Publications by Type: Legal Ruling

2011
CEDAW. Case of V.P.P. v. Bulgaria. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); 2011. Publisher's VersionAbstract

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/JurisprudenceSession53.aspx

CEDAW/C/53/D/31/2011

In 2011, the Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women considered V.P.P v. Bulgaria (C/53/D/31/2011). V.P.P., a minor, was sexually assaulted by B.G., an adult man who lived in a neighbouring apartment building.  Bulgarian authorities waited two years before indicting B.G. for “sexual molestation of a minor”.  The District Court approved a plea bargain agreement that B.G. receive a three-year suspended sentence for pleading guilty.  B.G. continued to live next door to V.P.P. following the assault and no action was taken to ensure the ongoing safety of V.P.P.

The District Court rejected a request to file a civil claim for moral damages and a separate successful tort suit for 15,000 euros could not be executed with the mechanisms available under Bulgarian law.

 S.V.P. submitted a communication under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Optional Protocol) on behalf of her daughter claiming that Bulgaria had violated articles 1, 2(a)-2(c), 2(e)-2(g), 3, 5, 12 and 15 of CEDAW.  She claimed that Bulgaria had failed to:

  • act with due diligence to protect V.P.P. against sexual assault;
  • provide an effective remedy and address the health, rehabilitative and other needs of V.P.P.;
  • provide V.P.P. ongoing protection from B.G.; and
  • introduce specific legal and policy measures and health services to address violence against women and girls.
  • S.V.P. also claimed that Bulgaria’s response to her daughter’s assault reflected gender stereotypes related to violence against women and girls. 

 

CEDAW. Case of Abramova v. Belarus. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); 2011. Publisher's VersionAbstract

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/jurisprudence.htm

CEDAW/C/49/D/23/2009

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has found in Abramova v. Belarus (C/49/D/23/2009) that Belarus’ treatment of a woman detained under administrative arrest violated articles 2(a)-2(b), 2(e)-2(f), 3 and 5(a) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), read in conjunction with article 1 and the Committee’s General Recommendation No. 19 on violence against women.

CEDAW. Case of L. C. v. Peru. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); 2011. Publisher's VersionAbstract

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/jurisprudence.htm

CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009

L.C. was 13 years old when she was repeatedly raped by a 34-year-old man who lived in her neighborhood in an impoverished region near Peru’s capital city of Lima.  Her ordeal started in 2006, and by 2007 she learned that she was pregnant.  Desperate, L.C. attempted to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of a building next door to her house.  Neighbors discovered her and rushed her to the hospital.  But even though doctors concluded that her spine needed to be realigned immediately—and even though abortion in Peru is legal where the mother’s health and life are at risk--they refused to operate on L.C. because she was pregnant. L.C. eventually suffered a miscarriage because of the severity of her injuries. Several weeks after the miscarriage, four months after she was told she needed surgery, L.C. underwent the spinal procedure. She was told shortly thereafter, however, that the surgery would have little to no effect and that she would remain paralyzed. On June 18, 2009, the Center for Reproductive Rights and the Center for the Promotion and Defense of Sexual and Reproductive Rights filed a human rights petition on behalf of L.C. against Peru before the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. The petition charges that Peru’s failure to implement measures that guarantee a woman’s ability to obtain essential reproductive health services in a timely manner, particularly legal abortion, not only violates the Peruvian Constitution, but international treaty obligations. Among other remedies, L.C. is asking that the Peruvian government acknowledge the human rights violation; provide L.C. with reparations, including physical and mental rehabilitation; and issue necessary measures so that no other woman is denied her right to comprehensive healthcare and therapeutic abortion.

2010
Case of A. v. Croatia. European Court of Human Rights; 2010. Publisher's VersionAbstract

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{"fulltext":["A%20v.%20Croatia%2055164/08"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"]}

Facts – Between November 2003 and June 2006, the applicant’s husband, who has been diagnosed as suffering from severe mental disorders with a tendency towards violent and impulsive behaviour, subjected the applicant to repeated psychological and physical violence including death threats and blows and kicks to the head, face and body. She was often abused in front of their daughter, who was herself the subject of violence on several occasions. The marriage ended in divorce in 2006. Between 2004 and 2009 various sets of criminal and minor-offences proceedings were brought against the husband and a number of protective measures were ordered. However, only some were implemented. For example, an eight-month prison sentence handed down in October 2006 following death threats was not served and the husband failed to undergo psycho-social treatment that had been ordered. He is currently serving a three-year prison sentence for making death threats against a judge.

Case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia. European Court of Human Rights; 2010. Publisher's VersionAbstract

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["Case%20of%20Rantsev%20v%20Cyprus%20and%20Russia"],"respondent":["CYP"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"]}

Facts – The applicant’s daughter Ms Rantseva, a Russian national, died in unexplained circumstances after falling from a window of a private property in Cyprus in March 2001. She had arrived in Cyprus a few days earlier on a “cabaret-artiste” visa, but had abandoned her work and lodging shortly after starting and had left a note to say she wanted to return to Russia. After locating her in a discotheque some days later, the manager of the cabaret had taken her to the central police station at around 4 a.m. and asked them to detain her as an illegal immigrant. The police had contacted the immigration authorities, who gave instructions that Ms Rantseva was not to be detained and that her employer, who was responsible for her, was to pick her up and bring her to the immigration office at 7 a.m. The manager had collected Ms Rantseva at around 5.20 a.m. and taken her to private premises, where he had also remained. Her body had been found in the street below the apartment at about 6.30 a.m. A bedspread had been looped through the railing of the balcony.

An inquest held in Cyprus concluded that Ms Rantseva had died in circumstances resembling an accident while attempting to escape from an apartment in which she was a guest, but that there was no evidence of foul play. Although the Russian authorities considered, in the light of a further autopsy that was carried out following the repatriation of the body to Russia, that the verdict of the inquest was unsatisfactory, the Cypriot authorities stated that it was final and refused to carry out any additional investigations unless the Russian authorities had evidence of criminal activity. No steps were taken by either the Russian or Cypriot authorities to interview two young women living in Russia whom the applicant said had worked with his daughter at the cabaret and could testify to sexual exploitation taking place there.

In April 2009 the Cypriot authorities made a unilateral declaration acknowledging violations of Articles 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Convention, offering to pay compensation to the applicant and advising that independent experts had been appointed to investigate the circumstances of Ms Rantseva’s death, employment and stay in Cyprus.

The Cypriot Ombudsman, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and the United States State Department have published reports which refer to the prevalence of trafficking in human beings for commercial sexual exploitation in Cyprus and the role of the cabaret industry and “artiste” visas in facilitating trafficking in Cyprus.

Law – Article 37 § 1: The Court refused the Cypriot Government’s request for the application to be struck out. It found that, despite the unilateral declaration acknowledging violations of the Convention, respect for human rights in general required it to continue its examination of the case in view of the serious nature of the allegations, the acute nature of the problem of trafficking and sexual exploitation in Cyprus and the paucity of case-law on the question of the interpretation and application of Article 4 of the Convention to trafficking in human beings.

Court E. Case of A, B, and C v. Ireland.; 2010. Publisher's VersionAbstract

http://strasbourgobservers.com/2010/12/17/a-b-and-c-v-ireland-abortion-and-the-margin-of-appreciation/

A., B. and C. v. Ireland concerned three Irish applicants who, in their first trimester of pregnancy, had travelled to England to have an abortion because they believed they would not be allowed to have one in Ireland.

The Irish Constitution, unlike the European Convention on Human Rights, explicitly extends the right to life to the unborn foetus. Abortion is moreover prohibited under the criminal law by section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (“the 1861 Act”) providing as penalty “penal servitude for life”. However, this does not mean that abortion constitutes a criminal act in all circumstances in Ireland. The 1861 legislation needs to be read in light of the amended Irish Constitution, which states in Article 40.3.3: “3° The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right; This subsection shall not limit freedom to travel between the State and another state; This subsection shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, information relating to services lawfully available in another state.”

However, no legislation or other regulatory measures have been adopted to clarify what is meant by the “equal right to life of the mother” and in which situations there is a real and substantial risk to that right to life such as to outweigh the right to life of the unborn foetus.

In A., B. and C. v. Ireland the Grand Chamber of the Court first distinguished between the circumstances of the first and the second applicant on the one hand and the third applicant on the other. It found that the first and second applicant travelled for an abortion for reasons of health and/or well-being, while the third applicant travelled for an abortion as she mainly feared her pregnancy constituted a risk to her life. Moreover, the third applicant complained that she required a regulatory framework by which any risk to her life and her entitlement to a lawful abortion in Ireland could be established, so that any information provided outside such a framework was insufficient. The Court consequently treated the complaint of the third applicant separately.

Case of A, B, and C v. Ireland. European Court of Human Rights; 2010. Publisher's VersionAbstract

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-102332

A., B. and C. v. Ireland concerned three Irish applicants who, in their first trimester of pregnancy, had travelled to England to have an abortion because they believed they would not be allowed to have one in Ireland.

The Irish Constitution, unlike the European Convention on Human Rights, explicitly extends the right to life to the unborn foetus. Abortion is moreover prohibited under the criminal law by section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (“the 1861 Act”) providing as penalty “penal servitude for life”. However, this does not mean that abortion constitutes a criminal act in all circumstances in Ireland. The 1861 legislation needs to be read in light of the amended Irish Constitution, which states in Article 40.3.3: “3° The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right; This subsection shall not limit freedom to travel between the State and another state; This subsection shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, information relating to services lawfully available in another state.”

However, no legislation or other regulatory measures have been adopted to clarify what is meant by the “equal right to life of the mother” and in which situations there is a real and substantial risk to that right to life such as to outweigh the right to life of the unborn foetus.

In A., B. and C. v. Ireland the Grand Chamber of the Court first distinguished between the circumstances of the first and the second applicant on the one hand and the third applicant on the other. It found that the first and second applicant travelled for an abortion for reasons of health and/or well-being, while the third applicant travelled for an abortion as she mainly feared her pregnancy constituted a risk to her life. Moreover, the third applicant complained that she required a regulatory framework by which any risk to her life and her entitlement to a lawful abortion in Ireland could be established, so that any information provided outside such a framework was insufficient. The Court consequently treated the complaint of the third applicant separately.

 

Case of Hajduova v. Slovakia. European Court of Human Rights; 2010. Publisher's VersionAbstract

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{"fulltext":["Hajduova%20v.%20Slovakia"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"]}

The husband repeatedly attacked and threatened his wife. She moved to a refuge with the children. The husband was diagnosed as suffering from a serious personality disorder and recommended treatment as in-patient in a psychiatric hospital. On conviction, the court held that he should undergo psychiatric treatment instead of a prison sentence. The husband was released from the hospital and immediately verbally threatened the wife and her lawyer. The wife alleged a violation of her Convention rights for the failure to detain and treat the husband following the first conviction.

Held that the state's failure to order the husband's detention enabled him to make further threats against the wife and was a breach of the state's positive obligations under Article 8 to secure respect for the wife's private life.

Case of Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland.; 2010. Publisher's VersionAbstract

hudoc.echr.coe.int/

Facts – The first applicant, a Swiss national, settled in Israel, where she got married and the couple had a son. When she feared that the child (the second applicant) would be taken by his father to an ultra-orthodox community abroad, known for its zealous proselytising, the Family Court imposed a ban on the child’s removal from Israel until he attained his majority. The first applicant was awarded temporary custody, and parental authority was to be exercised by both parents jointly. The father’s access rights were subsequently restricted on account of his threatening behaviour. The parents divorced and the first applicant secretly left Israel for Switzerland with her son. At last instance, the Swiss Federal Court ordered the first applicant to return the child to Israel.

In a Chamber judgment of 8 January 2009, the European Court held, by four votes to three, that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention (see Information Note no. 120).

Law – Article 8: In the opinion of the national courts and experts, the child’s return to Israel could be envisaged only if he was accompanied by his mother. The measure in question remained within the margin of appreciation afforded to national authorities in such matters. Nevertheless, in order to assess compliance with Article 8, it was also necessary to take into account any developments since the Federal Court’s judgment ordering the child’s return. The Court took the view that it could be guided on this point, mutatis mutandis, by its case-law on the expulsion of aliens and the criteria on which to assess the proportionality of an expulsion order against a minor who had settled in the host State. In the present case, the child was a Swiss national and had settled very well in the country where he had been living continuously for about four years. Even though he was at an age (seven years old) where he still had a significant capacity for adaptation, the fact of being uprooted again would probably have serious consequences for him and had to be weighed against any benefit that he was likely to gain from it. In this connection, it was noteworthy that restrictions had been imposed on the father’s right of access before the child’s abduction. Moreover, the father had remarried twice since then and was now a father again but had failed to pay maintenance for his daughter. The Court doubted that such circumstances would be conducive to the child’s well-being and development. As to the mother, her return to Israel could expose her to a risk of criminal sanctions, such as a prison sentence. It was clear that such a situation would not be in the child’s best interests, his mother probably being the only person to whom he related. The mother’s refusal to return to Israel was not therefore totally unjustified. Even supposing that she agreed to return to Israel, the father’s capacity to take care of the child in the event of criminal proceedings against her and of her subsequent imprisonment could be called into question, in view of his past conduct and limited means. Moreover, the father had never lived alone with the child and had not seen him since the child’s departure at the age of two. The Court was thus not convinced that it would be in the child’s best interests for him to return to Israel. As to the mother, she would sustain a disproportionate interference with her right to respect for her family life. Consequently, there would be a violation of Article 8 in respect of both applicants if the decision ordering the second applicant’s return to Israel were to be enforced.

Conclusion: violation (sixteen votes to one).

Article 41: Finding of a violation constituted sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage.

Case of Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland. European Court of Human Rights; 2010. Publisher's VersionAbstract

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{"fulltext":["Neulinger%20and%20Shuruk%20v.%20Switzerland"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"]}

Facts – The first applicant, a Swiss national, settled in Israel, where she got married and the couple had a son. When she feared that the child (the second applicant) would be taken by his father to an ultra-orthodox community abroad, known for its zealous proselytising, the Family Court imposed a ban on the child’s removal from Israel until he attained his majority. The first applicant was awarded temporary custody, and parental authority was to be exercised by both parents jointly. The father’s access rights were subsequently restricted on account of his threatening behaviour. The parents divorced and the first applicant secretly left Israel for Switzerland with her son. At last instance, the Swiss Federal Court ordered the first applicant to return the child to Israel.

In a Chamber judgment of 8 January 2009, the European Court held, by four votes to three, that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention (see Information Note no. 120).

Law – Article 8: In the opinion of the national courts and experts, the child’s return to Israel could be envisaged only if he was accompanied by his mother. The measure in question remained within the margin of appreciation afforded to national authorities in such matters. Nevertheless, in order to assess compliance with Article 8, it was also necessary to take into account any developments since the Federal Court’s judgment ordering the child’s return. The Court took the view that it could be guided on this point, mutatis mutandis, by its case-law on the expulsion of aliens and the criteria on which to assess the proportionality of an expulsion order against a minor who had settled in the host State. In the present case, the child was a Swiss national and had settled very well in the country where he had been living continuously for about four years. Even though he was at an age (seven years old) where he still had a significant capacity for adaptation, the fact of being uprooted again would probably have serious consequences for him and had to be weighed against any benefit that he was likely to gain from it. In this connection, it was noteworthy that restrictions had been imposed on the father’s right of access before the child’s abduction. Moreover, the father had remarried twice since then and was now a father again but had failed to pay maintenance for his daughter. The Court doubted that such circumstances would be conducive to the child’s well-being and development. As to the mother, her return to Israel could expose her to a risk of criminal sanctions, such as a prison sentence. It was clear that such a situation would not be in the child’s best interests, his mother probably being the only person to whom he related. The mother’s refusal to return to Israel was not therefore totally unjustified. Even supposing that she agreed to return to Israel, the father’s capacity to take care of the child in the event of criminal proceedings against her and of her subsequent imprisonment could be called into question, in view of his past conduct and limited means. Moreover, the father had never lived alone with the child and had not seen him since the child’s departure at the age of two. The Court was thus not convinced that it would be in the child’s best interests for him to return to Israel. As to the mother, she would sustain a disproportionate interference with her right to respect for her family life. Consequently, there would be a violation of Article 8 in respect of both applicants if the decision ordering the second applicant’s return to Israel were to be enforced.

Conclusion: violation (sixteen votes to one).

Article 41: Finding of a violation constituted sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage.

CEDAW. Case of Vertido v. Philippines. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); 2010. Publisher's VersionAbstract

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/jurisprudence.htm

CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008

In 1996, Karen Tayag Vertido worked as Executive Director of the Davao City Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the Philippines.  She filed a complaint against the then President of the Chamber, Jose B. Custodio, accusing him of raping her.  She alleged that the accused offered her a lift home following a business meeting one evening and that, instead, raped her in a nearby hotel.

Ms Vertido subsequently submitted a communication to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee).  She alleged that the acquittal of Mr Custodio breached the right to non-discrimination, the right to an effective remedy, and the freedom from wrongful gender stereotyping, in violation of articles 2(c), 2(d), 2(f) and 5(a) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

 

2009
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Organization of American States; 2009. Publisher's VersionAbstract

http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/women/decisions/ia_court_hr.asp

  • Pages 47-61, Facts
  • Pages 145-150, Summary of Decision
  • Pages 152-161, Concurring Opinions

1. On November 4, 2007, under Articles 51 and 61 of the Convention, the Inter- American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter “the Commission” or “the Inter- American Commission”) presented an application against the United Mexican States (hereinafter “the State” or “Mexico”), which gave rise to the instant case. The initial petition was presented to the Commission on March 6, 2002. On February 24, 2005, the Commission approved Reports Nos. 16/05, 17/05 and 18/05, declaring the respective petitions admissible. On January 30, 2007, the Commission notified the parties of its decision to joinder the three cases. Subsequently, on March 9, 2007, it approved the Report on merits No. 28/07, in accordance with Article 50 of the Convention, with specific recommendations for the State. This report was notified to the State on April 4, 2007. Upon considering that Mexico had not adopted its recommendations, the Commission decided to submit the case to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Commission appointed Commissioner Florentín Meléndez and Executive Secretary Santiago A. Canton, as delegates, and Elizabeth Abi-Mershed, Deputy Executive Secretary, and Juan Pablo Albán, Marisol Blanchard, Rosa Celorio and Fiorella Melzi, Executive Secretariat specialists, as legal advisers.

2. The application relates to the State’s alleged international responsibility for “the disappearance and subsequent death” of the Mss. Claudia Ivette González, Esmeralda Herrera Monreal and Laura Berenice Ramos Monárrez (hereinafter “Mss. González, Herrera and Ramos”), whose bodies were found in a cotton field in Ciudad Juárez on November 6, 2001. The State is considered responsible for “the lack of measures for the protection of the victims, two of whom were minor children, the lack of prevention of these crimes, in spite of full awareness of the existence of a pattern of gender- related violence that had resulted in hundreds of women and girls murdered, the lack of response of the authorities to the disappearance [...]; the lack of due diligence in the investigation of the homicides [...], as well as the denial of justice and the lack of an adequate reparation.” 

Case of Opuz v. Turkey. European Court of Human Rights; 2009. Publisher's VersionAbstract

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{"fulltext":["Opuz%20v.%20Turkey"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"]}

Facts: The applicant’s mother was shot and killed by the applicant’s husband in 2002 as she attempted to help the applicant flee the matrimonial home. In the years preceding the shooting the husband had subjected both the applicant and her mother to a series of violent assaults, some of which had resulted in injuries which doctors had certified as life-threatening. The incidents had included beatings, an attempt to run the two women down with a car that had left the mother seriously injured and an assault in which the applicant was stabbed seven times. The incidents and the women’s fears for their lives had been repeatedly brought to the authorities’ attention. Although criminal proceedings had been brought against the husband for a range of offences, including death threats, serious assault and attempted murder, in at least two instances they were discontinued after the women withdrew their complaints, allegedly under pressure from the husband. However, in view of the seriousness of the injuries, the proceedings in respect of the running down and stabbing incidents continued to trial. The husband was convicted in both cases. For the first offence, he received a three-month prison sentence, which was later commuted to a fine, and for the second, a fine payable in instalments. The violence culminated in the fatal shooting of the applicant’s mother, an act the husband said he carried out to protect his honour. For that offence, he was convicted of murder in 2008 and sentenced to life imprisonment. He was, however, released pending appeal and renewed his threats against the applicant, who sought the authorities’ protection. It was not until seven months later, following a request for information from the European Court, that measures were taken to protect her.

Inter-American Court of Human Rights Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico.; 2009. Publisher's VersionAbstract

http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/women/decisions/ia_court_hr.asp

In its 2009 judgment in the Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, the Court held Mexico to be responsible for human rights violations based on the handling of investigations into disappearances and deaths of women and girls in Ciudad Juárez. The state's actions, the court opined, contributed to the atmosphere of impunity surrounding the maltreatment of women in the city.

CEDAW. Case of Dayras, et al. v. France. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); 2009. Publisher's VersionAbstract

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/jurisprudence.htm

CEDAW/C/44/D/13/2007

The parties to Dayras, et al. v. France (C/44/D/13/2007) are Michèle Dayras, Nelly Campo-Trumel, Sylvie Delange, Frédérique Remy-Cremieu, Micheline Zeghouani, Hélène Muzard-Fekkar and Adèle Daufrene-Levrard, seven French nationals who are represented by SOS Sexisme, an organization based in Issy-les- Moulineaux, France. They claim to be victims of a violation by France of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. The Convention and its Optional Protocol entered into force for the State party on 13 January 1984 and 9 September 2000, respectively. A reservation was entered by France on ratification to article 16, paragraph 1 (g), of the Convention. 

CEDAW. Case of G.D. and S.F. v. France. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); 2009. Publisher's VersionAbstract

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/jurisprudence.htm

CEDAW/C/44/D/12/2007

The plaintiffs in G.D. and S.F. v. France (C/44/D/12/2007) who were automatically given their fathers’ last names pursuant to a customary law, despite being raised exclusively by their mothers, challenged the law as discriminating between the rights of husband and wife guaranteed under Article 16 of the Convention; the Committee held that the authors had no basis for invoking Article 16, because they themselves were not married and had no children. 

G.D. and S.F. v. France.; 2009. Publisher's VersionAbstract

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/jurisprudence.htm

The authors are two French women who are unmarried and have no children. Both authors were automatically given their father’s last name pursuant to a customary rule in force at the time of their birth.

Although the authors were abandoned by their fathers by an early age, raised exclusively by their mothers, and used their mother’s family name unofficially, they continue to be officially registered under their father’s family name. On 26 May 2006, after unsuccessfully pursuing a number of administrative procedures at the domestic level, the authors appealed to the Committee under Article 16(1), which requires non-discrimination between the rights of husband and wife, including the right to choose a family name and to transmit the family name to children.

The Committee, while acknowledging the hardship encountered by the authors, held the communication inadmissible because the authors did not qualify as victims under the meaning of Article 2 of the Optional Protocol. Since both women were unmarried, did not live in husband-and-wife relationships, and did not have children, they could not assert their rights under Article 16 of the Convention, whose beneficiaries are only married women, women living in de facto union, or mothers.

2008
CEDAW. Case of Zheng v. The Netherlands. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); 2008. Publisher's VersionAbstract

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/jurisprudence.htm

CEDAW/C/42/D/15/2007

Zhen Zhen Zheng (ZZZ), a Chinese national, was trafficked to the Netherlands for the purposes prostitution.  In April 2003, after escaping and after being put out on the street by a woman who took her in and forced her to do heavy housework, ZZZ applied for asylum in the Netherlands.   ZZZ was pregnant at the time of her asylum application.    

In May 2003, Dutch authorities dismissed ZZZ’s asylum claim because ‘she could not give details about her trip from China to the Netherlands, did not have identity documents and waited for eight months before applying for asylum.’  Subsequent appeals proved unsuccessful.

In January 2007, ZZZ submitted a communication to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee) in which she claimed that the Netherlands had violated her rights in article 6 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). 

2007
CEDAW. Case of Muñoz Vargas y Sainz de Vicuña v. Spain. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); 2007. Publisher's VersionAbstract

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/jurisprudence.htm

CEDAW/C/39/D/7/2005

Following the death of the Count of Bulnes, Cristina Muñoz-Vargas y Sainz de Vicuña (CMV), the Count’s first-born child, instituted legal proceedings in Spain challenging the succession of her younger brother to the title of nobility.  Under the Decree on the Order of Succession to Titles of Nobility, which was then in effect in Spain, a woman was entitled to inherit a title of nobility only if she was the first-born child and did not have a younger brother.  Male children were given primacy over female children in the ordinary line of succession in all other situations. 

CMV claimed that male primacy in the order of succession to titles of nobility was discriminatory and, therefore, unconstitutional.  Domestic courts dismissed her claim on the ground that the primacy afforded to male children was compatible with the constitutional rights to non-discrimination and equality, owing to the honorary and historic nature of titles and because the brother’s succession to the title of Count of Bulnes occurred prior to the commencement of the Spanish Constitution.  

The author subsequently submitted a communication to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (Committee) in which she claimed that male primacy in the order of succession to titles of nobility constituted discrimination on the basis of sex, in violation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in general, and articles 2(c) and 2(f) in particular.  She further claimed that Spain was required by CEDAW to amend or revise its laws establishing male primacy in the order of succession to titles of nobility.

 

CEDAW. Case of N.S.F. v. the U.K. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); 2007. Publisher's VersionAbstract

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/jurisprudence.htm

CEDAW/C/38/D/10/2005

Ms. N.S.F. was a Pakistani asylum seeker living in the UK with her two children. In 1996 she married and had two sons resulting from this union. Shortly after, her husband began subjecting her to domestic violence. She endured marital rape and eventually divorced her husband in August 2002. She subsequently fled to a nearby village with her two sons where she continued to be harassed by her ex-husband after the divorce causing her to move two more times. She reported him to the police but did not receive any protection. In January 2003, the author’s ex-husband came to her home with other men armed with knives and threatened to kill her. After this incident, the author decided to flee the country and arrived in the United Kingdom, transiting through Cairo, Egypt, on 14 January 2003 with her two children, and applied for asylum the same day. In February the Immigration and Nationality Directorate of the Home Office rejected the author’s asylum application. The author appealed, claiming that her removal would be a violation of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. She asserted that she had a well-founded fear of persecution by a non-state agent, under the 1951 Convention, due to her membership in a particular social group (women in Pakistan); that Pakistan did not offer her sufficient protection; that there was no real option of internal flight; and that article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was violated. 

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