International

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["Case%20of%20Rantsev%20v%20Cyprus%20and%20Russia"],"respondent":["CYP"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"]}

Facts – The applicant’s daughter Ms Rantseva, a Russian national, died in unexplained circumstances after falling from a window of a private property in Cyprus in March 2001. She had arrived in Cyprus a few days earlier on a “cabaret-artiste” visa, but had abandoned her work and lodging shortly after starting and had left a note to say she wanted to return to Russia. After locating her in a discotheque some days later, the manager of the cabaret had taken her to the central police station at around 4 a.m. and asked them to detain her as an illegal immigrant. The police had contacted the immigration authorities, who gave instructions that Ms Rantseva was not to be detained and that her employer, who was responsible for her, was to pick her up and bring her to the immigration office at 7 a.m. The manager had collected Ms Rantseva at around 5.20 a.m. and taken her to private premises, where he had also remained. Her body had been found in the street below the apartment at about 6.30 a.m. A bedspread had been looped through the railing of the balcony.

An inquest held in Cyprus concluded that Ms Rantseva had died in circumstances resembling an accident while attempting to escape from an apartment in which she was a guest, but that there was no evidence of foul play. Although the Russian authorities considered, in the light of a further autopsy that was carried out following the repatriation of the body to Russia, that the verdict of the inquest was unsatisfactory, the Cypriot authorities stated that it was final and refused to carry out any additional investigations unless the Russian authorities had evidence of criminal activity. No steps were taken by either the Russian or Cypriot authorities to interview two young women living in Russia whom the applicant said had worked with his daughter at the cabaret and could testify to sexual exploitation taking place there.

In April 2009 the Cypriot authorities made a unilateral declaration acknowledging violations of Articles 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Convention, offering to pay compensation to the applicant and advising that independent experts had been appointed to investigate the circumstances of Ms Rantseva’s death, employment and stay in Cyprus.

The Cypriot Ombudsman, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and the United States State Department have published reports which refer to the prevalence of trafficking in human beings for commercial sexual exploitation in Cyprus and the role of the cabaret industry and “artiste” visas in facilitating trafficking in Cyprus.

Law – Article 37 § 1: The Court refused the Cypriot Government’s request for the application to be struck out. It found that, despite the unilateral declaration acknowledging violations of the Convention, respect for human rights in general required it to continue its examination of the case in view of the serious nature of the allegations, the acute nature of the problem of trafficking and sexual exploitation in Cyprus and the paucity of case-law on the question of the interpretation and application of Article 4 of the Convention to trafficking in human beings.

http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/sdpage_e.aspx?b=10&se=109&t=9

Report located in the third row of the second page - A/HRC/14/22

This is the first thematic report submitted to the Human Rights Council by Rashida Manjoo, Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, since her appointment in June 2009. In addition to providing an overview of the main activities carried out by the Special Rapporteur, the report focuses on the topic of reparations to women who have been subjected to violence in contexts of both peace and post-conflict.

http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/sdpage_e.aspx?b=10&se=109&t=9

Report located in the fourth row of the second page - A/HRC/14/22/Add.1

This addendum to the Special Rapporteur’s annual report contains, on a country by country basis, summaries of communications (allegations letters and urgent appeals) sent to Governments on individual cases and general situations of concern to her mandate. This report includes summaries of the communications sent from 1 March 2009 to 20 March 2010 (with respect to allegation letters), and from 3 April 2009 to 15 April 2010 (with respect to urgent appeals). The report also contains summaries of government replies received until 17 May 2010.

http://www.anuariocdh.uchile.cl/index.php/ADH/article/viewArticle/11491

El artículo analiza la violencia de género y su relación con la discriminación estructural, y los distintos modelos de imputación de responsabilidad internacional del Estado por actos de terceros que se desprenden de los precedentes de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, en la sentencia del Caso González y otras (Campo Algodonero) vs. México.  

https://cejil.org/en/publicaciones/tools-protection-human-rights-summaries-jurisprudence-gender-based-violence

This compilation of international standards provides a solid jurisprudential research body and it presents a wider panorama of women’s reality in very different contexts revealing the indisputable persistence of gender-based violence in the world, in spite of the advances in the normative field. The selected cases are some of the most paradigmatic ones among those which, to date, have motivated some type of response from human rights protection systems.

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-102332

A., B. and C. v. Ireland concerned three Irish applicants who, in their first trimester of pregnancy, had travelled to England to have an abortion because they believed they would not be allowed to have one in Ireland.

The Irish Constitution, unlike the European Convention on Human Rights, explicitly extends the right to life to the unborn foetus. Abortion is moreover prohibited under the criminal law by section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (“the 1861 Act”) providing as penalty “penal servitude for life”. However, this does not mean that abortion constitutes a criminal act in all circumstances in Ireland. The 1861 legislation needs to be read in light of the amended Irish Constitution, which states in Article 40.3.3: “3° The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right; This subsection shall not limit freedom to travel between the State and another state; This subsection shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, information relating to services lawfully available in another state.”

However, no legislation or other regulatory measures have been adopted to clarify what is meant by the “equal right to life of the mother” and in which situations there is a real and substantial risk to that right to life such as to outweigh the right to life of the unborn foetus.

In A., B. and C. v. Ireland the Grand Chamber of the Court first distinguished between the circumstances of the first and the second applicant on the one hand and the third applicant on the other. It found that the first and second applicant travelled for an abortion for reasons of health and/or well-being, while the third applicant travelled for an abortion as she mainly feared her pregnancy constituted a risk to her life. Moreover, the third applicant complained that she required a regulatory framework by which any risk to her life and her entitlement to a lawful abortion in Ireland could be established, so that any information provided outside such a framework was insufficient. The Court consequently treated the complaint of the third applicant separately.

http://strasbourgobservers.com/2010/12/17/a-b-and-c-v-ireland-abortion-and-the-margin-of-appreciation/

A., B. and C. v. Ireland concerned three Irish applicants who, in their first trimester of pregnancy, had travelled to England to have an abortion because they believed they would not be allowed to have one in Ireland.

The Irish Constitution, unlike the European Convention on Human Rights, explicitly extends the right to life to the unborn foetus. Abortion is moreover prohibited under the criminal law by section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (“the 1861 Act”) providing as penalty “penal servitude for life”. However, this does not mean that abortion constitutes a criminal act in all circumstances in Ireland. The 1861 legislation needs to be read in light of the amended Irish Constitution, which states in Article 40.3.3: “3° The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right; This subsection shall not limit freedom to travel between the State and another state; This subsection shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, information relating to services lawfully available in another state.”

However, no legislation or other regulatory measures have been adopted to clarify what is meant by the “equal right to life of the mother” and in which situations there is a real and substantial risk to that right to life such as to outweigh the right to life of the unborn foetus.

In A., B. and C. v. Ireland the Grand Chamber of the Court first distinguished between the circumstances of the first and the second applicant on the one hand and the third applicant on the other. It found that the first and second applicant travelled for an abortion for reasons of health and/or well-being, while the third applicant travelled for an abortion as she mainly feared her pregnancy constituted a risk to her life. Moreover, the third applicant complained that she required a regulatory framework by which any risk to her life and her entitlement to a lawful abortion in Ireland could be established, so that any information provided outside such a framework was insufficient. The Court consequently treated the complaint of the third applicant separately.

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{"fulltext":["Hajduova%20v.%20Slovakia"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"]}

The husband repeatedly attacked and threatened his wife. She moved to a refuge with the children. The husband was diagnosed as suffering from a serious personality disorder and recommended treatment as in-patient in a psychiatric hospital. On conviction, the court held that he should undergo psychiatric treatment instead of a prison sentence. The husband was released from the hospital and immediately verbally threatened the wife and her lawyer. The wife alleged a violation of her Convention rights for the failure to detain and treat the husband following the first conviction.

Held that the state's failure to order the husband's detention enabled him to make further threats against the wife and was a breach of the state's positive obligations under Article 8 to secure respect for the wife's private life.

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{"fulltext":["Neulinger%20and%20Shuruk%20v.%20Switzerland"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"]}

Facts – The first applicant, a Swiss national, settled in Israel, where she got married and the couple had a son. When she feared that the child (the second applicant) would be taken by his father to an ultra-orthodox community abroad, known for its zealous proselytising, the Family Court imposed a ban on the child’s removal from Israel until he attained his majority. The first applicant was awarded temporary custody, and parental authority was to be exercised by both parents jointly. The father’s access rights were subsequently restricted on account of his threatening behaviour. The parents divorced and the first applicant secretly left Israel for Switzerland with her son. At last instance, the Swiss Federal Court ordered the first applicant to return the child to Israel.

In a Chamber judgment of 8 January 2009, the European Court held, by four votes to three, that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention (see Information Note no. 120).

Law – Article 8: In the opinion of the national courts and experts, the child’s return to Israel could be envisaged only if he was accompanied by his mother. The measure in question remained within the margin of appreciation afforded to national authorities in such matters. Nevertheless, in order to assess compliance with Article 8, it was also necessary to take into account any developments since the Federal Court’s judgment ordering the child’s return. The Court took the view that it could be guided on this point, mutatis mutandis, by its case-law on the expulsion of aliens and the criteria on which to assess the proportionality of an expulsion order against a minor who had settled in the host State. In the present case, the child was a Swiss national and had settled very well in the country where he had been living continuously for about four years. Even though he was at an age (seven years old) where he still had a significant capacity for adaptation, the fact of being uprooted again would probably have serious consequences for him and had to be weighed against any benefit that he was likely to gain from it. In this connection, it was noteworthy that restrictions had been imposed on the father’s right of access before the child’s abduction. Moreover, the father had remarried twice since then and was now a father again but had failed to pay maintenance for his daughter. The Court doubted that such circumstances would be conducive to the child’s well-being and development. As to the mother, her return to Israel could expose her to a risk of criminal sanctions, such as a prison sentence. It was clear that such a situation would not be in the child’s best interests, his mother probably being the only person to whom he related. The mother’s refusal to return to Israel was not therefore totally unjustified. Even supposing that she agreed to return to Israel, the father’s capacity to take care of the child in the event of criminal proceedings against her and of her subsequent imprisonment could be called into question, in view of his past conduct and limited means. Moreover, the father had never lived alone with the child and had not seen him since the child’s departure at the age of two. The Court was thus not convinced that it would be in the child’s best interests for him to return to Israel. As to the mother, she would sustain a disproportionate interference with her right to respect for her family life. Consequently, there would be a violation of Article 8 in respect of both applicants if the decision ordering the second applicant’s return to Israel were to be enforced.

Conclusion: violation (sixteen votes to one).

Article 41: Finding of a violation constituted sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage.

hudoc.echr.coe.int/

Facts – The first applicant, a Swiss national, settled in Israel, where she got married and the couple had a son. When she feared that the child (the second applicant) would be taken by his father to an ultra-orthodox community abroad, known for its zealous proselytising, the Family Court imposed a ban on the child’s removal from Israel until he attained his majority. The first applicant was awarded temporary custody, and parental authority was to be exercised by both parents jointly. The father’s access rights were subsequently restricted on account of his threatening behaviour. The parents divorced and the first applicant secretly left Israel for Switzerland with her son. At last instance, the Swiss Federal Court ordered the first applicant to return the child to Israel.

In a Chamber judgment of 8 January 2009, the European Court held, by four votes to three, that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention (see Information Note no. 120).

Law – Article 8: In the opinion of the national courts and experts, the child’s return to Israel could be envisaged only if he was accompanied by his mother. The measure in question remained within the margin of appreciation afforded to national authorities in such matters. Nevertheless, in order to assess compliance with Article 8, it was also necessary to take into account any developments since the Federal Court’s judgment ordering the child’s return. The Court took the view that it could be guided on this point, mutatis mutandis, by its case-law on the expulsion of aliens and the criteria on which to assess the proportionality of an expulsion order against a minor who had settled in the host State. In the present case, the child was a Swiss national and had settled very well in the country where he had been living continuously for about four years. Even though he was at an age (seven years old) where he still had a significant capacity for adaptation, the fact of being uprooted again would probably have serious consequences for him and had to be weighed against any benefit that he was likely to gain from it. In this connection, it was noteworthy that restrictions had been imposed on the father’s right of access before the child’s abduction. Moreover, the father had remarried twice since then and was now a father again but had failed to pay maintenance for his daughter. The Court doubted that such circumstances would be conducive to the child’s well-being and development. As to the mother, her return to Israel could expose her to a risk of criminal sanctions, such as a prison sentence. It was clear that such a situation would not be in the child’s best interests, his mother probably being the only person to whom he related. The mother’s refusal to return to Israel was not therefore totally unjustified. Even supposing that she agreed to return to Israel, the father’s capacity to take care of the child in the event of criminal proceedings against her and of her subsequent imprisonment could be called into question, in view of his past conduct and limited means. Moreover, the father had never lived alone with the child and had not seen him since the child’s departure at the age of two. The Court was thus not convinced that it would be in the child’s best interests for him to return to Israel. As to the mother, she would sustain a disproportionate interference with her right to respect for her family life. Consequently, there would be a violation of Article 8 in respect of both applicants if the decision ordering the second applicant’s return to Israel were to be enforced.

Conclusion: violation (sixteen votes to one).

Article 41: Finding of a violation constituted sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1652825

By expanding our understanding of human rights and affirmative state duties to include explicit concerns about female health, we provide a more complete articulation of a rights-based approach to elimination of gendered violence, thereby honoring principles of equality within a broader human rights framework. ... While few would question that states have an affirmative duty to implement policies geared at ending male violence against females, many would question whether such policies should include mandated interventions that are contrary to a woman's choice to preference her privacy over her health or safety. ... When assessing whether a nation has violated its duties under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("European Convention"), the Court required states to intervene if authorities knew or should have known there was a risk to the life of an individual by a third party. ... Second, and perhaps more importantly, all of the available data suggests that intimate partner violence is among the greatest preventable health risks that women and girls face. ... Nahide fell into the category of a "vulnerable individual" as a repeat victim of domestic violence who felt helpless because of the inadequate protection the State offered. ... Therefore, while Opuz does not directly create an explicit right to health in the context of gendered violence, it does give life to such a concept by articulating a clear standard of positive state intervention. 

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/jurisprudence.htm

CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008

In 1996, Karen Tayag Vertido worked as Executive Director of the Davao City Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the Philippines.  She filed a complaint against the then President of the Chamber, Jose B. Custodio, accusing him of raping her.  She alleged that the accused offered her a lift home following a business meeting one evening and that, instead, raped her in a nearby hotel.

Ms Vertido subsequently submitted a communication to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee).  She alleged that the acquittal of Mr Custodio breached the right to non-discrimination, the right to an effective remedy, and the freedom from wrongful gender stereotyping, in violation of articles 2(c), 2(d), 2(f) and 5(a) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/Recommendations.aspx

1. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (hereinafter referred to as “the Committee”), concerned about the multiple forms of discrimination experienced by older women and that older women’s rights are not systematically addressed in States parties’ reports, at its forty-second session, pursuant to article 21 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”), decided to adopt a general recommendation on older women and protection of their human rights.

2. In its decision 26/III, the Committee recognized that the Convention “is an important tool for addressing the specific issue of the human rights of older women”. General Recommendation No. 25, on article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention on temporary special measures (see E/CN.6/2004/CRP.3, annex I) also recognises that age is one of the grounds on which women suffer multiple forms of discrimination. In particular, the Committee recognized the need for statistical data disaggregated by age and sex as a way to better assess the situation of older women. 

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/Recommendations.aspx

Through this general recommendation, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (“the Committee”) aims to clarify the scope and meaning of article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (“the Convention”), which provides ways for States parties to implement domestically the substantive provisions of the Convention. The Committee encourages States parties to translate this general recommendation into national and local languages and to disseminate it widely to all branches of Government, civil society, including the media, academia and human rights and women’s organizations and institutions.

2. The Convention is a dynamic instrument that accommodates the development of international law. Since its first session in 1982, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and other actors at the national and international levels have contributed to the clarification and understanding of the substantive content of the Convention’s articles, the specific nature of discrimination against women and the various instruments required for combating such discrimination. 

http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/Worldswomen/WW2010pub.htm

The World’s Women 2010: Trends and Statistics is the fifth issue of The World’s Women and is being produced to coincide with the first-ever World’s Statistics Day, 20.10.2010. The current issue highlights the differences in the status of women and men in eight areas – population and families, health, education, work, power and decision-making, violence against women, environment and poverty. Analyses are based mainly on statistics from international and national statistical sources.
The World’s Women 2010 shows that progress towards gender equality has been made in some areas, such as school enrolment, health and economic participation. At the same time the report shows that much more needs to be done to close the gender gap in critical areas such as power and decision-making and violence against women.

http://aichr.org/documents/

Pursuant to the Terms of Reference (TOR) of the AICHR, this five-year Work Plan for the period of 2010 – 2015 includes programmes and activities of the AICHR with indicative budget to be approved by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, upon the recommendation of the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN.

AICHR is guided by the ASEAN Charter, the TOR of AICHR and the purposes and principles contained therein. AICHR desires that the ASEAN community shall be free from fear, war, aggression and poverty. The peoples of ASEAN shall enjoy the right to live in peace, dignity and prosperity. There shall be a balance between rights, duties and responsibilities of individuals in the context of the ASEAN Community. The Member States of ASEAN and all sectors of their respective societies have the shared responsibility to ensure the promotion and protection of these rights and duties.

The objective of the AICHR Work Plan 2010-2015 is to give reality to the Terms of Reference of AICHR. To that end, the Work Plan is aimed at realizing the aspiration of the people of ASEAN on human rights, strengthening AICHR, promoting awareness on human rights in ASEAN and enhancing cooperation with external partners, as well as to implement AICHR’s overarching mandate on human rights, thereby contributing to the successful building of an ASEAN Community by 2015.

http://www.protectionproject.org/resources/law-library/human-rights-mode...

http://web.law.columbia.edu/human-rights-institute/publications

This Manual offers guidance on how relevant human rights treaties, instruments, jurisprudence, and other sources may be useful for domestic violence advocacy. Divided into seven chapters, it aims to serve as a quick reference for busy advocates.

A resolution ratified by the ICW-CIF GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 14-19 October 2009, Johannesburg, South Africa (in association with National Council of Women of Great Britain and Widows for Peace through Democracy).