & Čehajić, 2008; Brown et al., 2008; Lickel et al., 2005) or manipulated (Iyer et al., 2007) shame in a way that cannot differentiate felt shame from an

appraisal of condemnation. We remedy this in the two studies reported below.

Felt rejection. In their model of the experience of moral failure, Gausel and Leach (2011) argued that the appraisal of concern for condemnation is typically linked to a subjective feeling of rejection. To feel rejected is to feel physically and psychologically isolated from others who devalue oneself (MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Scheff, 2000). People can use the word "shame" to describe this feeling of rejection (e.g., Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O'Connor, 1987; for discussions, see M. Lewis, 1992; Scheff, 2000; Thomas, 1997). This may be why felt rejection has sometimes been conceptualized as part of the shame concept. However, people do report the more precise experience of feeling "rejected," "rebuffed," "isolated," or "alone" if given the option to do so (Retzinger, 1991). It may be important to note that the subjective feeling of rejection should not be confused with the acts of ostracism, social exclusion, or rejection more typically studied in social psychology. One may feel rejected without actually being rejected by others. Likewise, one may be rejected by others without necessarily feeling rejected.

The appraisal of concern for condemnation can motivate people to protect their social image and prevent condemnation for moral failure (Gausel & Leach, 2011; see also Scheff, 2000). This can motivate them to act pro-socially, for example. However, the subjective feeling of rejection about moral condemnation or other devaluation by others has moderate to large associations with lower self-esteem, negative mood and affect, and less perceived control (for a meta-analytic review, see Gerber & Wheeler, 2009). Likewise, a wide range of research shows that felt rejection is strongly and consistently tied to self-defensive motivation (for reviews, see Gerber & Wheeler, 2009; MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Because felt rejection is so aversive, people defend their self-concept by withdrawing from those who are likely to condemn them (MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Retzinger, 1991; Thomas, 1997). In the case of an in-group's moral failure, physically or psychologically avoiding one's failure, or covering it up, is the most obvious way to limit one's condemnation and thus to manage one's feeling of rejection. Thus, a concern for condemnation of the in-group → felt rejection pathway should explain self-defensive motivation regarding in-group moral failure (Gausel & Leach, 2011).

Felt inferiority. There is a broad consensus that shame is based in the appraisal that a particular failure suggests a profound defect in the self (for reviews, see Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). Current thinking owes much to H. B. Lewis (1971), who viewed a feeling of inferiority as coexisting with a feeling of rejection in shame: "The self is thus divided in shame; it is experiencing condemnation from the other or from the field, and it is simultaneously acutely aware of itself" (p. 39). Tangney and colleagues' influential approach to shame gives special emphasis to H. B. Lewis's thinking about felt inferiority (see Tangney, 1991; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). As a result, recent work on shame about in-group moral failure has incorporated felt inferiority into measures (Brown & Čehajić, 2008; Brown et al., 2008) and manipulations (Iyer et al., 2007) of such shame. Because shame about a profound defect in the self is thought to threaten the whole self-concept, it is presumed that shame leads individuals to defend the self by withdrawing from the scene of their failure. As H. B. Lewis put it, "this global target of hostility makes it difficult to find a solution short of a sweeping replacement of self by another, better one" (p. 40).

People can certainly use the word "shame" to express a feeling of inferiority about a failure as an individual (R. H. Smith, Webster, Parrot, & Eyre, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2006) or as a group member (Leach & Spears, 2008). However, felt inferiority is not felt shame (see Gausel & Leach, 2011). Unlike felt shame, felt inferiority provides a more obvious psychological basis for self-defensive responses to failure by individuals (e.g., O'Connor, Berry, & Weiss, 1999; for reviews, see Ferguson et al., 2007; Gilbert & Andrews, 1998) and in-groups (e.g., Leach & Spears, 2008; for a discussion, see Iyer & Leach, 2008). Thus, there is good reason to distinguish felt shame from felt inferiority in examinations of individuals' experience of the moral failure of an in-group.

A Structural Model of Group-Based Shame

Individuals can feel a number of ways about their in-group's moral failure. We conceptualized felt shame, felt rejection, and felt inferiority as distinct group-based feelings characterized by their unique links to appraisals of the in-group. As in most work on group-based emotion, we distinguish between felt shame, felt rejection, and felt inferiority partly because we believe that these feelings have distinct associations with motivation (for reviews, see Iyer & Leach, 2008; Mackie & Smith, 2002). We expected felt shame to best predict the pro-social motivation of wishing to make restitution to those affected by the in-group's moral failure, whereas we expected felt rejection to best predict the self-defensive motivations of wishing to (psychologically and physically) avoid the in-group's moral failure and to cover it up.

In most theory and research on group-based emotion, appraisal regarding groups is seen as a necessary cause of emotion about groups (for reviews, see Iyer & Leach, 2008; Mackie & Smith, 2002). Because feelings are an individual experience of a group phenomenon, it is quite logical to see the group phenomenon and appraisals of it as causally prior to the emotion (for discussion, see Iyer & Leach, 2008; Leach et al., 2002). Additionally, a good deal of research about individual and group phenomena shows that appraisals can cause emotion. However, emotion can also cause appraisal (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993). Moreover, some emotion theorists blur causality further by arguing that motivation is actually a part of emotion rather than a simple consequence of it (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman et al., 1994).

Rather than endorsing one simple, single, causal model of emotion, we view appraisal, feeling, and motivation as proximate nodes in a connectionist model (see Leach, 2010; more generally, see E. R. Smith, 1996). For us, shame is not simply the expressed feeling of shame but the feeling of shame tied to an appraisal that the self suffers a defect. It is this specific appraisal–feeling combination that defines the feeling of shame and explains why this feeling should be tied to pro-social motivation. By the same token, the feeling of rejection in our model is not an autonomous, isolated construct but a particular subjective experience defined by its particular link to the appraisal of concern for condemnation by important others. Because the feeling of rejection is about concern for condemnation, it is logical to expect felt rejection to be especially tied to the self-defensive motivation to withdraw. Thus, the proposed pathways between appraisal → feeling → motivation in

our model are best thought of as the architecture of a network, rather than a unidirectional causal model. Appraisals precede feelings, and feelings precede motivation, because of their logical proximity to one another in our particular context, not because of a more general cause and effect relationship. The appraisal of the in-group as suffering a defect or as likely to be condemned is a logical antecedent of feeling shame or rejection about this particular interpretation of the in-group given its moral failure.

Although it is rarely discussed in work on emotion in intergroup relations, one of the most influential appraisal theories of emotion viewed appraisals and feelings as parts of a unified whole. Indeed, Lazarus (1991) argued that each emotion is characterized by a "core relational theme" that summarizes the appraisals, feelings, and "coping potential" that combine in the emotion. Given our connectionist model approach to shame, we are interested in examining the logical architecture of its appraisals, feelings, and motivations. Thus, we wish to assess whether our three particular appraisal–feeling combinations are uniquely associated with pro-social and self-defensive motivation (see Figure 3). The tool we use for this purpose is SEM. Although structural models can be used to examine causality, they were originally designed to assess the structure and strength of the covariance between measured constructs. Thus, SEM is an apt tool for examining how well individuals' appraisals, feelings, and motivations about in-group moral failure match our conceptual model of such individual differences (see Leach, 2010). Specifying structural models that link multiple appraisals to multiple feelings serves not only to validate the feeling constructs but also to reduce their intercorrelations (see also Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; Leach & Spears, 2008). This aids the empirical comparison of feelings of similar valence (see Kenny, 1979; Kline, 1998).

Construct Validity

Studies 1 and 2 presented members of a national in-group with evidence of its moral failure and assessed these individuals' appraisals (of in-group defect and concern for condemnation of the in-group), feelings (of shame, inferiority, and rejection), and self-defensive and pro-social motivations. More specifically, Norwegian community members were given an ostensible newspaper article that detailed their country's extensive mistreatment of the Tater ethnic minority (e.g., forced sterilization). Before we could examine our suggestions about which appraisals and feelings best predict self-defensive and pro-social motivation, we thought it necessary to show that our measures could distinguish between the theorized appraisals and feelings. We also sought to validate these measures by showing that each feeling was most associated with the expected appraisal. Thus, we combined the two parallel studies to perform a series of CFAs.

Method

Participants. The 379 participants from Studies 1 and 2 were combined to achieve adequate statistical power (129 men, 250 women; M_{age} = 26.3, range: 18–68 years).[1] Each of these parallel studies of Norwegians' moral failure in the mistreatment of the Tater minority is described in more detail below.

Measures. On the basis of the literature review above, we developed multi-item measures of the two appraisals and three feelings central to shame. We specified these items as group-based by making the subject of the items an in-group (i.e., Norwegians) and making the object of the items the relevant out-group (i.e., the Taters; for a discussion, see Iyer & Leach, 2008). In addition, both appraisal measures were about the in-group as a whole being condemned or suffering a moral defect. All three feeling measures assessed individuals' feelings about the in-group's moral failure vis-à-vis the out-group. All responses were given on a *not at all* (1) to *very much* (7) response scale. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics and intercorrelations.

Appraisals of the in-group. We assessed the appraisal of the in-group as suffering a moral defect (α = .76) with two items: "I think we Norwegians have some moral failing that has become evident in how we have treated the Taters" and "When I reflect on the Tater situation I think we Norwegians are defective in some way." We measured the appraisal of concern for the condemnation of the in-group (α = .74) with two items: "I think we Norwegians could be isolated from the 'good company' of moral nations because of this Tater situation" and "Other nations might not have the same respect for us Norwegians because of the treatment of Taters."

Group-based feelings. The key indicators in many measures of event-based shame contain the emotion words "ashamed," "disgraced," and "humiliated" (Iyer et al., 2007; Johns et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2005; Tangney et al., 1996; for reviews, see Robins, Noftle, & Tracy, 2007; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). English speakers judge these words to be very similar in meaning and of similar valence (Shaver et al., 1987). Thus, we measured individuals' feeling of group-based shame (α = .86) with three items: "As a Norwegian, I feel disgraced when I think about what we have done to the Taters"; "As a Norwegian, I feel humiliated when I think about what has happened to the Taters"; and "I feel ashamed when I think about what we Norwegians have done to the Taters."

To measure individuals' group-based feeling of inferiority (α = .81), we used two items: "When I think about what we Norwegians have done to the Taters, I feel that I am inferior" and "When I think about what we Norwegians have done to the Taters, I feel that I am vulnerable." These items are Based on Leach and Spears's (2008) measure of the pain of inferiority as well as measures of shame that emphasize global inferiority (e.g., R. H. Smith et al., 2002; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Unlike the appraisal that the in-group as a whole suffers a moral defect, the items in felt inferiority are ontological statements of being inferior as an individual person because of the in-group's moral failure.

We measured the group-based feeling of rejection with four items (α = .92): "I feel rebuffed when I think about what has happened to the Taters," "I feel rejected when I think about what has happened to the Taters," "I feel withdrawn when I think about what has happened to the Taters," and "I feel alone when I think about what has happened to the Taters." These items were inspired by research on shame as a threat to one's social bonds (Retzinger, 1991; Scheff, 2000).

[1] The same pattern of results was replicated in separate analyses in each separate sample. For Study 1, $\chi^2(55)$ = 142.64, $p < .001$, χ^2/df = 2.59, *CFI* = .951, *IFI* = .952, *RMSEA* = .088. For Study 2, $\chi^2(55)$ = 83.85, p = .007, χ^2/df = 1.52, *CFI* = .974, *IFI* = .974, *RMSEA* = .055.

Table 1
Scale Intercorrelations and Descriptive Statistics for Scale Validity Analyses, Studies 1 and 2 Combined

Variable	1	2	3	4	5
1. In-group defect	—				
2. Concern for condemnation of in-group	.43	—			
3. Felt shame	.40	.35	—		
4. Felt rejection	.46	.44	.37	—	
5. Felt inferiority	.35	.42	.22	.62	—
M	3.34	2.72	4.49	2.10	1.74
SD	1.59	1.27	1.74	1.21	1.00
α	.76	.74	.86	.81	.92

Note. $N = 378$. Response scale ranged from *not at all* (1) to *very much* (7).

Results

Measurement model. The hypothesized five-factor structure was examined with a CFA using maximum-likelihood estimation in AMOS 17. All five latent factors were allowed to correlate, but the items could not cross-load on any of the latent variables, and correlations were not allowed between error terms. As is common with measurement models, the chi-square was moderate in size and statistically reliable: $\chi^2(55) = 162.71$, $p < .001$ ($AIC = 260.71$). However, given the complexity of the model, chi-square is an inadequate test of model fit (Kline, 1998). Better tests that our hypothesized model fit the data well are provided by a χ^2/df ratio below 3 (2.96) and several chi-square-based fit indices above .930 (incremental fit index [*IFI*] = .963, comparative fit index [*CFI*] = .962). In, addition, good model fit was shown by our observation of a residual index below .080 (root-mean-square error of approximation [*RMSEA*] = .072; see Kline, 1998). The standardized solution is shown in Figure 1. The high, statistically reliable item loadings provided assurance that each latent variable was well defined by its items.

To further assess how well our hypothesized measurement model fit the data, we compared it to five plausible alternatives. For alternative models that are nested within our hypothesized model, the $\Delta\chi^2$ statistic is the best test of model superiority. In addition, we used the AIC as a second statistic for model comparison. The AIC is a chi-square-based fit statistic that takes model



Figure 1. Confirmatory factor analysis of appraisal and emotion measures. Studies 1 and 2 are combined. * $p < .05$.

complexity into account. Models with a lower AIC are preferred because they better represent the covariance between the variables examined (see Kline, 1998). What matters with the AIC is the relative difference between models, not the absolute size of the statistic.

Importantly, our hypothesized model fit much better than all five plausible alternatives. First, our model fit better than a three-factor model where felt shame and in-group defect made up the first factor, concern for condemnation and felt rejection made up a second factor, and felt inferiority made a third factor, $\Delta\chi^2(7) = 366.6$, $p < .001$. Indeed, this alternative model produced an AIC statistic higher than that of our hypothesized model (613.31).

Second, our model fit better than a four-factor model where the two appraisals were combined into a single factor while leaving felt shame, felt inferiority, and felt rejection as separate factors, $\Delta\chi^2(4) = 88.41$, $p < .001$ ($AIC = 341.12$). Third, our model fit better than a three-factor model where all emotion items loaded on one omnibus "shame" factor with the two appraisals as separate factors, $\Delta\chi^2(7) = 773.21$, $p < .001$ ($AIC = 1{,}019.92$).

Fourth, our model fit better than a two-factor model where both appraisals loaded on a single factor and all three feelings loaded on one omnibus "shame" factor, $\Delta\chi^2(9) = 859.41$, $p < .001$ ($AIC = 1{,}102.12$). Finally, our model proved superior to a model where all items loaded onto a single factor, $\Delta\chi^2(10) = 1{,}034.94$, $p < .001$ ($AIC = 1{,}275.65$).

We also examined a more specific way in which felt rejection and felt inferiority might overlap with the feeling of shame. Thus, we examined whether the one item that mentioned "shame" explicitly—"I feel ashamed when I think about what we Norwegians have done to the Taters"—loaded on the felt rejection and felt inferiority factors as well as the felt shame factor in an alternative model, $\chi^2(53) = 151.44$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 2.86$, $IFI = .966$, $CFI = .966$, $RMSEA = .070$ ($AIC = 253.44$). As we expected, the shame item did not load positively on either the felt rejection ($\beta = -.07$, $p > .10$) or felt inferiority ($\beta = -.07$, $p > .10$) factors.

Appraisals → feelings. Although the above CFAs establish that the five constructs we measured are distinguishable, we analyzed a more specific structural model to examine our hypotheses regarding the appraisal → feeling links. This model, which assesses the convergent and divergent validity of our measures, is shown in Figure 2. It fit the data well, $\chi^2(55) = 162.71$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 2.96$, $IFI = .963$, $CFI = .962$, $RMSEA = .072$ ($AIC = 260.71$).

As hypothesized, the three feelings were differentially predicted by the two appraisals. Felt shame was moderately predicted by the appraisal of in-group defect but not concern for condemnation of the in-group. In contrast, felt rejection was moderately predicted by concern for condemnation and only weakly predicted by in-group defect. Felt inferiority was moderately predicted by both appraisals.

We examined a variation of our hypothesized model to statistically compare the links between the two appraisals and three feelings. On the basis of Kenny (1979, pp. 204–205; D. A. Kenny, personal communication, March 3, 2009), we specified a single latent variable (without a disturbance term) as mediating the effects of both appraisals on the three feelings. The path from concern for condemnation of the in-group to this latent variable was set at 1, while the remaining paths in the model were estimated freely. Thus, the relative weighting of the two appraisals in predicting each of the three feelings was constrained to be equal (although the absolute size of these paths could vary across the three feelings). This alternative model fit the data less well than our hypothesized model, $\Delta\chi^2(2) = 7.46$, $p = .024$ ($AIC = 264.17$). This confirms that the three feelings were differentially predicted by the two appraisals.

Discussion

In previous research, shame has been conceptualized and measured in many different ways. The appraisals of defect and concern for condemnation and the feelings of rejection, inferiority, and shame itself have been combined in several inconsistent admixtures. On the basis of our conceptual differentiation of these two appraisals and three feelings, we developed measures of each and examined whether they could be distinguished empirically in pooled data from two parallel studies of Norwegians' experience of their country's mistreatment of the Tater ethnic minority.

Our differentiation of the two appraisals and three feelings that are often combined in notions of shame was corroborated in a series of CFAs. In a comprehensive examination of construct validity, we compared our hypothesized measurement model to six viable alternatives. Importantly, the one item that referred explicitly to feeling "ashamed" loaded uniquely on our measure of felt shame—it did not function as an indicator of felt rejection or inferiority. In addition, our measure of felt shame was not reliably correlated with either felt rejection or felt inferiority when their relations to the appraisals were accounted for (i.e., Figure 2).

Further evidence of construct validity came from the fact that each feeling had a distinct pattern of relations with the two appraisals. As we expected, felt shame was uniquely predicted by the appraisal that the in-group suffered a moral defect. Also, as we hypothesized, felt rejection was most predicted by the appraisal of concern for condemnation of the in-group. Felt inferiority stood somewhere between felt rejection and shame, as felt inferiority was equally predicted by both appraisals. This conflicted basis of felt inferiority makes it an unlikely predictor of either pro-social or self-defensive motivation (Gausel & Leach, 2011).

Study 1

Study 1 used our model of shame to examine which appraisal–feeling combinations best predict pro-social and self-defensive motivation in response to in-group moral failure. Thus, we assessed self-defensive and pro-social motivation in addition to the appraisals and feelings validated above. We expected felt rejection, based in the appraisal of concern for condemnation of the in-group, to best predict the self-defensive motivation of wanting to avoid and cover up the moral failure. As felt inferiority is tied to both appraisals, it is a conflicted feeling and thus unlikely to predict either motivation.

We expected felt shame to best predict the pro-social motivation of wanting to make restitution to the victims. Because restitution to victims is an attempt to make up for a moral failure, it should be best predicted by a feeling of shame based in the appraisal that the in-group suffers a moral defect. Indeed, group-based shame is a



Figure 2. Structural model of predictive relationships between appraisals (self-defect, other-condemnation) and feelings (shame, inferiority, rejection). Studies 1 and 2 are combined. † $p < .10$. * $p < .05$.

negative evaluation of the self given the recognition of the in-group's moral defect. For shame to be pro-social, individuals must recognize that the moral self is in need of reform. Thus, shame should be linked to wanting the in-group to make restitution mainly because individuals feel contrition for their collective moral failure (Gausel & Leach, 2011). By expressing contrition, one shows one's commitment to redressing the in-group's moral defect by criticizing the self and by making restitution to those who have been affected adversely (e.g., de Hooge et al., 2008). Thus, we examined our hypothesis that the felt shame → wanting the in-group to make restitution link is mediated by a feeling of individual (group-based) contrition. The role of contrition here can help to assess our argument that felt shame is pro-social because it motivates genuine effort at moral reform of the in-group and the individual.

Study 1 was also designed to further examine the links between the appraisals (of the in-group) and individual (group-based) feelings in our model. Specifically, we wished to examine whether individuals' identification with the in-group moderated the appraisal → feeling links. Those individuals who most identify with the in-group should have the strongest links between their appraisals of the in-group's moral failure and their individual (group-based) feelings about it (Mackie & Smith, 2002). Group identification is especially likely to moderate the link between appraisal and feeling when either appraisal or feeling is aversive or otherwise likely to be weak (see Iyer & Leach, 2008). For instance, it may require moderate to high identification with the in-group to feel the highly aversive state of rejection. Those individuals who are most highly identified with the in-group should most feel rejection when they appraise the in-group as likely to be condemned for its moral failure. Those who identify weakly may appraise the group as likely to be condemned without feeling implicated in this condemnation. Thus, they should feel less rejection on the basis of the concern for the condemnation of the in-group. As such, examination of group identification as a moderator of the appraisal → feeling links helps show who is most likely to experience each feeling.

Method

Participants. Two hundred and six ethnic Norwegians (83 men, 123 women; $M_{age} = 26.7$, range: 18–68 years) from southern Norway volunteered to participate in a study on "social feelings and identity." They were approached on trains and ferries and in public buildings.

Procedure. Participants first indicated their nationality and answered a series of questions regarding it (including their identification with this in-group). Participants then read a brief article ostensibly taken from the webpage of a national newspaper (*Aftenposten*). The article described the systematic discrimination that the Tater ethnic minority (commonly referred to as Gypsies) suffered at the hands of Norwegians and the Norwegian government for most of the 20th century (see Det Norske Storting, 2004–2005). This included forced sterilization until 1977 (Haave, 2000). Until 1986, state organizations kidnapped Tater children and used this as a threat to force Taters to remain in labor camps (Hvinden, 2001). It was also illegal for Taters to own animals from 1951 to 1974, which hampered their use of animals for transport (Hvinden, 2001). In 2001 and 2005 the Norwegian government admitted that documents confirming their misdeeds had been destroyed (Det Norske Storting, 2004–2005). As a result, the Norwegian government publicly admitted its moral failure and began a public discussion of the country's culpability.

Thus, the study presented ethnic Norwegians with factual information (most of which was taken from the paragraph above) about their in-group's moral failure regarding the Taters. To ensure comprehension, participants were asked to summarize the text in writing. Here, as in Study 2, we attempted a failed manipulation of participants' appraisal of concern for condemnation of the in-group.[2] We then asked participants to respond to a series of questions presented with response scales that ranged from *not at all* (1) to *very much* (7).

Measures. Appraisals and feelings were measured with the items described above: in-group defect ($\alpha = .81$), concern for condemnation ($\alpha = .80$), felt shame ($\alpha = .87$), felt rejection ($\alpha = .92$), and felt inferiority ($\alpha = .86$). The pro-social response of wanting the in-group to make restitution to the out-group ($\alpha = .62$) was measured with three items inspired by prior research (e.g., Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006): "I feel Norwegians should *not* compensate Taters financially for what has happened" (reversed); "I feel Norwegians should help Taters, as much as they can, to re-establish their culture"; and "I feel Norwegians should compensate Taters emotionally (e.g., offer free therapy)." Note that all of these items are about the in-group as a whole making restitution. Individuals' (group-based) contrition ($\alpha = .84$) was measured with the items "If I could I would like to tell the Taters how I feel," "It is important that Taters get to know that I feel bad about this," and "I would like to express my concern to the Taters."

Based on previous research on shame, self-defensive responses were measured with scales of wanting to avoid and to cover up the in-group's moral failure. Physical and psychological avoidance ($\alpha = .68$) were measured with four items: "If I could I would like to avoid encounters with Taters," "I would rather not get mixed up in discussions about Taters," "If I were to confront a Tater I would control my thoughts and think of something other than the abuse," and "I would like to forget about this Tater situation and everything that has happened to them." The three items used to measure wanting to cover up the moral failure ($\alpha = .66$) were as follows: "I think that we Norwegians should make it less clear what has happened to the Taters," "I think that we Norwegians need to be careful about the national information we share with other nations," and "We Norwegians should make this Tater story less prominent in the public consciousness."

We wished to assess identification with the in-group in a way that emphasized individuals' psychological inclusion in the group, as this has been shown to be an important basis of aversive emotions such as shame and guilt (Leach et al., 2008; for a discussion, see Iyer & Leach, 2008). Thus, we adapted Leach et al.'s (2008) measure of *individual self-stereotyping* ($\alpha = .90$) to create the following three items: "I have a lot in common with the average Norwegian person," "I am similar to the average Norwegian person," and "I consider myself a typical Norwegian." For comparison purposes, we also assessed the closely related concept of *in-group homogeneity* ($\alpha = .87$) with the following two items: "Norwegian people have a lot in common with each other" and "Norwegian people are very similar to each other." Because it assesses individuals' psychological inclusion in the in-group, individual self-stereotyping should moderate the appraisal → feeling links more strongly than in-group homogeneity.

Results

The descriptive statistics and intercorrelations of all measures are shown in Table 2. On average, participants tended to report moderate felt shame and relatively low felt rejection and inferiority. In addition, participants tended to express near moderate levels of avoidance and cover-up but high restitution. Given that there was a good deal of variation in these measures, we used SEM to examine our hypothesized model of the interrelations among participants' appraisals, feelings, and motivations. As shown in Figure 3, we specified self-defensive and pro-social motivation as latent outcomes that could correlate.

Hypothesized model. Our hypothesized full mediation model fit the data well, $\chi^2(118) = 242.86$, $p < .001$ ($AIC = 384.86$). This is indicated by a χ^2/df ratio just above 2 (2.06), as well as chi-square-based fit indices above .930 ($IFI = .940$, $CFI = .938$) and a residual index below .080 ($RMSEA = .071$). The relationships estimated in the structural model were consistent with our hypotheses. Felt shame was uniquely predicted by the appraisal that the in-group suffered a moral defect. In contrast, felt rejection was uniquely predicted by the appraisal of concern for the condemnation of the in-group. Felt inferiority was predicted by both appraisals. All of these statistically reliable relationships were moderate in size. Thus, the appraisals explained substantial variance in the feelings ($R^2 = .34$ to $.44$).

[2] In an attempt to increase participants' appraisal of concern for the condemnation of the in-group, we told participants that Norway's moral failure would be publicized internationally. This manipulation was likely undermined by the fact that an in-group's moral failure against an out-group is necessarily exposed publicly. Thus, in both of the present studies, more than 98% of the variance in appraisals occurred between individuals, within experimental conditions. Our structural modeling approach focused on the structure of links between the individual differences in appraisals, feelings, and motivations.

Table 2
Scale Intercorrelations and Descriptive Statistics, Study 1

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. In-group defect	—										
2. Concern for condemnation of in-group	.50	—									
3. Felt shame	.52	.47	—								
4. Felt rejection	.41	.48	.33	—							
5. Felt inferiority	.48	.49	.45	.69	—						
6. Cover-up	.04	.15	−.03	.31	.19	—					
7. Avoidance	−.06	.03	−.14	.12	.01	.41	—				
8. Restitution	.27	.21	.50	.06	.23	−.21	−.41	—			
9. Contrition	.40	.31	.52	.31	.39	−.04	−.34	.49	—		
10. Individual self-stereotyping	.16	.01	.13	.09	.18	.10	.18	−.12	.01	—	
11. In-group homogeneity	.19	−.02	.09	.05	.14	.05	.05	−.03	.14	.48	—
M	3.30	2.70	3.89	1.75	2.13	2.44	3.14	5.01	3.24	4.39	4.51
SD	1.58	1.31	1.71	0.97	1.23	1.29	1.31	1.33	1.55	1.23	1.21
α	.81	.80	.87	.92	.86	.66	.68	.62	.84	.90	.87

Note. $N = 208$. Response scale ranged from *not at all* (1) to *very much* (7).

Generally speaking, the feelings explained substantial variance in the responses to in-group moral failure ($R^2 = .20$ and .40). As hypothesized, felt shame predicted greater pro-social motivation. This link was moderate in size. In contrast, felt rejection predicted greater self-defensive motivation. This link was also moderate in size. In contrast, felt inferiority did not reliably predict either motivation, and both links were small in size.

Although not hypothesized in our model, other links between feelings and motivations were consistent with our conceptual approach and inconsistent with other views. Most dramatically, felt shame actually predicted less self-defensive motivation regarding the in-group's moral failure. This directly contradicts most previous theorizing of shame but is consistent with our hypothesized model. Also consistent with our hypothesized model, felt rejection predicted less pro-social motivation. Both of these links were small in size but are important disconfirmations of alternative conceptual approaches.

Alternative models. We compared our hypothesized model to three viable alternative models. We paid special attention to comparisons of the AIC statistic between nonnested models. The



Figure 3. Structural equation model of appraisals and feelings predicting self-defensive and pro-social motivation regarding in-group moral failure, Study 1. * $p < .05$.

AIC is a chi-square-based fit statistic that takes model complexity into account. Models with a lower AIC are preferred because they better represent the covariance between the variables examined (see Kline, 1998). What matters with the AIC is the relative difference between models, not the absolute size of the statistic.

First, we examined our hypothesis that the feelings fully mediate the appraisal → motivation links. Thus, a first alternative model included direct paths between the two appraisals and the two motivations. This constitutes a partial mediation model, $\chi^2(114) = 241.38$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 2.12$, $IFI = .938$, $CFI = .937$, $RMSEA = .073$. Importantly, none of the four direct paths between the two appraisals and the two motivations was statistically reliable ($p > .10$). All our predicted paths were still statistically reliable. Moreover, our more parsimonious hypothesized model fit no worse than the more complex partial mediation model, $\Delta\chi^2(4) = 1.48$, $p = .83$. Additionally, the AIC for this alternative partial mediation model (391.38) was higher than that for our hypothesized full mediation model. Thus, there was consistent evidence that our hypothesized full mediation model was superior to a partial mediation model.

Second, we examined an alternative full mediation model that ordered the variables as feelings → appraisals → motivations, $\chi^2(120) = 281.75$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 2.35$, $IFI = .922$, $CFI = .920$, $RMSEA = .081$. All of these fit statistics were worse than those for our hypothesized model (for a discussion, see Kline, 1998). Most important, this alternative model produced an AIC (419.75) higher than that of our hypothesized model.

Third, we investigated an alternative full mediation model that ordered the variables as appraisals → motivations → feelings, $\chi^2(120) = 252.80$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 2.11$, $IFI = .936$, $CFI = .934$, $RMSEA = .073$. All of these fit statistics were worse than those for our hypothesized model. Most important, this alternative model produced an AIC (390.80) higher than that of our hypothesized model.

Contrition: Explaining the pro-social potential of shame. In a mediation model we specified felt shame as predicting pro-social motivation because of shame's link to contrition (see Figure 4). This model fit the data very well, $\chi^2(24) = 40.27$, $p = .023$, $\chi^2/df = 1.68$, $IFI = .980$, $CFI = .979$, $RMSEA = .057$ ($AIC = 100.27$). The felt shame → in-group restitution link was partially mediated by contrition for the in-group's moral failure. As seen in Figure 4, about half of this link was explained by participants' contrition.

Moderation of appraisal → feeling links. We used hierarchical ordinary least squares multiple regression analyses to examine whether participants' degree of in-group identification moderated the appraisal → feeling links. All variables were centered at their mean to reduce the correlations between the main effects and interaction term. In a first step, one appraisal could predict one feeling. In a second step, one measure of in-group identification (either individual self-stereotyping or in-group homogeneity) could predict the feeling. In a third step, the interaction between in-group identification and the appraisal could predict the feeling. This third step tested whether in-group identification moderated the appraisal → feeling link.

After accounting for the effect of appraised in-group defect on felt shame, $\beta = .55$ ($SE = .07$), $p < .001$, individual self-stereotyping was not a statistically reliable predictor of felt shame, $\beta = .08$ ($SE = .09$), $p = .37$. The in-group defect → felt shame link was not reliably moderated by individual self-stereotyping, $\beta = .05$ ($SE = .06$), $p = .31$. Figure 5A shows this interaction at low (–1 *SD*) and high (+1 *SD*) levels of the appraisal and of in-group identification. In a parallel analysis, in-group homogeneity had no statistically reliable main or interaction effects on felt shame (all $ps > .10$). Thus, it is simply those who most appraise



Figure 4. Mediation models of the link between felt shame and pro-social motivation regarding in-group moral failure, Study 1. $^{*}p < .05$.



Figure 5. In-group identification (individual self-stereotyping [ISS]) as a moderator of the link between appraisals and feelings regarding in-group moral failure, Study 1.

the in-group as suffering a moral defect who feel the most shame about the in-group's moral failure.

After accounting for the effect of appraised concern for condemnation on felt rejection, $\beta = .39$ ($SE = .05$), $p < .001$, individual self-stereotyping was marginally associated with higher felt rejection, $\beta = .08$ ($SE = .05$), $p = .09$. In addition, the concern for condemnation → felt rejection link was moderated by individual self-stereotyping, $\beta = .10$ ($SE = .04$), $p = .011$. As shown in Figure 5B, those who were higher in individual self-stereotyping felt more rejection when they also were higher in the appraisal of concern for condemnation of the in-group. There were no statistically reliable main or interaction effects involving in-group homogeneity (all $ps > .10$).

After accounting for the effect of appraised in-group defect on felt inferiority, $\beta = .37$ ($SE = .05$), $p < .001$, individual self-stereotyping was marginally related to felt inferiority, $\beta = .11$ ($SE = .06$), $p = .07$. In addition, the in-group defect → felt inferiority link was marginally moderated by individual self-stereotyping, $\beta = .07$ ($SE = .03$), $p = .06$. As shown in Figure 5C, those who were higher in individual self-stereotyping felt more inferior when they also were higher in the appraisal that the in-group suffered a moral defect. There were no statistically reliable main or interaction effects involving in-group homogeneity (all $ps > .10$).

The appraisal of concern for condemnation was also associated with felt inferiority. After accounting for the effect of appraised concern for condemnation, $\beta = .51$ ($SE = .05$), $p < .001$, individual self-stereotyping was reliably related to felt inferiority, $\beta = .20$ ($SE = .06$), $p < .001$. In addition, the concern for condemnation → felt inferiority link was moderated by individual self-stereotyping, $\beta = .14$ ($SE = .04$), $p = .003$. As shown in Figure 5D, those who were higher in individual self-stereotyping felt more inferior when they were also higher in the appraisal of concern for condemnation of the in-group. In addition, there was a marginal effect of in-group homogeneity on felt inferiority, $\beta = .12$ ($SE = .06$), $p = .067$. However, in-group homogeneity did not reliably moderate the relationship between the concern for condemnation and felt inferiority, $\beta = .07$ ($SE = .05$), $p = .12$.[3]

Discussion

Unlike felt rejection and inferiority, felt shame was uniquely tied to the appraisal that the in-group suffered a moral defect. As we expected, felt shame was a unique, moderate-sized predictor of the pro-social motivation of wanting the in-group to make restitution to the out-group victim. And in contrast to some previous studies, felt shame here predicted less of the self-defensive motivation to cover up and avoid the in-group's moral failure. Felt shame is likely to have been strongly pro-social in this study because we distinguished it from the more inherently self-defensive feeling of rejection and the more debilitating feeling of inferiority. By distinguishing felt shame in this way, we were

[3] Although we did not focus on it here, anger at the in-group is another emotion that can predict pro-social motivation (for a review, see Iyer & Leach, 2008). We think that where anger at the in-group explains pro-social motivation, it is mainly because this anger is strongly tied to shame (Iyer et al., 2007) and/or to self-blame (Leach et al., 2006) and contrition. In fact, in supplemental analyses of Study 2, we found shame and anger at the in-group to have very similar effects on pro-social motivation.

better able to isolate and examine its productive self-criticism. In fact, felt shame's link to pro-social motivation was well explained by the penitent remorse of the contrition that participants felt about the in-group's moral failure. The prominent role played by contrition is consistent with our conceptualization of felt shame as a self-critical feeling aimed at reforming the moral self through acknowledgment of the moral failure and effort at restitution to those adversely affected.

As expected, felt rejection was most strongly tied to the appraisal of concern for condemnation of the in-group. Consistent with its unique link to concern for condemnation of the in-group, felt rejection best predicted the self-defensive responses of wanting to cover up and avoid the in-group's moral failure. What better way to escape condemnation and the attendant feeling of rejection than to withdraw from the scene? Although such motivation to withdraw has often been attributed to shame, it is better explained by the feeling of rejection about the concern for being condemned for a moral failure. Felt inferiority did not directly predict self-defensive responses to in-group moral failure. However, given its correlation with felt rejection, felt inferiority had a notable indirect relationship with self-defensive responses (indirect effect = .30). The absence of a direct effect is likely due to the fact that felt inferiority was tied to both appraisals.

Felt shame had a relatively strong link to the appraisal that the in-group's moral failure betrayed a moral defect in the in-group. Thus, it was those individuals who most made this appraisal who felt the most shame. Individuals' self-definition as Norwegian had no effect on this appraisal → feeling link. This is likely due to the fact that these participants were quite ashamed of their in-group's egregious treatment of the Tater minority. Individual differences in group identification should play less of a role in group-based emotion when the feelings are strong among group members (for a review, see Iyer & Leach, 2008). In contrast, experiencing the more aversive feelings of rejection or inferiority on the basis of in-group moral failure should require psychologically including oneself in the group. This is likely why participants felt less rejection and inferiority than felt shame in this study. It is also the likely explanation for why individual self-stereotyping moderated the links between the appraisals and felt rejection and felt inferiority. For both feelings, their links to the hypothesized appraisal were stronger for those who self-stereotyped themselves as being more similar to the in-group.

Study 2

Study 2 was designed to corroborate Study 1 in a separate sample by examining the same appraisal–feeling combinations as predictors of pro-social and self-defensive motivation in response to the same in-group moral failure. In addition, we again examined a model that specified felt contrition as mediating felt shame's prediction of pro-social motivation. To complement Study 1, we compared our hypothesized model to a fourth alternative model not examined in Study 1. Thus, in Study 2, we examined whether felt shame still predicted pro-social motivation in the presence of felt guilt. Guilt is widely thought to be the feeling most predictive of pro-social motivation in response to individual (for a review, see Tangney & Dearing, 2002) as well as in-group (for a review, see Branscombe & Doosje, 2004) moral failure. However, as discussed in the introduction, a close look at previous research shows shame to be at least as pro-social in orientation as guilt (see also Gausel & Leach, 2011). Because felt shame is a more intense experience than felt guilt and is more focused on the self and its shortcomings (for a review, see Tangney & Dearing, 2002), we expected felt shame to be a stronger predictor of pro-social motivation than felt guilt when felt shame is distinguished from the more self-defensively oriented feelings of rejection and inferiority.

Method

Participants. One hundred and seventy-three ethnic Norwegians (46 men, 127 women; M_{age} = 25.95, range: 19–56 years) voluntarily participated. They were approached on trains and ferries and in public buildings in southern Norway about 6 months after Study 1.

Procedure. Participants read a slightly shorter version of the article used in Study 1. Here, however, a picture of a victim of forced sterilization accompanied the text to make it more affecting. Participants then responded to questions accompanied by *not at all* (1) to *very much* (7) response scales.

Measures. The appraisals of in-group defect (α = .71) and concern for condemnation (α = .67) and the feelings of shame (α = .81), rejection (α = .92), and inferiority (α = .75) were measured as in Study 1. The motivations of avoidance (α = .62) and cover-up (α = .73) were also measured as in Study 1. Felt contrition (α = .84) and the pro-social motivation of wanting the in-group to make restitution to the victims (α = .82) were also measured as in Study 1.

We measured the feeling of group-based guilt using four items based on Leach et al. (2006; α = .93, M = 2.20, SD = 1.38): "I feel guilty when I think about what we Norwegians have done towards the Taters"; "As a Norwegian, I feel responsible for what has happened to the Taters"; "As a Norwegian, right now I feel guilty because of the abuse against the Taters"; and "I feel guilty because of what Norwegians did."

Results

The descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for all measures are reported in Table 3. Participants reported high shame about the in-group's moral failure. Consistent with this, participants reported moderate contrition and high motivation for the in-group to make restitution. The mean levels of felt rejection and felt inferiority, as well as self-defensive motivation, were relatively low. Thus, the mean levels of most measures were generally similar to those in Study 1. The mean level of felt guilt, the new measure in this study, was relatively low.

Hypothesized model. Our hypothesized full mediation model, $\chi^2(118)$ = 156.13, p = .011, fit the data very well, χ^2/df = 1.32, IFI = .973, CFI = .972, $RMSEA$ = .043 (AIC = 298.13). The standardized parameter estimates are shown in Figure 6. As in Study 1, felt shame predicted more pro-social motivation regarding the in-group's moral failure. As in Study 1, felt rejection predicted more self-defensive motivation, and felt inferiority did not predict either motivation. Thus, our key hypotheses were supported. Also consistent with our model and the results of Study 1, felt shame predicted less self-defensive motivation. However, unlike in Study 1, felt rejection was not related to lower pro-social motivation.

Table 3
Scale Intercorrelations and Descriptive Statistics, Study 2

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. In-group defect	—									
2. Concern for condemnation of in-group	.34	—								
3. Felt shame	.29	.22	—							
4. Felt rejection	.28	.35	.13	—						
5. Felt inferiority	.43	.38	.35	.55	—					
6. Cover-up	.07	.21	−.10	.29	.15	—				
7. Avoidance	.03	.07	−.17	.13	−.04	.40	—			
8. Restitution	.06	.04	.23	.07	.15	−.21	−.40	—		
9. Contrition	.20	.18	.23	.26	.32	−.03	−.30	.49	—	
10. Felt guilt	.36	.26	.33	.35	.61	.09	−.09	.19	.24	—
M	3.39	2.75	5.18	1.73	2.05	1.86	2.59	5.38	4.02	2.20
SD	1.59	1.24	1.49	1.03	1.19	1.05	1.07	1.46	1.54	1.38
α	.71	.67	.81	.92	.75	.73	.62	.82	.84	.93

Note. $N = 172$. Response scale ranged from *not at all* (1) to *very much* (7).

Alternative models. We again compared our hypothesized model to the three alternative models examined in Study 1. In addition, we compared our hypothesized model to a fourth alternative model that included felt guilt as a rival predictor.

First, we examined our hypothesis that the feelings fully mediate the appraisal → motivation links. Thus, we compared our hypothesized full mediation model to a partial mediation model that included direct paths between the two appraisals and the two motivations, $\chi^2(114) = 150.76$, $p = .012$, $\chi^2/df = 1.32$, $IFI = .974$, $CFI = .973$, $RMSEA = .043$. Importantly, this more complex partial mediation model did not fit better than our more parsimonious full mediation model, $\Delta\chi^2(4) = 5.37$, $p = .25$. Moreover, all predicted paths remained statistically reliable. In further support of our hypothesized mediation model, the alternative partial mediation model produced a higher AIC fit statistic (300.76). The only evidence for partial mediation came from the significant direct path between the appraisal of concern for condemnation and self-defensive motivation ($\beta = .31$, $p = .05$). The other three direct paths were not statistically reliable ($p > .10$). Thus, felt rejection was only a partial mediator of the self-defensive motivation to withdraw in this study.



Figure 6. Structural equation model of appraisals and feelings predicting self-defensive and pro-social motivation regarding in-group moral failure, Study 2. † $p < .10$. * $p < .05$.

Second, we examined a model that reversed the appraisal → feeling links, $\chi^2(120) = 168.87$, $p = .002$, $\chi^2/df = 1.46$, *IFI* = .965, *CFI* = .964, *RMSEA* = .049. According to every fit statistic, this feeling → appraisal → motivation model fit less well than our hypothesized model. The superiority of our hypothesized model was further confirmed by the fact that this alternative model produced a higher AIC (306.87).

A third alternative model allowed the two motivations to mediate the appraisal → feeling links, $\chi^2(120) = 176.07$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 1.47$, *IFI* = .960, *CFI* = .958, *RMSEA* = .052. This appraisal → motivation → feeling model fit the data less well than our hypothesized model, according to every fit statistic. The superiority of our hypothesized model was further confirmed by the fact that this alternative model produced a higher AIC (314.07) than our hypothesized appraisal → feeling → motivation model.

In a fourth alternative model, we added felt guilt to our hypothesized full mediation model, $\chi^2(228) = 332.72$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 1.46$, *IFI* = .957, *CFI* = .956, *RMSEA* = .052. According to every fit statistic, this alternative model fit less well than our hypothesized model. The superiority of our hypothesized model without felt guilt was further confirmed by the fact that the alternative model with felt guilt produced a higher AIC (524.72). Importantly, felt guilt did not predict pro-social ($\beta = .12$, $p = .31$) or self-defensive ($\beta = -.16$, $p = .27$) motivation in this alternative model. Thus, the addition of felt guilt explained no additional variance in pro-social ($\Delta R^2 < .01$) or self-defensive ($\Delta R^2 < .01$) motivation. However, including felt guilt in this alternative model did not prevent felt shame from independently predicting more pro-social motivation ($\beta = .19$, $p = .04$) and less self-defensive motivation ($\beta = -.30$, $p = .01$).

Contrition: Explaining the pro-social potential of shame. In a mediation model we specified felt shame as predicting pro-social motivation because of shame's link to contrition (see Figure 7), $\chi^2(24) = 52.68$, $p = .001$. This model fit the data well, $\chi^2/df = 2.20$, *IFI* = .956, *CFI* = .955, *RMSEA* = .083 (*AIC* = 112.68). The felt shame → in-group restitution link was fully mediated by contrition for the in-group's moral failure.

Discussion

In corroboration of Study 1, felt rejection was again a unique predictor of more self-defensive responses to in-group moral failure. Those participants who felt the greatest rejection about Norway's mistreatment of the Taters most wanted to avoid it and to cover it up. Unlike in Study 1, felt rejection did not predict less pro-social motivation here. It was simply unrelated. This may be due to the fact that wanting the in-group to make restitution to the victims was relatively high in this study. Although the feeling of inferiority was moderately associated with felt rejection, it did not directly predict self-defensive responses. However, felt inferiority had a notable indirect effect on self-defensive motivation (.17). These results further corroborate Study 1.

Study 2 also corroborated the Study 1 evidence for the pro-social potential of felt shame. As in Study 1, felt shame uniquely predicted wanting the in-group to make restitution to the Taters—victims of Norway's systematic mistreatment. In further corrobo-



Figure 7. Mediation models of the link between felt shame and pro-social motivation regarding in-group moral failure, Study 2. * $p < .05$.

ration of Study 1, individuals' feeling of contrition explained the link between felt shame and this pro-social motivation. Thus, the pro-social potential of felt shame about in-group moral failure was based in a penitent feeling of remorse for moral failure. This suggests that felt shame is, in this case, a principled self-criticism that animates effort at moral self-improvement. Further evidence that felt shame about in-group moral failure is not necessarily self-defensive came from the fact that here, as in Study 1, felt shame actually predicted less self-defensive motivation.

Although results were quite consistent with those of Study 1, it is worth noting that felt shame's links with contrition and pro-social motivation were weaker here than in Study 1. We think that this is most likely due to the fact that felt shame was notably higher in Study 2 ($M = 5.18$, $SD = 1.49$) than in Study 1 ($M = 3.89$, $SD = 1.71$), $t(378) = 7.75$, $p < .001$. The high mean level of felt shame in this study likely attenuated this measure's associations with other measures. This is an ironic downside to the rare observation of the strong expression of group-based shame (for a review, see Iyer & Leach, 2008; for a discussion, see Leach, 2010).

Study 2 extended the results of Study 1 by examining an alternative to our hypothesized model that included the feeling of guilt. Whether focused on individual or group moral failure, most previous theory and research has focused on guilt as the key predictor of pro-social motivation, such as wanting to make restitution (for reviews, see Gausel & Leach, 2011; Iyer & Leach, 2008). Indeed, a great deal of previous theory has argued that guilt is a more moral, and thus more pro-social, alternative to shame. Although a close inspection of previous research does not support this view, as shown in the introduction, guilt is still widely believed to be more pro-social than shame. For this reason alone, the present findings are important. Because shame is known to be a more intense, and more self-conscious, feeling of self-criticism, there is good reason to expect shame to have more pro-social potential than guilt. However, because most previous studies have not shown felt shame to be uniquely linked with an appraisal of a moral defect, nor have they isolated felt shame from felt rejection and felt inferiority, they have been in a poor position to demonstrate the pro-social potential of felt shame.

General Discussion

Shame is commonly conceptualized as a painful feeling based in the failure to live up to an important standard for the self. This failure is often taken as a sign that one suffers a serious defect of the whole self. Hence, it is argued that shame should predict self-defensive responses to failure, such as avoidance, covering-up, and other forms of withdrawal (for reviews, see M. Lewis, 1992; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2006). Although the scale and scope of evidence for this view are often exaggerated, shame does have small to moderate associations with self-defensive responses to moral and other failures (for a review, see Gausel & Leach, 2011). However, a close examination of the literature also shows that shame has small to moderate associations with the motivation to improve the self after failure (e.g., de Hooge et al., 2010) and to improve social relations (for a review, see Gausel & Leach, 2011). Although some theorists in sociology (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2001; Scheff, 2000) and psychology (e.g., Ferguson et al., 2007; Keltner & Harker, 1998; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002) have conceptualized shame as pro-social, this is an unpopular view advocated by a small minority.

The popular orthodoxy that shame is necessarily tied to self-defensive motivation has guided most work on individuals' shame about the moral failure of their in-group (for a review, see Iyer & Leach, 2008). This has meant that previous studies were in a poor position to interpret the repeated finding that feelings of shame are associated with pro-social responses, such as wanting the in-group to apologize, materially compensate, or make some other form of restitution to the victimized (e.g., Brown & Čehajić, 2008; Brown et al., 2008; Iyer et al., 2007; Manzi & González, 2007). Thus, for the most part, the pro-social potential of (both individual and group-based) shame has been an unacknowledged anomaly in the literature.

Along with Gausel and Leach (2011), we believe that the paradoxical effects of shame in the literature result from the wide and varied use of the term "shame" by participants and researchers alike. Using "shame" as an umbrella term likely obscures the many, quite different, appraisals and feelings about failure that can be described as shame. Thus, the term shame has been used to describe the appraisals that the self suffers a defect and concern for condemnation by others. In addition to describing the subjective feeling of shame per se, the term shame has also been used to describe feelings of felt rejection and felt inferiority. These feelings and appraisals can co-occur with the subjective feeling of shame. They may also be correlated with felt shame. However, there is good conceptual and empirical reason to distinguish between the appraisals and feelings typically included under the umbrella term of "shame." Most crucially, only the appraisal of concern for condemnation and the feeling of rejection have any obvious link to the self-defensive motivation to withdraw from a moral failure (Gausel & Leach, 2011). When the subjective feeling of shame is distinguished from these concerns for a damaged social image, as well as the debilitating feeling of inferiority with which it is often conflated, there is little reason to expect felt shame to encourage self-defensive motivation. In fact, the feeling of shame is a self-critical experience that should be tied to a feeling of contrition about failure. This sense of confessional remorse for a defect in the self suggests that felt shame should be linked to pro-social motivation, such as wanting to make restitution to those affected adversely by one's failure (Gausel & Leach, 2011).

Models of Emotion: Measuring Shame

As with many emotion concepts, researchers and participants alike tend to use the term "shame" imprecisely. Thus, we constructed carefully worded items to measure each of the two appraisals and three feelings most central to discussions of shame. Because we wished to examine individuals' shame about their in-group's moral failure, we were sure to measure the three feelings as group based. Thus, the wording of the two appraisal items made it clear that they were about the in-group as a whole, and the wording of the three feeling items made it clear that they referred to an individual's feelings as a member of the in-group (for a discussion, see Iyer & Leach, 2008). To make the appraisal meaningful and to generate genuine feeling, we first presented individuals with objective evidence of their in-group's brutal mistreatment of an ethnic minority (for a discussion, see Leach, 2010).

Likely because of our elaborate theory-driven measurement, participants in both studies used the semantic markers we provided in nuanced ways. Importantly, the item that referred explicitly to shame loaded only on the felt shame factor in our CFAs—it did not cross-load on the felt rejection or felt inferiority factors. Thus, in a context where these alternative, more precise verbal markers were made available to participants as possible labels for their experience, they did not use the term "shame" to describe these other related feelings—they reserved this label for just one specific dimension of their feelings, indicated by the words "ashamed," "disgraced," and "humiliated." These results show clearly that our participants were able to distinguish on a phenomenological level between feelings of shame, rejection, and inferiority. Indeed, reports of felt shame had only small correlations to felt rejection and inferiority. And unlike most previous research on shame (or guilt) about in-group moral failure (for a review, see Iyer & Leach, 2008), participants reported moderate to high feelings of felt shame.

It was also important to specify the meaning of the three feelings by linking participants' use of emotion language to distinctive appraisals and responses. If the words used to express closely associated feelings are not distinctively tied to appraisals, or other validating constructs, there is little way of knowing what participants mean when they report feeling "ashamed" or "rejected" or "inferior" (see also Leach et al., 2006; Leach & Spears, 2008; for a discussion see Iyer & Leach, 2008). Thus, specifying structural models that link multiple appraisals to multiple feelings serves to validate the feeling constructs (see also Leach et al., 2006; Leach & Spears, 2008). Thus, we did not identify felt shame simply as a scale of associated emotion words; we identified felt shame as a feeling tied to an appraisal that the in-group suffers a (moral) defect (see also Lazarus, 1991; Ortony et al., 1988). Additionally, we identified felt rejection as a feeling tied to an appraisal that the in-group could be condemned for its moral failure. We know of no prior attempt to empirically specify felt shame, and related feelings, in this way.

The simultaneous estimation of the correlations between appraisals, feelings, and motivations is made possible by SEM. In studies such as this, structural models can serve as models of associative or connectionist networks. Rather than assuming that a structural model assesses unidirectional causal pathways, a model can be used to assess the strength and structure of the connections in a network of constructs (Leach, 2010). From this point of view, the structure of a model is not one of causality but one of proximity; the most proximate constructs will be most close to each other in the network. Thus, as individuals' group-based feelings are about a group, appraisals of the group are a logical antecedent of such feelings. As group-based feelings are individuals' evaluation of the group's situation, such feelings are a logical antecedent of individuals' motivation for group-based action. This *appraisal of the in-group → group-based feeling → motivation to act as part of the group* model is what we examined in both studies. There was clear support for this structure of the constructs over the most viable alternatives. Individuals' group-based feelings "fit" best between appraisals of the group and motivation to act as a group member.

The Pro-Social Potential of Shame

Our structural modeling approach also enabled an examination of how well felt shame, felt rejection, and felt inferiority predicted pro-social and self-defensive motivation regarding the in-group's moral failure. Specifying structural models that link multiple appraisals to multiple feelings serves to reduce the intercorrelations between the feelings (see also Leach et al., 2006; Leach & Spears, 2008). This aids comparisons of the predictive power of related feelings of similar valence (see Kenny, 1979; Kline, 1998).

In both studies, those Norwegian participants who reported higher felt shame about their country's mistreatment of the Tater minority expressed more pro-social motivation. This was true even when accounting for participants' felt guilt (in Study 2), which is usually thought to be more pro-social than shame. Interestingly, both studies also distinguished themselves from previous work by showing that felt shame was a significant predictor of less self-defensive motivation. In both studies, felt shame was linked to the pro-social motivation of wanting the in-group to make restitution mainly because felt shame was tied to the feeling of contrition. Thus, participants wanted their in-group to make restitution to the Taters mainly because they wanted the Taters to know how bad they felt about their in-group's moral failure. This sense of remorseful penitence provides a clear psychological basis for wanting to redress the in-group's moral defect by being more moral toward the out-group (Leach et al., 2002). Because morality is of central importance to individuals' positive evaluation of their in-groups (Leach et al., 2007; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002), individuals are motivated to act in ways that redress moral failure and thereby maintain their individual and in-group moral virtue (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008). Although prior work on shame was right to highlight the importance of self-criticism (Niedenthal et al., 1994; Tangney et al., 1996), it did not allow for the possibility that self-criticism can be redressed most directly by self-improvement (e.g., de Hooge et al., 2010; for discussions, see Gausel & Leach, 2011; Leach et al., 2002, 2006). The pro-social potential of shame thereby illustrates the broad role that felt shame can have in self- and social regulation (Ahmed et al., 2001; Ferguson et al., 2007; Keltner & Harker, 1998; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002; Scheff, 2000).

Explaining Self-Defensive Responses to Moral Failure

In both studies, those individuals who most appraised Norway's moral failure as feeding a concern for condemnation by others most expressed a desire to physically and psychologically avoid the victims and to cover up their country's moral failure. In line with our reading of H. B. Lewis (1971), we found that felt rejection was the best predictor of self-defensive responses to in-group moral failure. This is not surprising. There is little worse than feeling rejected, and thus most people wish to avoid it (MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Hence, those individuals who feel rejected because they are concerned about others' moral condemnation have little option but to withdraw (H. B. Lewis, 1971). The consistent link between felt rejection and self-defensive responses makes good theoretical sense and is consistent with a wide variety of research on social exclusion, condemnation, and rejection (for reviews, see Gerber & Wheeler, 2009; MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Although concern for condemnation by others can motivate efforts at improving one's social image, feeling rejection about this concern tends to be extremely painful (for reviews, see Gausel & Leach, 2011; MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Thus, when the expression of "shame" is based mainly in an appraisal of concern for

condemnation, or conflated with feelings of rejection or inferiority, “shame” is likely to be self-defensive in orientation. However, on the basis of the current results, we suggest that such “shame” is better described as feelings of rejection or inferiority.

Outstanding Issues

There are at least four outstanding issues worthy of attention. First, the felt shame measure used here was composed of explicit emotion words with quite distressing implications for those expressing them (i.e., ashamed, disgraced, and humiliated). Yet, shame is often “unacknowledged” or “bypassed” in an effort to avoid the distressing nature of this emotion (H. B. Lewis, 1971; Retzinger, 1991). Assessing unacknowledged shame is an important challenge for future research. Our reliance on explicit expressions of shame, and other highly distressing feelings that are difficult to admit, is likely to have resulted in an underestimation of their effects.

Second, we analyzed the links between individual differences, rather than the effects of experimental manipulations. Thus, our results do not permit claims about causal direction. This was partly due to our failed attempts to manipulate the appraisal of concern for condemnation (see footnote 2). This is consistent with a more general trend that experimental manipulations meet a great deal of resistance where individuals already have established appraisals and feelings about existing intergroup relations (e.g., Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008; Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006). As a result, individual differences in appraisals and feelings often dwarf experimental manipulations, as they did here (for discussions, see Iyer & Leach, 2008; Leach, 2010).

Irrespective of our failed manipulations, our main aim was to examine the structure of the individual differences in people’s appraisals, feelings, and motivations regarding an in-group’s moral failure. Thus, we compared our hypothesized model of the links between these constructs to numerous alternatives. Given our conceptualization of emotion as a connectionist model, our hypothesized appraisal → feeling → motivation model does not assume singular, unidirectional, causal links. Instead, our hypothesized model represents the logical structure of individual differences in these constructs (Leach, 2010). In the context of an in-group moral failure, an appraisal of the in-group as suffering a moral defect is the logical antecedent of feeling shame as a member of the in-group. Likewise, this feeling is the logical antecedent of wanting the in-group to make restitution (for a general discussion, see Iyer & Leach, 2008). However, given these logical proximities between constructs, the feeling of shame could be induced to “cause” the appraisal of in-group defect. Thus, what matters in our model is the special link between the particular appraisal and feeling, which together constitute the emotion. Which element “comes first” is simply a product of which one precedes the other logically, temporally, or methodologically. In a connectionist model of emotion, the dynamic interrelations between the elements are what matter (Leach, 2010; for a general discussion, see E. R. Smith, 1996).

A third outstanding issue is that we conducted both studies in the Norwegian language regarding a particular, well-acknowledged example of in-group moral failure. Thus, some may wonder whether our results are generalizable. However, Gausel, Mazziotta, and Feuchte (2012) recently used our approach in a study of feelings about tribal violence in Liberia. As in the present study, they found felt shame to be pro-social in orientation. In addition, Gausel, Vignoles, and Leach (2012) used our approach in studies of individual moral failure conducted in Norway and England. In both studies, felt shame was most predictive of pro-social motivation, and the appraisal of concern for condemnation and associated feelings of rejection were most predictive of self-defensive motivation. In these studies at the individual level, Gausel and colleagues were able to manipulate the appraisal of concern for condemnation by leading individuals to believe that important others could find out about their moral failure.

Fourth, we examined only *moral* in-group failure. This is consistent with the fact that research on group-based shame has examined moral failure almost exclusively. However, shame can be felt about any failure that is relevant to the self (for reviews, see Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). Past research has shown little difference between responses to morality- and competence-related failures (e.g., R. H. Smith et al., 2002; for a review, see Tangney & Dearing, 2002). If there is a difference in feelings about moral and nonmoral failure, it is likely to be that nonmoral failure promotes more felt inferiority than felt shame (see H. B. Lewis, 1971; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). It is also possible that competence-based failure might lead the appraisal of a defect to be more closely linked to felt inferiority than felt shame.

Unlike unidirectional causal models, connectionist network views of shame allow an examination of the structure of appraisals and feelings across contexts. In the structural models presented here, felt shame was uniquely linked with an appraisal of in-group defect and was distinct from felt rejection and felt inferiority. This pattern of association clarified what felt shame was in these studies, and thus it helped explain why felt shame was pro-social in orientation. In other contexts, shame might mean something different and thus have a different motivational orientation. By showing what is meant when people express “shame,” our approach can better explain what shame is and thus what shame does. As such, our approach has the potential to clarify the apparent contradiction in the findings produced by approaches to shame that view the emotion as an (unspecified) admixture of appraisals, feelings, and motivations. When an expression of “shame” communicates concern for condemnation and felt rejection, it should be tied to the self-defensive motivation to withdraw. When an expression of “shame” communicates felt inferiority, it should be passive in orientation. Likewise, when an expression of “shame” communicates a contrite self-criticism for a specific defect, it should be tied to self-improvement and pro-social motivation. Conceptualizing and examining “shame” as having these three faces should aid efforts in understanding what is a complex emotion of the utmost importance to the self and to social relations.

References

Ahmed, E., Harris, N., Braithwaite, J., & Braithwaite, V. (2001). *Shame management through reintegration.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Branscombe, N. R., & Doosje, B. (Eds.). (2004). *Collective guilt: International perspectives.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Brown, R., & Čehajić, S. (2008). Dealing with the past and facing the future: Mediators of the effects of collective guilt and shame in Bosnia

and Herzegovina. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 38,* 669–684. doi:10.1002/ejsp.466

Brown, R., González, R., Zagefka, H., Manzi, J., & Čehajić, S. (2008). Nuestra culpa: Collective guilt and shame as predictors of reparation for historical wrongdoing. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94,* 75–90. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.1.75

de Hooge, I. E., Breugelmans, S. M., & Zeelenberg, M. (2008). Not so ugly after all: When shame acts as a commitment device. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95,* 933–943. doi:10.1037/a0011991

de Hooge, I. E., Zeelenberg, M., & Breugelmans, S. M. (2010). Restore and protect motivations following shame. *Cognition & Emotion, 24,* 111–127. doi:10.1080/02699930802584466

Det Norske Storting. (2004–2005). *Innstilling fra justiskomiteen om erstatningsordning for krigsbarn og erstatningsordninger for Romanifolk/Tatere og eldre utdanningsskadelidende Samer og Kvener* (Innst. S.nr. 152) [Recommendation from the Department of Justice regarding the arrangement of compensation for children of war and the arrangement of compensation regarding Romani people/Taters and elderly education hindered Samis and Kvener]. Retrieved from http://www.stortinget.no/Global/pdf/Innstillinger/Stortinget/2004-2005/inns-200405-152.pdf

Dresler-Hawke, E., & Liu, J. H. (2006). Collective shame and the positioning of German social identity. *Psicología Politica, 32,* 131–153.

Ellemers, N., Pagliaro, S., Barreto, M., & Leach, C. W. (2008). Is it better to be moral than smart? The effects of morality and competence norms on the decision to work at group status improvement. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95,* 1397–1410. doi:10.1037/a0012628

Ferguson, T. J., Brugman, D., White, J. E., & Eyre, H. L. (2007). Shame and guilt as morally warranted experiences. In J. L. Tracy, R. W. Robins, & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), *The self-conscious emotions: Theory and research* (pp. 330–348). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Frijda, N. H., Kuipers, P., & ter Schure, E. (1989). Relations among emotion, appraisal, and emotional action readiness. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57,* 212–228. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.57.2.212

Gausel, N., & Leach, C. W. (2011). Concern for self-image and social image in the management of moral failure: Rethinking shame. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 41,* 468–478. doi:10.1002/ejsp.803

Gausel, N., Mazziotta, A., & Feuchte, F. (2012). *The role of shame, guilt and other-condemnation in response to attack or repair responses between perpetrators and victims in Liberia*. Unpublished manuscript, Østfold University College, Halden, Norway.

Gausel, N., Vignoles, V. L., & Leach, C. W. (2012). *What if they find out? The role of shame, inferiority and rejection in response to immorality and the risk of condemnation.* Manuscript submitted for publication, Østfold University College, Halden, Norway.

Gerber, J., & Wheeler, L. (2009). On being rejected: A meta-analysis of experimental research on rejection. *Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4,* 468–488. doi:10.1111/j.1745-6924.2009.01158.x

Gilbert, P., & Andrews, B. (Eds.). (1998). *Shame: Interpersonal behavior, psychopathology, and culture* (pp. 78–98). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Giner-Sorolla, R., Castano, E., Espinosa, P., & Brown, R. J. (2008). Shame expressions reduce the recipient's insult from outgroup reparations. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44,* 519–526. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2007.08.003

Haave, P. (2000). *Sterilisering av Tatere 1934–1977: En historisk undersøkelse av lov og praksis* [The sterilization of Taters, 1934–1977: A historical investigation of law and practice]. Oslo, Norway: Norges Forskningsråd.

Harth, N. S., Kessler, T., & Leach, C. W. (2008). Advantaged group's emotional reactions to intergroup inequality: The dynamics of pride, guilt, and sympathy. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34,* 115–129. doi:10.1177/0146167207309193

Hvinden, B. (2001). *Storsamfunn og minoritet: Sammendrag av resultatene av delprogram om Romanifolket (Taterne) og det norske samfunnet* [The larger society and minority: Summary of the results from the part program on Romany people (Taters) and the Norwegian society]. Oslo, Norway: Norges Forskningsråd, Kultur og Samfunn.

Iyer, A., & Leach, C. W. (2008). Emotion in inter-group relations. *European Review of Social Psychology, 19,* 86–125. doi:10.1080/10463280802079738

Iyer, A., Schmader, T., & Lickel, B. (2007). Why individuals protest the perceived transgressions of their country: The role of anger, shame, and guilt. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33,* 572–587. doi:10.1177/0146167206297402

Johns, M., Schmader, T., & Lickel, B. (2005). Ashamed to be an American? The role of identification in predicting vicarious shame for anti-Arab prejudice after 9-11. *Self and Identity, 4,* 331–348. doi:10.1080/15298860500145822

Keltner, D., Ellsworth, P. C., & Edwards, K. (1993). Beyond simple pessimism: Effects of sadness and anger on social perception. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64,* 740–752. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.64.5.740

Keltner, D., & Harker, L. A. (1998). The forms and functions of the nonverbal signal of shame. In P. Gilbert & B. Andrews (Eds.), *Shame: Interpersonal behavior, psychopathology, and culture* (pp. 78–98). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Kenny, D. A. (1979). *Correlation and causality.* New York, NY: Wiley.

Kline, R. B. (1998). *Principles and practice of structural equation modeling.* New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Lazarus, R. S. (1991). *Emotion and adaptation.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Leach, C. W. (2010). The person in political emotion. *Journal of Personality, 78,* 1827–1860. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2010.00671.x

Leach, C. W., Ellemers, N., & Barreto, M. (2007). Group virtue: The importance of morality (vs. competence and sociability) in the positive evaluation of in-groups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93,* 234–249. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.93.2.234

Leach, C. W., Iyer, A., & Pedersen, A. (2006). Guilt and anger about in-group advantage as explanations of the willingness for political action. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32,* 1232–1245. doi:10.1177/0146167206289729

Leach, C. W., Snider, N., & Iyer, A. (2002). Spoiling the consciences of the fortunate: The experience of relative advantage and support for social equality. In I. Walker & H. J. Smith (Eds.), *Relative deprivation: Specification, development, & integration* (pp. 136–163). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Leach, C. W., & Spears, R. (2008). "A vengefulness of the impotent": The pain of in-group inferiority and schadenfreude toward successful outgroups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95,* 1383–1396. doi:10.1037/a0012629

Leach, C. W., van Zomeren, M., Zebel, S., Vliek, M. L. W., Pennekamp, S. F., Doosje, B., . . . Spears, R. (2008). Group-level self-definition and self-investment: A hierarchical (multicomponent) model of in-group identification. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95,* 144–165. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.95.1.144

Lewis, H. B. (1971). *Shame and guilt in neurosis.* New York, NY: International Universities Press.

Lewis, M. (1992). *Shame: The exposed self.* New York, NY: Free Press.

Lickel, B., Schmader, T., Curtis, M., Scarnier, M., & Ames, D. R. (2005). Vicarious shame and guilt. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 8,* 145–157. doi:10.1177/1368430205051064

MacDonald, G., & Leary, M. R. (2005). Why does social exclusion hurt? The relationship between social and physical pain. *Psychological Bulletin, 131,* 202–223. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.131.2.202

Mackie, D. M., & Smith, E. R. (Eds.). (2002). *From prejudice to intergroup emotions: Differentiated reactions to social groups.* New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Manzi, J., & González, R. (2007). Forgiveness and reparation in Chile: The role of cognitive and emotional intergroup antecedents. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 13,* 71–91. doi:10.1080/10781910709336769

Miller, R. S., & Tangney, J. P. (1994). Differentiating embarrassment and shame. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 13,* 273–287. doi:10.1521/jscp.1994.13.3.273

Niedenthal, P. M., Tangney, J., & Gavanski, I. (1994). "If only I weren't" versus "if only I hadn't": Discriminating shame and guilt in counterfactual thinking. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67,* 585–595. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.67.4.585

O'Connor, L. E., Berry, J. W., & Weiss, J. (1999). Interpersonal guilt, shame, and psychological problems. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 18,* 181–203. doi:10.1521/jscp.1999.18.2.181

Ortony, A., Clore, G. L., & Collins, A. (1988). *The cognitive structure of emotions.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511571299

Retzinger, S. (1991). *Violent emotions: Shame and rage in marital quarrels.* Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Robins, R. W., Noftle, E. E., & Tracy, J. L. (2007). Assessing self-conscious emotions: A review of self-report and nonverbal measures. In J. L. Tracy, R. W. Robins, & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), *The self-conscious emotions: Theory and research* (pp. 443–467). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Rodriguez Mosquera, P. M., Manstead, A. S. R., & Fischer, A. H. (2000). The role of honor-related values in the elicitation, experience and communication of pride, shame and anger: Spain and the Netherlands compared. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26,* 833–844. doi:10.1177/0146167200269008

Rodriguez Mosquera, P. M., Manstead, A. S. R., & Fischer, A. H. (2002). The role of honour concerns in emotional reactions to offences. *Cognition & Emotion, 16,* 143–163. doi:10.1080/02699930143000167

Rodriguez Mosquera, P. M., Manstead, A. S. R., Fischer, A. H., & Zaalberg, R. (2008). Attack, disapproval, or withdrawal? The role of honour in anger and shame responses to being insulted. *Cognition & Emotion, 22,* 1471–1498. doi:10.1080/02699930701822272

Roseman, I. J., Wiest, C., & Swartz, T. S. (1994). Phenomenology, behaviors, and goals differentiate discrete emotions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67,* 206–221. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.67.2.206

Scheff, T. J. (2000). Shame and the social bond: A sociological theory. *Sociological Theory, 18,* 84–99. doi:10.1111/0735-2751.00089

Schmader, T., & Lickel, B. (2006). The approach and avoidance function of guilt and shame emotions: Comparing reactions to self-caused and other-caused wrongdoing. *Motivation and Emotion, 30,* 42–55. doi:10.1007/s11031-006-9006-0

Shaver, P., Schwartz, J., Kirson, D., & O'Connor, C. (1987). Emotion knowledge: Further exploration of a prototype approach. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52,* 1061–1086. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.52.6.1061

Smith, E. R. (1996). What do connectionism and social psychology offer each other? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70,* 893–912. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.70.5.893

Smith, R. H., Webster, J. M., Parrot, W. G., & Eyre, H. L. (2002). The role of public exposure in moral and nonmoral shame and guilt. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83,* 138–159. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.83.1.138

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 33–47). Monterey, CA: Brooks-Cole.

Tangney, J. P. (1991). Moral affect: The good, the bad, and the ugly. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61,* 598–607. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.61.4.598

Tangney, J. P., & Dearing, R. L. (2002). *Shame and guilt.* New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Tangney, J. P., & Fischer, K. W. (1995). *The self-conscious emotions: Shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride.* New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Tangney, J. P., Miller, S. R., Flicker, L., & Barlow, D. H. (1996). Are shame, guilt, and embarrassment distinct emotions? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70,* 1256–1269. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.70.6.1256

Thomas, H. E. (1997). *The shame response to rejection.* Sewickley, PA: Albanel.

Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2006). Appraisal antecedents of shame and guilt: Support for a theoretical model. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32,* 1339–1351. doi:10.1177/0146167206290212

Received July 5, 2010
Revision received December 6, 2011
Accepted December 15, 2011 ■